1 This was an application for permission for a disciplinary tribunal to be appointed under s 82A(5) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) (“LPA”), to investigate a complaint against the respondent, who at the material time, was a non-practising solicitor (“Present Application”). The essence of the complaint is that the respondent acted as an advocate and solicitor at a time when he did not hold a practising certificate and/or when he may have been an undischarged bankrupt.

2 The applicant was the Law Society of Singapore (“Law Society”), and the respondent was one Ng Kai Ming (“Mr Ng”). I heard the Present Application on 21 May 2026. Notwithstanding that it was an ex parte hearing, I invited Mr Ng to be present if he wished to address me on whether permission should be granted for the complaint made against him to be investigated. Mr Ng filed written submissions, but declined the invitation to attend the hearing.

3 At the end of the hearing, I allowed the Present Application and granted the permission sought by the Law Society. In coming to this decision, I also took into account the written submissions put forward by Mr Ng. I now set out the grounds for my decision.

4 The Present Application had its origins in a complaint made to the Law Society by a complainant (“Complainant”). I set out below the factual background to the complaint and the Present Application. It should be noted that this was essentially the case alleged against Mr Ng, and I did not make any findings as to any contested factual matters.

5 Mr Ng was admitted as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court on 12 February 1986 and held a practising certificate (“PC”) from 14 February 1986 until 31 March 1999. Mr Ng was made bankrupt by way of an order of court dated 9 February 2001 and was subsequently discharged from bankruptcy on 16 October 2018.

6 On 2 June 2017, the Complainant signed a Warrant to Act authorising Alpha Law LLC (“Alpha Law”) to act for him in divorce proceedings against his wife (“Wife”). By this point, interim judgment had already been obtained granting the divorce, and the outstanding issues concerned the division of their matrimonial assets and the custody of a child. These issues were heard on 24 September 2018 and were later decided: see TQT v TYU [2018] SGHCF 17 (“Judgment”). In the Judgment, the matrimonial assets were awarded in the ratio of 75% to the Wife and 25% to the Complainant.

7 The Complainant subsequently discharged Alpha Law and engaged counsel from PKWA Law Practice LLC (“PKWA”) to mount his appeal against the Judgment. However, the Complainant eventually decided to act in person for the appeal, which was heard on 25 September 2019. The appeal was successful with the matrimonial assets being apportioned in the revised ratio of 75% to the Complainant and 25% to the Wife: see TQU v TQT [2020] SGCA 8 (“TQT (CA)”).

8 The Law Society submitted that during the period between June 2017 and September 2019, Mr Ng acted as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of ss 32(1) and 33(1)(a) of the LPA, when he was an unauthorised person within the meaning of s 32(2) of the LPA. According to the Law Society, Mr Ng had done so by advising the Complainant on the law, and by drafting and revising court documents to be used in the Complainant’s divorce proceedings.

9 Specifically, the Law Society alleged that between June 2017 and September 2018, though the Complainant had instructed Alpha Law to act for him in his divorce proceedings, it was Mr Ng who took charge of the Complainant’s case, rendering advice to the Complainant and drafting documents for the Complainant’s use in the proceedings. In addition, the Law Society submitted that Mr Ong Meng Hwa William (“Mr Ong”), an advocate and solicitor who practised at Alpha Law at all material times, would appear at court hearings but otherwise had minimal involvement in the Complainant’s case. The Law Society also submitted that Mr Ng was paid $14,000 by “Mr Ong/Alpha Law” in respect of the work he did for the Complainant’s case. For the avoidance of doubt, Mr Ong’s conduct was separately investigated by the Law Society, and Mr Ong was not a party to the Present Application.

10 The Law Society further submitted that from October 2018 to September 2019, Mr Ng continued to advise the Complainant and to draft and revise documents for the proceedings, although the Complainant had at the same time engaged the services of PKWA for the conduct of his appeal against the Judgment.

11 In its supporting affidavit, the Law Society adduced transcripts of audio recordings of meetings between the Complainant and Mr Ng, which were made surreptitiously by the Complainant, and covered more than 30 hours of conversations. The Law Society also adduced email correspondence sent to the Complainant from both Mr Ng’s personal email and an email account belonging to a secretary at Alpha Law.

12 Initially, Mr Ng, in his written submissions, challenged the Law Society’s submission that a prima facie case had been made out. In this regard, Mr Ng asserted that he had, from the outset, informed the Complainant that he did not hold a PC. In addition, and specific to his involvement in the Complainant’s appeal against the Judgment, Mr Ng emphasised that he did not ask for or receive payment in connection with the work he had done in respect of the appeal. Instead, Mr Ng asserted that he had assisted the Complainant without charge because of his friendship with the Complainant. On the foregoing premise, Mr Ng sought to avail himself of the proviso in s 33(2) of the LPA, which states that it is an offence for an unauthorised person, directly or indirectly, to do any of the acts listed in ss 33(2)(a) to 33(2)(e) of the LPA unless he or she proves that the act was not done for or in expectation of any fee, gain or reward. However, as I explain below, Mr Ng’s reliance on this was questionable because the Law Society’s case against him was framed under s 33(1)(a) of the LPA.

13 Mr Ng, in his written submissions, also submitted that the Law Society’s delay in bringing the Present Application was a strong militating factor against the grant of permission. In this regard, Mr Ng referred to s 82A(6A)(a) of the LPA, and pointed out that some, or all, of the alleged misconduct had occurred more than six years before the Present Application was filed by the Law Society. There was a factual basis for this submission, since the Present Application was filed on 13 February 2026, more than six years after the appeal against the Judgment was heard in the Court of Appeal on 25 September 2019.

14 On 19 May 2026, two days before the Present Application was to be heard, Mr Ng sent the Law Society’s solicitors an email in which he stated, among other things, the following:

15 To determine whether permission should be granted for a disciplinary tribunal to be appointed in the present circumstances, the court applies the two-step framework set out by this court in Re Salwant Singh s/o Amer Singh [2019] 5 SLR 1037 (“Salwant Singh”) at [30]. This may be summarised as follows:

16 This is the approach I took in this case. However, I also consider that there is some benefit in clarifying the law pertaining to s 33 of the LPA, as well as the considerations relevant to the exercise of discretion under s 82A(6A)(a) of the LPA in applications involving non-practising solicitors such as Mr Ng. I accordingly begin with s 33 of the LPA.

17 Section 33 of the LPA prohibits an unauthorised person from acting as an advocate or solicitor. Sections 33(1) and 33(2) of the LPA are reproduced below for ease of reference:

18 The predecessor to s 33 of the LPA, namely, s 30 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1985 Rev Ed) (“1985 LPA”), together with the related provisions in the 1985 LPA were examined in Turner (East Asia) Pte Ltd v Builders Federal (Hong Kong) Ltd [1988] 1 SLR(R) 281 (“Turner”). In particular, while ss 29(1) and 30(1) of the 1985 LPA contained the expressions “practise as an advocate and solicitor”, “do any act as an advocate or a solicitor” and “acts as an advocate or a solicitor”, Chan Sek Keong JC (as he then was) observed (at [14]) that these expressions were not defined. This remains true for the version of the LPA presently in force; s 2(1) of the LPA only defines the terms “advocate and solicitor”, “advocate” and “solicitor” as “an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court”.

19 After canvassing several foreign authorities and the provisions of ss 29 and 30 of the 1985 LPA, Chan JC laid down (at [20]) two tests (cumulatively referred to as the “Turner tests”) to ascertain whether one is acting as an advocate and solicitor or doing an act as such:

(a) Other than those specific acts listed in ss 30(1) and 30(2) of the 1985 LPA (which are in essentially the same terms as ss 33(1) and 33(2) of the LPA presently in force), an act is an act of an advocate and solicitor when it is customarily (whether by history or tradition) within his exclusive function to provide, such as giving advice on legal rights and obligations, drafting contracts and pleadings, and pleading or appearing in a court of law (“First Turner test”).

(b) A person acts as an advocate and/or solicitor if, by reason of his being an advocate and solicitor, he is employed to act as such in any matter connected with his profession (“Second Turner test”).

20 Contrary to Mr Ng’s seeming understanding of s 33 of the LPA (referred to above at [12]), s 33(1) of the LPA is a general prohibition which is separate from the specific prohibition found in s 33(2) of the LPA. Crucially, and as noted in Turner at [14], s 33(2) explicitly states that it does not derogate from the generality of s 33(1) of the LPA. Cases decided after Turner support this interpretation: see, for example, Choo Cheng Tong Wilfred v Phua Swee Khiang [2021] SGHC 154 (“Wilfred Choo”) at [78].

21 Section 33(1) of the LPA itself contains three distinct prohibitions, namely, (a) acting as an advocate and solicitor, (b) doing any of the acts set out in s 33(1)(a) of the LPA as an advocate and solicitor, and (c) wilfully or falsely pretending to be an advocate and solicitor. I leave the last of these to one side for present purposes. At first glance, the structure of s 33(1) might seem to overlap with s 33(2) of the LPA: for instance, the actus reus of s 33(1)(a)(iii) appears to be virtually identical to that in s 33(2)(a) of the LPA. The former describes one who “draws or prepares any document or instrument relating to any proceeding in the courts in Singapore”, whereas the latter refers to one who “draws or prepares any document or instrument relating to any movable or immovable property or to any legal proceeding”.

22 But in my view, there is a distinction between ss 33(1)(a)(iii) and 33(2)(a) of the LPA, and it lies in whether the act in question is done “as such advocate, solicitor or agent”. This seems to me to be the additional element that is found in s 33(1)(a) but not in s 33(2) of the LPA.

23 In my view, s 33 of the LPA effectively imposes four prohibitions. One of these, under s 33(1)(b) of the LPA, has been noted at [21] above and this pertains to false pretences. The remaining three are not necessarily concerned with pretences, but concern the character of the acts done by an unauthorised person, and these prohibitions are of increasing specificity, as follows:

(a) First, s 33(1)(a) of the LPA prohibits any unauthorised person from acting as an advocate and solicitor. This is the most general of the three prohibitions and is readily explained by the Turner tests (set out above at [19]). For completeness, I concur with the view espoused in Wilfred Choo at [82], that the Turner tests should be read disjunctively and not conjunctively, such that only one of those tests needs to be satisfied for a person to be found to have acted as an advocate and solicitor. In the context of the general prohibition against acting as an advocate and solicitor, the First Turner test is likely to be especially relevant.

(b) Second, s 33(1)(a) of the LPA prohibits any unauthorised person from doing any of the acts set out in its subsections (namely, ss 33(1)(a)(i), 33(1)(a)(ii), 33(1)(a)(iii)) as an advocate and solicitor. Effectively, for this prohibition to be contravened, an unauthorised person must have done any of the acts set out in the subsections of s 33(1) in the capacity of an advocate and solicitor. This is where the distinction between ss 33(1)(a)(iii) and 33(2)(a) of the LPA may be meaningfully drawn; the former requires an examination into whether the drawing or preparing of the document was done as an advocate and solicitor, while the latter is not concerned with the capacity in which one draws or prepares the document. Again, whether one has acted in the capacity of an advocate and solicitor may be ascertained with reference to the Turner tests, and crucially, an unauthorised person may act in the capacity of an advocate and solicitor without holding out as an advocate and solicitor. To conclude otherwise would mean that this prohibition adds nothing to the prohibition against false pretences in s 33(1)(b) of the LPA, and that seems untenable to me. Here, again, it is the First Turner test that would typically be relevant, and the focus will often be on whether the respondent was engaged to do the acts in question because of some perceived ability, training, competence or professional position. In the example noted at [25] below, for instance, the New York attorneys were undoubtedly engaged by reason of their expertise as arbitration lawyers even though they were not professing to be advocates and solicitors.

(c) Third, s 33(2) of the LPA prohibits any unauthorised person from doing any of the acts specified in its remaining subsections (namely ss 33(2)(a), 33(2)(b), 33(2)(d) and 33(2)(e)), regardless of whether such person does so as an advocate and solicitor or not. In line with the plain wording of s 33, the proviso at the end of s 33(2) of the LPA is applicable only to this specific prohibition.

24 For completeness, I should sound a note of caution regarding one specific observation which was made in Turner at [14], reproduced below for ease of reference:

25 In my view, that passage should be seen in the light of the specific facts of Turner. In Turner, New York attorneys represented a party in arbitral proceedings, and the other party in those proceedings applied to the High Court for an injunction to restrain the attorneys from acting in the arbitration on account of ss 29 and 30 of the 1985 LPA. Even though the New York attorneys did not hold themselves out as advocates and solicitors, Chan JC found that their acting in the arbitration would have contravened ss 29 and 30 of the 1985 LPA, as this amounted to the provision of services customarily provided by advocates and solicitors.

26 Undoubtedly, ss 30(2)(a) to 30(2)(e) of the 1985 LPA would have aided the court in Turner in its assessment of whether an unauthorised person has acted as an advocate and solicitor. However, I think the doing of any of the acts specified in s 33(2) of the LPA by an unauthorised person who, for instance, is not and does not profess to be a legal practitioner, may not, without more, amount to doing such an act as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of ss 33(1)(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) of the LPA. To the extent that the specific acts in s 33(2) of the LPA do fall within the range of activities traditionally falling within the exclusive function of an advocate and solicitor, it seems plausible that this may amount to “acting as an advocate and solicitor” applying the First Turner test. I recognise that this might give rise to an overlap between the first and the third of the aforementioned prohibitions (see [23(a)] and [23(c)] above) that may need to be resolved. It was not necessary for me to come to a view on this to resolve the present matter, given that the alleged misconduct here was framed as giving rise to contraventions of s 33(1) of the LPA and, further, that Mr Ng did not contest that a prima facie case was made out for an investigation (see [14] above), and I therefore leave it open. It may be that the distinction lies in a possible difference between “acting” as an advocate and solicitor which suggests a course of conduct, rather than engaging in isolated acts, on the one hand, and doing the specific acts set out in s 33(2) of the LPA on the other hand; and/or in the fact that the prohibition under s 33(2) would typically be invoked where it is immaterial whether the prohibited acts were carried out or undertaken in the capacity of a legal practitioner, whereas the prohibitions under s 33(1) would typically be invoked where the acts were carried out as such a legal practitioner. In any case, I leave this for consideration on a future occasion.

27 As recounted above at [15], if a prima facie case is established, the Chief Justice should then consider any relevant factors in favour of, as well as militating against, an investigation into the alleged misconduct.

28 It is evident that delay is a relevant factor which may militate against the grant of leave. Indeed, s 82A(6A)(a) of the LPA provides that the Chief Justice may refuse to grant permission for an investigation to be made into a complaint of misconduct against a Judicial Service Officer, Legal Service Officer, Public Defence Officer (“PD Officer”), non‑practising solicitor or relevant lawyer (non-practitioner) (“lawyer (NP)”) if the application for such permission is made after the expiry of the period of six years from the date of the alleged misconduct.

29 In Law Society of Singapore v Chan Chun Hwee Allan [2018] 4 SLR 859 (“Allan Chan”), the Court of Three Judges offered guidance on the issue of delay in the context of the LPA provisions applicable to advocates and solicitors (namely, ss 85(4A) and 85(4C), pursuant to which leave must be obtained from the court before a complaint may be referred to the chairperson of the Inquiry Panel where the complaint is made more than six years from the alleged misconduct). And in Salwant Singh (at [62]–[64]), I provided guidance on how delay ought to be assessed in the context of complaints against Legal Service Officers, which are governed by s 82A of the LPA.

30 In my view, based on the principles enunciated in Allan Chan and Salwant Singh, the following propositions apply to all applications for leave under s 82A(5) of the LPA, regardless of whether the party subject to the complaint is a Judicial Service Officer, Legal Service Officer, PD Officer, non‑practising solicitor or relevant lawyer (NP):

(a) First, the decision whether to order an investigation or not is inevitably influenced by the public interest in safeguarding public confidence in the legal profession.

(b) Second, this is to be weighed against the interest of the party that is subject to the complaint, and in that regard, the court should consider any actual prejudice that may be occasioned to that party by reason of the delay and view that also in the context of the gravity of the offence.

31 Hence, it follows that the strength of the complaint and the gravity of the alleged misconduct are factors that bear on the public interest, and these may pull in favour of the discretion being exercised to permit the investigation even where there has been delay. However, this must be balanced against actual prejudice to the respondent that flows from the delay, and that pulls in the opposite direction.

32 A prima facie case for an investigation into a complaint of misconduct against a non-practising solicitor is made out where the evidence, if it is eventually accepted by the court, would be sufficient to prove every element of the alleged misconduct, either directly as a primary fact or inferentially as a secondary fact: see Re Nalpon Zero Geraldo Mario [2012] 3 SLR 440 at [22]–[24].

33 In the Present Application, leaving aside Mr Ng’s concession that there was a prima facie case for an investigation, I was satisfied that the evidence placed before me by the Law Society disclosed a prima facie case.

34 It was not disputed that Mr Ng did not hold a PC between June 2017 and September 2019, this being the period during which the Law Society alleged that Mr Ng was an unauthorised person who acted as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of ss 32(1) and 33(1)(a) of the LPA.

35 As set out above (at [9]), the Law Society submitted that between June 2017 and September 2018, Mr Ng took charge of the Complainant’s case, rendered legal advice to the Complainant and drafted documents for the Complainant’s proceedings in the High Court. The Law Society submitted that, by virtue of the foregoing, Mr Ng, an unauthorised person, had acted as an advocate and solicitor for the Complainant, contrary to s 33(1)(a) of the LPA.

36 As a matter of law, it is trite that the giving of legal advice is the exclusive function of advocates and solicitors and would satisfy the First Turner test. As the Law Society correctly pointed out, this view was supported by:

(a) Section 35(1)(c) of the LPA, which provides that ss 32 and 33 of the LPA do not extend to the giving of advice in relation to or arising out of arbitration proceedings; this carve-out for arbitration proceedings suggests that ss 32 and 33 do extend to the giving of legal advice in other settings.

(b) Turner, where “giving advice on legal rights and obligations” was listed (at [20(a)]) as an example of an act customarily within the exclusive purview of the work of an advocate and solicitor.

(c) Wilfred Choo, where it was recognised (at [83]) that “the giving of advice on legal rights and obligations … is one of the quintessential services rendered by advocates and solicitors”.

(d) Kassimatis, Theodoros KC v Attorney-General [2024] 1 SLR 1196 (“Kassimatis”), where the Court of Appeal observed (at [25]) that “[o]ne who offers advice on legal matters … will likely be caught by s 33 [of the LPA]”.

37 The evidence adduced by the Law Society demonstrated, on a prima facie basis, that Mr Ng had furnished the Complainant legal advice between June 2017 and September 2018. By way of illustration, the transcripts of the audio recordings of meetings between the two revealed the following:

(a) On 12 June 2017, Mr Ng explained to the Complainant that he bore the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that a specific property was purchased using inheritance moneys.

(b) On 15 June 2017, Mr Ng advised the Complainant not to pursue a separate action against the Wife to recover shares he had allegedly given to her.

(c) On 11 July 2017, Mr Ng told the Complainant to comply with the court’s directions on discovery for “a tactical reason”. Pertinently, this was prefaced by Mr Ng telling the Complainant that “it is [his] duty to advise [the Complainant]”.

(d) On 14 September 2017, Mr Ng advised the Complainant on the date of valuation of matrimonial assets and landmark judgments on this issue, followed by an application of these principles to specific properties belonging to the Complainant.

(e) On 4 June 2018, Mr Ng informed the Complainant of his views on the likely outcome of the High Court matter.

38 In addition, I was satisfied that the preparation of documents relating to a court proceeding is the exclusive function of advocates and solicitors and this too would satisfy the First Turner test. This view was supported by:

(a) Section 29(1) of the LPA, which states that advocates and solicitors have “the exclusive right to appear and plead in all courts of justice in Singapore”. In my view, documents tendered to the court, other than as evidence, would typically constitute written advocacy. It follows that if oral advocacy (“to appear and plead”) is the “exclusive right” of advocates and solicitors by virtue of s 29(1) of the LPA, the same must be true for written advocacy.

(b) Section 77(1)(b) of the LPA, which prohibits solicitors from permitting their name “to be made use of in any such proceeding or matter upon the account or for the profit of any unauthorised person”. This has the practical effect of prohibiting any advocate and solicitor from tendering legal documents in their name on behalf of an unauthorised person, which means that any legal document tendered to the court apparently prepared by an advocate and solicitor, must in fact have been prepared by or under the supervision of the advocate and solicitor.

(c) Kassimatis, where the Court of Appeal observed (at [25]) that one “who offers to draft a legal submission for reward will likely be caught by s 33” of the LPA.

39 The evidence adduced by the Law Society also demonstrated, on a prima facie basis, that Mr Ng had prepared documents for the Complainant’s use in the High Court proceedings between June 2017 and September 2018. Based on the transcripts of the audio recordings of meetings between the two, as well as emails adduced into evidence, it appeared that Mr Ng had drafted, among other things:

40 Further, and as set out above (at [10]), the Law Society submitted that from October 2018 to September 2019, Mr Ng continued to advise the Complainant and to draft and revise documents for proceedings in the Court of Appeal. The Law Society submitted that by virtue of the foregoing, Mr Ng, an unauthorised person, had yet again acted as an advocate and solicitor for the Complainant, in contravention of s 33(1)(a) of the LPA.

41 In a similar vein, I was satisfied based on the evidence adduced by the Law Society, that there was a prima facie case that Mr Ng gave legal advice to the Complainant in respect of his proceedings in the Court of Appeal:

(a) On 14 January 2019, Mr Ng explained to the Complainant that the Wife could not sell his properties yet and told the Complainant that he should apply for a stay of execution pending appeal. Mr Ng also told the Complainant what points he should raise before a Judge of the High Court at a hearing in chambers that he was to attend in person.

(b) On 5 September 2019, Mr Ng advised the Complainant, by way of an email, on the points he should raise to the Court of Appeal.

42 I was also satisfied that, based on the evidence adduced by the Law Society, there was a prima facie case that Mr Ng prepared the following documents for the Complainant to use in his proceedings in the Court of Appeal:

(a) a draft Appellant’s Case on or around March 2019; and

(b) a 21-page document with the cover page “Appellant’s Skeletal Submissions” on or around 31 July 2019.

43 Accordingly, I was satisfied that the evidence placed before me by the Law Society disclosed a prima facie case against Mr Ng of the alleged misconduct having occurred between June 2017 and September 2019. It was therefore unsurprising, as noted at [14] above, that Mr Ng accepted this, albeit belatedly.

44 As for the issue of delay, I was satisfied that the balancing exercise came down in favour of allowing the Present Application. First, as noted above, Mr Ng accepted that there was a prima facie case against him. Second, the Law Society’s case rested significantly on objective records and evidence, and there would not be undue prejudice to Mr Ng by reason of the delay. Third, the alleged misconduct was serious, and on the face of the record, the complaint appeared to relate to a pattern of such conduct, thereby heightening its gravity. In my view, the public interest in favour of permitting an investigation prevailed in this balancing exercise.

45 For the foregoing reasons, I allowed the Present Application and ordered that the costs of the Present Application be reserved to the disciplinary tribunal or, if the matter proceeds beyond that, to the Court of Three Judges.