1 Trustees in bankruptcy play an important role in our bankruptcy regime. These trustees not only administer bankrupts’ estates, but are also responsible for supervising the conduct and affairs of these bankrupts. While this role has traditionally been undertaken by the Official Assignee (“OA”), legislative amendments in recent years have heralded a shift towards a bankruptcy regime that is primarily administered by private trustees in bankruptcy (ie, licensed insolvency practitioners appointed by the Court as trustees), with the OA taking on more of a regulatory role. In particular, the passing of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution (Amendment) Bill in 2023 mandated the appointment of private trustees in bankruptcy in all bankruptcy cases, save for cases where the OA consents to be appointed as the trustee in bankruptcy: see s 36(2) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IRDA”).

2 The management of bankrupts’ estates by these private trustees in bankruptcy involves an inherently adversarial process. On the one hand, a bankrupt will want, among other things, minimal monthly or annual pay-outs. On the other hand, creditors will be looking to maximise recovery of the debts owed to them. The private trustee will therefore need to balance the interests of both the bankrupt and his creditors, so as to ensure a fair and judicious outcome for both parties in the administration of the estate. The corollary to this is that conflicts may arise between the private trustee, the bankrupt and/or the creditors: Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (9 January 2023) vol 95 (Edwin Tong Chun Fai, Minister for Culture, Community and Youth and Second Minister for Law). Indeed, complaints have been made by bankrupts to the OA against their private trustees since 2016, when a requirement was introduced for institutional creditors making bankruptcy applications to nominate private trustees in bankruptcy, rather than the OA, to administer the bankrupt’s estate.

3 Where such conflicts arise, what recourse does the bankrupt have under the IRDA? In particular, when can a bankrupt apply to Court to review conduct of the private trustee that he is dissatisfied with? Is the removal of the private trustee an available remedy? These questions arise squarely for determination in the present application.

4 I begin by setting out the relevant facts. Mr See Chuen Lim, Alvin (Shu Quanlin, Alvin) (the “Applicant”) filed a debtor’s bankruptcy application (HC/B 4364/2025) on 29 October 2025, seeking a bankruptcy order to be made against himself and for Mr Kanthosamy Rajendran (the “PTIB”) to be appointed as the trustee of his bankruptcy estate. On 20 November 2025, a bankruptcy order was made against the Applicant and the PTIB was appointed as the trustee of his estate.

5 Various disputes subsequently arose between the Applicant and the PTIB, which precipitated the filing of several applications by the Applicant.

6 On 21 January 2026, the Applicant filed HC/SUM 260/2026 (“SUM 260”), which was an application for the Court to grant the Applicant permission to travel overseas to visit his spouse’s immediate family in Vietnam. According to the Applicant, the PTIB had refused the request on the basis that the purpose of the trip was “social” in nature and there were therefore no compelling reasons for the request to be approved. ¹

7 On 30 January 2026, the Applicant filed HC/SUM 399/2026 (“SUM 399”). This was an application for the Court to review the monthly contributions and target contributions set by the PTIB on the basis that these sums were unsustainable in the light of the Applicant’s income and expenses.

8 On 24 February 2026, the Applicant indicated at a case management conference that he wished to withdraw SUM 260 as the PTIB confirmed that the Applicant’s request to travel to Vietnam had been subsequently approved. Permission to withdraw SUM 260 was granted by the Court.

9 SUM 399 was heard by a Judge on 20 March 2026. The Judge dismissed the application on the basis that there were no grounds to interfere with the PTIB’s determination of the Applicant’s monthly contributions and target contributions.

10 On 26 March 2026, the Applicant filed the present application (“SUM 940”) seeking the removal of the PTIB as his trustee in bankruptcy and the appointment of replacement trustees with immediate effect. At the end of the hearing of SUM 940 on 14 April 2026 (and after the Applicant and the PTIB had made their oral submissions), the Applicant indicated that he had not had the opportunity to file written submissions and that he wished to do so. Although it was clear to me that the hearing had proceeded on the basis that the Applicant was content to rely solely on his oral submissions, I allowed the Applicant a further opportunity to file his written submissions, keeping in mind that he was acting in person, and reserved my decision in SUM 940. The Applicant’s written submissions were thereafter filed on 20 April 2026. Further submissions were filed by the PTIB and the Applicant on 14 and 16 June 2026 respectively on the issue of a bankrupt’s standing to bring an application under s 43(1) of the IRDA.

11 The Applicant has commenced SUM 940 pursuant to s 43(1) of the IRDA, which enables a bankrupt to apply to Court for the review of any act, omission or decision by the trustee in bankruptcy and allows the Court to confirm, reverse or modify any act or decision of the trustee or, pertinently, to make any other order as the Court thinks fit. The Applicant relies on three “grounds” in support of his application for the removal of the PTIB:

(a) The PTIB’s failure to provide guidance to the Applicant when he received a notice from the Land Transport Authority (“LTA”) regarding road tax liabilities (“Notice”);

(b) The PTIB’s unreasonable and inconsistent refusal of the Applicant’s requests for overseas travel; and

(c) The sending of another bankrupt’s personal correspondence by the PTIB to the Applicant. ²

Taken together, the Applicant contends that there has been an “irreparable breakdown” of the working relationship between the PTIB and the Applicant and that the PTIB’s appointment is no longer compatible with the proper administration of the Applicant’s estate. ³

12 The PTIB, on the other hand, takes the position that SUM 940 should be dismissed. As a threshold matter, the PTIB argues that the Applicant has no standing to seek the removal of the PTIB pursuant to the IRDA and the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution (Personal Insolvency) Rules 2020 (“PIR”). On the three “grounds” raised by the Applicant, the PTIB contends that his decisions were reasonable and that, in any event, there would be minimal interaction between the PTIB and the Applicant from this point on in relation to the administration of the Applicant’s estate.

13 The following two issues arise for my determination in the present application:

(a) Whether the Applicant has standing to make an application under s 43(1) of the IRDA; and

(b) If so, whether the “grounds” raised by the Applicant warrant intervention by the Court pursuant to s 43(1) of the IRDA.

14 There are two distinct sub-issues pertaining to the question of standing.

15 The first is whether the Applicant is precluded from making an application seeking the removal of the PTIB under s 43(1) of the IRDA in the light of s 44 of the IRDA and reg 48(1) of the PIR. Section 44 of the IRDA – titled “Removal of trustee in bankruptcy” – provides that “[a] trustee in bankruptcy may be removed from office only by an order of the Court or by a general meeting of the bankrupt’s creditors summoned especially for that purpose in accordance with the regulations”; reg 48(1) of the PIR states that the OA or any creditor of a bankrupt may make an application to the Court for the removal of the trustee in bankruptcy.

16 The PTIB argues that the effect of s 44 of the IRDA and reg 48(1) of the PIR is that only the OA or a creditor of the bankrupt will have the standing to seek the removal of a private trustee in bankruptcy by way of an application to the Court. The Applicant, on the other hand, argues that these provisions do not prevent him from bringing an application under s 43(1) of the IRDA to review acts, omissions or decisions of the PTIB and to posit that the appropriate order to be made by the Court in response to the PTIB’s conduct should be for the removal of the PTIB. The Applicant submits that the power accorded to the Court under s 43(1) of the IRDA to “make such other order as the Court thinks fit” is broad enough to encompass an order to remove the PTIB.

17 In my view, s 44 of the IRDA and reg 48(1) of the PIR do not preclude the bringing of the present application by the Applicant as an application under s 43(1) of the IRDA. I agree with the PTIB that a bankrupt has no standing to bring a standalone application seeking the removal of a private trustee in bankruptcy under s 44 of the IRDA. It is clear from reg 48(1) of the PIR that only the OA or a creditor of the bankrupt may bring such an application. This does not mean, however, that the Court can make an order removing a private trustee in bankruptcy only upon an application by the OA or a creditor. On the contrary, s 43(1) of the IRDA confers broad powers and discretion on the Court to review the conduct of the private trustee: see Zhang Hong En Jonathan v Private Trustee in Bankruptcy of Zhang Hong’En Jonathan [2021] 4 SLR 139 (“Jonathan Zhang”) at [17] and [34]. The PTIB has not pointed me to any authorities which suggest that these powers under s 43(1) of the IRDA do not encompass the power to, in an appropriate case, remove a private trustee in bankruptcy. Accordingly, I do not think that there is any basis for such a limitation to be read into the scope of the Court’s powers in relation to a bankrupt’s application under s 43(1).

18 I draw further guidance on this issue from the English Court of Appeal’s observations in Greet and another v Rilett (11 March 1999) (UK) in relation to the provisions in the UK which are in pari materia to ss 43 and 44 of the IRDA. That case concerned, in part, an application for leave to appeal against a decision by the English High Court in an application by a bankrupt for, among other things, the removal of his trustee in bankruptcy. In respect of the English High Court’s decision to treat that application as an application under s 303 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) (“IA”) (which is in pari materia to s 43 of the IRDA), the English Court of Appeal observed:

19 These observations make clear that although the Court’s power to order the removal of a private trustee in bankruptcy is not extinguished simply because an application is brought under s 43 of the IRDA instead of s 44, s 43 should not be seen as a mechanism through which bankrupts may sneak applications for the removal of a private trustee through the backdoor, thereby bypassing the requirements on standing which apply to s 44. To do so would not only render these requirements nugatory, but also lose sight of the statutory objective underlying s 43(1) of the IRDA – which is to enable certain stakeholders in the bankruptcy process to invoke the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction in respect of conduct of the trustee that they are dissatisfied with and for such conduct to be corrected where necessary.

20 In other words, to say that a bankrupt is precluded from making an application under s 43(1) of the IRDA simply because the bankrupt posits that an appropriate order would be for the removal of the private trustee in bankruptcy would be to conflate the question of the appropriate remedy with the threshold question of whether the Court's jurisdiction has been properly invoked. In dealing with such an application, the Court needs to first decide (a) which acts, omissions or decisions of the private trustee the applicant is dissatisfied with, and (b) whether such conduct justifies intervention by the Court. It is only when an applicant can show that the relevant threshold for the Court to intervene under s 43(1) of the IRDA has been met will the Court consider what the appropriate order is and, where applicable, whether the removal of the private trustee is an appropriate order to make in the light of the complained-of conduct. The focus of s 43(1) is therefore not on the removal of the private trustee (even though this may be a potential order made by the Court), but on the private trustee’s allegedly objectionable conduct and whether (and if so, what) orders are necessary to remedy the effects of such conduct.

21 It is also for this reason that it would require, in my view, a truly exceptional case for the Court to make an order removing a private trustee in a s 43(1) application. This is because any orders made by the Court will generally be directed at remedying specific conduct of the private trustee – eg, by substituting the Court’s decision for a decision made by the private trustee or by directing the private trustee to take or refrain from taking a particular course of action (see s 43(1)(a) of the IRDA and Jonathan Zhang at [42]). The removal of the trustee altogether seems to me a far more drastic step. It follows that where the Court is minded to consider the removal of a trustee as an appropriate order in a s 43(1) application, it should satisfy itself not only that the threshold for intervention has been met, but also that the nature and gravity of the private trustee's conduct is such that no lesser order would adequately remedy the position.

22 The second sub-issue on standing is whether there are further restrictions on the Applicant’s standing to bring an application under s 43(1) of the IRDA. Save for the arguments made on the first issue above, the PTIB initially accepted that any decisions made by a private trustee in bankruptcy may be challenged in Court by the bankrupt or his creditors under s 43(1) of the IRDA. ⁴ However, this appeared to differ from the position as set out in the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Brake v Chedington Court Estate Ltd [2023] UKSC 29 (“Brake”), which outlines the current position in the UK on a bankrupt’s standing to apply under s 303(1) of the IA. The UK’s position is of potential relevance, given that s 43(1) of the IRDA was retained (in largely the same form) from s 40(1) of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 1995 Rev Ed) (“BA”), which was in turn adopted from s 303(1) of the IA: see Table of Derivations set out in the Bankruptcy Bill 1994.

23 In Brake, the UK Supreme Court explained that a bankrupt does not have unqualified standing to make an application under s 303(1) of the IA. Section 303 provides as follows:

While the wording of s 303(1) of the IA suggests that a bankrupt is entitled to make an application to the Court to review an act, omission or decision of a trustee, the UK Supreme Court held that the “express terms of [s 303 of the IA] are not, however, to be given a literal reading”. Instead, on both principle and authority, there are limitations on the persons who have standing to apply under this provision.

24 Specifically, for a bankrupt to establish his standing to apply under s 303(1) of the IA, he must show that there is or is likely to be a surplus of assets once all liabilities to creditors, and the costs and expenses of the bankruptcy, have been paid: see Brake at [9]. The reason for this is simple. Upon the bankruptcy order being made, all property belonging to the bankrupt will, with a few exceptions, vest in the Official Receiver or trustee of the estate. This means that the bankrupt will cease to have any beneficial interest in his former property from that point onward. As such, unless there is or is likely to be a surplus of assets, the bankrupt will have no legitimate interest in the administration of the estate and it should not matter to him how the estate is to be administered: see In re A Debtor, Ex p The Debtor v Dodwell (The Trustee) [1949] Ch 236 at 240. The bankrupt will therefore lack standing under s 303(1) to challenge the administration of the estate by the trustee: see Brake at [11].

25 However, even where there is no surplus or is not likely to be a surplus of assets, there may be exceptional circumstances in which a bankrupt will have standing under s 303(1) of the IA. Specifically, a bankrupt will have standing to challenge a trustee’s act, omission or decision under s 303(1) of the IA if they relate to a direct interest of the bankrupt which arises only by reason of the bankruptcy process (see Brake at [20], [32] and [74]). For example, a bankrupt applying to annul his bankruptcy may have a direct interest in the quantum of the trustee’s remuneration and legal fees and may apply under s 303(1) for them to be fixed by the Court, as the bankrupt would want the annulment to be obtained as cheaply as possible (see Engel v Peri [2002] EWHC 799 (Ch)).

26 In the light of these observations, I invited parties to submit further written submissions, if they wished, on the relevance of Brake to the issue of the Applicant’s standing to bring SUM 940 under s 43(1) of the IRDA. The PTIB takes the position that Brake is potentially relevant to the present case, given that s 303 of the IA is similar to s 43 of the IRDA, and submits that the Applicant has no standing to bring SUM 940 as he has not demonstrated that there would be a surplus after payment of all debts to the Applicant’s creditors. The Applicant, on the other hand, appears to accept that he has not shown that there would be a surplus, but argues that the present application concerns the exercise of powers that exist only by reason of the bankruptcy – namely, the PTIB’s powers to approve or refuse overseas travel and the PTIB’s duty to advise the Applicant on matters arising from the bankruptcy. These powers exist only because the Applicant is an undischarged bankrupt subject to the PTIB’s statutory authority.

27 Having considered the parties’ further submissions, and for the reasons below, I take the view that the proper interpretation of s 43(1) of the IRDA includes the further restrictions on standing which are set out in Brake.

28 The Court’s task when undertaking a purposive interpretation of a legislative provision involves the following three steps (see Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (“Tan Cheng Bock”) at [37]–[38]):

(a) First, ascertain the possible interpretations of the provision, having regard not just to the text of the provision but also to the context of that provision within the written law as a whole.

(b) Second, ascertain the legislative purpose or object of the statute.

(c) Third, compare the possible interpretations of the text against the purposes or objects of the statute.

29 I therefore begin by considering the possible interpretations of s 43(1) of the IRDA. Section 43(1) of the IRDA states that the OA, the bankrupt, any creditor of the bankrupt or any other person may make an application to the Court to review an act, omission or decision of the trustee in bankruptcy that he or she is dissatisfied with. The ordinary meaning of these words suggests that the named persons in s 43(1) possess unqualified standing to make an application under this provision. Such an interpretation would, however, lead to a manifestly impractical and unreasonable result. This would mean that even individuals who are wholly unconnected to the bankruptcy, and who therefore have no interest at all in the bankruptcy, may make an application under s 43(1) of the IRDA to challenge the conduct of the private trustee. It would also allow a bankrupt (or any of the other named persons) to apply to Court to challenge every act, omission or decision of the trustee in bankruptcy without qualification. This would require the private trustee to potentially answer to the bankrupt at every step of the bankruptcy process, thereby delaying and increasing the costs of the administration of the bankrupt’s estate. I am doubtful that Parliament could have intended for such a result: see Tan Cheng Bock at [38].

30 The alternative – and, in my view, better – interpretation of s 43(1) of the IRDA is that some qualification exists in relation to the standing of the persons named in s 43(1) to make an application to the Court for the review of the trustee’s conduct, which will ensure that only persons with a legitimate interest in the bankruptcy are allowed to challenge the conduct of the trustee.

31 Having ascertained the possible interpretations of s 43(1) of the IRDA, I now proceed to consider the legislative purpose or object of the provision. In respect of the general purpose of the statute, I do not find the general purpose of the IRDA particularly helpful given that the IRDA was primarily intended to, among other things, consolidate Singapore’s corporate and personal insolvency and debt restructuring laws into a single Act: Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (1 October 2018) vol 94 (Edwin Tong Chun Fai, Senior Minister of State for Law). What would be more instructive, in my opinion, would be to look to the general purpose underlying the BA, which first introduced the appointment of private trustees in bankruptcy to our regime. This is especially because s 43(1) of the IRDA can be directly traced to s 40 of the BA. In this regard, the Bankruptcy Bill 1994 sought to streamline and update cumbersome, complex and archaic bankruptcy procedures so as to achieve greater efficiency and lower costs: see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (25 August 1994) vol 63 (Prof S Jayakumar, Minister for Law) at col 403. In fact, one of the very problems which that bill sought to tackle was the issue that bankruptcy procedures at the time resulted in substantial delay in the administration of estates.

32 The specific purpose of s 43(1) of the IRDA, as far as the text is concerned, appears simply to confer upon the Court broad powers and discretion to review the private trustee’s conduct upon the application to Court by a wide group of persons: see Jonathan Zhang at [17]. The surrounding statutory context, however, raises some doubts as to whether Parliament necessarily intended for a bankrupt to have unqualified standing to apply under s 43(1) of the IRDA. This is because the bankrupt is entitled to make a complaint to the OA in relation to the trustee’s conduct in the administration of the estate under s 42(2) of the IRDA. The OA must then inquire into the matter and take such action as it thinks expedient. The existence of the mechanism in s 42(2) suggests that Parliament did not intend for a bankrupt to have unqualified recourse to the Court under s 43(1) in respect of every act or omission of the trustee, particularly where the bankrupt's primary interest is in the conduct of the administration rather than in any specific right or interest of his own.

33 Seen against this backdrop, I am fortified in my conclusion that adopting the plain meaning of s 43(1) of the IRDA will lead to an unworkable result. Allowing the named persons in s 43(1) to have unqualified standing to make an application to review an act, omission or decision of the trustee in bankruptcy would run counter to the general purpose of the BA, which is to achieve greater efficiency and lower costs in the administration of bankrupts’ estates. Such an interpretation of s 43(1) would also call into question the utility of the mechanism set out in s 42(2) of the IRDA, which provides a bankrupt with some recourse in relation to the trustee’s conduct in the administration of the estate. This leaves the alternative interpretation of s 43(1) – ie, that some qualification exists in relation to the standing of the persons named in s 43(1) to make an application to the Court for the review of the trustee’s conduct – as the interpretation of the provision which better coheres with the purposes and objects of the statute.

34 This, however, leaves us none the wiser as to what exactly the nature of the qualification on standing is (or should be) under s 43(1) of the IRDA. I therefore turn to extraneous material to ascertain the proper meaning of s 43(1): see s 9A(2)(b)(ii) of the Interpretation Act 1965 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Interpretation Act”) and Tan Cheng Bock at [38] and [47]. In this regard, I find that the observations in Brake are of assistance. As mentioned above at [22], s 43(1) of the IRDA was retained from s 40 of the BA, which was in turn adopted from s 303(1) of the IA. Given that the records of the Parliamentary debates on the Bankruptcy Bill 1994, the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Bill 2018 and the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution (Amendment) Bill 2022 do not shed any light on the specific legislative purpose behind s 43(1) of the IRDA, I take the view that it would be instructive to look upstream to the legislative intent and the principles pertaining to s 303(1) of the IA instead, which have been broadly summarised in Brake.

35 In this regard, the UK Supreme Court highlighted the following points, which were drawn from the relevant English case law:

(a) Section 303(1) was never intended to provide a means of redress to a party with no connection to the bankruptcy: see Brake at [8].

(b) Even for persons who are connected with the bankruptcy, the following restrictions on standing apply:

(i) As a general requirement, in order to establish standing to challenge a trustee’s conduct in relation to the administration of a bankrupt’s estate, a bankrupt must show that there is or is likely to be a surplus of assets once all liabilities have been paid to his creditors. This necessarily follows from the fundamental principle that a bankrupt is divested of his interest in his former property (ie, his estate in bankruptcy) once the bankruptcy order is made: Brake at [11]. Therefore, unless there is or is likely to be a surplus, the bankrupt has no legitimate interest in the administration of the estate and will have no standing to apply under s 303(1) of the IA.

(ii) Besides establishing standing by way of (i) above, the bankrupt (or indeed any other person) may also establish standing by showing that the s 303(1) application concerns matters (1) directly affecting his rights or interests which arise specifically from the bankruptcy and (2) arising from powers conferred on the trustee which are peculiar to the bankruptcy regime: see Brake at [9], [22] and [74]. This requirement originated from the legal position prior to the mid-19th century reforms, and there is no reason to suggest that the subsequent bankruptcy regimes intended to depart from this position: see Brake at [31]–[33].

36 In my view, these restrictions on standing similarly apply to s 43(1) of the IRDA for the following reasons.

37 First, these restrictions would have applied to s 303(1) of the IA at the time it was transplanted into our bankruptcy regime by way of s 40(1) of the BA in 1995. I can see no reason – from the statutory context of the IRDA, the relevant Parliamentary debates or the case law – to conclude that Parliament had intended for a departure from this position.

38 Second, these restrictions on standing are consistent with our bankruptcy regime and the statutory context surrounding s 43. The rationale for the general requirement for a bankrupt to show that there is or is likely to be a surplus of assets after the payment of his creditors before he can demonstrate a legitimate interest in the administration of his estate applies with equal force to our bankruptcy regime. As is the case in the UK, the bankrupt’s property vests in the OA and becomes divisible among the bankrupt’s creditors upon the making of the bankruptcy order: see s 327(1) of the IRDA. The existence of s 42(2) also means that a bankrupt who cannot establish standing in this manner is not without recourse, as he may make a complaint to the OA, who must then inquire into the matter.

39 Third, these restrictions on standing further the general legislative purpose of achieving greater efficiency and lower costs in the bankruptcy process, by ensuring that only persons with a legitimate interest in the bankruptcy and/or the administration of the estate are allowed to challenge the conduct of the private trustee by way of an application to the Court. Adopting the plain meaning of the text of s 43(1) as the proper interpretation of the provision would, conversely, lead to an unreasonable result.

40 Proceeding on this basis, I am satisfied that the Applicant has no standing to bring SUM 940. The Applicant did not assert, and there is no evidence to suggest, that there is or is likely to be a surplus once all liabilities have been paid to the Applicant’s creditors. ⁵ The question is therefore whether SUM 940 concerns matters directly affecting the Applicant’s rights or interests which arise specifically out of the bankruptcy.

41 In relation to the PTIB’s decisions on the Applicant’s travel requests, I accept that such decisions pertained to the bankrupt’s disability under s 401(1)(b) of the IRDA not to leave Singapore without the prior permission of the PTIB and that the PTIB’s powers to grant such permission arise directly from the bankruptcy. I cannot, however, see how this right or interest of the Applicant has been directly affected, at least at this stage, given that all his travel requests have since been approved by the PTIB. In other words, there are no outstanding matters which impinge upon the Applicant’s disability not to leave Singapore without the prior permission of the PTIB.

42 The requirement is also not met in respect of the Applicant’s contentions that the PTIB allegedly failed to provide guidance to the Applicant when he received the Notice from the LTA. The Applicant has not pointed to any statutory duty owed by the PTIB that has been breached. I do not think that there were any interests or rights of the Applicant which were affected by the PTIB’s conduct in relation to the Notice. In so far as the Notice revealed potential criminal liability, such matters lie outside the scope of the Applicant’s bankruptcy. And in so far as the Notice affected the potential administration of the Applicant’s estate, by way of the potential road tax owed by the Applicant, the Applicant would have no interest to speak of given that he has not shown that there is or will be surplus assets after the payment of his creditors.

43 As for the alleged threat made by the PTIB to cease acting as the private trustee of the Applicant’s estate, I do not think that the threat, in and of itself, had affected any rights or interests of the Applicant arising from the bankruptcy. Even if such a threat was made and acted upon by the PTIB, the PTIB would still need to satisfy the relevant conditions for resignation set out at r 44 of the PIR (eg, providing the relevant notice, nominating a replacement trustee etc). The meeting of these conditions would protect the rights and interests of the Applicant in the bankruptcy. I therefore cannot see how any rights or interests of the Applicant could have been affected by the PTIB’s alleged threat.

44 Finally, no right or interest of the Applicant could have been affected by the sending of another bankrupt’s personal correspondence by the PTIB to the Applicant. The Applicant accepted at the hearing before me that his argument was not that his interests had been adversely affected, but simply that this demonstrated that the PTIB was not administering the bankrupts’ estates with diligence.

45 For these reasons, I find that the Applicant has no standing to proceed with his application under s 43(1) of the IRDA to review the complained-of acts of the PTIB.

46 Even if I am wrong on the points above regarding standing, I find that none of the “grounds” raised by the Applicant justify the Court’s intervention under s 43(1) of the IRDA.

47 Parties were in agreement that the applicable test under s 43(1) of the IRDA was set out in Jonathan Zhang, where the Court agreed that the threshold which must be met before the Court interferes with a trustee’s decision is if it can be shown that he has acted in bad faith or so perversely that no trustee properly advised or properly instructing himself could so have acted, or alternatively if he has acted fraudulently or in a manner so unreasonable and absurd that no reasonable person would have acted in that way: see Jonathan Zhang at [25], [31] and [43]. The Court also observed as follows at [41]:

48 I agree that this test (ie, the perversity standard) is the applicable test to decide whether the Court’s intervention is warranted under s 43(1) of the IRDA. The threshold to be met for the perversity standard is a high one. This is because the administration of the bankrupt’s estate would be impossible if the private trustee has to answer at every step to the bankrupt (or any other interested party) for the exercise of his powers and discretion in the management of and realisation of the property: see Jonathan Zhang at [31] citing Bramston v Haut [2013] 1 WLR 1720 at 1737. 

49 Applying the perversity standard to the present facts, I cannot conclude that no other private trustee would have made the same decisions as the PTIB.

50 I first address the Applicant’s contentions pertaining to the Notice and the PTIB’s alleged lack of guidance. The Applicant submits that the PTIB had failed to advise him on how to deal with the Notice regarding outstanding road tax in respect of a vehicle registered in the Applicant’s name prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy. The PTIB allegedly informed the Applicant that he was “not willing to advise” the Applicant on the matter and asked the Applicant to engage independent legal counsel on his own expense. ⁶ When the Applicant subsequently contacted the Ministry of Law for clarification, he was expressly informed that such queries ought to be directed to the PTIB. Even then, the PTIB refused to provide further guidance to the Applicant, stating that the matter was “quasi-criminal” in nature. ⁷

51 At the hearing, the PTIB explained that the email sent by the Applicant to the PTIB seeking guidance on the Notice only stated that the Applicant had received a notice to attend court. ⁸ The PTIB therefore concluded that there were impending criminal proceedings against the Applicant, in respect of which he had no duty of advice. In relation to the potential effect of the road tax on the Applicant’s estate, the PTIB took the view that the LTA would file a proof of debt in respect of any tax payable by the Applicant and the matter could be dealt with at that point in time. These points were not refuted by the Applicant, whose only response was that the PTIB did not spell out these reasons at the time.

52 I do not think that the PTIB’s response to the Applicant in relation to the Notice was so unreasonable that no trustee would have made the same decision. The Applicant has not provided any evidence or arguments to refute the substantive explanations given by the PTIB as to why he had responded to the Applicant in the way he did. Instead, the Applicant’s main gripe appears to be that the PTIB had threatened him over the phone to cease acting as his private trustee if he continued raising questions. The PTIB denies that he made such threats, although no such evidence has been admitted by the PTIB to this effect. Regardless of whether the alleged threat was made, I do not think that this warrants intervention by the Court. This seems to have been a one-off statement made by the PTIB in the context of what appears to be a heated argument with the Applicant. I therefore do not think it would be appropriate to deem that the making of this “threat” satisfies the perversity standard. This is especially in the light of the fact that the PTIB continued to carry out his duties in relation to the estate, even when the Applicant continued to make further requests for various matters.

53 I move on to consider whether the PTIB’s alleged unreasonable and inconsistent refusal of the Applicant’s requests for overseas travel warrants intervention by the Court. The acts complained of by the Applicant relate to the PTIB’s initial refusal to approve two applications which the Applicant made to travel to Malaysia and Vietnam. These applications were made in December 2025 and stated that the trip to Malaysia was for the Applicant to accompany his wife for “essential medical treatment” and that the trip to Vietnam was to visit his wife’s family. ⁹ The Applicant had also informed the PTIB in December 2025 that the plane tickets to Vietnam had already been booked before the bankruptcy order was made. The PTIB had allegedly refused the two trips on the basis that (a) there was insufficient substantiation of the medical treatment that his wife would be undergoing in Malaysia, and (b) the travel to Vietnam was a “social visit” and was therefore not a compelling reason for travel. The Applicant claims that the PTIB did not inform him what further information or documentation would be required in order for the applications to be approved. Although these applications were subsequently approved by the PTIB after a case conference held on 3 February 2026, the Applicant submits that the PTIB had acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in refusing the requests in the first place.

54 The PTIB’s submission at the hearing was that he had initially refused the applications because he was concerned about the need to mitigate the risk of assets being concealed or disposed of and to ensure that the Applicant had provided full disclosure of his earnings. At that time, the PTIB took the view that there was a possibility that the Applicant was concealing assets overseas. This was because the Applicant had declared his annual income at $100,000 for 2024 although his monthly income was listed at around $3,200. Specifically, in relation to the Applicant’s intended trip to Malaysia, the PTIB said that the Applicant had adduced insufficient documents to show what exactly the medical treatment was. As the documents reflected that it was a “laser treatment”, the PTIB took the view that the treatment could be of an aesthetic nature. Given that the Applicant did not provide further information on his wife’s condition or on the treatment, the PTIB concluded that this was not an “urgent medical reason” and so did not approve the request. As for the Applicant’s request to travel to Vietnam, the PTIB took the view that the purpose of the trip was social in nature and, in the light of the concerns above, decided to reject the request. The PTIB then reconsidered his decision to refuse the Applicant’s applications after finding out at the case conference that the Applicant’s father had paid for the air tickets to Vietnam and after the Applicant stated that he would apply for permission before purchasing flight tickets next time. The PTIB therefore agreed to reconsider his decision if the Applicant agreed to produce the flight tickets.

55 I do not think that the PTIB had acted unreasonably in refusing the Applicant’s request to travel to Malaysia on 23 December 2025. Based on the email correspondence between the Applicant and the PTIB, the Applicant had only indicated that his wife was going for a “skin laser treatment procedure” and had not provided further information on her condition. ¹⁰ It was not unreasonable for the PTIB to have sought further information on the details of the treatment and the wife’s condition before deciding if the request should be approved. It was also not indefensible for the PTIB to have asked the Applicant to consider whether there was a possibility that his wife could travel to Malaysia for the treatment alone, given that it was unclear what the specific medical issue was, or for the PTIB to have subsequently approved the request after mandating that further documents had to be provided.

56 I am also not of the view that the PTIB’s refusal of the Applicant’s request to travel to Vietnam in February 2026 constitute grounds for the Court to intervene. I accept that the PTIB’s initial decision not to allow the Applicant’s request to travel to Vietnam to visit his wife’s family appears, on its face, to be unduly harsh. This is because the Applicant had been forthcoming with this request and the trip was only for a short period. According to the Applicant, he had informed the PTIB as early as 16 December 2025 that he wished to travel to Vietnam in February 2026 to visit his wife’s family and that the plane tickets had already been booked. The Applicant’s email also makes reference to a prior oral conversation between the parties on his intended requests. ¹¹

57 However, I do not think that the PTIB’s decision to refuse this request was so utterly unreasonable and absurd that no trustee properly advised or properly instructing himself could have arrived at the same decision. At the time of refusal, the PTIB had already been made aware of certain facts which suggested to him that the Applicant may have other means of income which were not declared. These include the fact that the Applicant had declared his annual income at $100,000 for 2024 although his monthly income was listed at around $3,200. ¹² In other words, the concerns of the PTIB in relation to the non-declaration of the Applicant’s full earnings and the potential concealment or dissipation of assets would not only have arisen by the time the PTIB decided to refuse the travel request, but was also at the forefront of the PTIB’s mind when he refused the requests. ¹³ I cannot see how these can be characterised as invalid considerations which a reasonable private trustee would not have considered. I also do not think that the PTIB’s decision to subsequently allow the requests, subject to the relevant documents being adduced, is problematic. I see this as a compromise which the PTIB had arrived at to balance the interests of the bankrupt and the interests of the estate, in the light of the concerns he had at the time.

58 The third “ground” relied upon by the Applicant pertains to the PTIB’s alleged breach of confidentiality. Specifically, the PTIB had inadvertently sent a letter to the Applicant via WhatsApp. The letter was intended for another bankrupt with the same first name as the Applicant. To be clear, the Applicant is not alleging that the confidentiality of his documents or matters pertaining to his estate has been compromised. Instead, his argument is that this act demonstrates the low standard of administration which the PTIB is applying to his estate. ¹⁴ The PTIB acknowledges that the letter was sent erroneously to the Applicant but stresses that he deleted the message after realising the mistake.

59 I do not think that this mistake by the PTIB warrants intervention by the Court pursuant to s 43 of the IRDA. This is for the simple reason that inadvertent mistakes, in and of themselves, generally cannot be said to meet the perversity standard. The PTIB also, in my view, acted reasonably in rectifying the error once it was brought to his attention.

60 It is evident that there has been a souring of the relationship between the Applicant and the PTIB. But the Court will not disturb a private trustee’s decision simply because the Applicant disagrees with it or because the Applicant dislikes interacting with the private trustee. If a bankrupt wishes to convince the Court that orders should be made pursuant to s 43(1) of the IRDA in relation to specific acts, omissions or decisions of the PTIB, the bankrupt needs to show that the perversity standard has been met. This the Applicant has failed to do. There is therefore no basis for the Court to intervene pursuant to s 43(1) of the IRDA, much less to order the removal of the PTIB. This is especially the case for SUM 940 at this stage, where it is clear that (a) there are no outstanding issues pertaining to the Notice from the LTA, (b) the relevant requests by the Applicant for travel have been approved, and (c) there have been no breaches of the Applicant’s confidentiality.

61 For the reasons above, I dismiss SUM 940. I will give further directions to the parties for submissions on costs.