1 Mr Shanmugam, the claimant in OC 11/2025 (“OC 11”), and Mr Tan, the claimant in OC 12/2025 (“OC 12”), sued the defendants (“Bloomberg” and “Mr Low”) for defamation arising from an article that Bloomberg had published and of which Mr Low was its author. The parties agreed for OC 11 and OC 12 to be tried together.

2 Mr Shanmugam is the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs. At the material time, he was the Minister for Law in addition to being the Minister for Home Affairs. He has been a Member of Parliament since 3 September 1988 and a Cabinet Minister since 1 May 2008. ¹

3 Mr Tan is the Minister for Manpower and the Minister-in-charge of Energy and Science & Technology in the Ministry of Trade and Industry. At the material time, he was the Second Minister for Trade and Industry in addition to being the Minister for Manpower. He has been a Member of Parliament since 10 July 2020 and a Cabinet Minister since 27 July 2020. ²

4 The first defendant, Bloomberg, is a financial, software, data, and media company incorporated under the laws of Delaware, United States of America. It regularly publishes articles on its website at https://www.bloomberg.com (“Website”). ³ The second defendant, Mr Low, is a reporter at Bloomberg News in Singapore, covering real estate matters with a focus on Singapore. ⁴ Bloomberg News is the news division of Bloomberg.

5 On 12 December 2024, Bloomberg published on the Website an article titled “Singapore Mansion Deals Are Increasingly Shrouded in Secrecy” (“Article”). The Article is reproduced in full at Annex 1. Where a paragraph number is mentioned in this judgment, this refers to the corresponding paragraph of the Article in Annex 1.

6 The claimants claim the Article contained the following offending words (“Extract”): ⁵

7 Mr Shanmugam pleads and attests that: ⁶

(a) The Extract, by itself and/or in context, means and is understood to falsely mean that Mr Shanmugam took advantage of there being no checks and balances or disclosure requirements in selling his property in a non-transparent manner and that he wanted to hide his transaction and avoid scrutiny, including about the possibility of money laundering.

(b) The Extract, as it means and would be understood to mean (as set out above), is false and baseless and is calculated to disparage and impugn him as well as in his offices as the Minister for Law and Minister for Home Affairs of Singapore.

8 Mr Tan pleads and attests that: ⁷

(a) The Extract, by itself and/or in context, means and is understood to falsely mean that Mr Tan took advantage of there being no checks and balances or disclosure requirements in purchasing a property in a non-transparent manner and that he wanted to hide his transaction and avoid scrutiny, including about the possibility of money laundering.

(b) The Extract, as it means and would be understood to mean (as set out above), is false and baseless and is calculated to disparage and impugn him as well as in his offices as the Minister for Manpower and Second Minister for Trade and Industry of Singapore.

9 The Article was also published on various social media platforms by way of social media posts, which Bloomberg does not dispute. ⁸

10 On 19 December 2024, the claimants’ lawyers (“DSC”) wrote to the defendants to demand that they: (a) remove the Article and a post relating to the Article; (b) publish an apology and undertaking as set out in DSC’s letters; and (c) compensate the claimants by way of damages, which the claimants would donate to charity. The letters further stated that if the demands were not complied with by 24 December 2024, or if any agreed damages were not paid to the claimants by 7 January 2025, the claimants would commence legal proceedings against the defendants. ⁹ The defendants did not comply with the claimants’ demands. ¹⁰

11 It is undisputed that, at the time of commencement of OC 11 and OC 12 on 6 January 2025, the Article and social media posts relating to the Article continue to be published and remain available on the Website and various social media platforms to persons in Singapore. ¹¹

12 The defendants argue that the Extract is a selective and incomplete reproduction of the Article. The focus of the Article is to highlight that purchases of Good Class Bungalows (“GCBs”) which are not caveated bring some privacy benefits and typically transact at higher prices, and that purchasers of GCBs who do not want their identities to be publicly discoverable use trust structures for such purchases (“Article Focus”). ¹²

13 The defendants’ case is that the Article and Extract, by themselves and/or in context, mean and would be understood to mean the following: ¹³

(a) The purchase of GCB land by foreigners and naturalised citizens is an issue of public concern in Singapore, as Singapore has granted citizenship to wealthy migrants who are paying large sums of money for GCB properties. The price of GCB properties has risen significantly.

(b) A permitted mechanism used by the wealthy for privacy from public scrutiny of their property purchases is the purchase of GCBs through a trust, whose ultimate beneficial owners cannot be publicly identified. In the case of Mr Shanmugam, his GCB was sold to a trust structure. The purchase of his GCB was an example of a purchase through a trust, whose ultimate beneficial owners could not be publicly identified.

(c) The prices paid by wealthy purchasers of GCBs using non-caveated transactions have typically been higher than prices in caveated transactions. Purchasers who pay such higher prices obtain greater relative privacy from public scrutiny of their wealth and property purchases compared to caveated transactions.

(d) Non-caveated transactions of GCBs provide relatively more privacy than caveated transactions because they do not show up in the generally used and accessible Singapore Urban Redevelopment Authority (“URA”)’s database of caveats lodged. However, non-caveated transactions may become public through press reporting and directed searches of local real estate ownership records. Mr Tan’s purchase of his GCB was one example of a non-caveated transaction of GCBs.

(e) The use of non-caveated transactions and of trusts, by purchasers to acquire GCBs, leads to perceptions of non-transparency vis-à-vis the public; and leads to (often unfounded) negative public perceptions.

(f) Public perceptions (and misperceptions) of non-transparency could be ameliorated if all private property deals for GCBs were subject to public mandatory disclosure rules of the identities of ultimate beneficiaries purchasing the GCBs. Such mandatory disclosure rules would align with Singapore’s reputation as a transparent and open economy.

14 In relation to Mr Shanmugam, the defendants further plead as follows: ¹⁴

(a) Any reference to sellers of GCBs is incidental to the Article Focus. Mr Shanmugam’s GCB transaction is mentioned because it is just an example of a GCB purchase using a trust structure. The Article is not directed at him.

(b) No ordinary reasonable reader could understand the Article to suggest any actual or suspected impropriety on Mr Shanmugam’s part, not least because he was the seller (and not purchaser) of the property through a trust. Additionally, para 28 makes clear that Mr Shanmugam did not sell his GCB to a trust with a foreign beneficiary. No reasonable reader would infer any link between the sale of his GCB with money laundering or the possibility of money laundering.

(c) Even if the Article was defamatory of any identified person, it did not and could not be taken as a reference to Mr Shanmugam as he was not a purchaser of a GCB. It is widely understood that only purchasers can file caveats. The Article does not suggest that it is the seller’s obligation to satisfy himself of the bona fides of the purchaser, that the seller was in any position to file a caveat, or that a seller of a GCB would or could use non-caveated transactions for privacy reasons. Reading the Article, no reasonable reader would draw any adverse conclusions about a seller.

15 In relation to Mr Tan, the defendants further plead as follows: ¹⁵

(a) Mr Tan’s non-caveated purchase is just one of four examples of non-caveated purchases mentioned. It is not defamatory to state that a purchaser of property: (i) can make use or lawfully take the benefit of the relative privacy that a non-caveated transaction offers even if greater transparency in property transactions might be desired; or (ii) wishes to keep his property transactions out of the public eye to avoid drawing attention to his wealth and social status as the law permits.

(b) It is general knowledge in Singapore that Mr Tan is a man of means, and he was the Chief Executive Officer of a publicly-listed healthcare conglomerate prior to his entry into politics. The Article also states that he is currently a serving Minister. Any suggestion that he purchased his property in a non-transparent manner to hide his transaction and avoid scrutiny about the possibility of money laundering would not be plausible.

16 Next, the defendants plead that if the Article is held to be defamatory, they are entitled to the defence in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 (“Reynolds (HL)”) (“Reynolds privilege”) by virtue of their exercise of responsible journalism to report on a matter of public interest. The publication was in the public interest as the defendants were exercising their duty to communicate important information on a matter of public interest to the general public who had a general right to receive it. ¹⁶

17 There are essentially four main issues to be determined:

(a) whether the Article referred to or would be understood by readers in Singapore to refer to the claimants;

(b) whether the Extract meant or was understood to mean what the claimants have pleaded and attested to (see [7]–[8] above);

(c) if the Article is held to be defamatory, whether the defendants can rely on the Reynolds privilege; and

(d) if the Article is held to be defamatory and the defendants cannot rely on the Reynolds privilege, the appropriate damages to be awarded.

18 To succeed in an action for defamation, the claimant must prove not only that the defendant published the offending words, but that those words were published of the claimant. The test is an objective one, ie, whether the ordinary reasonable person or reader (“Reader”) who, at the material time, was aware of the relevant circumstances or special facts (if any) would reasonably understand the claimant to be referred to by the offending words. The context in which the words are used is relevant as it is in that context that the question of reference to the claimant is to be determined. The claimant need not be expressly referred to by name in the offending words (Review Publishing Co Ltd v Lee Hsien Loong [2010] 1 SLR 52 (“Review Publishing”) at [48]–[50]).

19 It is undisputed that the claimants are expressly named in the Article. They thus argue that they would be identified by readers in Singapore as having been referred to by and in the Extract. ¹⁷ The defendants argue that save for paras 21 and 25 which specifically refer to the claimants (“Named Passages”), the claimants were not referred to in the rest of the Extract (“Unnamed Passages”) or Article. ¹⁸ The issue is thus whether a Reader in Singapore would reasonably understand the Unnamed Passages to refer to the claimants.

20 I turn to consider several cases where the court has held the impugned words referred to the claimant despite the absence of express reference.

21 In A Balakrishnan v Nirumalan K Pillay [1999] 2 SLR(R) 462 (“A Balakrishnan”), the court held that a reasonable person who was acquainted with the claimants, on reading the article, would conclude the offending words referred to them although they were not expressly identified in the article. The article contained the word “organisers” (in paras 6 and 9) and publicity had been given to the claimants as members of the organising committee that had organised the “Tamil Language Week” event which was the subject matter of that article. Pertinently for present purposes, the court found that para 10 of the article also referred to the claimants despite the word “organisers” being absent. This was because para 9 preceded para 10, where the court found references to certain persons taking on “responsibilities in the Tamil Language Week” which, by necessary implication, referred to the “organisers” (at [23] and [28]).

22 In Review Publishing, the court found the offending words in the article, such as “government” at paras 10 and 11 and “Singapore’s great and good” at para 13, referred to the claimants, Mr Lee Kuan Yew (“LKY”) and Mr Lee Hsien Loong (“LHL”), despite a lack of express reference. LKY was named at para 9, while LHL was not referred to by name in the offending words but as “[LKY’s] son” at para 9. The court found the word “government” ordinarily means the body of persons who govern the State. In the context of the phrase “squeaky-clean government” in the same paragraph, it would not be difficult to associate “government” with LKY as he was almost universally recognised as the architect of Singapore’s corruption-free government (at [53]–[54]). The court also found that “government” referred to LHL in the context of the article. It was common knowledge that LHL, then Prime Minister, was the head of the government in Singapore (at [59]). The court found that the words “Singapore’s great and good” referred to LKY and LHL given that the ordinary reasonable person would have known of the defamation actions they commenced against various politicians and newspapers which actions had been given wide media coverage in Singapore (at [55] and [61]).

23 In Price Waterhouse Intrust Ltd v Wee Choo Keong (“Price Waterhouse”) [1994] 2 SLR(R) 1070, the defendant sent a letter to the Official Receiver and the bank, stating that the defendant had been informed by the plaintiffs that the company was in liquidation. The plaintiffs alleged the letter contained offending words to impugn their professional conduct and reputation. The court found the offending words referred to the plaintiffs, although they were not mentioned in the offending words itself. The court had regard to the fact that the letter was published to the Official Receiver and the bank, who both knew the plaintiffs were the managers and receivers of the company in receivership, and had negotiated, concluded and completed the sale of its assets while in receivership (at [7], [17], [20] and [24]).

24 Thus, in assessing whether the offending words refer to the claimants, the court will have regard to the context of those words within the article as a whole (A Balakrishnan at [22]). Hence, even if the claimants are merely cited in the Article as examples of individuals involved in non-caveated GCB transactions (see [13(b)] and [13(d)] above), the question is whether the Reader, reading the Extract as a whole (containing the Named and Unnamed Passages), would understand that the Unnamed Passages also relate to the claimants’ transactions.

25 I find that the Reader would understand the Extract to refer to the claimants. I refer to some examples in this regard.

26 To begin with, the Article’s title or headline “Singapore Mansion Deals Are Increasingly Shrouded in Secrecy” (“Article Headline”) included the claimants’ property “deals”, whether they were the buyer or seller. There would have been no reason otherwise to mention the claimants by name and their property transactions in the Article, and particularly under the header “Non-Caveated Deals”. A property “deal” or “transaction” (mentioned in various places of the Article) would necessarily involve a buyer and a seller. The issue of “opacity” and the lack of “checks and balances” (in paras 30 and 31) for instance, are clearly in relation to such “property deals”.

27 Next, I find the sentence “Singapore’s ultra-rich are increasingly cloaking their purchases of mansions in the city-state in secrecy, to avoid drawing attention to their wealth and social status” (in para 1) on its face and in its wider context refers to the claimants’ property transactions. Whilst this sentence does not identify either claimant specifically, the Article subsequently names the claimants as participants in GCB transactions of significant value: Mr Tan as the purchaser of a GCB for “nearly S$27.3 million” and Mr Shanmugam as the seller of a GCB for “S$88 million”. A person of ordinary means simply does not transact in properties of these values. That Mr Shanmugam features as a seller rather than a purchaser does not take him outside the reference of the Article (see [30]–[32] below).

28 Further, Mr Tan was reported to have purchased his GCB (at para 21) under the heading “Non-Caveated Deals”. The Article explains earlier at (para 3) that a caveat is a legal filing that makes a property transaction widely known, and that “deals without caveats are much harder to track because they [do not] show up in a database maintained by [the URA]”. By placing the claimants’ transactions under the section “Non-Caveated Deals”, the Article characterises their transactions as conducted without the usual disclosure mechanism. It is also undisputed that the Extract and Article refer to “buyers” of “mansions” who did not file caveats and discloses some of such buyers which includes Mr Tan. ¹⁹

29 Having been identified in the Article as participants in multimillion-dollar GCB transactions, the Reader would therefore understand Mr Tan to fall within the class of persons described as “Singapore’s ultra-rich” and that his purchase of a GCB or mansion was one of the transactions increasingly cloaked in secrecy. The Reader would also understand Mr Shanmugam, being a seller, was party to such a purchase or property transaction.

30 The defendants contend that Mr Shanmugam was the seller, that the reference to him as a seller is incidental to the Article Focus and that any element of secrecy attaches only to the buyer (see [14] above). I disagree. As stated by Lord Reid in Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239 at 1246:

31 The Reader does not read a newspaper article with the precision of a lawyer who draws sharp distinctions between seller and purchaser. The Article reports that a trust, whose ultimate beneficiary’s identity could not be established, purchased Mr Shanmugam’s property (at paras 25 and 26). To the Reader, the transaction is characterised by opacity, and Mr Shanmugam is presented as a party to it. The Reader, reading the Article Headline with the sentence at para 1 and the header “Non-Caveated Deals” (among other phrases), and then reading that a trust with an unidentifiable beneficiary purchased Mr Shanmugam’s property for S$88 million, would not stop to ask on which side of the transaction the secrecy originated. He would form the general impression that Mr Shanmugam’s transaction, just like Mr Tan’s, was among those conducted in ways to avoid scrutiny.

32 I also reject the defendants’ argument that no Reader would draw adverse conclusions about Mr Shanmugam, as a seller on the basis of a non-caveated transaction, as it is widely understood that only purchasers can file caveats (see [14(c)] above). The Extract mentions Mr Shanmugam’s property as being sold to a trust whose ultimate beneficiary’s identity could not be established. The opacity that the Article associates with Mr Shanmugam’s transaction is not only about whether the transaction was caveated, but also about using a trust structure to conceal the identity of the ultimate purchaser.

33 Further, the Article states (at para 4) that “More individuals are also acquiring Singapore mansions using shell companies or trusts that help keep their identities private.” I find the Reader would associate this sentence to Mr Shanmugam’s property transaction, even if the individual concerned in para 4 is the buyer. The Article (at paras 25 and 26) goes on to state that Mr Shanmugam’s property was purchased by UBS Trustees on behalf of an entity called the Jasmine Villa Settlement, and that the “ultimate beneficiary’s identity couldn’t be established”. The Reader, reading paras 4, 25 and 26 together, would understand Mr Shanmugam as a party and participant in the acquisition of such a property in “secrecy” or that “help[s] keep [the identity of the buyer] private” (at para 4).

34 It cannot be disputed that the phrase “Singapore’s law minister” (at para 5) refers to Mr Shanmugam, as this is repeated at para 25 which states “Singapore’s law minister, K Shanmugam”. It is also public knowledge that Mr Shanmugam was Singapore’s law minister at the time the Article was published.

35 To conclude, I find the Extract and Article (and not just the Named Passages) that “Singapore Mansion Deals Are Increasingly Shrouded in Secrecy” referred to and would have been understood by the Reader in Singapore to refer to the claimants.

36 For completeness, the fact that the Article also refers to other individuals is immaterial, as the words complained of need not refer exclusively to the claimants (Price Waterhouse at [24]). The only relevant rule is that, in order to be actionable, the defamatory words must be understood to be published of and concerning the claimant; it is irrelevant that the words are published of two or more persons if they are proved to be published of him (Price Waterhouse at [24] and A Balakrishnan at [20], citing Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 at 121).

37 The test for determining the natural and ordinary meaning of the offending words in a defamation action is well settled. The court decides what meaning the words would convey to an ordinary reasonable person (or Reader), not unduly suspicious or avid for scandal, using his general knowledge and common sense. It is irrelevant what meaning was intended by the maker or publisher of the statement or was understood by the claimant. Importantly, the natural and ordinary meaning of the offending words is not confined to their literal or strict meaning but includes inferences or implications that the ordinary reasonable person may draw from those words in the light of his general knowledge, common sense and experience. There have been various formulations of the ordinary reasonable person but ultimately, all these descriptions seek to emphasise the point that such a person is very much an average rational layperson, neither brilliant nor foolhardy, and not idiosyncratic in his behaviour or disposition (Review Publishing at [27], [28] and [31]).

38 I find that there are two elements to the claimants’ pleaded meaning (see [7] and [8] above):

(a) the claimants took advantage of the absence of checks and balances or disclosure requirements to conduct their property transactions in a non-transparent manner (“First Element”); and

(b) in so doing, the claimants sought to hide their transactions and avoid scrutiny, including scrutiny that might extend to the possibility of money laundering (“Second Element”).

For the Article to be defamatory, both elements must be made out.

39 I find the First Element is made out on the natural and ordinary meaning of the Article. The Reader, on reading the Article, would understand that there is an absence of checks and balances and disclosure requirements in the current system in Singapore pertaining to non-caveated GCB or mansion transactions, which enables such transactions to be kept secret or non-transparent. This is portrayed in the Article, including in the following manner:

(a) “Singapore Mansion Deals Are Increasingly Shrouded in Secrecy” (Article Headline), and “More people buy homes with trusts, hiding owners’ identities” (first bullet point under the Article Headline).

(b) “Singapore’s ultra-rich are increasingly cloaking their purchases of mansions in the city-state in secrecy, to avoid drawing attention to their wealth and social status” (para 1).

(c) “Close to half of those bungalow purchases … didn’t include legal filings known as property caveats that make the transactions widely known. Deals without caveats are much harder to track because they don’t show up in a database maintained by [the URA]” (para 3).

(d) “More individuals are also acquiring Singapore mansions using shell companies or trusts that help keep their identities private. Some buyers now require brokers to sign non-disclosure agreements that bar them from divulging owners’ identities and other details …” (para 4).

(e) “Soaring prices … have raised questions about whether there should be more transparency around the ownership of the highly coveted assets” (para 5).

(f) “The Price of Quiet Mansion Deals” (header after para 6) and “Buyers typically pay premiums for off-radar transactions in Singapore” (after the header).

(g) “There are more and more buyers who prefer to be low profile” (para 7).

(h) “Some countries have sought to uncloak the secrecy of the rich … To combat money-laundering and discourage secrecy …” (para 22).

(i) “The Singapore Land Authority, a statutory board under the law ministry, does not collect general data on landed residential properties acquired through trust companies if the beneficiaries are Singapore citizens” (para 28).

(j) “In essence, that means that property agents and other service providers involved in the transactions are primarily responsible for verifying the identities and source of wealth of Singaporean mansion buyers” (para 29).

(k) “The risk is that ‘things may go out of control if there are no checks and balances,’ and it would be better if all private property deals are subject to mandatory disclosure rules … ‘Singapore has prided itself as being a very transparent and open economy, so it should continue to hold on to the ideal’” (para 31).

40 The word “shrouded” in the Article Headline conveys to the Reader that there is something hidden. The Article Headline, together with the bullet point immediately below it and para 1, would immediately convey to the Reader that there are GCB deals being kept secret or hidden. This is to avoid drawing attention to the purchaser’s wealth, social status and identity. The Reader would understand that the method by which such transactions are kept “secret” is by “deals without caveats”, using “shell companies or trusts” or using “non-disclosure agreements” (at paras 3 and 4). As Mr Low confirmed in court, the Article conveyed that such “secrecy” was achieved by these methods. ²⁰ I find that the Article also conveys to the Reader that a buyer would pay a premium to the seller for a deal to be kept “quiet” or “off-radar” (see [39(f)] above); in other words, the premium is paid also for the seller’s silence regarding the transaction.

41 The defendants themselves accept that the Reader who reads the Article “leaves with a sense of the market’s opacity”. Their argument is that this opacity operates in relation to the public only, and that the Article does not posit that GCB transactions are kept absolutely secret from the Singapore government (“Government”) as well (as the claimants argue). ²¹ However, I find the impression conveyed to the Reader, reading the particular words or phrases and in the context of the Article in which they are set out, is that even the Government does not know of such non-caveated transactions. The Government’s inability to see such transactions is itself a manifestation of the absence of checks and balances and disclosure requirements that the First Element concerns.

42 Paragraph 3 expressly informs the Reader that non-caveated transactions “[do not] show up in a database maintained by” the Government through the URA. It stops short of stating that such transactions are maintained in some other Government database. The said impression is reinforced by the sentence immediately thereafter, that non-caveated transactions become public knowledge through “press leaks” and “directed searches of local real estate ownership records” – the latter does not convey to the Reader what mechanism of search this might be.

43 The impression that the Government is unaware of non-caveated transactions is reinforced further by the comparators in paras 22 and 23. Paragraph 22 informs the Reader that the United Kingdom (“UK”) introduced rules in 2022 requiring offshore companies that own UK properties to disclose their ultimate beneficiary, so as to “uncloak the secrecy of the rich” and to “combat money-laundering and discourage secrecy”. Paragraph 23 conveys a similar idea in the context of New York, where legislation would give “access … to law enforcement agencies” of a database of shell companies’ owners in real estate deals. In both instances, the Reader would understand that the disclosure of ownership information is directed to the government, with the monitoring and enforcement of anti-money laundering measures being a function that rests with the government. Against that backdrop, the Singapore position in para 3 reads as a pointed contrast: whereas other governments have built mechanisms to see through the secrecy surrounding non-caveated transactions, the Government does not appear able to access information on non-caveated transactions, which surface only fortuitously through leaks or ad hoc searches rather than through any systematic official record.

44 Having informed the Reader at the beginning of the Article (in para 3) that URA’s database does not show non-caveated property transactions, the Article also ends (at paras 28 and 29) by stating that even the “Singapore Land Authority, a statutory board under the law ministry, does not collect general data on landed residential properties acquired through trust companies if the beneficiaries are Singapore citizens” and that it is left to “property agents and other service providers” to be “primarily responsible” for “verifying the identities and source of wealth” of Singaporean purchasers. The impression created is that there is a regulatory gap which buyers can exploit and thus operate in secrecy. The natural and ordinary meaning conveyed by the Article is therefore that non-caveated transactions and the identities of the ultimate beneficiaries in a transaction involving a purchaser that is a trust or shell company can be kept secret or hidden from the Government and the public.

45 I thus find that the Reader would form the cumulative impression that non-caveated property transactions operate in secrecy and are “off-radar” or “under the radar” because of an absence of adequate checks and balances and disclosure requirements (eg, from the words and phrases at [39] above). The Reader would perceive the claimants’ transactions as such dealings, and the claimants themselves as persons who conducted their property transactions of GCBs in a non-transparent manner, taking advantage of the systemic absence of checks and balances and disclosure requirements that the Extract describes.

46 In relation to Mr Tan, the editorial placement of his transaction under the heading “Non-Caveated Deals”, read in the context of the Extract’s description of non-caveated transactions as a mechanism for avoiding disclosure, would lead the Reader to draw the inference that his purchase was conducted without the usual transparency that a caveat affords and that he had thus taken advantage of the opacity that the absence of a caveat permits.

47 As for Mr Shanmugam, I find that the Reader would understand his transaction (involving a trust whose beneficiary cannot be identified) as an instance of the trust mechanism the Article describes as a tool for maintaining privacy from scrutiny (para 4 and the first bullet point under the Article Headline). For the reasons given at [30]–[32] above, the Reader would not distinguish between Mr Shanmugam’s position as seller and the purchasing trust’s opacity, but would form the general impression that, like Mr Tan, he had transacted his property in a non-transparent manner, taking advantage of the absence of checks and balances or disclosure requirements (the transaction being both non-caveated and involving a trust as buyer).

48 I thus find the First Element is made out pertaining to both claimants.

49 The defendants argue that the Article contains nothing defamatory of the claimants. Rather, the Article is concerned with trends in the purchase of GCBs in Singapore, namely: (a) to highlight that GCBs whose buyers forgo a caveat, and thereby enjoy certain privacy benefits, typically transact at a higher price given the nature of the properties; and (b) individual purchasers of GCBs who do not want their identities to be publicly discoverable use trust structures to purchase GCBs. ²² I disagree. The defamatory character of the Second Element lies not in any explicit accusation but in the inference it invites, ie, the claimants sought to hide their transactions and avoid scrutiny that might extend to the possibility of money laundering.

50 Here, I set out the paragraphs relevant to money laundering:

51 In this regard, money laundering is expressly referred to in paras 8 and 22. Whilst not expressly mentioned in para 23, I find that a Reader reading paras 22 and 23 together, would understand that para 23 also concerns the issue of money laundering, pertaining to New York. Ms Madeleine Lim (“Ms Lim”), the Senior Executive Editor (Bloomberg News) North Asia – Hong Kong and co-head for Bloomberg News in the Asia Pacific region, confirmed as much. ²³ In court, Mr Low also agreed that a plain reading of para 22 states that the UK introduced new rules to combat money laundering (and discourage secrecy), that para 23 is reference also to the combating of money laundering, and that he wanted the readers of the Article to understand that paras 22 and 23 included the combating of money-laundering. ²⁴

52 The claimants’ case is that, reading paras 7 and 8 together, the Reader would understand that the reason buyers prefer to be low profile is because they fear being scrutinised for money laundering. ²⁵ The defendants’ case is that it is because the buyers do not wish to be publicly associated with a money laundering scandal, and that this is different from imputing any motive to conceal an actual association with money laundering. ²⁶ I do not accept that the Article would be read so narrowly, for the following reasons.

53 First, the Article says that buyers do not wish to be “unduly scrutinized” (para 8); it does not say that they wish to avoid being associated with, linked to, or named in connection with, the scandal. The Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 2nd Ed 1989, Vol XIV) defines “scrutinise” as “to examine methodically and with close attention” while the Cambridge International Dictionary of English (Cambridge University Press, 1995) defines the same as “to examine (something) very carefully in order to discover information”. The word denotes a close and searching examination, which is materially different from mere mention of, publicity about, or association with another’s affairs. In the context of the Article, that scrutiny would pertain to the buyers’ own dealings and legitimacy of their transactions, and to whether there was possible wrongdoing on their part (ie, the activity of money laundering), and not merely to whether there might be a possible association with a scandal (as the defendants contend).

54 Second, the Article identifies only one form of wrongdoing that such an examination might uncover: money laundering. The S$3 billion scandal at para 8 is the sole offence or wrongdoing mentioned, and Mr Low accepted that there was no other. ²⁷ In fact, the offence of money laundering is clear in para 8, which mentions ten money launderers having been convicted and jailed. The comparative material at paras 22 and 23, describing measures by other jurisdictions to “combat money-laundering and discourage secrecy”, reinforces that the secrecy the Article is concerned with is the secrecy within which money laundering may occur. The Reader is therefore left to understand that the scrutiny the buyers wish to avoid is scrutiny for the very activity of money laundering, that being the only object of scrutiny the Article supplies. Indeed, in court, Mr Low agreed that in paras 22 and 23, he was drawing the link between secrecy and combating money laundering for the benefit of readers of the Article. ²⁸

55 Third, and in any event, the distinction the defendants assert is too fine a one for a Reader to draw. Being “an average rational layperson, neither brilliant nor foolhardy” (Review Publishing at [31]), the Reader would not pause to separate a fear of being associated with a money laundering scandal from a fear of being scrutinised for money laundering, any more than he would distinguish the respective roles of buyer and seller (see [31] above). The approach is to envisage the ordinary reader between the extremes of the unusually suspicious and the unusually naïve, and see what is the most damaging meaning they would put on the words in question (Review Publishing at [31], citing Rubber Improvement Ltd v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 (“Rubber Improvement”) at 259). A holistic approach is to be adopted in determining the meaning of the words alleged to be defamatory: it is the broad impression conveyed by those words that falls to be considered, and not the meaning of each word or sentence under analysis (Jeyasegaram David v Ban Song Long David [2005] 2 SLR(R) 712 at [27], citing Rubber Improvement). To the Reader, the two collapse into a single impression: that these buyers prefer secrecy because they do not wish for their transactions to be examined for money laundering. The defendants’ own pleading is consistent with this. In pleading that “[t]he Article makes clear, at paragraph 8, that the Singapore Government does take firm action against money laundering”, ²⁹ the defendants accept that the Article engages the activity of money laundering and its enforcement, and not merely the reputational fact of a “scandal”.

56 As I have found in relation to the First Element, the Reader would perceive both claimants as participants in precisely the class of non-transparent, non-caveated transactions that the Article describes. Reading the paragraphs pertaining to money laundering in conjunction (in particular, paras 8, 22 and 23), it follows that the impression conveyed of such buyers, that they prefer secrecy to avoid scrutiny that might extend to the possibility of money laundering, would be understood by the Reader to attach to Mr Tan’s transaction directly as Mr Tan was a purchaser of a non-caveated GCB. As for Mr Shanmugam, although he was the seller, his transaction possessed the hallmarks of a transaction conducted to avoid scrutiny: not only was it non-caveated, but the purchasing trust’s ultimate beneficiary could not be established. For the reasons given at [31] and [55] above, the Reader would not distinguish his position as seller from that of the purchasing trust and would perceive his transaction as likewise conducted in secrecy to avoid scrutiny extending to the possibility of money laundering. Thus, whilst paras 7 and 8 expressly focuses on the “buyer”, I find that the Reader reading the Article as a whole would form the impression that parties (whether buyers or sellers) that partake in such property transactions (where they are non-caveated or sold to a shell company or trust) take advantage of the “secrecy” to avoid scrutiny including for the possibility of money laundering.

57 In the above regard, it should be noted that Mr Tan’s transaction is mentioned immediately before paras 22 and 23 which deal with money laundering. Mr Low admitted in court that the positions in the UK and New York pertaining to combating money laundering and discouraging secrecy have nothing to do with whether a property transaction is caveated “because their system is different”. ³⁰ Yet, paras 22 and 23, which pertain to money laundering, are placed under the heading “Non-Caveated Deals”, immediately after mentioning Mr Tan’s property transaction, and just before mentioning Mr Shanmugam’s property transaction. The arrangement of the paragraphs of the Article in this manner reinforces the impression conveyed to the Reader that the secrecy afforded from non-caveated property transactions allows those involved in such transactions to avoid scrutiny that might extend to the possibility of money laundering.

58 I thus find the Second Element is also made out.

59 For the reasons above, I find the natural and ordinary meaning of the Article is that the claimants took advantage of the absence of checks and balances or disclosure requirements to conduct their property transactions in a non-transparent manner, and that they did so in order to hide their transactions and avoid scrutiny that might extend to the possibility of money laundering. So understood, the Article is defamatory of both claimants: an allegation that a person has deliberately structured his property dealings to escape examination for possible money laundering plainly tends to lower him in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. All persons who procure or participate in publishing a libel, including (in a newspaper’s case) the journalist, editor and publisher, are jointly and severally liable as joint tortfeasors for the whole of the claimant’s damage (Loh Siew Hock v Lang Chin Ngau [2014] 4 SLR 1117 at [21]). I thus find Bloomberg (the publisher) and Mr Low (the author of the Article) jointly and severally liable for the whole damage suffered by the claimants as a result of the defamatory publication.

60 I turn to the defendants’ argument that they can rely on the Reynolds privilege if the Article was found to be defamatory. They argue that the publication of the Article was in the public interest in that they were exercising their duty to communicate important information on a matter of public interest to the general public who had a general right to receive it. ³¹

61 The claimants refute that the defendants had exercised responsible journalism and argue essentially as follows. ³² First, the Reynolds privilege is not part of Singapore law. Second, the defence of responsible journalism is not applicable to Bloomberg, a non-citizen. Third, having regard to the meaning ascribed by the claimants to the Extract, the defendants had not acted responsibly nor was the publication in the public interest.

62 The Reynolds privilege is a development of the common law defence of qualified privilege in England. The rationale underlying the traditional defence of qualified privilege, which equally underpins the Reynolds privilege, was explained by the Court of Appeal in Review Publishing at [176], citing Reynolds (HL) at 194:

63 In Review Publishing at [177], citing Seaga v Harper [2009] 1 AC 1 at [5], it has also been described as:

64 However, the traditional defence of qualified privilege presented difficulties for media defendants seeking to rely on it in respect of publications on matters of public interest. As the Court of Appeal in Review Publishing explained at [184]:

It was against this backdrop that the House of Lords developed the Reynolds privilege, which seeks to strike a new balance between the competing interests of freedom of speech and the protection of reputation.

65 I turn to consider whether the Reynolds privilege forms part of Singapore law, such that the defendants can rely on it. In Review Publishing, the Court of Appeal held (at [236] and [239]) that the Reynolds privilege has never been part of Singapore’s common law. Instead, it was a development brought about by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention”) and the Human Rights Act 1998 (c 42) (UK), neither of which applies in Singapore. The Court thus held that the Reynolds privilege cannot be declared to be part of Singapore’s common law on the ground (advanced by the appellants therein) that it is a purely common law development (Review Publishing at [261], [262] and [264]).

66 In Review Publishing, the Court further stated (at [254] and [264]) that if the Reynolds privilege were to be adopted as part of our common law, it would have to be adopted on the basis that the freedom of speech enshrined in Art 14(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) is likewise “a right based on a constitutional or higher legal order foundation”. Additionally, “constitutional free speech in Singapore is limited to Singapore citizens only”, as Art 14(1)(a) confers the right to freedom of speech on “citizen[s] of Singapore” (at [264]). Article 14(1)(a) remains unchanged in the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Rev Ed).

67 In light of the Court’s holding in Review Publishing, Bloomberg’s reliance on the Reynolds privilege is a non-starter. Turning to Mr Low, the Court in Review Publishing stated (at [266]) that the crucial question vis-à-vis Singapore citizens is whether, in the context of publication of matters of public interest, the Reynolds rationale should apply so that constitutional free speech becomes the rule and restrictions on this right become the exception; this is a question not yet decided by the highest court in Singapore. In this regard, the Court observed as follows (at [290]):

68 Here, I find the defendants have not provided a sufficient basis to satisfy this court that the Reynolds privilege should be adopted in Singapore. The defendants submit that the role of the media in Singapore has changed significantly since Review Publishing, there being a wider discourse across multiple channels and greater public accounting for personal matters now. They further contend that rising property prices and the role of new citizens in driving these prices are hot-button issues, evidencing a change in local political and social conditions since Review Publishing. ³³

69 At the first stage the court is to make a “value judgment” as to whether Singapore’s contemporary political, social and cultural values support shifting the existing balance between constitutional free speech and the protection of reputation in favour of the former. This is not a judgment the court can or should make in a vacuum. As the Court of Appeal made clear, the proponent of change must produce evidence of a change in Singapore’s political, social and cultural values sufficient to satisfy the court that change is necessary so as to provide greater protection against the existing law of defamation for defendants where the publication of matters of public interest is concerned (Review Publishing at [273]). For instance, this could take the form of the equivalent of a Brandeis brief (Review Publishing at [271(c)]).

70 Here, the defendants produce no evidence of a change in Singapore’s political, social or cultural values, such that the court can be satisfied that change is necessary to support a development of the law to encompass the Reynolds privilege. I thus hold that the Reynolds privilege should not be applied in Singapore. As it is not part of Singapore law, the Reynolds privilege defence is thus not available. I add, for completeness, that even if the privilege were to be part of Singapore law and available to the defendants, they would be unlikely to make it out on the facts.

71 The list of factors which the court should consider in applying the “responsible journalism” test (or the “Reynolds factors”) includes the following (Review Publishing at [192], citing Reynolds (HL) at 205): (a) the seriousness of the allegation; (b) the nature of the information, and the extent to which the subject matter is a matter of public concern; (c) the source of the information; (d) the steps taken to verify the information; (e) the status of the information; (f) the urgency of the matter, as news is often a perishable commodity; (g) whether comment was sought from the claimant, although an approach to the claimant will not always be necessary; (h) the tone of the article; and (i) the circumstances of the publication, including the timing. The weight to be given to the factors will vary from case to case.

72 It does not appear that Mr Low (or Bloomberg) would satisfy the “responsible journalism” test. I highlight a few of the Reynolds factors by way of illustration. For instance, the allegations of impropriety and links to money laundering made against the claimants in the Article are very serious. The more serious the charge, the more the public is misinformed and the individual harmed, if the allegation is not true.

73 There was also no urgency to publish the Article. The claimants’ transactions were not new, such that it would have become “perishable” or dated if not quickly published. They occurred in 2023, a year before the Article was published in December 2024. As the Article states “Last year, Singapore’s Minister for Manpower Tan See Leng bought a Good Class Bungalow …” (at para 21), and in reference to Mr Shanmugam’s transaction, it was “inked more than a year ago in August 2023” (at para 25). Mr Low was in fact aware that the claimants’ property transactions were old news. He knew the sale of Mr Shanmugam’s GCB was public knowledge even a few months before the Article was published. ³⁴ In internal correspondence between the Bloomberg team on 13 March 2024, Mr Low’s colleague had stated in relation to Mr Shanmugam’s transaction, that “if the sale happened in October, it would be dated if we write it now, and folks would be quesioting [sic] why we’re doing it now …”. On 24 September 2024, in an internal correspondence concerning Mr Shanmugam’s transaction, a Bloomberg staff had queried “what’s the why now on reason for writing this more than a year after the deal.” ³⁵ Mr Low was party to the correspondence.

74 Next, although Bloomberg contacted the claimants’ respective press secretaries, what was conveyed differed materially from what was eventually published. In essence, I find the claimants were not given an adequate opportunity to comment. Simple fairness dictates that a person who intends to publish a (defamatory) story about another should give that person a fair opportunity to put his side of the story. This includes fairness in terms of the accuracy of the characterisation of the allegations that are to be published about the claimant (Richard Parkes, et al, Gatley on Libel and Slander (Sweet & Maxwell, 13th Ed, 2022) at para 16–013).

75 In relation to Mr Shanmugam, the defendants rely on an email sent to his press secretary (“Ms Ng”) on 21 October 2024, by Ms Chanjaroen (from Bloomberg) (“21/10/24 Email”): ³⁶

76 Acting on Mr Shanmugam’s instructions, Ms Ng informed Mr Low that Mr Shanmugam would not be commenting on the matters raised in the 21/10/24 Email, the sale of his property being a private matter. ³⁷ Mr Shanmugam’s decision not to respond does not assist the defendants, however. While the 21/10/24 Email indicated that the Article would concern “off-radar” GCB transactions, and conveyed to Mr Shanmugam that his sale was not caveated and that the purchaser was a trust, the term “off-radar” was left unexplained. The 21/10/24 Email also gave no indication that the Article would present that “off-radar” transaction in the context of money laundering. ³⁸ The reference to money laundering in the email appeared only as part of a question said to have been raised by Mr Chee Soon Juan, a politician from an opposition party, as to whether there were checks to ensure the funds were not from money laundering. Nothing in the email indicated that the Article itself would suggest that Mr Shanmugam had been party to a secret transaction, with the secrecy stemming from a wish to avoid scrutiny extending to the possibility of money laundering. Indeed, even the money-laundering matter that the email had framed as Mr Chee’s concern was ultimately removed from the published Article (see para 27), so that Mr Shanmugam was given no opportunity to address the imputation the Article in fact conveyed.

77 Next, Mr Low emailed Mr Tan’s press secretary (“Ms Sing”) on 25 October 2024 as follows: ³⁹

78 The email to Ms Sing went no further than the bare factual description that Bloomberg planned to report that his transaction was not caveated and was conducted off-the-radar. No context was provided whatsoever, in relation to Mr Low’s query. The email gave no indication that his transaction would be presented as an example of deliberate opacity, or that the reason for this opacity was to avoid scrutiny for possible money laundering.

79 Before publishing allegations, a publisher should at the very least put the thrust of the allegations to the person concerned to give him the opportunity of saying whatever he thinks appropriate (Galloway v Telegraph Group Ltd [2006] EMLR 11 at [75]). In effect, neither claimant was given a genuine opportunity to respond to the substance of how their transaction would be characterised in the Article that was eventually published. I reiterate [74] above.

80 The timing of publication also appears to weigh against the defendants. The Article was published in December 2024, in the period preceding the Singapore general elections that were subsequently held in May 2025. Mr Low conceded on the stand that he was aware at the time of publication that elections were coming and that they had to take place by 2025. More significantly, he conceded that it was Bloomberg and he who decided to characterise Mr Shanmugam’s transaction as “political fodder” in the Article at para 27, and that this characterisation was an editorial decision. ⁴⁰ Being an editorial judgment made by the defendants, this characterisation cannot thus be attributed to an external source. A responsible journalist who makes his own decision to present a named government minister’s transaction as politically charged material, in the knowledge that elections are imminent, assumes a correspondingly heightened responsibility to ensure that the presentation is fair, accurate and not misleading. I do not find the defendants would have discharged this obligation.

81  Taking the above factors together, I am not satisfied that the defendants acted responsibly. Even if the Reynolds privilege were available to either of them, the defence would not, on these facts, have been made out. It is also clear, as will be seen later, that there were material falsehoods in the Article (see [95]–[104] below).

82 I turn to the assessment of damages. The claimants plead that they should be awarded aggravated damages in addition to general damages. ⁴¹

83 General damages are compensatory in nature. They serve to console the claimant for the distress he has suffered from the publication of the statement, to repair the harm to his reputation and to vindicate his reputation (Arul Chandran v Chew Chin Aik Victor [2001] 1 SLR(R) 86 at [53] and Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei [2010] 4 SLR 357 (“Peter Lim”) at [4]).

84 The claimants rely on the following factors to determine the appropriate quantum of general damages (Peter Lim at [7]): (a) the nature and gravity of the defamation; (b) the position and standing of the parties ; (c) the mode and extent of publication; (d) the conduct of the defendants from the time the defamatory statement was published to the very moment of the verdict; and (e) the presence of malice. ⁴²

85 I have found that the natural and ordinary meaning of the Article is that the claimants took advantage of the absence of checks and balances or disclosure requirements to conduct their property transactions in a non-transparent manner, and that they did so to hide their transactions and avoid scrutiny that might extend to the possibility of money laundering. These are grave assertions that directly impugn the claimants’ personal integrity, character and professional reputation. This is therefore a factor that points towards the award of higher damages.

86 It is well established that the higher the claimant’s standing, the higher the damages awarded. The courts have “consistently awarded higher damages to public leaders … because of the greater damage done not only to them personally, but also to the reputation of the institution of which they are members” (Peter Lim at [12]). At the material time, Mr Shanmugam was the Minister for Law and Minister for Home Affairs, and Mr Tan was the Minister for Manpower and Second Minister for Trade and Industry. They were also Members of Parliament who held, and continue to hold, high political office as Cabinet Ministers. They are plainly public leaders of considerable standing. The defamatory statements impugn not only their personal integrity, character and professional reputation, but also the standing of the offices they hold as Cabinet Ministers, and they damage their moral authority to lead (Peter Lim at [13]).

87 The courts have also held that the higher the defendant’s standing and reputation, the greater the impact of the defamation and degree of injury (Koh Sin Chong Freddie v Chan Cheng Wah Bernard [2013] 4 SLR 629 (“Freddie Koh”) at [37]). It is undisputed that Bloomberg is a well-known media and news company worldwide. It had 4.3 million Facebook “followers” as at 3 January 2025, and over 600,000 subscribers to “Bloomberg Media” worldwide on or around 16 August 2024; these assertions by the claimants were not challenged by Bloomberg. ⁴³ As Ms Lim stated, Bloomberg was a “reputable international news agency”. ⁴⁴ Mr Low has been a reporter with Bloomberg since September 2021 and has authored many articles for Bloomberg. In particular, he has been writing articles pertaining to Singapore real estate since around September 2023. ⁴⁵

88 Accordingly, the parties’ position and standing point towards the award of higher damages.

89 The wider the extent of publication, the greater the award of damages for defamation (Peter Lim at [33]). Interaction figures such as “likes”, “shares”, “reactions” and comments offer insight into the number of individuals who accessed a post, although I am cognisant that not everyone who comes across a post will interact with it (Lee Hsien Loong v Leong Sze Hian [2021] 4 SLR 1128 at [45]). In the present case, the extent of publication was very wide, and I set out some examples.

90 The parties agree that the number of “internet users” from Singapore who viewed the Article on the Website was 73,580 as at 27 August 2025. ⁴⁶ The defendants also do not dispute the number of interaction figures exhibited in the claimants’ affidavits of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC(s)”). ⁴⁷ The defendants have also accepted that from 28 August 2025 to 30 March 2026, there were another approximately 1,400 unique views from Singapore of the Article on the Website. ⁴⁸

91 Next, the defendants do not dispute that the Article was also published on Bloomberg’s social media pages and they accept the figures adduced by the claimants in the claimants’ AEICs. ⁴⁹ These include the following:

(a) a 12 December 2024 7.21am Bloomberg X post with 43,600 views on or around 11 June 2025; ⁵⁰

(b) a 12 December 2024 12.20pm Bloomberg X post with 41,800 views on or around 11 June 2025; ⁵¹

(c) a 12 December 2024 3.20pm Bloomberg X post with 44,200 views on or around 11 June 2025; ⁵²

(d) a 12 December 2024 6.20pm Bloomberg X post with 34,900 views on or around 11 June 2025; ⁵³

(e) a 12 December 2024 9.20pm Bloomberg X post with 24,100 views on or around 11 June 2025; ⁵⁴

(f) a 13 December 2024 12.20am Bloomberg X post with 24,400 views on or around 11 June 2025; ⁵⁵

(g) a 12 December 2024 7.21am Bloomberg Markets X post with 20,800 views on or around 11 June 2025; ⁵⁶

(h) a 12 December 2024 7.51am Bloomberg Asia X post with 1,494 views on or around 11 June 2025; ⁵⁷

(i) a 12 December 2024 11.26am Bloomberg Asia X post with 1,317 views on or around 11 June 2025; ⁵⁸

(j) a 12 December 2024 2.18pm Bloomberg Asia X post with 1,478 views on or around 11 June 2025; ⁵⁹

(k) a 12 December 2024 5.18pm Bloomberg Asia X post with 1,453 views on or around 11 June 2025; ⁶⁰

(l) a 12 December 2024 8.18pm Bloomberg Asia X post with 1,502 views on or around 11 June 2025; ⁶¹

(m) a 12 December 2024 11.18pm Bloomberg Asia X post with 1,598 views on or around 11 June 2025; ⁶²

(n) a 12 December 2024 2.38pm Bloomberg Wealth X post with 1,103 views on or around 11 June 2025; ⁶³

(o) a 12 December 2024 2.39pm Bloomberg Economics X post with 6,510 views on or around 11 June 2025; ⁶⁴ and

(p) a 12 December 2024 Bloomberg Threads post with 2,946 views on or around 11 June 2025. ⁶⁵

92 The defendants further accept there was republication of the Article. ⁶⁶ As for hyperlinks, the claimants accept that any republication by that means is already captured within the figure for the number of internet users from Singapore who viewed the Article on the Website. ⁶⁷ Further, where the Article’s entire text was reproduced on a third-party website or in a social media post, the parties agree on the following: ⁶⁸

(a) a 14 December 2024 Facebook post which had received 36 “reactions”, 3 “comments” and 7 “shares” as at 12 June 25; ⁶⁹

(b) a 16 December 2024 Facebook post which had received 23 “reactions”, 11 “comments” and 11 “shares” as at 7 April 25; ⁷⁰ and

(c) a Reddit post which had received 60 “comments” and 185 “upvotes” as at 11 June 25. ⁷¹

93 The court may also have regard to the defendants’ conduct in assessing damages, including aggravated damages. Such conduct can include malice on the defendants’ part and conduct throughout the proceedings of the trial (Lee Hsien Loong v Singapore Democratic Party [2009] 1 SLR(R) 642 at [72]). I find the following conduct of the defendants constitutes aggravating factors.

94 I find there was malice on the defendants’ part. Malice in defamation means “any ill-will, spite or some wrong or improper motive” (Shanmugam Kasiviswanathan v Lee Hsien Yang [2024] 5 SLR 194 (“KS v LHY”) at [65]). Malice may be proved: (a) by the defendant’s knowledge of falsity, recklessness, or lack of belief in the defamatory statement; and (b) where the defendant has a genuine or an honest belief in the truth of the statement, but his dominant motive is to injure the claimant or some other improper motive (Freddie Koh at [90]). 

95 First, I find that the Extract was published in circumstances where Mr Low, its author, knew the relevant imputations to be false, or published without caring whether they were true. I set out some examples.

96 As I have found, the Article conveys to the Reader that even the Government is unaware of non-caveated transactions (see [41] above). However, this is untrue. Mr Low accepted that a member of the public could obtain the details of a transaction, including a non-caveated one, through SLA’s Integrated Land Information Service (“INLIS”) by entering the address of the property in question. ⁷² If the details of non-caveated transactions are held by SLA, a government statutory board, the Government is thus aware of such transactions.

97 Mr Low knew that what was conveyed to the Reader (at [96] above) was untrue; at the very least he was reckless as to its veracity. At the time he wrote the Article, he was familiar with INLIS, having “done a lot of searches [on] INLIS as a real estate reporter”, and that before the Article was published, he “was aware that whether or not a transaction is caveated, a member of the public searching a specific address and taking the steps [he] described would have been able to learn of the details of the transfer”. ⁷³ Mr Low thus knew that the details of non-caveated transactions were recorded in and retrievable from a database maintained by SLA. Indeed, even Mr Low’s claim that the Article was meant to create the impression to the Reader that the transactions were kept a secret only to the public is a statement that he knew to be false or made recklessly. ⁷⁴ Non-caveated property transactions are maintained in public records and can be searched through INLIS, even if INLIS is not widely publicised. ⁷⁵

98 Next, para 29 conveys that private industry players are primarily responsible for verifying the identities and source of wealth of Singaporean GCB buyers. Read together with para 28, I have found they create an impression that there is a regulatory gap which buyers can exploit, as non-caveated transactions and identities of ultimate beneficiaries in a transaction involving a purchaser who is a trust or shell company can be kept hidden from the Government and public (see [44] above). Again, this is untrue.

99 On 14 October 2024, Mr Low informed the SLA that he intended to write a story on recent GCB purchases in Singapore, and asked SLA whether the Government or SLA “review[s] big-ticket transactions for any money laundering risks”. ⁷⁶ On 25 October 2024, the SLA responded by referring him to parliamentary statements on Singapore’s anti-money laundering regime dated 3 October 2023 (“Hansard”). ⁷⁷

100 The Hansard describes a regime in which verification by private gatekeepers is one element of a structure led and enforced by the Government. Singapore’s strategy is said to have “three prongs”: “prevention, underpinned by a robust legal and regulatory framework”; “detection, … anchored by our [Suspicious Transaction Reports] regime and supervision by sectoral regulators”; and “enforcement, … about taking strong action when there is suspicion of money laundering”. Private industry players such as financial institutions are “important gatekeepers”, which must “comply with anti-money laundering requirements, including the conduct of due diligence”. The Hansard is clear that these private industry players operate within, and are supervised under, a government-led framework; the regime is described as “a holistic ecosystem approach across the Government, public-private partnership and international collaboration”. ⁷⁸

101 The Article’s characterisation of private players as “primarily responsible” therefore does not reflect the position in the Hansard to which the SLA directed Mr Low. Private players act as gatekeepers performing front-line due diligence within a wider regime led by the Government, which retains primary responsibility for Singapore’s anti-money laundering framework.

102 Mr Low knew that his characterisation at [98] above was untrue, or at the very least, he was reckless as to its veracity. Having read the Hansard, he accepted in court that the Monetary Authority of Singapore supervises gatekeepers such as financial institutions to ensure compliance, and that it is the Government that makes laws pertaining to money laundering, enforces these laws, investigates money laundering activities, and decides on the anti-money laundering framework in Singapore. ⁷⁹ He thus understood that private gatekeepers perform their verification function as one supervised component of a Government-led regime.

103 Additionally, the Article conveyed the falsehood that “[b]uyers typically pay premiums for off-radar transactions in Singapore” (see [39(f)] and [40] above). The Reader would understand an “off-radar” transaction to mean a non-caveated transaction, as depicted in the chart at para 6 (“Chart”). Mr Low confirmed as much. ⁸⁰ I find there is no evidence that non-caveated deals command a premium, and that Mr Low knew that what he conveyed was untrue.

104 On 5 September 2024, Mr Low asked List Sotheby’s International Realty (“Sotheby’s”) whether there was “a difference between non-caveated and caveated transactions in terms of pricing”, to which Sotheby’s replied “No”. Sotheby’s further stated that “The price of a bungalow is a function of several factors such as location, size and shape of the land plot, frontage, terrain, age, architectural design, quality of finishes, etc.” ⁸¹ Pertinently, the Chart accounted for only one variable: whether a transaction was caveated. Mr Low accepted that no other factor was considered. ⁸² Yet, as Sotheby’s had told him, the price of a bungalow turns on several factors, none of which the Chart accounted for. The higher prices of non-caveated transactions could thus reflect some of those factors rather than the absence of a caveat. Mr Low moreover admitted that he did not do a check on the non-caveated properties that he displayed on the Chart, to verify if a premium was actually paid, because he claims that the “chart speaks for itself”. ⁸³ I fail to see how Mr Low could have come to the conclusion he did, given Sotheby’s reply to him.

105 Furthermore, whether a transaction is caveated is a matter within the buyer’s control – the defendants pleaded that “it is widely understood that only purchasers can file caveats” (see [14(c)] above). As Mr Low agreed in court, a buyer can purchase a GCB at the market price (without a premium) in cash and still choose not to lodge a caveat. ⁸⁴

106 Second, and independently, Bloomberg’s internal correspondence reveals the defendants’ dominant motive in publishing the Article was to target the claimants, particularly Mr Shanmugam. The genesis of the Article lay not in a story about trends in the GCB market (as the defendants claim), but in an interest in the claimants. On 12 March 2024, Ms Joyce Koh emailed Mr Low to say that she had heard “from a source that our favourite minister Shan recently sold his GCB at Queen Astrid, probably for an eye-watering sum”. Mr Low replied that he had already seen the property record and that the sale was done a year ago. Pertinently, Mr Low then added that “in the spirit of minister GCB transactions, manpower minister tan see leng also bought a GCB last year in bukit timah”. ⁸⁵ The focus was on the claimants as individuals.

107 The exchange that followed, within Bloomberg internally, shows that those involved appreciated the sensitivity of what they proposed to publish. Ms Joyce Koh observed, in her reply to Mr Low’s email above, that “[i]t would be quite a politically sensitive story though I reckon ... esp [sic] with elections approaching”. Despite that observation, the response was not to reconsider, but to find a means of presentation that would carry the story. Mr Low then suggested that “[o]ne possible way to get into it is to wrap it in a broader story on how rich [people] are using trusts to buy property in Singapore”. ⁸⁶

108 The language of “wrap[ping]” into a broader story, suggested no less than by Mr Low himself, is telling. It indicates that the broader narrative about trusts and secrecy was conceived not as the subject of the Article in its own right, but as a vehicle within which the claimants’ transactions could be presented. This is supported by the following. In response to Mr Low about “wrapping” into a broader story, Ms Joyce Koh replied on 13 March 2024, that “a story showing that Shan has sold his GCB would strike a nerve … Still, if the sale happened in October, it would be dated if we write it now, and folks would be quesioting [sic] why we’re doing it now … so a general stepback on people selling homes to trust might be the way to go for this.” ⁸⁷ On 14 March 2024, Ms Andrea Tan added to the email discussion by suggesting that “Perhaps one way in is via Open House? We can spotlight recent transactions in the GCB market including Shan, Mah and Tan and anything/one else interesting that emerges”. ⁸⁸

109 Even on 24 September 2024, Ms Andrea Tan asked, “what’s the why now on reason for writing this more than a year after the deal”, recognising that the transaction was by then dated. The answer given by Ms Chanjaroen was not that it was a journalistic development in the GCB market, but that it was about Mr Shanmugam himself. Ms Chanjaroen replied that Mr Shanmugam “[is] someone who should lead by example, as the police, immigration, the courts – all report into him”, and that he was “Singapore’s most powerful minister”; and that “Even saying: Singapore’s law minister said he sold his family house worth S$88 million to an unknown entity managed by UBS Trust – would justify the reason of writing”. ⁸⁹ The justification advanced for publishing was thus Mr Shanmugam’s office and standing, and not any matter of genuine public interest in the market trend.

110 Taken together, this correspondence demonstrates that the dominant purpose behind the Article was to publish a story about the claimants, in particular about their GCB transactions. The broader narrative of how wealthy individuals in Singapore use non-caveated transactions and trust structures to keep their dealings secret or “off-radar” was the cover devised to carry that story.

111 I find that Bloomberg’s conduct in removing the paywall pertaining to the Article also demonstrates malice.

112 When the Article was published on the Website, it was hidden behind a paywall which allowed the Article to be readable only to subscribers. ⁹⁰ Following the publishing of the Article on 12 December 2024, a correction direction (“Direction”) was issued, under the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 (2020 Rev Ed) (“POFMA”), by the POFMA Office on 23 December 2024. Essentially, the Direction pointed out various falsehoods in the Article. It required Bloomberg to, among other things, post a correction notice in relation to the Article (“Article CN”) and on the main page of the Website (“Website CN”). In this regard, the Article CN and Website CN had to include a hyperlink to a government website setting out the falsehoods in the Article (“Factually Site”). ⁹¹

113 On 25 December 2024 at about 9.30am to 10am, the paywall to the Article was removed. ⁹² The claimants argue that this demonstrates malice while the defendants claim the removal of the paywall was to comply with the Direction. ⁹³ In her AEIC, Ms Lim explained that the paywall obscured the hyperlink to the Factually Site and would have breached the Direction; hence the “immediate and obvious solution” was to remove the paywall for the Article as Bloomberg had to comply with the Direction by 7pm on 23 December 2024. ⁹⁴

114 I do not accept that the paywall was removed to comply with the Direction; rather it was done to make the Article accessible to the broader public. Ms Lim agreed that by removing the paywall, the public would be able to access the Article. ⁹⁵

115 First, there is no evidence that the hyperlink pertaining to the Article CN was obscured by the paywall; in fact, the evidence showed the contrary. Ms Lim confirmed in court that as at 23 December 2024 (two days before the paywall was removed), the Article on the Website as viewed on a mobile browser already displayed the Article CN – an exhibit of the Website as viewed on a mobile browser showed the hyperlink to the Factually Site was present on that date. ⁹⁶ Indeed, Ms Lim attests that what Bloomberg was concerned about was that its “Addendum” (ie, Bloomberg’s statement to disagree with the correction notices) would be obscured by the paywall, as can be seen from Bloomberg’s internal email raising this concern. ⁹⁷ Ms Lim also confirmed in court that as at 23 December 2024, the Article on the Website as viewed on a desktop browser also displayed the Article CN with the hyperlink to the Factually Site. ⁹⁸ Pertinently, the POFMA Office confirmed by email of 23 December 2024 (“23/12/24 POFMA Email”) that Bloomberg had “fulfilled the other requirements contained in the [Direction]”, with the only outstanding requirement being the publication of the Website CN which pertained to the publication of the correction notice at the top of the main page of the Website. ⁹⁹

116 Second, I do not accept that Bloomberg removed the paywall to the Article as the “immediate and obvious solution” as it had to comply with the direction by 23 December 2024. The 23/12/24 POFMA Email made clear that the Direction pertaining to the Article CN had been complied with, yet two days later, the paywall was removed. Indeed, the 23/12/24 POFMA Email even stated that Bloomberg could request for more time to deal with the outstanding issues (ie, the Website CN). ¹⁰⁰ For completeness, Ms Lim attested that on around 26 December 2024 the Website CN had also been complied with. ¹⁰¹

117 Even if I were to accept that the paywall on the Article obscured the hyperlink to the Factually Site (which I do not), Bloomberg could have devised another solution to ensure compliance with the Direction rather than removing the paywall indefinitely. Ms Lim attested that she understood from Bloomberg’s “Products team” that “[r]edesigning the paywall for a single instance, so as to allow the hyperlink required by the [Direction] to be clickable but still keeping the paywall in place for the Article, was not an option Bloomberg would have pursued to support compliance in a timely manner” [emphasis added]. ¹⁰² In court, Ms Lim admitted that redesigning the paywall was an option, if Bloomberg were given more time to comply with the Direction (pertaining to the Article CN). Indeed, there was no evidence that Bloomberg ever intended to seek an extension of time from the POFMA Office in this regard, in contrast to its correspondence with the POFMA Office in relation to the Website CN. ¹⁰³

118 Moreover, the paywall has never been reinstated, ¹⁰⁴ and Bloomberg’s own internal correspondence reveals that its removal was not, in truth, directed at compliance with the Direction. Rather, it was to enable more persons to access the Article. In an internal email on 25 December 2024, Ms Lim wrote “When you have a moment, could you please make this story publicly accessible? It shouldn’t be behind the paywall given we would like [people] to be able to read it and judge for themselves”. Shortly later, in another internal email, Ms Lim confirmed that the Article should be made publicly accessible, as Bloomberg’s lawyers and editor-in-chief had all “signed off”. ¹⁰⁵ At the time these internal emails were sent, the POFMA Office had already conveyed to Bloomberg that the Direction pertaining to the Article CN had been complied with (see [115] above).

119 The claimants raise other considerations in support of the damages to be awarded to them. I do not consider these to be material. For instance, they claim the defendants withheld material documents until they were ordered to be produced by the court. ¹⁰⁶ I am not satisfied that the claimants have shown that the defendants were deliberately suppressing documents. The defendants were entitled to challenge an order for production of documents on reasonable and relevant grounds (such as privilege), and they produced the documents when the court ordered them to do so. As for Mr Sreenivasan’s conduct in court, this was not a case in which counsel subjected the claimants to repeated irrelevant questioning or persisted in a line of cross-examination unconnected to the issues before the court. Indeed, when invited by the court to cease pursuing a point, he did so. As for a refusal to apologise, this does not necessarily result in aggravated damages (KS v LHY at [62]). The present case is not one where the defendants continued to persecute their allegations against the claimants, such as by repeatedly drawing attention to the Article. I make an observation here that in so far as the paywall to the Article was removed, thus allowing the public at large to access the Article, this has already been considered as a separate factor above.

120 I turn to the quantum of damages. The claimants submit that the court should award general and aggravated damages in excess of the awards made in Shanmugam Kasiviswanathan v Xu Yuanchen [2026] SGHC 69 (“KS v XY”). In that case, the court awarded $160,000 in general damages and $50,000 in aggravated damages, each to Mr Shanmugam and Mr Tan. ¹⁰⁷ The defendants submit that any damages should not exceed $80,000 each to Mr Shanmugam and Mr Tan. They cite in particular KS v XY, and Lee Hsien Loong v Ngerng Yi Ling Roy [2016] 1 SLR 1321 (“LHL v RN”) where the plaintiff was awarded a total of $150,000 in damages against the defendant. ¹⁰⁸

121 Bearing in mind the various factors above, I award $230,000 in total (in general and aggravated damages) to each claimant, being $170,000 in general damages and $60,000 in aggravated damages.

122 The nature of the defamation in the present case is graver than in KS v XY. The allegation against the claimants here suggests they might be involved in potential serious criminal conduct (ie, money laundering). Moreover, Bloomberg is an established and internationally renowned media entity with a higher standing and reputation, and substantially larger following (see [87] above). This is in contrast to the defendant in KS v XY, who was the chief editor of the website The Online Citizen; and the defendant in LHL v RN whose blog would have had a less widespread reach. The viewership of the Article (see [90] –[91] above) was also greater, or at least comparable to KS v XY and LHL v RN. For instance, in KS v XY, the impugned article had garnered over 114,000 views (at [49]). In the present case, the parties agree that there were 73,580 views in Singapore as at 27 August 2025, and the defendants accept that from 28 August 2025 to 30 March 2026 there were another approximately 1,400 unique views of the Article on the Website from Singapore. These figures do not include the views of the Article on Bloomberg’s social media posts. That said, I am cognisant that in LHL v RN, the plaintiff was the Prime Minister of Singapore. At the end of the day, each case should be decided on its own facts, balancing all the factors together.

123 To conclude, I thus award Mr Shanmugam and Mr Tan $230,000 each – comprising $170,000 in general damages and $60,000 in aggravated damages. Bloomberg and Mr Low are to be jointly and severally liable to the extent of $230,000 to each of the claimants. I also grant the injunction as prayed for by the claimants, in OC 11 and OC 12.

124 I will hear parties on costs.