1 The claimant (“Mr Nadarajan”) was served with a statutory demand (“SD”) by the defendant (“Ms Eswari”). The SD sought payment of a judgment sum and costs orders which Ms Eswari had obtained in earlier court proceedings against Mr Nadarajan.

2 In Originating Application (Bankruptcy) No 64 of 2026 (“OSB 64”), Mr Nadarajan applied for an extension of time to apply to set aside the SD. Mr Nadarajan relied on the fact that there were other ongoing court proceedings which he had commenced against Ms Eswari, claiming that if he succeeded in those proceedings, he would have grounds to set aside the judgment sum and costs orders claimed in the SD. Mr Nadarajan further applied for a stay of all enforcement proceedings relating to the judgment sum and costs orders, pending the conclusion of the ongoing court proceedings.

3 I dismissed OSB 64 on 4 August 2026. I now set out the full grounds of my decision which expand on the brief grounds I delivered at the hearing. I do so because OSB 64 raised a point of principle concerning a debtor’s ability to set aside a statutory demand claiming a judgment debt, where there is a pending challenge to that judgment debt. This issue does not appear to have been considered in the reported case authorities.

4 Ms Eswari is the executrix of the estate of her late husband, Mr C Nathan (“Mr Nathan”).

5 Mr Nadarajan is Mr Nathan’s brother.

6 Ms Eswari commenced legal proceedings against Mr Nadarajan in the State Courts by way of District Court Suit No 787 of 2022 (“DC 787”). Ms Eswari’s claim was for the sum of $90,000, which she asserted had been transferred by Mr Nathan to Mr Nadarajan, for Mr Nadarajan to hold on trust for Mr Nathan. In bringing the claim, Ms Eswari relied on Mr Nathan’s will (“Will”), which recorded the trust arrangement, and testimony from both her and another witness on what Mr Nathan had told them about the arrangement before his death. Mr Nadarajan admitting receiving the sum of $90,000 from Mr Nathan but denied that he held the money on trust for Mr Nathan.

7 On 22 December 2025, after the trial of DC 787, District Judge Vince Gui (“DJ Gui”) allowed Ms Eswari’s claim and entered judgment for the sum of $90,000. DJ Gui’s reasons for allowing the claim, as set out in his oral judgment, provide important context to the issues to be decided in OSB 64. The material portion is as follows:

8 Mr Nadarajan did not appeal against DJ Gui’s decision.

9 While the proceedings in DC 787 were ongoing, Mr Nadarajan commenced parallel proceedings in the Family Justice Courts by way of Family Court Originating Claim No 13 of 2025 (“FC 13”), seeking to have the Will declared null and void. Mr Nadarajan’s purported grounds for invalidating the Will were that: (a) Mr Nathan was blind when he executed the Will; (b) the law required the contents of a will executed by a blind person to be read to the person in a language that he understands; and (c) this requirement was not complied with when the Will was executed. At the hearing of OSB 64, Mr Nadarajan informed me that he had originally intended to challenge the validity of the Will as part of his defence in DC 787. However, DJ Gui informed him that any such challenge should be made to the Family Justice Courts instead. Mr Nadarajan thus commenced FC 13, albeit only sometime in May 2025, after experiencing “hiccups” in filing those proceedings. FC 13 was still pending when I heard OSB 64 and was fixed for hearing on 25 to 27 August 2026.

10 The SD was served on Mr Nadarajan on 7 June 2026. In the SD, Ms Eswari claimed the sum of $128,316, comprising: (a) the judgment sum in DC 787; (b) the costs ordered for the trial in DC 787; (c) the costs ordered for various interlocutory applications and a registrar’s appeal in DC 787; and (d) interest on the judgment sum and cost orders.

11 Under r 67(2)(b)(i) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution (Personal Insolvency) Rules 2020 (“PIR”), Mr Nadarajan had to file any application to set aside the SD by 21 June 2026 (i.e. 14 days after the SD was served on him on 7 June 2026). Mr Nadarajan failed to comply with the prescribed timeline.

12 On 26 June 2026, Mr Nadarajan filed OSB 64, seeking the following reliefs:

(a) an extension of time to apply to set aside the SD (“EOT Application”); and

(b) an order that Ms Eswari “be stayed” from commencing all enforcement proceedings against him until the conclusion of FC 13 (“Stay Application”).

13 Ms Eswari opposed OSB 64.

14 Mr Nadarajan was five days late in applying to set aside the SD. In his affidavit filed in support of OSB 64, Mr Nadarajan provided two reasons for not applying to set aside the SD earlier. First, Mr Nadarajan claimed that he was uncertain about the consequences of bankruptcy, and he was only later informed that being made bankrupt would affect his ability to pursue his claim in FC 13. Second, Mr Nadarajan claimed that he was unsure whether the existence of the pending proceedings in FC 13 constituted grounds for setting aside the SD.

15 Under r 67(4) of the PIR, the court may grant a debtor an extension of time to file an application to set aside a statutory demand. In deciding whether to grant an extension of time, the court considers and weighs the following factors: (a) the period of the delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the grounds for setting aside the statutory demand; and (d) the prejudice that might result from an extension of time: Koh Kim Teck v Shook Lin & Bok LLP [2021] 1 SLR 596 at [51]. The weight to be placed on each factor depends on the facts.

16 In weighing the relevant factors in the present case, the pivotal factor bearing on whether an extension of time should be granted was Mr Nadarajan’s intended grounds for setting aside the SD. As for the other factors, I found that the period of the delay was short. Given the short delay, I was also prepared to accept that Mr Nadarajan had sufficiently accounted for the delay, even if Mr Nadarajan’s explanation was not entirely convincing. On the one hand, the “warning” recitals on the SD would have made it clear to Mr Nadarajan that: (a) he had to make any application to set aside the SD within 14 days of its service on him; (b) if he did not apply to set aside the SD within that time or settle his debts, he could be made bankrupt; and (c) if he was unsure about his position, he should seek legal advice immediately. Hence, even if Mr Nadarajan had harboured doubts about how to respond to the SD, he should have sought advice earlier. Mr Nadarajan did not explain when he had sought advice (if at all), or when and how he came to realise that he should apply to set aside the SD. On the other hand, I did not think that Mr Nadarajan’s delay was deliberate or motivated by tactical reasons. In a similar vein, I was also satisfied that an extension of time would not prejudice Ms Eswari, provided that the intended grounds for setting aside the SD had a reasonable prospect of success. The qualification in the preceding sentence was important. In this regard, I agreed with Ms Eswari that unless there was some merit in Mr Nadarajan’s intended setting aside application, the EOT Application should not be granted.

17 Rule 68(2) of the PIR sets out the grounds on which the court must set aside a statutory demand. The provision reads:

18 Mr Nadarajan did not specify which sub-paragraph(s) of r 68(2) of the PIR he was relying on to set aside the SD. This was unsatisfactory because the burden was on Mr Nadarajan to clearly set out his case and not leave the Court and Ms Eswari to guess, or worse still, to come up with possible arguments on his behalf, just to pre-emptively rebut them. Be that as it may, I will explain why Mr Nadarajan’s intended grounds for setting aside the SD would have failed under each sub-paragraph of r 68(2) of the PIR.

19  Starting with r 68(2)(a) of the PIR, Mr Nadarajan clearly did not have a valid counterclaim, set-off or cross-demand which was equivalent to or which exceeded the amount of the debts specified in the SD. While Mr Nadarajan had commenced proceedings against Ms Eswari in FC 13, the relief sought in those proceedings was to have the Will declared invalid, and Mr Nadarajan was not seeking judgment for a monetary sum. Hence, any judgment obtained in FC 13 would not have constituted grounds for raising a counterclaim, set-off or cross-demand within the meaning of r 68(2)(a) of the PIR.

20 Turning to r 68(2)(b) of the PIR, it is well established that a court exercising its bankruptcy jurisdiction will not go behind a judgment debt and inquire into its validity: Chia Kok Kee v Tan Wah [2024] SGHC 216 at [14] and [18]; see also paragraph 160(2) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021. Each of the debts claimed in the SD were judgment debts. While Mr Nadarajan might have intended to apply to set aside the judgment and costs orders made in DC 787 at a future time, those judgment debts remained valid and binding on him until they were set aside. In fairness to Mr Nadarajan, he conceded that he did not have present grounds for challenging the debts claimed in the SD.

21 As for r 68(2)(c) and (d) of the PIR, they were plainly inapplicable in the present case. Mr Nadarajan did not allege that Ms Eswari was holding his property or any security in respect of the debts claimed in the SD. Mr Nadarajan also did not contend that the requirements relating to the form and contents of a statutory demand under r 64 of the PIR had not been complied with.

22 This left r 68(2)(e) of the PIR as the only ground which Mr Nadarajan could conceivably rely on to set aside the SD. Rule 68(2)(e) confers a residual power on the court to set aside a statutory demand on “any other ground”, apart from the specifically enumerated grounds under r 68(2)(a) to (d) of the PIR. This residual power has been analogised with the court’s power to deny summary judgment, even where there are no triable issues, if the court is satisfied that there ought to be a trial for some other reason: Chia Kok Kee v Tan Wah [2024] SGHC(A) 36 (“Chia Kok Kee (AD)”) at [27], citing Chimbusco International Petroleum (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Jalalludin bin Abdullah and other matters [2013] 2 SLR 801 (“Chimbusco”) at [46]. However, while such a power exists, the circumstances in which the power will be exercised will be rare: Chia Kok Kee (AD) at [27]; Chimbusco at [46].

23 Given the residual nature of the power under r 68(2)(e) of the PIR, it would not be desirable to lay down fixed or absolute rules on when it is appropriately exercised. This would always depend on the facts at hand. As I discuss below, the facts of the present case certainly did not warrant the exercise of the Court’s power because Mr Nadarajan was seeking to collaterally attack a final judgment entered after a trial. The position may be less straightforward in cases where a debtor applies to set aside a statutory demand where there is a pending appeal against the judgment debt claimed in the statutory demand, or where the debtor applies to set aside a judgment debt in circumstances where there may be viable grounds for setting aside, such as where the judgment debt arose under a default judgment.

24 In my view, however, the fact that a judgment debt is being challenged in some way, would generally not be grounds for setting aside a statutory demand claiming the judgment debt under r 68(2)(e) of the PIR. I take this view for three main reasons.

25 First, the case authorities discussed at [22] above make it clear that the court’s power under r 68(2)(e) of the PIR should only be exercised in rare cases. Put simply, r 68(2)(e) of the PIR cannot be a broad license to set aside a statutory demand where the underlying judgment debt is being challenged by the debtor in some way. This would render the specifically enumerated grounds for setting aside a statutory demand under r 68(2)(a) to (d) of the PIR otiose, especially r 68(2)(b), which is inoperative where the SD claims a judgment debt. A broad reading of r 68(2)(e) of the PIR would therefore be contrary to the legislative scheme.

26 Second, setting aside a statutory demand because there is a pending challenge against the judgment debt claimed in the statutory demand would be akin to ordering a stay of potential bankruptcy proceedings brought in reliance on the statutory demand. In Seto Wei Meng (suing as the administrator of the estate and on behalf of the dependants of Yeong Soek Mun, deceased) and another v Foo Chee Boon Edward [2021] SGHCR 5 (“Seto Wei Meng”) at [24]–[25], I held that the mere fact of a pending appeal or setting aside application in respect of the debt on which the bankruptcy application is founded is insufficient to justify a stay of the bankruptcy proceedings. Instead, the court must weigh the creditor’s prima facie right and interest in obtaining a bankruptcy order against the prejudice the debtor may suffer if he was made bankrupt pending the appeal: Seto Wei Meng at [29]. I do not see why a lower standard should apply in deciding whether to set aside a statutory demand where there is a pending challenge to the underlying judgment debt by way of an appeal or setting aside application. In such cases, the creditor is equally entitled to institute bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor in reliance on the judgment debt. Moreover, given the reduced risk of prejudice to the debtor where bankruptcy proceedings have not even commenced, it stands to reason that a stricter standard should apply.

27 Third, it is unnecessary for a statutory demand to be set aside simply because there are pending proceedings which may result in the judgment debt claimed in the statutory demand being extinguished. Adequate protection is afforded to the debtor through several other means:

(a) After judgment is entered, the debtor may apply for a stay of enforcement of the judgment. If a stay is granted, the judgment debt would not be immediately payable, and it cannot be claimed in a statutory demand, and cannot be relied on to commence bankruptcy proceedings. Conversely, if a stay is refused, this underscores the strength of the creditor’s interest in enforcing the judgment debt immediately.

(b) The service of a statutory demand, in itself, would not cause unfair or irreparable prejudice to the debtor. The legal consequence of a debtor’s failure to comply with a statutory demand is only to raise a rebuttable presumption of insolvency against the debtor under s 312(a) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (“IRDA”) in any bankruptcy proceedings which may be commenced against the debtor in respect of the debt claimed in the statutory demand.

(c) Even if bankruptcy proceedings are commenced, the debtor may apply for a stay of the bankruptcy proceedings under ss 315(1) or 316(5) of the IRDA. In practice, a party may seek to have the court exercise its case management powers to adjourn bankruptcy proceedings, pending the determination of the proceedings where the judgment debt is being challenged. A debtor may also formally apply for a stay of the bankruptcy proceedings out of caution and is likely to be directed to do so by the court if the creditor objects to an adjournment being granted on case management grounds.

28 Hence, apart from exceptional cases where the debtor would suffer serious or irreparable prejudice if the statutory demand is not set aside forthwith, the law already provides debtors with sufficient recourse, and there is generally no justification to invoke r 68(2)(e) of the PIR to set aside a statutory demand claiming a judgment debt where there is a pending challenge to that judgment debt.

29 The present facts were far from the kind of exceptional facts that might warrant reliance on r 68(2)(e) of the PIR. On the contrary, Mr Nadarajan’s intended grounds for setting aside the judgment, and in turn, the SD, were devoid of merit.

30 First, Mr Nadarajan’s intended application to set aside the SD was entirely speculative. Mr Nadarajan had to first succeed in setting aside the Will in FC 13. Nothing was placed before me to demonstrate that FC 13 had any merit, let alone that it was likely to succeed. Even if Mr Nadarajan crossed this significant hurdle, he still faced the mammoth task of persuading the District Court to set aside the judgment and all costs orders made in DC 787.

31 Second, I could not see how Mr Nadarajan could use the proceedings in FC 13 to collaterally attack the judgment in DC 787. It bears emphasis that this was a final judgment entered after a trial, and the doctrine of res judicata, in the sense of cause of action estoppel, would prevent the judgment from being reopened except in very limited and exceptional circumstances, namely, where there was fraud or collusion in obtaining the judgment: see The Royal Bank of Scotland NV (formerly known as ABN Amro Bank NV) and others v TT International Ltd (nTan Corporate Advisory Pte Ltd and others, other parties) and another appeal [2015] 5 SLR 1104 (“TT International”) at [103]. Mr Nadarajan did not adduce any evidence of such fraud or collusion. Even if cause of action estoppel did not apply, any re-opening of the decision in DC 787 was likely to be barred by the wider doctrine of res judicata, which is also known as the abuse of process doctrine (see Goh Nellie v Goh Lian Teck and others [2007] 1 SLR(R) 453 at [51]–[53]), since the matters which Mr Nadarajan relied on to impugn the judgment in DC 787 were already known to him before those proceedings were decided, and Mr Nadarajan should have had those matters adjudicated on before DC 787 was decided.

32 For completeness, I was mindful that the doctrine of res judicata is subject to a right of appeal that parties may be permitted under the law: TT International at [99]. However, given how far out of time Mr Nadarajan was to appeal, and the absence of evidence showing his prospects of succeeding in such an appeal, this would not have strengthened Mr Nadarajan’s case for setting aside the SD. Moreover, for the reasons discussed at [24]–[28] above, even if Mr Nadarajan had appealed against the judgment, this itself would not have been grounds for setting aside the SD.

33 Third, even if Mr Nadarajan was not legally prohibited from re-opening the decision in DC 787, his purported grounds for challenging the judgment were unlikely to succeed. Mr Nadarajan argued that the judgment rested squarely on the validity of the Will, and any trust relationship between him and Mr Nathan was established by the Will. In my view, Mr Nadarajan’s argument was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of Ms Eswari’s case in DC 787 and what the DJ Gui had decided. It is clear from DJ Gui’s oral judgment that he did not find that the Will had created a trust between Mr Nadarajan and Mr Nathan. On the contrary, Ms Eswari’s case was that the trust was created during Mr Nathan’s lifetime and the Will was evidence that a trust existed, and this is precisely what DJ Gui found when he said that “[t]he trust arrangement was unequivocally recorded in the deceased’s will [emphasis added]”. Hence, I could not see how the validity of the Will was relevant to the existence of the trust.

34 For these reasons, I found that Mr Nadarajan’s intended application to set aside the SD did not have any reasonable prospect of success. Consequently, I did not allow the EOT Application.

35 I turn to the Stay Application. Whilst not exactly worded as such, Mr Nadarajan was effectively applying for a stay of enforcement of the judgment and costs orders made in DC 787, pending the conclusion of FC 13.

36 In my judgment, the Stay Application was devoid of merit, and it amounted to an abuse of process.

37 First, I agreed with Ms Eswari’s submission that a court exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction does not have the power to grant such a stay. In this regard, it is noteworthy that ss 315 and 316 of the IRDA only give the court power to stay proceedings on a bankruptcy application. This is logical since these are the proceedings which the court is exercising jurisdiction over. Conversely, nothing in the IRDA expressly gives a court exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction the power to stay the enforcement of a judgment made by a different court.

38 Second, it would be inappropriate for a court exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction to stay the enforcement of a judgment made by a different court. Order 22 r 13 of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”) suggests that an application for such a stay should be made to the court which made the judgment in the first instance; and if the application is dismissed, a further application may be made to the appellate court (see O 18 r 6(1), O 18 r 35(2), O 19 r 6(1) and O 19 r 35(2) of the ROC 2021).

39 Third, as it transpired, Mr Nadarajan had applied to DJ Gui for an identical stay of enforcement of the judgment in DC 787, by way of District Court Summons No 113 of 2026, and his application was dismissed. In my view, it was legally untenable for Mr Nadarajan to relitigate the issue in OSB 64 since the General Division of the High Court does not exercise appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over decisions of the District Courts when exercising its bankruptcy jurisdiction. Moreover, Mr Nadarajan was collaterally attacking DJ Gui’s decision to dismiss his earlier application, and this was an abuse of process.

40 I therefore did not allow the Stay Application as well.

41 As there was no merit in the EOT Application and the Stay Application, I dismissed OSB 64. I fixed costs at $2,109 (all-in), which comprised $2,000 in basic costs and $109 in disbursements. This was the sum sought by Ms Eswari, which I found to be fair and reasonable.