1 Mr Rachmat Hidayat Bin Edy Juju (“Appellant”) pleaded guilty to one charge under s 65(1)(a) punishable under s 65(2)(a) read with s 65(6)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“RTA”) for driving a motorcycle without due care and attention, which resulted in the death of his pillion rider (“Deceased”). The District Judge (“DJ”) sentenced the Appellant to four months’ imprisonment (“Custodial Sentence”) and ordered a disqualification term of eight years. As the Appellant had been admitted to the Drug Rehabilitation Centre (“DRC”) for a separate drug-related matter, the DJ agreed with the Prosecution’s submission and ordered the Custodial Sentence to commence only upon the expiry of the Appellant’s DRC admission. That meant that he would commence serving his imprisonment term only after 13 March 2028, which was the tentative date of his discharge from the DRC.

2 In HC/MA 9008/2026/01 (“MA 9008”), the Appellant did not challenge the Custodial Sentence nor his disqualification order. He appealed solely against the commencement date of his Custodial Sentence. Contrary to the position taken before the DJ, the Prosecution accepted on appeal that the Custodial Sentence should not commence only upon the expiry of the Appellant’s DRC admission. Having considered the parties’ submissions, I allowed MA 9008 and ordered the Custodial Sentence to be varied to commence on 29 May 2026, being the date of the hearing of this appeal. My reasons for doing so are set out in full below.

3 On 20 May 2023, the Appellant was riding a motorcycle with the Deceased as a pillion rider. He failed to keep proper control of his motorcycle, which resulted in it veering rightwards from the second lane to the first lane and then into the centre divider. The collision caused the Deceased to be flung off the motorcycle.

4 Both the Appellant and the Deceased were conveyed by ambulance to the hospital. The Deceased was found to have suffered multiple injuries, and she was pronounced dead on the same day. As for the Appellant, he suffered abrasions and a minor head injury. He was discharged on the same day. The Appellant was charged with and pleaded guilty to an offence of driving without due care and attention under s 65(1)(a) punishable under s 65(2)(a) read with
s 65(6)(a) of the RTA.

5 The DJ’s decision on sentence may be summarised as follows:

(a) There were no relevant culpability factors in this case.

(b) While the Appellant’s offence caused the death of the Deceased, the court should not double count any factors which may already have been taken into account. Moreover, the damage to the Appellant’s own vehicle was not to be treated as an aggravating factor.

(c) The Appellant’s lack of relevant antecedents was a neutral factor.

(d) The Appellant’s cooperation with the authorities was given due weight.

(e) The Appellant was accorded a 30% reduction in his sentence on account of his early plea of guilt.

6 Taking into account the foregoing factors, the DJ found that the starting point for the sentence was around six months’ imprisonment. After accounting for the 30% reduction in sentence on account of the Appellant’s early plea of guilt, the DJ sentenced the Appellant to four months’ imprisonment.

7 As for the length of the driving disqualification order, the DJ found that the mandatory minimum driving disqualification order of eight years was appropriate, since there was no special reason to dispense with the imposition of the same.

8 On 14 March 2025, the Appellant was admitted to the DRC. According to the Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”), the Appellant’s tentative date of discharge from the DRC programme, subject to his continuous good conduct in prison, is 13 March 2028. Considering the foregoing, one issue before the DJ was when the Custodial Sentence ought to commence.

9 In the proceedings below, the Appellant submitted that any custodial sentence imposed ought to commence earlier than on the expiry of his DRC admission. In support of this position, he explained that he was about to embark on a community-based programme (“CBP”) in May 2026, during which he intended to attend an “advanced culinary course”. He contended that if any custodial sentence were to commence only upon the expiry of his DRC admission in 2028, his opportunity to attend this course would be “forfeited”.

10 The DJ, however, agreed with the Prosecution’s submission and ordered the Custodial Sentence to commence upon the expiry of the Appellant’s admission to the DRC. Among other things, the DJ considered the following:

(a) The court has the power to postpone the commencement of a sentence under s 318 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”), and in doing so, the court must “consider all the circumstances of the case”.

(b) A DRC admission is designed to rehabilitate drug addicts for their personal benefit and the larger societal interest. There was a need to allow the Appellant’s treatment and rehabilitative process to be completed because of his lengthy history of drug abuse.

(c) If the Custodial Sentence were to commence at the time sentence was passed, the Appellant would have been removed from DRC, and it was unclear if he could be re-emplaced on DRC after he serves his imprisonment term.

11 The Appellant chiefly submitted, as he did before the DJ, that his Custodial Sentence should have commenced immediately and should not have been postponed to commence only upon the expiry of his admission to the DRC.

12 He explained that the DRC programme comprises four distinct stages. Starting with the first stage, inmates attend classes for rehabilitation that focus on their emotional, mental, and physical well-being. As for the second stage, inmates undergo suitable self-enrichment courses. Meanwhile, the third stage prepares inmates for reintegration and job emplacement. The DRC stint culminates in the fourth stage which involves CBP for the inmates’ reintegration with the family and society.

13 In this connection, the Appellant claimed that individuals who have ongoing cases or who have been sentenced for other offences will have their CBP delayed or forfeited if the sentence imposed does not surpass that individual’s tentative discharge date from the DRC programme. He explained that in his case, while he had already completed the first two stages of the DRC programme, the deferred commencement of his Custodial Sentence had prevented him from participating in the CBP phase of his DRC regime. The Appellant argued that this deferred commencement of his sentence would have resulted in him being “locked up” or “deployed for labour in prison”, both of which would have defeated the rehabilitative aim underpinning the DRC programme.

14 For these reasons, the Appellant sought a “revision” and submitted that the commencement date of his Custodial Sentence should be “revised” to start immediately, so that he could be emplaced on CBP and fully complete his rehabilitation programme at the DRC.

15 On appeal, the Prosecution explained that the DRC regime consists of two main phases: (a) an in-care phase (ie, during which the inmate is incarcerated); and (b) a CBP phase. During the in-care phase, drug abusers go through programmes such as psychology-based correctional programmes and employability skills training. They may then be emplaced on CBP and serve the remainder of their detention in the community under supervision, as part of a step-down approach to facilitate their reintegration into society.

16 In response to the assertions made by the Appellant in his Petition of Appeal (see [12]–[13] above), the Prosecution posed queries to the Singapore Prison Service (“SPS”). Thereafter, the Prosecution sought to adduce fresh evidence through an affidavit (“Affidavit”) deposed by Mr Teh Hwa Yong Derry, who was the Superintendent of the DRC (“Mr Teh”). The Affidavit presented the following three new material facts:

(a) First, Mr Teh confirmed that if the Custodial Sentence were to commence on 29 May 2026 (ie, the date of the hearing of MA 9008), the Appellant’s DRC regime would be able to continue beyond his Custodial Sentence.

(b) Second, after the Custodial Sentence was ordered to commence at the end of the Appellant’s DRC admission, Mr Teh decided not to emplace the Appellant on CBP. Mr Teh explained that the purpose of CBP is to allow inmates to serve the tail-end of their DRC detention in the community under structured supervision, and to support their reintegration back into society. Since the Custodial Sentence was ordered to commence at the end of his DRC admission, the Appellant was not due to be released and thus the purpose of CBP was not engaged.

(c) Third, and in connection with the second point above, if there was no Custodial Sentence awaiting the Appellant at the tail-end of his DRC regime, it followed that the Appellant could be considered for CBP towards the tail-end of his DRC stint.

17 In view of Mr Teh’s evidence, the Prosecution acknowledged that if the Custodial Sentence were to commence only at the end of the Appellant’s DRC stint, he would be deprived of a chance to participate in the CBP phase. Thus, the Prosecution accepted that the Custodial Sentence should commence on 29 May 2026, which meant that the Appellant’s DRC regime would continue after he serves his Custodial Sentence, whereupon he may then be eligible for the CBP phase of the DRC programme. The Prosecution submitted that this would achieve the twin goals of punishment for the Appellant’s RTA offence and would also ensure that he completes his rehabilitation in the DRC.

18 I pause to note that the relevant information pertaining to the distinct phases of the DRC regime was not brought to the DJ’s attention earlier. In particular, the Prosecution had made no mention below of the Appellant’s potential eligibility for the CBP phase or when or under what circumstances he might be precluded from it. It would appear that this was due to an inadvertent but unfortunate oversight on the Prosecution’s part.

19 The following two issues arise from the parties’ respective submissions.

(a) First, whether Mr Teh’s evidence should be admitted for this appeal.

(b) Second, when the Custodial Sentence should commence.

I will address each issue in turn below.

20 Before considering when the Custodial Sentence should commence, I had to first decide on the Prosecution’s application to admit fresh evidence through Mr Teh’s Affidavit for this appeal.

21 When fresh evidence is sought to be admitted in a criminal appeal,
s 392(1) of the CPC provides that the appellate court may admit the evidence if it thinks additional evidence is necessary (Soh Meiyun v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 299 (“Soh Meiyun”) at [14]). In considering whether the fresh evidence is “necessary”, the three conditions laid down in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 of “non-availability”, “relevance” and “reliability” applied, save that the first condition of “non-availability” was less paramount than the other two conditions. The consequence is that an appellate court exercising criminal jurisdiction should generally hold that additional evidence which is favourable to the accused persons and which fulfils the conditions of relevance and reliability is “necessary”, and should admit such evidence on appeal (Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 SLR 505 (“Iskandar bin Rahmat”) at [72] citing Soh Meiyun at [14]–[16]). In the present case, I was satisfied that Mr Teh’s evidence ought to be admitted pursuant to s 392(1) of the CPC. I set out my reasons below.

22 I deal first with the condition of non-availability of the evidence. In my view, the Prosecution could clearly have obtained the evidence contained in Mr Teh’s Affidavit with reasonable diligence at the time of the Appellant’s sentencing. Contrary to the Prosecution’s assertions that the Appellant had raised new facts about the DRC regime on appeal which prompted its filing of Mr Teh’s Affidavit in response, I should make it clear that the Appellant had, from the very first hearing on 12 January 2026 (“First Hearing”), already raised his concern about the impact that a deferred commencement of his Custodial Sentence would have on his ability to participate in the CBP phase of his DRC programme. As I alluded to above at [9], at this hearing, the Appellant had contended that he was going to be emplaced on CBP in May 2026, and that he was intending to pursue an “advanced module” at the Asian Culinary Institute during this programme. The Appellant explained that if the commencement of his Custodial Sentence was postponed to 2028, he would not be able to be emplaced on this programme, and his chances of pursuing this “advanced module” would thereby be “forfeited”. For these reasons, the Appellant wanted his Custodial Sentence to commence immediately from the date of his sentencing.

23 Clearly, the Appellant’s concerns during the First Hearing went directly to the question of when the Custodial Sentence should commence. The Prosecution could and should have made the relevant inquiries with the SPS at that stage (or even prior to the First Hearing, anticipating that such a point might well be raised) to ascertain the veracity of the Appellant’s key assertions. The Prosecution, however, did not appear to have done so.

24 Instead, when the DJ questioned the Prosecution at the First Hearing regarding whether the Appellant’s DRC programme would be affected if the Custodial Sentence started to run from the date of sentencing, the Prosecution initially stated that it was “not sure if that [is] the case” and that how the Appellant’s rehabilitation should continue “would be best left to the CNB to handle as the institution dealing with his rehabilitation”. Following a short adjournment of the proceedings, the Prosecution, on the same day, indicated to the DJ that the Prosecution “did make extensive checks with the CNB in this regard” and that its understanding was that the Appellant “will be removed from DRC, and that whether or not he can be re-emplaced on DRC after the imprisonment term is served is not so clear”.

25 Subsequently, during a further mention of the Appellant’s case on 16 January 2026 (“Further Mention”), the Appellant repeated largely similar assertions to those made during the First Hearing. When the DJ invited the Prosecution to respond to these contentions, the Prosecution merely stated that the claims that were advanced by the Appellant were “his own say so”, and that the Prosecution had “not established that with the prison authorities”.

26 From the record, it was unclear if there was truly a miscommunication between the Prosecution and the DRC, or whether there was sufficient effort, much less “extensive checks”, made by the Prosecution to ascertain what the CBP phase was all about to begin with. It bears emphasis that the Prosecution is best-placed to assist the court with relevant and accurate details about the DRC regime and how the CBP phase might come into operation. More importantly, having already been put on notice of the Appellant’s specific concerns at the First Hearing, it was incumbent on the Prosecution to have made the relevant inquiries not only with the CNB but with the SPS at that stage. If necessary, the Prosecution could have requested for additional time to seek clarification in relation to this issue before it affirmatively took a position on the appropriate commencement date of the Custodial Sentence. Had the Prosecution done so, the relevant information would have been made available to the DJ before he made his order for the commencement date of the Custodial Sentence. Instead, it was not until the Appellant filed his Petition of Appeal in MA 9008 that the Prosecution thought it necessary to seek clarification from the SPS, and to have placed Mr Teh’s evidence before this court – more than four months after the date of the DJ’s decision.

27 However, as the Court of Appeal in Iskandar bin Rahmat made clear, the condition of non-availability is less paramount than the other two conditions of relevance and reliability in the context of admitting fresh evidence in criminal appeals (Iskandar bin Rahmat at [72] citing Soh Meiyun at [15]–[16]). Accordingly, the availability of Mr Teh’s evidence at the time of the proceedings below was certainly no bar to its admission on appeal.

28 Mr Teh’s evidence was clearly relevant and reliable. It provided important insight into the DRC scheme, including an explanation of its two phases – the in-care phase and the CBP phase. His evidence also confirmed several of the Appellant’s key assertions as to how the deferred commencement of his Custodial Sentence would adversely affect his chances of being emplaced on CBP. In other words, Mr Teh’s evidence was directly relevant to the central issue in this appeal and was favourable to the Appellant’s case. In any event, the Appellant understandably had no objections to the admission of Mr Teh’s Affidavit.

29 For the reasons above, I allowed the Prosecution’s application to admit Mr Teh’s evidence in MA 9008.

30 Before turning to the issue of when the Custodial Sentence should commence, I briefly address a preliminary procedural point. In his Petition of Appeal, even though he had filed an appeal ostensibly against sentence, the Appellant made several references to seeking a “revision” of the commencement date of his Custodial Sentence (see [14] above). This potentially gave rise to the impression that he was seeking a criminal revision, which was a distinct procedure governed under ss 401 and 402 of the CPC. That said, considering that the Appellant was self-represented throughout the appeal, I did not consider it necessary to require him to clarify matters of procedure at the hearing. The substance of the relief that the Appellant sought was never in doubt: he wished to challenge the DJ’s direction that his Custodial Sentence commence only upon the expiry of his DRC stint, and to have the commencement date of this sentence brought forward.

31 More pertinently, I considered that nothing turned on the precise characterisation of the Appellant’s case. Whether this matter proceeded by way of an appeal under s 374 of the CPC or as a revision under ss 401 and 402 of the CPC would have made no difference to the outcome given the specific circumstances of this case. Indeed, in Oon Heng Lye v Public Prosecutor [2017] 5 SLR 1064 (“Oon Heng Lye”), it was observed that the powers of the High Court on revision include, when s 401(2) is read with s 390(1)(d) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) – which is in pari materia with the present CPC – the power to alter or reverse any order made by the court below (Oon Heng Lye at [13]).

32 The statutory power under s 390(1)(d) was similarly available to this court on appeal. Section 374(1) of the CPC provides that an appeal may be made against, amongst others, any order of court. In my view, the DJ’s direction as to the commencement date of the Custodial Sentence constituted an “order” within the meaning of s 374(1) of the CPC. When the Appellant brought this matter before the court through his appeal, ss 390(1)(d) and 390(2) of the CPC conferred the requisite power on this court to grant the relief sought by the Appellant. These provisions state the following:

33 The plain wording of s 390(1)(d) of the CPC expressly empowered this court, at the hearing of the appeal, to alter the DJ’s order relating to the commencement date of the Custodial Sentence. In any event, I was also cognisant of the catch-all provision in s 390(2) which goes further by making clear that nothing in s 390(1) of the CPC is to be taken as circumscribing the appellate court’s power from making such other order in the matter as it may think just. In other words, either provision was, on its own, sufficient to ground this court’s power to grant the relief sought by the Appellant in MA 9008.

34 Having addressed the procedural basis of the Appellant’s appeal, I turn to the central issue which concerns when the Custodial Sentence should commence. Having considered the parties’ submissions and Mr Teh’s evidence, I allowed the Appellant’s appeal and varied the commencement date of the Custodial Sentence to 29 May 2026, being the date of the hearing of this appeal.

35 It was undisputed that a DRC admission is designed to rehabilitate a drug addict for his personal benefit and in the larger societal interest (Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v Public Prosecutor [2012] 4 SLR 947 at [49]). Considering the Appellant’s lengthy history of drug abuse, I agreed with the DJ that there was a need to allow the Appellant’s rehabilitation at the DRC to run its full course. However, the DJ’s order may have led to a contrary and wholly unintended result. As I explained above (at [24]–[26]), this was through no fault of the DJ, who made his decision without the benefit of the Prosecution’s clarification and Mr Teh’s evidence pertaining to how the CBP phase vis-à-vis the DRC regime operated in practice.

36 In this connection, Mr Teh’s evidence revealed that the DRC regime comprises two distinct phases – the in-care phase and the CBP phase. During the CBP phase, inmates may be allowed to serve the tail-end of their DRC admission in the community under structured supervision, which includes inmates undertaking employment or being required to participate in educational or occupational training programmes. The overarching aim of the CBP phase is to facilitate the inmate’s reintegration into society. Yet, it was precisely this important phase of the DRC regime that the DJ’s order had inadvertently foreclosed. Indeed, as Mr Teh made clear, following the imposition of the Custodial Sentence, he had considered the facts and circumstances of the Appellant’s case and decided not to place the Appellant on the CBP phase. This was because the purpose of the CBP phase (ie, to facilitate his reintegration to society) would not apply given that the Appellant had been ordered to serve the Custodial Sentence at the end of his DRC regime. Put another way, the DJ’s order had effectively deprived the Appellant of the opportunity to participate in programmes specifically designed to prepare him for reintegration into society – an outcome that would be inconsistent with the rehabilitative purpose that underpins each DRC admission.

37 In view of the foregoing, I considered that the appropriate order was for the commencement date of the Custodial Sentence to be 29 May 2026. As the Prosecution to its credit rightly acknowledged on appeal, such an order would allow the Appellant’s DRC regime to continue beyond his Custodial Sentence, thereby preserving his eligibility for emplacement on CBP. This struck the appropriate balance between the relevant competing considerations: the Appellant would serve his imprisonment term as punishment for the RTA offence, while at the same time remaining on course to complete the full arc of his rehabilitation under the DRC regime – preserving, in particular, the opportunity for him to participate in the CBP phase that the DJ’s order had inadvertently foreclosed.

38 As observed above at [23] and [26], the Prosecution ought to have anticipated that the question of how a custodial sentence would interact with the Appellant’s ongoing DRC admission was likely to arise, and to have apprised the court of the details about the DRC regime and how the CBP phase might come into operation. Had this been done, this appeal could have been averted, since the Prosecution eventually came to adopt the same position as the Appellant in this appeal.

39 This case serves as a timely reminder that the Prosecution is duty-bound to place all relevant information fully and accurately before the court to enable it to determine the appropriate sentencing outcome. Indeed, if the Appellant had not filed this appeal, he would have been gravely prejudiced if things were simply left to run their course.

40 For the reasons above, I allowed MA 9008 and varied the commencement date of the Custodial Sentence to 29 May 2026. There was no change to the disqualification order.