1 The appellant wife (“Wife”) in this case had been ordered, in an earlier action commenced by the respondent husband (“Husband”) in the General Division of the High Court (“GDHC”), to deliver up vacant possession of a property which the Husband was declared to be the sole legal and beneficial owner (“Property”). The Wife contends, however, that notwithstanding the Husband’s established ownership, the enforcement of his property rights ought to be tempered under s 56 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Charter”).

2 The parties were married on 19 September 2019. ¹ This was the second marriage for both of the parties, who had been divorcees at the time of their marriage with children from their previous marriages. The Husband has a 25-year-old son from his first marriage, while the Wife has two daughters (aged 20 and 17 respectively) from her first marriage. ² The Wife receives monthly child maintenance of $3,866 from her former husband, who is the biological father of the Wife’s daughters. ³ The Husband and the Wife do not have any children as between each other. ⁴ The Husband is gainfully employed, whereas the Wife asserts that she is presently unable to work by reason of her medical condition. ⁵

3 The Property had been purchased by the Husband during his first marriage and transferred into his sole name after his divorce. ⁶ The Wife and her daughters have been residing at the Property with the Husband since at least 24 August 2020. ⁷ The Wife separately owns a Housing Development Board flat (“HDB Flat”) in her sole name. ⁸

4 The parties’ relationship appears to have broken down sometime during the COVID-19 lockdown. ⁹ Sometime in September 2022, the Wife locked the Husband out of the Property by changing the locks on the front gate without informing him. ¹⁰ This was not disputed by the Wife in the court below.

5 The Husband’s attempts to resolve the differences between himself and the Wife proved to be unsuccessful. He was unable to gain access to the Property. ¹¹ Subsequently, on 19 December 2024, the Husband filed HC/OA 1326/2024 (“OA 1326”) in the GDHC seeking a declaration that he is the sole legal and beneficial owner of the Property. He also sought orders that: (a) he be permitted to enter the Property to retrieve his personal belongings; (b) the Wife and her daughters vacate from the Property; (c) the Wife deliver up vacant possession of the Property to him; and (d) the Wife reimburse him the sum of $1,050 for costs and expenses incurred in his failed attempts to re-enter the Property. ¹²

6 The Wife argued that OA 1326 ought to be dismissed as the Property was a “matrimonial home” and the GDHC was “not the proper forum for the determination of [its] ownership”. ¹³ The Wife also argued, inter alia, that she had an equitable interest in the Property by virtue of a common intention constructive trust. ¹⁴

7 On 30 April 2025, while OA 1326 remained pending, the Wife entered into a tenancy agreement to lease out her HDB Flat for two years at a monthly rent of $3,300 from 1 May 2025 to 30 April 2027. ¹⁵

8 OA 1326 was heard by Justice Vinodh Coomaraswamy on 8 July 2025. The learned judge dismissed the arguments pursued by the Wife and entered the following orders in HC/ORC 4748/2025 (“ORC 4748”) in favour of the Husband: ¹⁶

9 Subsequently, on 14 October 2025, the Wife filed HC/SUM 3004/2025 (“SUM 3004”), seeking a stay of execution of ORC 4748 “pending the determination and disposal of the [parties’] divorce and the ancillary matters”. ¹⁷ She also sought an “extension of time” for the delivery up of vacant possession of the Property until the disposal of the parties’ divorce and the ancillary matters. ¹⁸ The following day, 15 October 2025, the Wife filed for divorce against the Husband in FC/OAD 5374/2025 (“OAD 5374”). ¹⁹ OAD 5374 remains at a nascent stage, with no interim judgment having been granted.

10 Following a hearing on 6 November 2025, Coomaraswamy J granted a stay in HC/ORC 6968/2025 (“ORC 6968”) on the following terms: ²⁰

11 Thereafter, on 20 November 2025, the Wife filed FC/SUM 2808/2025 (“SUM 2808”) for an order granting her and her daughters: (a) “a right of exclusive occupation and/or exclusive possession”; or (b) in the alternative, “a right of occupation and possession” of the Property until such time as the ancillary matters of her divorce in OAD 5374 have been conclusively determined (inclusive of any and all appeals). The learned district judge (“DJ”) dismissed SUM 2808 on 15 May 2026, setting out her grounds of decision in YEC v YED [2026] SGFC 73 (“GD”). The Wife now appeals against that decision.

12 I dismiss the appeal for the reasons set out below.

13 The DJ began her analysis by dismissing the Wife’s claim for “exclusive occupation” and/or “exclusive possession”, noting that none of her arguments supported such an entitlement (GD at [13]). The DJ then turned to consider the Wife’s argument that s 56 of the Charter permits her to “remain resident at the [Property]”, which she claimed to be the “matrimonial home”, pending the determination of the ancillary matters of her divorce (GD at [12(a)]). The DJ noted that the GDHC had already adjudicated on the question as to the title and possession of the Property in OA 1326, and held that s 56 of the Charter did not confer on the court the power to reorder the proprietary interests in the Property (GD at [20] and [23]). The DJ, however, accepted that the court has a “limited discretion” under s 56 of the Charter to “consider how and whether the exercise of rights by the owner-spouse over the property should be deferred until at least some provision for the other spouse has been made” (GD at [24]–[25] and [17]–[18]). Nevertheless, the DJ held that the existence of this discretion did not assist the Wife, given that the GDHC had “already exercised its discretion in deciding how to enforce the rights of ownership of the Husband” in OA 1326 by granting the Wife a period of three months to hand over vacant possession of the Property. Further, the DJ reasoned that she would not have exercised her discretion in favour of the Wife under s 56 of the Charter based on the facts of this case (GD at [25]–[26]).

14 The DJ next dismissed the Wife’s argument that she had “beneficial proprietary rights” to the Property “by operation of law” owing to its alleged status as a “matrimonial asset” under s 112(10) of the Charter (GD at [12(b)] and [29]). She also dismissed the Wife’s argument that she had an equitable proprietary interest in the Property by virtue of a constructive trust (GD at [12(c)]). That issue had been fully and finally determined by the GDHC in OA 1326 and was res judicata (GD at [38]–[39]).

15 Finally, the DJ considered the Wife’s argument that she had “an equitable personal right against the Husband not to be removed from the matrimonial home” on the basis of the doctrine of the deserted wife’s equity (GD at [43]). While the DJ observed that the applicability of this doctrine was “questionable in today’s context”, she nonetheless opined that its objective, which is “to ensure that the wife has a roof over her head”, could also be considered by the court in deciding whether to exercise its discretion under s 56 of the Charter. The DJ held that the doctrine did not, in any event, take the Wife’s case any further (GD at [45]). Having rejected all the arguments advanced by the Wife in SUM 2808, the DJ dismissed the application in its entirety.

16 On appeal, the Wife contends that the DJ had erred in declining to exercise her discretion under s 56 of the Charter to defer the enforcement of the Husband’s rights over the Property. ²¹

17 Her main arguments may be summarised as follows. First, she submits that the DJ erred in treating the court’s discretion under s 56 as having been “effectively spent” by the GDHC’s order in ORC 4748 (vide OA 1326), which granted her a period of three months to hand over vacant possession to the Husband (see [8] above). ²² The Wife argues that this resulted in the express reference to an application under s 56 of the Charter in the GDHC’s subsequent order in ORC 6968 (vide SUM 3004) to be of “no practical purpose”. ²³

18 Second, the Wife argues that the DJ erred in failing to determine, or “at least giv[e] operative weight” to, “the evidence that the [Property] functioned as the matrimonial and family home”. ²⁴ On this point, the Wife asserts that she had paid for “extensive renovations” to the Property on the understanding that it was to be the matrimonial home. ²⁵ She also points to the fact that she had been residing at the Property with her daughters since November 2018. ²⁶ On that basis, the Wife argues that her application “engages family-law considerations” and should not be viewed as “ordinary enforcement between strangers”. ²⁷

19 Third, the Wife argues that the DJ placed “insufficient weight” on the “countervailing” facts that: (a) her HDB Flat is subject to a tenancy until 30 April 2027, the rental income of which is required to sustain herself and her daughters given that she does not have any income; (b) she has been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and depression, resulting in her being declared “temporarily unfit for work”; (c) her daughters have been residing at the Property for years and “remained in education”; and (d) the Husband had “already left the [Property] of his own accord” and was residing elsewhere. ²⁸ She submits that these facts “pointed strongly toward[s] temporary relief”, which the DJ ought to have considered (or given more weight to) in exercising her discretion under s 56 of the Charter. ²⁹

20 Fourth, the Wife argues that the DJ adopted “too narrow an approach” to the doctrine of the deserted wife’s equity. ³⁰ She argues that the existence of the doctrine supports the proposition that the court may “temper immediate enforcement of ownership rights where necessary to avoid leaving the non-owner spouse without practical accommodation pending matrimonial determination or other provision”. ³¹

21 Lastly, the Wife submits that she is not seeking to “reopen” the GDHC’s declaration that it is the Husband who owns the Property. She submits that the grant of “interim occupation relief” under s 56 of the Charter does not contradict the GDHC’s declaration of the Husband’s ownership, and that the GDHC had expressly envisaged such an application being made when ordering the stay in SUM 3004. ³²

22 The Husband, on the other hand, submits that the DJ did not err in refusing to grant the Wife continued occupation and/or possession of the Property under s 56 of the Charter pending the determination of the ancillary matters of the parties’ divorce. ³³ First, the Husband submits that s 56 does not empower the court to “create” an “independent right of occupation or possession” in favour of the Wife. ³⁴ As the GDHC had conclusively determined the parties’ proprietary rights to the Property in OA 1326, there is “no subsisting dispute” concerning title to, or possession of, the Property which s 56 of the Charter may apply to. ³⁵

23 Second, the Husband also submits that the DJ did not err in declining to exercise her discretion under s 56 of the Charter to grant the Wife occupation and/or possession of the Property, for the reasons set out in her GD (at [25]–[27]). ³⁶ The Husband does not dispute the DJ’s conclusion that the court has a “narrow” and “limited” discretion under s 56 to “defer the exercise” of the owner-spouse’s rights to property “at least until some provision [for] the other spouse has been made”. ³⁷ He submits, however, that the circumstances raised by the Wife do not warrant its exercise:

(a) First, permitting the Wife to remain in occupation would “constitute a substantial interference with [his] property rights in the [Property]”, which is solely owned and paid for by the Husband. ³⁸

(b) Second, the Wife had made no financial contributions towards the acquisition of the Property. ³⁹

(c) Third, the Wife has her own fully paid-up three-room flat (ie, the HDB Flat), ⁴⁰ which she had chosen to lease to a third party “despite being fully aware of the proceedings in OA 1326”. The Wife’s claims that she will lack alternative accommodation if her application in SUM 2808 were to be dismissed is therefore said to be “self-induced”. ⁴¹

(d) Fourth, the Wife’s temporary inability to work (which the Husband disputes), without more, does not establish “financial hardship”. ⁴² The Husband further points to the monthly child maintenance that the Wife receives from her former husband for her two daughters, as well as the rental income she receives from her HDB Flat. ⁴³

24 The Husband therefore submits that the Wife has not established any “exceptional or equitable circumstances” justifying the exercise of the court’s discretion under s 56 of the Charter to interfere with his proprietary rights over the Property. ⁴⁴ He submits that it would be particularly prejudicial for him to be excluded from residing in his own property, while the Wife continues to occupy it rent-free and simultaneously receives rental income from her HDB Flat. ⁴⁵ Moreover, the period of three months which the GDHC had granted to the Wife in OA 1326 to deliver up vacant possession of the Property provided ample time for her to vacate and make alternative arrangements for accommodation. ⁴⁶

25 Finally, the Husband submits that the DJ did not err in not applying the doctrine of the deserted wife’s equity. He submits that the doctrine was never intended to be “wielded as a sword by a party who has excluded the other co-owner from his own property”, and that there are no factual or equitable considerations for its application in the present case. ⁴⁷

26 The issue that arises in this appeal is whether the DJ erred in declining to grant the Wife and her daughters a right to remain on the Property pending the conclusive determination of the ancillary matters in OAD 5374.

27 It is necessary to draw a distinction between possession and occupation, as that distinction clarifies the subject matter of the Wife’s claim under s 56 of the Charter. The use and enjoyment of property, including the occupation of realty, has been said to be “an incident of ownership of the particular property” (see Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore: Family Law vol 11 (LexisNexis, 2026) (“Halsbury’s Laws”) at para 130.748 and Leong Wai Kum, Elements of Family Law in Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2018) (“Leong (2018)”) at para 14.116). To put it more precisely for present purposes, the right to occupy property is an incident of “possession”. Central to the concept of possession, which is a conclusion of law, is “the right to exclude all others from the property in question”, including the owner or other person with superior title (see Clarence House Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc [2010] 1 WLR 1216 at [32(2)], citing Manchester Airport plc v Dutton [2000] QB 133 at 142). This should be distinguished from “occupation”, which is a conclusion of fact denoting the idea of a bare physical occupancy of land (Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Land Law (Oxford University Press, 7th Ed, 2011) (“Gray & Gray”) at para 2–008; Chua June Ching Michelle v Chai Hoi Tong [2011] 4 SLR 418 at [12]). It follows that once an owner-spouse is declared entitled to possession of a property as a matter of law, as is the case here for the Husband, that spouse is entitled to assert his possessory rights over the property and exclude the non-owner spouse from occupation.

28 The Wife’s prayer for a “right” of exclusive possession, or indeed any form of possession, is not sustainable under s 56 of the Charter. The proprietary and possessory rights to the Property have been conclusively determined by the GDHC in OA 1326 in favour of the Husband (see [8] above), and no appeal was filed by the Wife against that decision. By that determination, the Husband is entitled to assert his rights to the Property as against the world, including the Wife. As will be explained below, the court has no power under s 56(3)(a) of the Charter to grant or rearrange property rights determined in accordance with the principles of property law. In the face of the determination in OA 1326, what remains of the Wife’s case is a claim for a respite from the Husband’s enforcement of his rights as the owner of the Property, specifically, a claim to remain in occupation until the ancillary matters of the divorce have been conclusively disposed of. It is to that question that I now turn.

29 The crux of the Wife’s case is that the DJ did not correctly exercise her discretion under s 56 of the Charter. ⁴⁸ I turn to consider the scope and operation of s 56 of the Charter.

30 Section 56 of the Charter provides:

31 Section 56 of the Charter has its origins in s 12 of the Straits Settlements Married Women’s Property Ordinance (SS Ord No XI of 1902), which was in turn modelled on s 17 of the Married Women’s Property Act 1882 (c 75) (UK) (“MWPA”) (see Leong Wai Kum, Principles of Family Law in Singapore (Butterworths Asia, 1997) (“Leong (1997)”) at 804; see also Tan Evelyn v Tan Lim Tai [1971–1973] SLR(R) 771 (“Evelyn Tan”) at [9]). Section 17 of the MWPA provides:

32 Prior to 30 December 2022, the date when the amendments to the Charter effected by the Women’s Charter (Amendment) Act 2022 (Act 3 of 2022) (“2022 Amendments”) came into force, s 59 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“2022 Charter”) provided as follows:

33 The 2022 Amendments rearranged the contents of s 59 of the 2022 Charter into the form which s 56 of the Charter now takes. While the Explanatory Statement of the Women’s Charter (Amendment) Bill (Bill No 43/2021) explained that the amendment was part of the repeal and re-enactment of Part 6 of the 2022 Charter to “restate and rationalise the rights and duties of husbands and wives and related matters”, the specific sentence dealing with s 59 of the 2022 Charter simply stated that s 56 of the Charter “re-enacts” s 59. This suggests that there is no difference in substance between the words “the court may … make any order”, “the court may make such order … as [it] thinks fit” and “the judge … may make such order … as he thinks fit” in s 56(3)(a) of the Charter, s 59 of the 2022 Charter and s 17 of the MWPA, respectively. The authorities decided with reference to the earlier formulations therefore apply with equal force to s 56 of the Charter in its present form.

34 Section 56 of the Charter, as its title states, provides for a summary procedure for the determination of disputes between spouses as to title or possession of any property, and the enforcement of the rights so determined between them (see Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777 (“Pettitt v Pettitt”) at 820D–E, cited in PQR v STR [1992] 3 SLR(R) 744 (“PQR v STR”) at [8] and Evelyn Tan at [18]). Property disputes may be brought in the District Courts or the GDHC under their general civil jurisdiction. Spouses have an additional avenue for the resolution of such disputes by way of a summary application under s 56 of the Charter. Applications under s 56, being proceedings under the Charter, are “family proceedings” within the definition of that term in s 2(1) of the Family Justice Act 2014 (2020 Rev Ed) (“FJA”). By virtue of s 26(2) read with s 26(3A) of the FJA, such applications are heard in the first instance by a Family Court, as was the case here. These two avenues for the resolution of property disputes are distinct; the general civil jurisdiction provides the full suite of procedural mechanisms available in civil litigation, while s 56 provides a dedicated summary procedure for spouses that may be initiated “by summons or in any other summary way” (s 56(2) of the Charter) and “heard in chambers if either party so requires” (s 56(4)(a) of the Charter). The summary procedure reflects the scope of the court’s power under s 56 of the Charter, which applies only to disputes between spouses as to title or possession, and the enforcement of such rights as between them. 

35 Applications under s 56 of the Charter are determined by reference to the existing proprietary rights of the parties, ascertained according to orthodox principles of property law. These are propositions which are well-established in Singapore (see PQR v STR at [10]; Walker James Edward v Hong Geok Choo [1996] SGHC 87; Evelyn Tan at [18]; Lee Leh Hua v Yip Kok Leong [1999] 1 SLR(R) 554 at [26]; see also Leong Wai Kum, Marriage, Spouses and Assets (Academy Publishing, 2025) (“Leong (2025)”) at para 7.60). Like its English progenitor, ie, s 17 of the MWPA, s 56 of the Charter does not confer on the court the power to create, vary or reorder the proprietary rights of the parties according to its own notions of justice or equity (see Pettitt v Pettitt at 820D–E (per Lord Diplock), cited in PQR v STR at [8]). The court’s task is to “declare [those] proprietary rights as the general principles of property law dictate” (Halsbury’s Laws at para 130.723).

36 In the House of Lords’ decision of National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (“Ainsworth”), Lord Wilberforce observed that s 17 of the MWPA (the provision from which s 56 originated) has been “rightly” treated by the authorities as “conferring upon the court power, without disturbing established property rights, not to allow those rights to be fully enforced where to do so would run counter to the duties of one spouse to another” [emphasis added] (at 1246A–B). In Pettitt v Pettitt, Lord Diplock held that the words of s 17 of the MWPA confer on the courts “a wide discretion as to the enforcement of the proprietary or possessory rights of one spouse in any property against the other” (at 820E). Referring to these words, Professor Leong Wai Kum has expressed the view that the court has a discretion, where appropriate, to defer or restrict the exercise of the owner-spouse’s property rights (see Leong (2025) at paras 7.86–7.89; see also Leong (2018) at para 14.029), this being grounded in the rights that each spouse enjoys by virtue of their marital relationship. As the learned author puts it, the discretion is “not broad” (see Leong (2025) at para 7.88). I respectfully agree. The basis for this discretion finds its justification in s 46(a) of the Charter, which provides that spouses are “mutually bound to cooperate with each other” in “safeguarding the interests of the union” (Leong (2018) at para 14.118; see also Ainsworth at 1247C–D and 1236C). Recognising this discretion is consistent with the prevailing judicial view of marriage as “an equal co-operative partnership of efforts” (NK v NL [2007] 3 SLR(R) 743 at [20]).

37 In empowering the court to “make any order … with respect to the property in dispute”, s 56(3)(a) of the Charter confers on the court a discretion as to the enforcement of the proprietary or possessory rights of one spouse in any property against the other once those rights have been determined. This discretion enables the court to determine the manner and timing of giving effect to the property rights it has declared in accordance with orthodox principles of property law, so as to moderate the practical consequences of their enforcement as between spouses. It does not empower the court to transfer any proprietary interest in property from one spouse to the other or to create new proprietary rights (PQR v STR at [8], citing Lord Diplock in Pettitt v Pettitt at 820D–E). In determining the terms of enforcement, the court may have regard to all the circumstances of the case. The marital relationship of the parties is relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion, given the context in which the discretion is exercised. That relationship carries with it duties and obligations that spouses owe to each other and to the children of the marriage, which are recognised and given effect by the Charter itself, and may inform how, and when, an owner spouse’s established rights are enforced, so as to account for the genuine and evidenced needs of the parties and their children, and to avoid a manifestly unjust outcome. But, as the discretion is one as to enforcement, it cannot be exercised to override or reorder the declared rights themselves. What the court does in the exercise of its discretion under s 56 pertains only to how the owner spouse asserts his or her rights as against the other spouse, and does not disturb the owner spouse’s rights as against any other party. In each case, the object of the discretion is to ensure an orderly transition, with the discretion going to the fixing of a specified period that provides a reasonable time and opportunity to make the necessary arrangements for alternative accommodation or to obtain the appropriate remedy. It is therefore a narrow one.

38 In exercising its discretion under s 56 of the Charter, a determinative consideration is whether the interval allowed in the course of enforcement is objectively referable to ensuring an orderly transition for the family, having regard to the genuine and evidenced needs of the parties and their children. Such an interval is a practical incident of enforcement. It is a matter of fixing a date by reference to what that transition requires, such as time to secure alternative accommodation or to apply for appropriate reliefs such as maintenance. It follows that the discretion under s 56(3)(a) cannot be invoked for the mere convenience of the non-owner spouse, out of a preference to enjoy the use of the property rent-free, or to gain negotiating leverage in the ancillary proceedings.

39 Applying these principles, the Wife’s claim must fail. Her claim to a right to remain in occupation until the ancillary matters have been conclusively determined (inclusive of any and all appeals) bears no resemblance to what may constitute a reasonable transitional period for the Husband’s recovery of possession of the Property. It is pegged to the completion of future litigation, open-ended and measured not by the needs of an orderly transition but by the Wife’s own strategy in her divorce litigation. On the facts of this case, there may also be a risk of incentivising delay in proceedings, since a party who occupies rent-free has little reason to bring them to a swift conclusion. What the Wife seeks, properly characterised and stripped of the language of adjusting the manner and timing of enforcement, is a suspension of the Husband’s possessory rights to the Property for a duration of her own choosing, and not a regulation of enforcement at all. That falls outside the scope of s 56(3)(a) of the Charter. I accordingly find the Wife’s contention that the DJ did not correctly exercise her discretion to be unfounded.

40 I turn now to deal with the parties’ arguments proper. The Wife’s first argument is that the DJ had erred in treating the court’s discretion under s 56 of the Charter as having been effectively “exhausted” by Coomaraswamy J’s order in ORC 4748 (see [17] above). ⁴⁹

41 In my judgment, this argument is without merit. In deciding whether to exercise its discretion under s 56 of the Charter, the court is entitled to have regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case. The grant by Coomaraswamy J of a three-month period to hand over vacant possession to the Husband in ORC 4748 – made at the request of the Wife’s (former) counsel – is one such relevant circumstance. ⁵⁰ It is relevant because those three months already represents the regulation of the Husband’s possessory rights, deferred to the extent that the Wife’s transition to new accommodation would reasonably require. In any case, the DJ clearly explained why she would have declined to exercise her discretion to grant the further restriction the Wife sought on the Husband’s possessory rights even if “it could be argued that the [GDHC] had not expressly considered the issue of whether some provision had been made for the Wife before enforcing the Husband’s right of ownership in the [Property]” (GD at [25]). She considered that this was a short marriage, in which the Husband was excluded from the Property some three years into it. As noted by the DJ, the Wife has a property of her own, which she chose to rent out notwithstanding having been put on notice, by the Husband’s filing of OA 1326, that she might be required to vacate the Property and move into her HDB Flat. The Husband, by contrast, has been kept out of his own property since September 2022, and has had to live elsewhere throughout (GD at [25]–[26]). I see no reason to interfere with the DJ’s decision.

42 The Wife’s second submission is that the DJ had failed to determine or “giv[e] operative weight” to “the evidence that the [Property] functioned as the matrimonial and family home”. ⁵¹ In support of this, the Wife points to how she had paid for “extensive renovations” amounting to $200,000 to the Property. ⁵² I am unable to accept the Wife’s argument. The DJ had made it clear that she declined to make any finding as to whether the Property was a matrimonial asset and/or that it was the parties’ matrimonial home. She had also made it equally clear that her views remained the same even if the Property was found to be a matrimonial asset and/or matrimonial home (see GD at [37(f)]).

43 Further, as the Husband has pointed out, ⁵³ the GDHC had accepted the Husband’s submission that the payments for those renovations had been made “wholly or substantially” by the Husband. ⁵⁴ The Wife did not appeal against those findings. In any event, the issue as to who had in fact paid for the renovation expenses is neither here nor there. If the Wife’s argument is advanced for the purposes showing that the Property is a “matrimonial asset” as defined under s 112(10)(a)(ii) of the Charter, that, in my view, would be a misconceived attempt to litigate matters which are more properly within the province of the ancillary matters hearing. Issues pertaining to the parties’ respective contributions and entitlements are more appropriately reserved for the court hearing the ancillary matters of their divorce. The discretion under s 56(3) of the Charter cannot be extended to trespass upon the jurisdiction to divide matrimonial assets under s 112 of the Charter. Indeed, the Wife herself takes the position that she is not asking the court to “divide matrimonial assets under s 112 at this stage”. ⁵⁵ She argues, however, that the court “should not permit the immediate eviction” of the Wife “in a way that would make the pending matrimonial proceedings practically hollow in respect of accommodation and home stability”. ⁵⁶ It is difficult to see how that will be so. She will be entitled to her share of the pool of matrimonial assets at the relevant time, and whether she continues to occupy the Property has little bearing (if any) on those entitlements (see Ho Kiang Fah v Toh Buan [2009] 3 SLR(R) 398 at [16]). For these reasons, I dismiss the Wife’s argument on this ground.

44 Next, the Wife raises the fact that her solely owned HDB Flat is subject to a tenancy that lasts until 30 April 2027, and claims that the rental income from her HDB Flat is necessary to sustain herself and her daughters given that she does not have any income. It is a matter of fact that the Wife had entered into the tenancy agreement for the HDB Flat on 30 April 2025, after OA 1326 had been commenced on 19 December 2024. By that time, the Wife would have known that her continued occupation in the Property was no longer certain, in light of the orders that the Husband was seeking in OA 1326. She nevertheless chose to rent out the HDB Flat. These considerations had been taken into account by the DJ in declining to exercise her discretion to make further provision for the Wife beyond the three months that the GDHC had already granted to her (GD at [25]–[26]). The Wife is also receiving monthly rental income of $3,300, in addition to monthly child maintenance of $3,866 from her former husband. It is therefore likely that the Wife has the means to find alternative accommodation for herself and her children, notwithstanding the fact that she is presently unable to move into the HDB Flat.

45 As for the Wife’s claim that she is unfit to work, I note that the medical certificates and opinions exhibited to her affidavit in support of SUM 2808 do not provide information about her condition and fitness to work that sufficiently supports her claim. ⁵⁷ She has also adduced no evidence to show that her unfitness is or is likely to be permanent; the medical certificates exhibited to her affidavit only reflects her unfitness for work to be temporary in nature. ⁵⁸ I therefore reject the Wife’s argument that the DJ had erred by failing to accord sufficient weight to the fact that she was unfit to work.

46 The discretion under s 56 of the Charter is not a means for the Wife to manage her financial affairs, nor a substitute for any other recourse that may be available to her. Relief directed at addressing living expenses, maintenance being the obvious example, cannot be obtained through the back door of s 56 of the Charter. What must be applied for and proven through proper legal process cannot be circumvented by invoking that provision.

47 In relation to the Wife’s argument that the Husband had “already left the [Property] of his own accord” and is residing elsewhere, it lies ill in the Wife’s mouth to claim that this fact should count against the Husband in the exercise of the court’s discretion, seeing as how her actions in changing the locks of the Property had prevented him from returning when he attempted to do so in September 2022.

48 The Wife also relies on the deserted wife’s equity in support of her contention that the court ought to exercise its discretion under s 56 of the Charter to defer the enforcement of the Husband’s proprietary rights.

49 The deserted wife’s equity refers to the personal right of a deserted wife to remain in occupation of the matrimonial home following her husband’s desertion, despite having no legal or beneficial interest in the relevant property (see Gurasz v Gurasz [1970] P 11 (“Gurasz v Gurasz”) at 16C–G; see also UJT v UJR [2018] 4 SLR 931 (“UJT v UJR”) at [67], citing Ainsworth). It is a right against a person, not property, and does not of itself create or vary any proprietary interest in the relevant property (Ainsworth at 1245B).

50 The development of the deserted wife’s equity in the United Kingdom was closely tied to s 17 of the MWPA, which provided a procedural vehicle to give effect to a wife’s right to remain in occupation of the family home. The court could tailor its orders to restrain or postpone the husband’s enforcement of his property rights, including by the grant of injunctions (see Ainsworth at 1233B–C).

51 The deserted wife’s equity appears to have emerged in response to the social issues in the United Kingdom of deserted wives and the housing shortage during the post-war period (see Peter Walton, “The ‘Deserted Wife’s Equity’ – Forged in the Black Country” (2019) 3 Wolverhampton Law Journal 61 at 61). This was alluded to by Lord Wilberforce in Ainsworth at 1241C–E:

52 It is rooted in an era when the basis for divorce was the matrimonial offence theory. Under this theory, divorce was seen as a form of legal relief granted to an innocent spouse when the other had committed a matrimonial offence, with the petitioning spouse being required to prove the commission of the offence to the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt (see, on the standard of proof, Koh Teng Lam v Koh Chen Chee Elsie [1974–1976] SLR(R) 510 at [18]–[35] and Leong (1997) at 705). It has been explained that the deserted wife’s equity “only arose when the husband left the wife in circumstances amounting to committing the matrimonial offence of desertion” (Leong (1997) at 832).

53 In this case, the Wife has not established that the deserted wife’s equity is in any way engaged on the facts. All that the Wife has put forward is the fact of the parties’ separation. By her own conduct in changing the locks, she excluded the Husband from the Property. The Wife has not addressed, let alone shown, that her current circumstances fall within the deserted wife’s equity. The doctrine is simply not engaged on these facts, and that is a complete answer to her reliance on it.

54 Given that the Wife did not establish that her circumstances fall within the equity, it is unnecessary to consider the standing of the doctrine in Singapore. I would add only that I am not persuaded by the Wife’s submission that the doctrine was endorsed in UJT v UJR. ⁵⁹ The learned Judge in that case proceeded on the basis that Ainsworth represented “the position at common law in Singapore”, this being a position which the “parties appear[ed] to accept” (at [67]). It appears that the Judge did not receive full arguments on the applicability of the doctrine before concluding that, in any case, the deserted wife’s equity could not be relied upon on the facts before her, as the husband there had passed away, resulting in the termination of the marriage (at [68]).

55 For completeness, I also agree with the DJ that there is no need to rely on the doctrine as a distinct source of rights to found a discretion as to the enforcement of an owner-spouse’s property rights against the non-owner spouse. Section 56(3)(a) of the Charter is broad enough to enable the court to exercise its discretion to moderate, in an appropriate case, the enforcement of an owner-spouse’s property rights, having regard to the duties and obligations that spouses owe to each other and to their children. Indeed, that discretion is not one that operates only in favour of wives; it applies symmetrically as between spouses, and is equally capable of regulating the enforcement of a wife’s property rights against a husband, where that is required to ensure a proper transition for the family, taking into account the genuine and evidenced needs of the parties and their children.

56 For the reasons above, I dismiss the appeal. Parties are granted liberty to seek consequential orders.

57 Costs are to be agreed; otherwise, written submissions on costs, limited to five pages each, are to be filed within seven working days after the date of this judgment.