1 HC/OA 988/2025 (“OA 988”) is an application brought by the Attorney-General (“AG”) against Mr Ng Kai Hoe Raymond (“Mr Ng”) and Ms Iris Koh Hsiao Pei (“Ms Koh”) (collectively, the “Respondents”), seeking orders under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”).

2 The AG’s primary case is that the Respondents are vexatious litigants within the meaning of s 74 of the SCJA. The AG applies for an order against each of the Respondents pursuant to the provision on the following terms (each a “Vexatious Litigant Order”, and collectively the “Vexatious Litigant Orders”):

(a) no civil proceedings are to be instituted without the permission of the General Division of the High Court (“GDHC”) by the Respondents (individually or collectively) in any court or subordinate court; and

(b) any civil proceedings instituted by the Respondents (individually or collectively) in any court or subordinate court before the making of this order must not be continued by the Respondents (individually or collectively) without the permission of the GDHC.

3 In the alternative, the AG’s case is that the Respondents have persisted in commencing actions or making applications which are totally without merit, and that an extended civil restraint order against each of them under s 73C of the SCJA would not be sufficient. The AG thus seeks a general civil restraint order against each of the Respondents under s 73D of the SCJA on the following terms (each a “GCRO”, and collectively the “GCROs”):

(a) the Respondents be restrained from (individually or collectively) commencing any civil action or making any civil application, in any court or subordinate court, without the permission of the GDHC;

(b) the Respondents may each apply to amend, vary or discharge his or her GCRO, provided that the GDHC grants permission to make that application; and

(c) the GCROs are to remain in force for a period of two years from the date they are made, or such time as may be extended by this court.

4 In response, the Respondents deny that they are vexatious litigants, or that they have persistently commenced actions and applications that are totally without merit. While the Respondents run different arguments, they generally also contend that even if the statutory requirements are satisfied, the court should exercise its residual discretion not to grant the orders sought, especially the Vexatious Litigant Orders. They argue that the severe measures sought are completely disproportionate to their conduct in question as self-represented persons (“SRPs”, and in the singular “SRP”), and would prejudice, impede or fetter their access to justice. Ms Koh also emphasises that “the application must be assessed against her individually and not against ‘the Respondents’ collectively” [emphasis in original]. ¹

5 Having considered the matter, I grant the Vexatious Litigant Order against Mr Ng and grant the GCRO against Ms Koh. These are my reasons.

6 The Respondents are married and have operated businesses together. ² Mr Ng is a management consultant. ³ He is associated with several ventures. This includes being the founder of an artificial intelligence platform named “GetEven.AI” and maintaining a blog which I will refer to as the “Vendshare Blog”. Ms Koh is the founder of a group known as “Healing the Divide”, which Mr Ng is also associated with. Ms Koh also operates a blog (“Healing the Divide Blog”). ⁴

7 To date, the Respondents have, individually or collectively, instituted various legal proceedings. In support of the application against Mr Ng, the AG relies on four main actions (three of which are jointly brought by the Respondents) and six applications within the three joint actions. As against Ms Koh, the AG relies on two out of the three joint actions, and the same six applications within the three joint actions. ⁵ I begin by briefly setting out the context to and the outcomes of these legal proceedings.

8 The first action, HC/OA 554/2024, is a judicial review application filed by the Respondents against the Health Sciences Authority (“HSA”), which arose out of the Respondents’ dissatisfaction with how COVID-19 vaccines were being advertised at the material time. ⁶ I shall refer to this as the “HSA JR Action”.

9 To elaborate, pursuant to the Respondents’ complaints, the HSA conducted investigations into an event organised by Pfizer called “Project Vax: Protect What Matters”. The Respondents alleged, inter alia, that celebrities had shared pledges made during the event on social media, in breach of cl 4(n) of the Health Products (Advertisement of Specified Health Products) Regulations 2016 (“Regulations”).

10 On 7 June 2024, the Respondents commenced the HSA JR Action, applying for a mandatory order to compel HSA to take action against any entity that used celebrities to advertise vaccinations. Subsequently, on 4 July 2024, the Respondents requested a change of relief and sought to compel HSA to, inter alia, have a “correct legal understanding” of the Regulations, or seek “to ensure that the correct legal interpretation is applied”.

11 The Respondents filed two applications within the HSA JR Action:

(a) HC/SUM 1835/2024, for costs to be awarded in advance of the HSA JR Action (“Advance Costs Application”); and

(b) HC/SUM 2669/2024, which was a discovery application to seek production of HSA internal policies and communications (“Discovery Application”).

12 The learned Justice Valerie Thean struck out the entirety of the HSA JR Action pursuant to HSA’s application, holding that: (a) the action disclosed no reasonable cause of action, (b) the action amounted to an abuse of process and (c) it was in the interests of justice to strike out the action. Given the striking out of the main action, the court made no order on the Respondents’ two applications. However, Thean J commented that the two applications were without much merit.

13 Second, I turn to DC/OC 1239/2024, which was a claim by the Respondents and three other individuals against Mr Calvin Cheng (“Mr Cheng”) for defamation filed on 29 July 2024 (“Defamation Action against Mr Cheng”). ⁷ The dispute arose from a Facebook post by Mr Cheng on 21 June 2024, in which he had allegedly made defamatory statements against the claimants concerning their purported misinformation about COVID-19 vaccinations. Mr Cheng’s Facebook post was made a day after messages were posted on social media by some of the claimants about COVID-19 vaccinations.

14 The learned District Judge Chiah Kok Khun (“DJ Chiah”) heard two applications, and delivered his judgment in Iris Koh Hsiao Pei v Calvin Cheng Ern Le [2024] SGDC 311 (“Calvin Cheng”) as follows.

15 First, by way of DC/SUM 1361/2024, the claimants sought an interlocutory injunction against Mr Cheng to require his removal of the allegedly defamatory comments and to cease from making further statements (“Injunction Application”). DJ Chiah dismissed the Injunction Application as, inter alia, the alleged defamatory statements were not clearly defamatory and there were possible applicable defences: Calvin Cheng at [109].

16 Second, by way of DC/SUM 1758/2024, Mr Cheng applied to strike out the claims of Mr Ng and two other claimants (“Three Claimants”). DJ Chiah allowed the application against the Three Claimants. He found that the Three Claimants had no locus standi as they failed to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the alleged defamatory statements refer to them. In the premises, DJ Chiah struck out the claims by the Three Claimants as (a) they disclosed no reasonable cause of action; (b) they constituted an abuse of process of the court; and (c) it was in the interests of justice to strike them out: Calvin Cheng at [110]. For the avoidance of doubt, the claim by Ms Koh and the other claimant is pending.

17 In relation to the third action, DC/OC 3/2025 was the Respondents’ claim against the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) and an unidentified “NUS Colleague” filed on 2 January 2025. ⁸ This will be referred to generally as the “Action against NUS”.

18 The action arose from an article published on 19 November 2024 by Associate Professor Dr Ben Leong (“Dr Leong”), who was employed by NUS, titled “Dummy’s Guide to LIP (Litigants-in Person) Lawfare”. In the article, Dr Leong discussed how there is a “New Lawfare Defamation Business Model” involving suing people for defamation. The article included a disclaimer by Dr Leong that the “[o]pinions expressed herewith are strictly [Dr Leong’s] as a private citizen and has nothing to do with [Dr Leong’s] employer, [NUS].”

19 The Respondents lodged a complaint over this article with NUS. This prompted NUS to conduct an internal investigation. Subsequently, on 24 November 2024, Dr Leong uploaded a post on Facebook regarding the internal investigation conducted by NUS. In this post, Dr Leong alluded to an unnamed colleague from NUS who had advised him on what to include in his statement to NUS. Thereafter, the Respondents sued NUS and the “NUS Colleague”.

20 The Respondents alleged, inter alia, that NUS was negligent, and also vicariously liable for various torts committed by Dr Leong, including defamation and conspiracy. According to the Respondents, the “NUS Colleague” had conspired with Dr Leong.

21 On 6 March 2025, NUS applied to strike out the Respondents’ claims in DC/SUM 391/2025 (“SUM 391”). This application was dealt with by the learned Deputy Registrar Allen Ng (“DR Ng”), who also dealt with the applications filed by the Respondents as follows:

(a) The Respondents’ application for substituted service on the unnamed “NUS Colleague” (“Service Application”) in DC/SUM 70/2025 was dismissed on 25 February 2025 as it was not established that it was impractical to effect personal service. Indeed, it was open for the Respondents to apply for pre-action production of information to find out this individual’s identity. The “NUS Colleague” remained unidentified.

(b) During the eve of the first substantive hearing for SUM 391, the Respondents emailed the court, seeking to expunge various paragraphs from the supporting affidavit filed on behalf of NUS (“Expungement Application”). This application was dismissed at the hearing on 8 May 2025.

(c) On 3 June 2025, the Respondents filed DC/SUM 1047/2025, asking for a “stay of whole action due to the introduction of inadmissible evidence and improper legal representation” (“First Stay Application”). ⁹ On 6 June 2025, this application was dismissed as the issue of inadmissible evidence had already been dealt with in the Expungement Application.

(d) During the fifth substantive hearing of the striking out application on 19 June 2025, the Respondents made an oral application to stay the proceedings as they made allegations of procedural misconduct against counsel for NUS (“Second Stay Application”). This application was not formally dismissed but DR Ng noted that the Respondents’ submissions “were misguided” and the hearing proceeded.

22 After five substantive hearings, DR Ng allowed NUS’s application to strike out the claim on 11 July 2025, with reasons set out in his notes of evidence (“NUS Liability Decision”). ¹⁰ Among other things, the court found that the Respondents did not have a reasonable cause of action in negligence or vicarious liability for conspiracy. Of further note is that thereafter, DR Ng awarded indemnity costs against the Respondents for the striking out application and the First Stay Application (“NUS Costs Decision”). ¹¹

23 Finally, the AG also relies on DC/OC 1154/2025, which was a claim for defamation by Mr Ng against Mr Wong Peng Kong (“Mr Wong”). I shall refer to this as the “Defamation Action against Mr Wong”.

24 The background to the dispute arose from Mr Wong’s sharing of an article on his Facebook account on 18 March 2021. The article was originally published by Rice Media Pte Ltd (“Rice Media”), titled “These Singaporeans Lost Money in a Financial Scheme. What Can They Actually Do About It?” (“Rice Media Article”). According to Mr Ng, the Rice Media Article contained words that were defamatory of him.

25 Mr Ng commenced the Defamation Action against Mr Wong on 24 June 2025. As Mr Wong did not participate in the proceedings, default judgment was entered in favour of Mr Ng. Eventually, the learned Deputy Registrar Navin Anand (“DR Anand”) awarded nominal damages of $1 to Mr Ng. In his judgment set out in Ng Kai Hoe Raymond v Wong Peng Kong [2026] SGDC 136 (“Wong Peng Kong”), ¹² DR Anand found that (a) there was limited publication of the article by Mr Wong; and (b) Mr Ng’s reputation was not deserving of legal protection: at [33]. DR Anand also concluded that the action “should never have been commenced”: at [51]. Mr Ng has since appealed against the decision.

26 I also note the Respondents’ involvement in, individually or collectively, a host of other cases. ¹³ Some of these cases have concluded; others are ongoing. Many are defamation actions, and proceedings under the Protection from Harassment Act 2014 (2020 Rev Ed) (“POHA”). In sum, the AG estimates that the Respondents have, individually or collectively, filed a total of 37 actions (excluding any applications within the actions) from May 2021 to January 2026.

27 I broadly set out the larger context of the Respondents’ conduct, as relied on by the AG. The Respondents have made various indications to file legal proceedings as follows:

(a) Mr Ng has stated his intention on the Vendshare Blog to sue “thousands” with the help of AI. Ms Koh has posted a TikTok video, declaring that “2024 will be the year that [she is] going to seek justice for [her] name and to restore what [she] lost”. ¹⁴

(b) The Respondents have embarked on a series of threatened and actual litigation in connection with an allegedly defamatory article published by The Straits Times on 10 February 2025, titled “Court orders Iris Koh, Raymond Ng’s items to be seized after they fail to pay costs in defamation suit” (“ST Article”). ¹⁵ Mr Gary Goh (“Mr Goh”) had shared the ST Article on Facebook. Subsequently, Mr Ng issued a letter of demand to Mr Goh (“LOD”), seeking $50,000 in damages, although Mr Ng offered to accept $5,000 to settle the dispute. In the LOD, Mr Ng also claimed that Mr Goh is likely to spend more than $100,000 to “continue the lawsuit to its very end”, and warned Mr Goh not to “embark on this path without thinking it through.” After Mr Goh’s solicitors refuted the claim, Mr Ng did not proceed with any further action. In relation to the ST Article, Ms Koh has commenced POHA actions against four media entities. ¹⁶

(c) Ms Koh has threatened to sue Raffles Girls School (Secondary) (“RGS”) for alleged defamation arising from an examination question which made reference to Ms Koh. ¹⁷ In this connection, Ms Koh posted, among other things, multiple videos on her TikTok account. Likewise, Mr Ng has posted about this matter on his TikTok account and the Vendshare Blog. Ms Koh has not filed any proceedings against RGS.

(d) Mr Ng has threatened to sue the Singapore Police Force, the Ministry of Health, the Commercial Affairs Department, the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore and the Monetary Authority of Singapore. ¹⁸ This arose in relation to a Facebook post made by Ms Geno Ong (“Ms Ong”) where she claimed to have had a meeting with officials from the government agencies to discuss the Respondents. At that time, Ms Ong was separately being sued by Mr Ng for defamation. Ms Ong has since passed away.

28 I also highlight some other aspects of the Respondents’ conduct, again as relied on by the AG:

(a) The Respondents have treated potential litigation to be a source of income, for example, using terms such as “litigation income”. ¹⁹ During the Action against NUS, the Respondents alleged that they suffered losses from postponing the filing of “hundreds of other suits” (which I address further at [57] below).

(b) Mr Ng has stated that he would compensate individuals who report defamatory statements made against the Respondents, should the Respondents succeed in obtaining financial damages against the statement-makers. ²⁰

(c) Mr Ng’s GetEven.AI platform has been publicised on the Vendshare Blog and the Healing the Divide Blog. ²¹

(d) The Respondents have sought to crowdfund by seeking donations from the public to cover their litigation costs and adverse costs orders. ²²

29 With this background in mind, I turn to consider whether to impose the Vexatious Litigant Orders on the Respondents.

30 Section 74 of the SCJA provides for a vexatious litigant order to be made as follows:

31 At the outset, I observe that the Vexatious Litigant Orders sought by the AG are narrower in scope than provided for within s 74(1)(a)–(b) of the SCJA. While a vexatious litigant order may be made in relation to all legal proceedings instituted by a vexatious litigant, here, the AG seeks to impose restraints limited to civil proceedings instituted by the Respondents (see [2] above).

32 Returning to the applicable law, a vexatious litigant order does not deprive a litigant of the right of access to justice in an absolute manner but merely qualifies the exercise of that right: Attorney-General v Tee Kok Boon [2008] 2 SLR(R) 412 (“Tee Kok Boon”) at [77]. As explained by the Court of Appeal in Lai Swee Lin Linda v Attorney-General [2016] 5 SLR 476 (“Linda Lai”) at [7]–[9], the objectives for imposing such an order are threefold:

(a) First, and principally, a vexatious litigant order prevents an abuse of the process of the court. It allows the court to strike a balance between allowing litigants to enjoy their right to have unfettered access to the courts, and protecting the courts from being inundated with endless and unmeritorious litigation to the detriment of other parties with meritorious causes.

(b) Second, a vexatious litigant order serves to protect the opposing party who faces a litany of legal proceedings brought by the vexatious litigant.

(c) Third, a vexatious litigant order also safeguards the vexatious litigant from himself. If such an order is not made, the vexatious litigant is very likely to persist indefinitely in instituting legal proceedings.

33 Parties do not dispute that for a vexatious litigant order to be imposed, the court has to be satisfied of three broad requirements in that a person has: (a) “habitually” and “persistently” and (b) “without any reasonable ground”, (c) “instituted vexatious legal proceedings”. I go through these aspects in turn.

34 The terms “habitually” and “persistently” are to be given their ordinary meaning. No technical meaning is specifically ascribed to these ordinary English words for the purpose of s 74(1) of the SCJA. As set out in Linda Lai at [10], these words are commonly interpreted in the following manner:

(a) “Habitually” suggests the institution of legal proceedings that are almost as a matter of course or almost automatically when the appropriate conditions exist.

(b) “Persistently” suggests determination and the act of doggedly continuing in the face of difficulty or opposition.

35 Likewise, “vexatious” is to be given its ordinary meaning. In Linda Lai at [11] and [24], “vexatious” proceedings include those that are:

(a) instituted with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the opposing party;

(b) brought for collateral purposes and not for the purpose of having the court adjudicate on the legitimate issues which arise; or

(c) so obviously untenable or groundless as to be utterly hopeless, regardless of whether the litigant’s motives are wholly innocent.

36 It is plain from s 74(5) of the SCJA that “legal proceedings” include, inter alia, any action and any application made within. Further, a broad reading of the phrase “instituted … legal proceedings” is warranted. A step taken which, if successful, sets in train the machinery of the court would be tantamount to an institution of legal proceedings: Attorney-General v Tham Yim Siong [2017] 5 SLR 1206 (“Tham Yim Siong”) at [57]. There, a document that was lodged for filing but rejected by the Registry was found to fall within this definition.

37 To add to the above, a “pattern of conduct” on the part of the vexatious litigant is necessary. The mere institution of vexatious legal proceedings, without more, does not engage s 74(1) of the SCJA: Linda Lai at [10]. The court takes an objective view of the facts in deciding whether a litigant’s conduct falls within s 74(1) of the SCJA: Linda Lai at [13]. It is immaterial that the litigant may have acted in good faith in bringing the legal proceedings concerned or that he genuinely believes in the justice of his cause and may not understand that his case has already been authoritatively dealt with by the court: Linda Lai at [13], citing Tee Kok Boon at [106] and [121] and Attorney-General v Mah Kiat Seng [2013] 4 SLR 788 at [17].

38 As for the requirement of the vexatious legal proceedings being instituted “without any reasonable ground”, it appears to me that this includes an objective examination on the merits of the legal proceedings. Indeed, in Tham Yim Siong at [63], it was found that the applications were “devoid of merit whatsoever” such that they were brought “without any reasonable ground”. In this connection, it is relevant to consider any reasoning proffered by a court with respect to the legal proceedings that are relied upon. This may demonstrate that there were no reasonable grounds to bring such legal proceedings.

39 I should add that I accept Mr Ng’s submission that an analogy may be drawn to one of the tests for a striking out of an action, in that the element of “without any reasonable ground” is likely satisfied where an action is legally or factually unsustainable. ²³ It seems to me that where an action has been struck out under O 9 r 16(1) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC”), particularly on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, it is a paradigm example of a proceeding that is likely instituted “without any reasonable ground”.

40 It has been noted that proceedings that are so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless “must necessarily satisfy” the requirement of the proceedings being instituted “without any reasonable ground”: Tee Kok Boon at [105], citing Attorney-General v Betts [2004] NSWSC 901 at [10] which was in turn citing Attorney General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481 at 491 (“Wentworth”). I reproduce the relevant paragraph of Wentworth at 491:

41 It may then be observed that there is some overlap between the requirements of “without any reasonable ground” and “vexatious” legal proceedings, in so far as proceedings that are so obviously untenable (under [35(c)] above) are likely to satisfy both requirements. Nonetheless, both requirements remain distinct. As may be seen at [35] above, the requirement of “vexatious” legal proceedings is wide enough to encompass an assessment that goes beyond the merits of the case. This is because the institution of “vexatious” legal proceedings may also be demonstrated through an objective assessment of whether the litigant’s intention was, for example, to annoy or to achieve collateral purposes (see [35(a)–(b)] above). Should either of the grounds under [35(a)–(b)] above be relied on to prove that the legal proceedings are “vexatious”, it must then further be shown that the legal proceedings are instituted are “without any reasonable ground”, under which an objective assessment of the merits is undertaken. This was a point also made in Wentworth at 491 (see [40] above).

42 I should add that there is no “magic number” of legal proceedings required before a litigant would be labelled as vexatious. As the Court of Appeal observed, although the number of legal proceedings that have been brought by the litigant may be relevant to the question of whether he has been instituting vexatious legal proceedings habitually and persistently, it is not determinative and should not be given undue weight. Instead, the court must take a broad view of all the legal proceedings that have been instituted by the litigant and consider whether the general character and result of those proceedings cause him to fall within the category: Linda Lai at [14].

43 According to Linda Lai, the hallmark of a vexatious litigant is one who is unable to accept the finality of court decisions and repeatedly brings vexatious legal proceedings to re-litigate matters: at [12]. It is common ground among the parties that this is merely an illustration of an archetypal vexatious litigant. I agree. Further, I note that under the plain language of s 74(1) of the SCJA, it does not matter whether the vexatious legal proceedings were instituted against the same person or against different persons.

44 As an aside, the AG draws my attention to Attorney-General (NSW) v Klewer (No 3) (2010) 264 ALR 535 (“Klewer”) at [294], where the court found that out-of-court statements threatening or discussing litigation may be considered to demonstrate the persistence or a collateral purpose for which litigation may have been brought. ²⁴ I agree, to the extent that out-of-court statements appear to be relevant to the question of whether the legal proceedings were instituted with an intention to annoy or embarrass the opposing party, or for collateral purposes, thereby demonstrating that the proceedings were vexatious (see [35(a)–(b)] above). Indeed, in Tham Yim Siong at [62(a)], the court considered the fact that the first respondent had publicised his applications on Facebook, which demonstrated that those applications were brought with the principal purpose of embarrassing the defendants to those applications.

45 As highlighted by the parties, even if the three requirements of s 74(1) of the SCJA are satisfied, the court retains a residual discretion not to grant a vexatious litigant order. However, as observed by the Court of Appeal, it is unlikely (though not inconceivable) that a court will decline to grant the application when it has concluded that the litigant is vexatious: Linda Lai at [16]. With these legal principles in mind, I turn to the case against Mr Ng.

46 The AG asserts that the Vexatious Litigant Order should be imposed on Mr Ng. As set out at [7] above, the AG’s position is that Mr Ng has commenced four main actions and six applications within those actions which have been adjudged to be substantively unmeritorious and/or an abuse of process. ²⁵ These are described at [8] to [25] above. The AG submits that the findings of the various courts, the substantive adverse outcomes and the costs orders are proof that the proceedings were brought without any reasonable ground and vexatious. ²⁶

47 According to the AG, the number of vexatious legal proceedings instituted by Mr Ng suffices to establish habituality and persistence. ²⁷ The AG points to the Respondents’ out-of-court conduct to demonstrate their “collective efforts to annoy, embarrass and pressure” the opposing parties to the legal proceedings. ²⁸ Moreover, to demonstrate Mr Ng’s collateral purposes, the AG submits that the Respondents treat litigation as an “income source” through “various lawfare tactics”. ²⁹ Their operation includes the generation of claims, the extraction of settlement payments, the advertising of GetEven.AI services and obtaining crowdfunding and sponsorship. ³⁰

48 To resist the Vexatious Litigant Order, Mr Ng submits that he has not commenced legal proceedings “habitually” and “persistently” as he has been “willing and accepting of the various courts’ decisions”. He has not persisted in litigation against the same individuals in matters which have achieved finality. For ongoing matters, his claims have not been struck out. ³¹ Indeed, Mr Ng claims that he has refrained from suing certain parties, such as the five government agencies (see [27(d)] above), demonstrating that he does not automatically institute legal proceedings. ³²

49 Mr Ng claims that when undertaking a broad overview of all legal proceedings he instituted, there lacks the quality of vexatiousness. ³³ In relation to the legal proceedings relied on by the AG, there is no indication that he sought to embarrass or annoy the opposing parties. Additionally, he denies that he has commenced legal proceedings for collateral purposes as his pursuits, monetary or otherwise, would not constitute a collateral purpose. ³⁴

50 Mr Ng contends that the “without any reasonable ground” element is not satisfied. He reasons that the three of his cases which have been struck out were due to “bad pleadings” and his other proceedings have been shown to be legally and factually sustainable. ³⁵

51 Overall, Mr Ng argues that the requirements under s 74(1) of the SCJA have not been satisfied. In the alternative, the court should exercise its residual discretion and not impose such an order as the majority of his proceedings were conducted by him as an SRP. ³⁶

52 In my view, Mr Ng has instituted four main actions and seven applications without any reasonable ground. (To digress, I explain at [64] below how I arrive at one more application than submitted by the AG.) The reasoning by the court in each of these legal proceedings is key, to which I turn to examine.

53 First, the HSA JR Action and the two applications within the action were without merit. In striking out the HSA JR Action, Thean J held that the action “disclose[d] no reasonable cause of action”. ³⁷ Importantly, the court also found that the Respondents were “pursuing a hypothetical question” which amounted to “an abuse of the process of court”.

54 In relation to the two applications filed by the Respondents (ie, the Advance Costs Application and the Discovery Application), no order was made by the court since these applications became moot in light of the claim being struck out. Nonetheless, Thean J deemed it fit to comment that “[i]t would have been plain the applications do not really have much merit”. In light of these findings, it is apparent to me that there were indeed no reasonable grounds to bring these two applications.

55 Second, the Defamation Action against Mr Cheng was similarly struck out against the Three Claimants, ie, Mr Ng and two other claimants. DJ Chiah found that all three grounds of striking out under O 9 r 16(1) of the ROC were applicable. As set out at [16] above, Mr Ng’s claim was found to be factually and legally unsustainable and he lacked the requisite locus standi to commence his claim against Mr Cheng. Therefore, Mr Ng’s claim was plainly and obviously unsustainable, disclosed no reasonable cause of action and constituted an abuse of court processes: Calvin Cheng at [102], [104] and [106]. The court opined that Mr Ng’s claim “should not have been filed”: Calvin Cheng at [106]. In the circumstances, it is clear that Mr Ng had, without any reasonable ground, taken out the Defamation Action against Mr Cheng.

56 Turning to the Injunction Application filed by the claimants (which included the Respondents) within the Defamation Action against Mr Cheng. It is of note that the claimants failed to establish any of the requirements for an interlocutory injunction in a defamation claim. DJ Chiah held that the alleged defamatory statements were not clearly defamatory; two possible defences to defamation applied; there was no evidence that Mr Cheng intended to repeat the statements; and there was no evidence of the existence of special circumstances to grant the injunction: Calvin Cheng at [71]. Based on the foregoing, the court opined that the Injunction Application “fail[ed] on all fronts” and, importantly, that it was “wholly misconceived” [emphasis added]: Calvin Cheng at [72]. Therefore, while a court should be slow to find that the dismissal of a proceeding, without more, is evidence that it was brought without any reasonable ground, based on my perusal of DJ Chiah’s reasoning, I am satisfied that the Injunction Application was brought without any reasonable ground.

57 Third, for the Action against NUS, the Respondents’ claims against NUS were struck out. In particular, the Respondents’ claims failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action against NUS in negligence, or for vicarious liability (for Dr Leong’s alleged defamation and for conspiracy): NUS Liability Decision at [52], [57], [63] and [77]. Specifically, on the Respondents’ allegation that the conspiracies involving NUS resulted in actionable losses arising from, inter alia, the Respondents postponing the filing of “hundreds of other suits”, DR Ng described this as “vague”, “speculative”, “hypothetical”, and that it “embarrasses” and “prejudices” NUS in the conduct of its defence: NUS Liability Decision at [71], [75(b)] and [76]. (As an aside, the Respondents’ position clearly reflects their treatment of potential litigation as a source of income.) Indeed, subsequently, DR Ng concluded that the Respondents’ conduct in the striking out application and First Stay Application was “unreasonable”, even accounting for the fact that they were SRPs (NUS Costs Decision at [21]). DR Ng thus awarded costs on an indemnity basis for the striking out application and the First Stay Application.

58 Nonetheless, DR Ng opined that he was “not prepared” to find that the commencement of the same was unreasonable, or that the Respondents brought the action “in bad faith, as a means of oppression, improper purpose, etc”. He further opined that he was “unable to discount the possibility that the claim was a misguided attempt at vindicating their legal rights”: NUS Costs Decision at [20]. The Respondents rely heavily on these observations by DR Ng in the NUS Costs Decision. ³⁸ However, I agree with the AG that strictly speaking, DR Ng made neutral findings. As advanced by the AG during the hearing, DR Ng neither found that the commencement of the action was unreasonable, nor that it was reasonable to have done so. For present purposes, this court may consider the matter of whether the proceedings were brought without any reasonable ground afresh. What emerges is that the Action against NUS was brought without any reasonable ground as none of the pleaded causes of action disclosed a reasonable cause of action against NUS. In such circumstances, it is immaterial that a litigant may have acted in good faith in bringing the legal proceedings concerned: Linda Lai at [13].

59 In respect of the Respondents’ applications filed in the Action against NUS, DR Ng dismissed the Service Application, the Expungement Application and First Stay Application as follows: ³⁹

(a) In dismissing the Service Application, DR Ng disagreed with the Respondents’ submission that it was impracticable to identify the unnamed “NUS Colleague”. This was because it was open to the Respondents to obtain the requisite information through an application for pre-action production of information, and DR Ng stated that the Respondents themselves were aware of this option, and there was “nothing to prevent them from taking that step”.

(b) Under the Expungement Application, the Respondents’ main contention was that evidence was not admissible for a striking out application under O 9 r 16(1)(a) of the ROC. The Expungement Application was dismissed because, inter alia, it was incorrect for the Respondents to submit that NUS was barred from adducing affidavit evidence which went to the merits of a case since it was clear that NUS also relied on O 9 rr 16(1)(b)–(c) of the ROC and the court’s inherent jurisdiction to strike out the claim. As the AG points out, the Respondents had earlier made a similar argument during the HSA JR Action that no evidence was admissible for the striking out application. ⁴⁰ There, it was explained to the Respondents during the hearing that evidence was admissible should the application be made on the grounds of O 9 rr 16(1)(b)–(c) of the ROC. ⁴¹ The Respondents were thus apprised of the fact that affidavit evidence could be used to support an application under O 9 rr 16(1)(b)–(c) of the ROC during the HSA JR Action and having been made aware of such, there was no reasonable ground to repeat such an argument during the Expungement Application.

(c) DR Ng characterised the First Stay Application as the Respondents’ refusal to accept the dismissal of the Expungement Application, and as part of their “multiple attempts to relitigate the issue” which caused wastage of time and costs. This was because under the First Stay Application, the Respondents had repeated their submission of the inadmissibility of evidence that was already dealt with in the Expungement Application. The court noted that the First Stay Application was “not the correct forum to ventilate any dissatisfaction with his decision”.

60 While DR Ng did not formally dismiss the Second Stay Application, I am satisfied that the Second Stay Application, being an oral application that was made during the hearing, was nonetheless a relevant legal proceeding as it was a step taken that set in train the court’s machinery (see [36] above). With respect to the Second Stay Application, the Respondents alleged, inter alia, that there was tampering of Dr Leong’s Facebook post and that the affidavit filed on behalf of NUS was misleading. After clarifications from counsel for NUS, the Respondents admitted that they had “made a mistake”. DR Ng noted that the Respondents’ submissions in support of the Second Stay Application were “misguided”.

61 From the foregoing, I am of the view that, overall, these four applications within the Action against NUS were filed without any reasonable ground.

62 Finally, the Defamation Action against Mr Wong is another instance of a proceeding that was brought without any reasonable ground. I am mindful that Mr Ng obtained judgment. However, this was a default judgment entered in favour of Mr Ng because Mr Wong did not participate in the proceedings to contest liability. This was not a judgment on merits. More importantly, during the assessment of damages, DR Anand awarded only nominal damages and made several comments of note:

(a) First, DR Anand observed that the Defamation Action against Mr Wong was an action which “should never have been commenced”: Wong Peng Kong at [51]. This was because the extent of publication was manifestly limited and there was de minimis damage to Mr Ng’s reputation: Wong Peng Kong at [41].

(b) Second, DR Anand found Mr Ng’s lack of candour regarding his prior defamation action in respect of the Rice Media Article to be troubling: Wong Peng Kong at [46]. For context, based on the Rice Media Article, Mr Ng (and two other claimants) had previously commenced a defamation action against, among others, Rice Media (“Defamation Action against Rice Media”). In the Defamation Action against Rice Media, an unless order was imposed where the claimants (including Mr Ng) were ordered to provide disclosure, failing which the action would be struck out. As they failed to comply with the unless order, the Defamation Action against Rice Media was dismissed, with judgment entered in favour of the defendants (including Rice Media). An application to set aside the judgment was dismissed, and no appeal was filed against this decision: Wong Peng Kong at [8]. In other words, the claimants (including Mr Ng) failed to obtain any relief or damages against Rice Media (and the other defendants), and the Rice Media Article continues to remain accessible online: Wong Peng Kong at [9]. DR Anand was troubled by Mr Ng’s attempt to downplay the outcome of this prior defamation action given that other actions commenced by Mr Ng for damages in respect of publication of words to the same effect were relevant.

(c) Third, as DR Anand observed, Mr Ng has other pending defamation actions regarding the Rice Media Article and DR Anand was of the view that the way Mr Ng commenced the various defamation actions after the dismissal of the Defamation Action against Rice Media “calls for a proper explanation”: Wong Peng Kong at [47].

63 Overall, notwithstanding that default judgment was granted in favour of Mr Ng, it does not appear to me that there was any reasonable ground in bringing the action against Mr Wong, based on the observations made by DR Anand.

64 By all of the above, I find that the four actions and seven applications were brought without any reasonable ground. While the AG seeks to rely on four actions and six applications in relation to Mr Ng, this seems to be because the AG only emphasises the three unsuccessful applications within the Action against NUS. ⁴² However, as I have found at [59]–[60] above, there are four relevant applications within the action, including the Second Stay Application. This brings the total number of proceedings that were brought without any reasonable ground to four actions and seven applications. Moreover, it does not suffice for Mr Ng to say that the cases that have been struck out were due to “bad pleadings” (see [50] above). ⁴³ It is clear from the grounds of the respective courts in the matters that the actions and applications were substantively unmeritorious.

65 Turning to the element of vexatiousness, in my view, this is fulfilled on the basis that the relevant legal proceedings are so obviously untenable or groundless so as to be utterly hopeless. Indeed, pursuant to my observation at [41] above, stemming from my finding that the legal proceedings were instituted “without any reasonable ground”, it follows that the obviously untenable proceedings would likewise satisfy the element of vexatiousness.

66 I would further add that it appears to me that Mr Ng has brought the legal proceedings for collateral purposes. To reiterate, the AG relies on three main planks to demonstrate Mr Ng’s collateral purposes: ⁴⁴

(a) First, the fact that Mr Ng has described potential litigation to be a source of income. For example, in the Action against NUS, Mr Ng claimed that his loss lies in not receiving a settlement sum. ⁴⁵

(b) Second, Mr Ng stands to gain from the publicity of his GetEven.AI platform — he charges $1,000 for individuals to use the platform to “[s]ue [t]hose [w]ho [h]urt [them]!” ⁴⁶ In fact, he advertised the use of GetEven.AI for legal proceedings.

(c) Finally, apart from his calls to the public for donations, Mr Ng has also publicised his “sponsorship scheme” on TikTok where an individual can “sponsor” his lawsuit and “get returns”. ⁴⁷

67 Viewing the planks in tandem, coupled with the fact that the legal proceedings were instituted without any reasonable ground, it does not appear to me that these legal proceedings were brought to address any genuine grievances. It does not seem to me that Mr Ng brought those legal proceedings to have the court adjudicate on the issues which arise but rather disturbingly, in furtherance of the collateral purposes set out above.

68 I would add that the manner in which Mr Ng issues letters of demand fortifies my view that his institution of the relevant legal proceedings was not to adjudicate genuine disputes. Mr Ng’s evidence is that the LOD he issued to Mr Goh (see [27(b)] above) is “based on a template that [he] use[s] for all [his] letters offering such amicable resolution to other parties” and that he “only [has] to update the addressee’s details each time [he] send[s] a letter to the specified recipient”. ⁴⁸ I am mindful that Mr Ng did not eventually institute proceedings against Mr Goh. However, in light of Mr Ng’s admission that he uses the same template when issuing all of his letters of demand, the content of the LOD is of relevance. It is revealing that in the LOD, Mr Ng demands damages of $50,000 but, in the same breath, is willing to accept $5,000 to settle the claim. There appears to me to be a disconnect between the losses Mr Ng claims to have suffered and what he is willing to accept as compensation to settle the claim. Further, the LOD also reiterates that litigation is “inherently stressful and time-consuming” and that bringing the matter to trial would likely incur costs of over $10,000 to $100,000. The recipient is informed “not [to] embark on this path without thinking it through”. ⁴⁹ Based on the contents of the LOD, it seems to me that Mr Ng’s issuance of the LOD is a veiled attempt at extracting a settlement and not to resolve a genuine dispute. While it is unclear whether letters akin to the LOD were issued in respect of the relevant legal proceedings, the LOD nonetheless throws some light on Mr Ng’s broad motivations in the conduct of litigation.

69 It is also likely that Mr Ng had the intention to annoy his opposing parties. One clear illustration lies in Mr Ng’s conduct in the Action against NUS. He had sent multiple emails to NUS and, while this was a civil action for defamation, he had blind-copied various non-parties to the action, such as the Ministry of Law, Ministry of Health, the Attorney-General’s Chambers and journalists “from major press outlets [which were] too many to list”. ⁵⁰

70 For completeness, I address Mr Ng’s general contention that taking a broad view of all the proceedings he has instituted, it cannot be said that the requirements of a Vexatious Litigant Order are made out since only three of his actions have been struck out. ⁵¹ First, this submission does not take into account the failed applications made by Mr Ng which I have also found to be relevant. Second, the import of Linda Lai at [14] (see [42] above) is that it is not the case that each and every proceeding taken out by a litigant must individually be examined to conclude that he or she is vexatious. Rather, the court takes a broad view of all the proceedings and considers whether their general character and results reveal a pattern of conduct which supports such a conclusion. Ultimately, there is no “magic number” of legal proceedings required for a vexatious litigant order to be imposed. In this vein, based on my assessment of the proceedings above, it suffices to establish the requisite general pattern of conduct.

71 I turn to the qualities of habituality and persistence, and begin with a few cases where the courts have found them to be present:

(a) In Linda Lai, the defendant instituted numerous legal proceedings against the government arising from the termination of her employment. The court was of the view that she would continue to institute legal proceedings to revive her claims “unless and until a court finds for her and gives her exactly the relief she seeks”: at [77].

(b) In Tham Yim Siong at [60], the first defendant evinced a “clear pattern of conduct … in repeatedly attempting to file proceedings notwithstanding that each proceeding was, in turn, struck out and dismissed or rejected by the courts”. In relation to the second and third defendants, they were only parties to two applications. Nonetheless, the applications taken out by the first defendant were also relevant as these were based on the same factual issues as the second and third defendants’ applications: at [61]. The court found habituality and persistence in respect of all three defendants.

(c) In Klewer, the defendant commenced over sixty proceedings and appeals that were unsuccessful save for a few minor exceptions: at [329] and [338]. The “number and timing” of the defendant’s proceedings satisfied the court that she had habitually and persistently instituted them. It showed that the defendant’s “demonstrated preferred response to conflict” was to “commence proceedings in circumstances where none [were] warranted”: at [336].

(d) It was observed in Brogden v Attorney-General [2001] NZAR 809 (“Brogden”) at [21] that the court can consider a pattern of behaviour involving: (a) a failure to accept an inability to further challenge decisions where the appeal process has been exhausted; or (b) the attacking of a range of defendants drawn into the “widening circle of litigation solely because of an association with a defendant against whom a prior proceeding has failed”. I note that the court in Brogden was discussing this in relation to the requirement of persistence. Nonetheless, relating this back to the definition of “habitual” in Linda Lai at [34(a)] above, it appears to me that the institution of legal proceedings against a party as a matter of course when the appropriate conditions exist, in this case, because of that party’s association with a defendant, goes towards meeting the habituality requirement.

72 Overall, I am satisfied that Mr Ng has “habitually” and “persistently” instituted vexatious legal proceedings. Some parallel may be drawn to the authorities I have canvassed above. It appears to me that Mr Ng exhibits a clear pattern of conduct in filing legal proceedings despite being met with actions that have been struck out against him or dismissed against him for want of merit. Based on my survey of Mr Ng’s proceedings that have been brought without any reasonable ground, it paints a picture that these proceedings are his preferred response to conflict even if they were not justified.

73 Mr Ng claims that he has not instituted additional actions against the same defendant or against the finality of a decision. ⁵² However, I accept the AG’s contention that Mr Ng has in fact attempted to re-litigate matters conclusively decided by the courts. ⁵³ This is clearly illustrated in the First Stay Application that was taken out in the Action against NUS, which DR Ng noted to be a manifestation of the Respondent’s refusal to accept the dismissal of the Expungement Application (see [59(c)] above). Moreover, such conduct is egregious when considering the fact that the Expungement Application was, in itself, a repetition of the same line of argument made by the Respondents during the striking out of the HSA JR Action (see [59(b)] above). I should add that the Respondents also persisted in the course of action to stay the proceedings by way of the Second Stay Application. Likewise of note are Mr Ng’s various defamation actions in relation to the Rice Media Article, notwithstanding the dismissal of the prior defamation action on the same subject matter, ie, the Defamation Action against Rice Media (see [62(b)–(c)] above).

74 Further, it also seems to me that Mr Ng takes out proceedings as a matter of course, targeting a range of defendants that are drawn into a widening circle of litigation due to an association with a defendant against whom a prior proceeding has failed: Brogden at [21]. This is apparent from how after the Defamation Action against Rice Media failed, Mr Ng’s strategy then shifted to launching an action against a stranger (ie, Mr Wong) some four years after Mr Wong had shared the article on Facebook. ⁵⁴ In a similar fashion, the Action against NUS, which was taken out against NUS and an unnamed “NUS Colleague”, followed as a matter of course due to their association with Dr Leong, despite the latter having published the allegedly defamatory article. While Mr Ng has not filed an action against Dr Leong, it is nonetheless clear that the defendants to the Action against NUS were targeted on the basis of their association to Dr Leong. Once Mr Ng fixates on a target, which may be an individual or a particular subject matter, he takes out proceedings almost as a matter of course on those associated, resulting in a widening circle of litigation.

75 From the analysis above, the requirements under s 74(1) of the SCJA are met. In my judgment, there are no reasons to exercise my residual discretion not to impose the Vexatious Litigant Order on Mr Ng. To persuade me to the contrary, I note Mr Ng’s reliance on his capacity as an SRP. Mr Ng submits that he had “limited experience having conduct of matters as an [SRP]” in the matters that were struck out. ⁵⁵

76 However, the court’s indulgence to an SRP is not to be expected as a matter of entitlement: Mak-Levrion Kah Kay Natasha v R Shiamala [2024] 4 SLR 616 (“Mak-Levrion”) at [10]. Any latitude given to an SRP cannot extend indefinitely to excuse the SRP’s own conscious decisions: Madina Beevi Abdul Jameel v M Akbar bin Mohamed Ibrahim [2024] SGHC 199 at [16]. In this vein, I do not see how Mr Ng’s conscious decisions to institute vexatious legal proceedings, in a manner that was habitual, persistent and without reasonable ground, can be afforded much indulgence. In any event, the extent of leeway given to SRPs differs depending on whether they are experienced litigants and it cannot be said that Mr Ng (and Ms Koh, for that matter) were “unfamiliar with legal proceedings”, having instituted and acted in various proceedings: Mak-Levrion at [11(d)].

77 For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that Mr Ng has habitually and persistently and without reasonable ground, instituted vexatious legal proceedings. There is no reason not to impose the Vexatious Litigant Order. Given Mr Ng’s conduct, this order is an appropriate measure. In respect of Mr Ng, I make an order in terms of [112] below.

78 As explained at [7] above, the AG’s case is that Ms Koh has commenced at least two main actions (ie, the HSA JR Action and the Action against NUS) and six applications in the three joint actions that have been adjudged as substantively unmeritorious and/or an abuse of process. ⁵⁶ Once again, the AG asserts that in these matters, the findings of the various courts, the substantive adverse outcomes and the costs orders are proof that the proceedings were without any reasonable ground and vexatious. ⁵⁷ Further, the legal proceedings brought by Ms Koh establish habituality and persistence. ⁵⁸

79 While the AG acknowledges that the conduct of the Respondents should be individually assessed, the context shows the Respondents “acting in concert” and being “aligned in their objectives”. For example, the AG points to their collective efforts to annoy opposing parties. The AG also refers to the videos posted by Ms Koh on her TikTok account in relation to the HSA JR Action and the Defamation Action against Mr Cheng. ⁵⁹

80 With respect to the broader context described at [27]–[28] above which the AG refers to as the Respondents’ “lawfare”, the AG highlights Ms Koh’s threat to sue RGS and her involvement in the series of threatened litigation regarding the ST Article. ⁶⁰ While it was Mr Ng who issued the LOD to Mr Goh, the Respondents’ strategy later shifted to Ms Koh filing legal proceedings in the Protection from Harassment Court against media entities for publishing the ST Article. ⁶¹

81 In terms of Ms Koh’s collateral purposes, the AG again relies on the Respondents’ characterisation of their litigation as a “source of income”. ⁶² The AG points out that even though Ms Koh denies her involvement in GetEven.AI, she has publicised GetEven.AI on the Healing the Divide Blog. ⁶³ She has also posted on Facebook to call for donations from the public in relation to her lawsuits. ⁶⁴

82 Turning to Ms Koh, she disputes that the requirements under s 74(1) of the SCJA are fulfilled. She stresses that the case for the Vexatious Litigant Order must be assessed against her individually and not against the Respondents collectively. ⁶⁵

83 Ms Koh argues that her conduct is not “habitual” or “persistent”. She points out that only two sets of proceedings that she was a party to have been struck out (ie, the HSA JR Action and the Action against NUS). She is not a litigant who re-litigates matters that have been finally decided. ⁶⁶ Neither were her proceedings “vexatious”. According to Ms Koh, the fact that a claim is struck out or fails does not indicate vexatiousness, especially when the claimant is an SRP “navigating a legally complex field”. ⁶⁷ Her proceedings were not instituted “without any reasonable ground” as, inter alia, several of her matters that were dismissed were not dismissed on the basis of a considered assessment of the merits. ⁶⁸ Overall, based on a broad view of Ms Koh’s general character and results of the legal proceedings, she does not “reflexively [re-litigate] lost causes”. ⁶⁹

84 In any event, Ms Koh says that the court’s residual discretion should be exercised and the Vexatious Litigant Order should not be imposed against her. ⁷⁰ The Vexatious Litigant Order would be disproportionate and this court should be “cautious” before making an order which makes “access to justice materially harder for [an SRP] responding to genuine grievances”. ⁷¹

85 At the outset, I agree with Ms Koh’s submission that conduct that is not attributable to her, ie, Mr Ng’s sole conduct, should not be considered against her. ⁷² However, as Ms Koh also acknowledges, the proceedings that she was a party to are of relevance. ⁷³ They are reflective of Ms Koh’s conduct. In so far as I have made findings in respect of Mr Ng above which concern legal proceedings involving Ms Koh, I consider them to also apply to her.

86 In my judgment, Ms Koh has instituted two main actions and seven applications “without any reasonable ground”. These largely concern the HSA JR Action and the Action against NUS, where Ms Koh’s claims were struck out. As these proceedings were collectively instituted with Mr Ng, the findings I have made concerning those actions and the applications within them apply with equal force in respect of Ms Koh. Specifically, I find that the actions and applications that were brought without any reasonable ground are as follows:

(a) the HSA JR Action and the two applications within it (ie, the Advance Costs Application and the Discovery Application) (see [53]–[54] above);

(b) the Injunction Application filed under the Defamation Action against Mr Cheng (see [56] above); and

(c) the Action against NUS and four applications within it (see [57]–[60] above).

87 The requisite element of vexatiousness is also satisfied, as the relevant legal proceedings that I have found to be brought without any reasonable ground are so obviously untenable or groundless so as to be utterly hopeless (see [41] above).

88 Further, I am also satisfied that some of these legal proceedings were instituted with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the opposing parties. In relation to the HSA JR Action, Ms Koh posted a series of videos on her TikTok account. In one such video, she made a public call-to-action, stating “I want to invite everyone to support us in our legal lawsuits against HSA and to end this ‘ownself check ownself’ for good. ... Be sure to help us to share, comment and viral this content.” ⁷⁴ On the day the HSA JR Action was filed, Ms Koh posted a TikTok video with the text “HSA, No More Talk Cock, See You In Court!”. ⁷⁵ Based on the videos posted online by Ms Koh in relation to the HSA JR Action and the publicity she sought to generate, it appears to me that this was brought with the purpose of annoying and embarrassing the opposing party: Tham Yim Siong at [62(a)].

89 I note that the AG has sought to demonstrate the Respondents’ collateral purposes by discussing them collectively. ⁷⁶ However, as most of the examples relied on are attributable to Mr Ng’s conduct, I do not think I am in a position to make a clear finding whether Ms Koh instituted the relevant legal proceedings with collateral purposes in mind. In any event, I have found that the relevant legal proceedings were vexatious as they were so obviously untenable, and likely instituted with the intention of annoying the opposing parties.

90 In my view, Ms Koh’s institution of two main actions and seven applications with unfavourable outcomes on the merits, demonstrates determination in the face of opposition and may be characterised as persistently instituting vexatious legal proceedings. In particular, the challenges regarding the same point on the admissibility of affidavit evidence during the striking out applications, first in the HSA JR Action, and then repeatedly in the Action against NUS, support this finding.

91 However, unlike my finding against Mr Ng, I am not satisfied that the requirement of “habituality” has been made out in respect of Ms Koh. My findings in respect of the Action against NUS apply to Ms Koh as she was a party to the action, in the sense that Ms Koh sued NUS and the “NUS Colleague” arising from their association with Dr Leong (see [74] above). Even then, the Action against NUS is just one example and I do not think that Ms Koh has similarly exhibited habituality, in the sense that the AG has not adduced sufficient evidence to establish a pattern of conduct by Ms Koh in instituting vexatious legal proceedings almost automatically when the appropriate conditions exist.

92 While it may appear that Ms Koh has taken out a host of other defamation actions in a manner that seems to be as a matter of course, these are ongoing matters and it is not entirely clear at this juncture whether these proceedings are vexatious or brought without any reasonable ground. Ms Koh’s conduct in relation to the Action against NUS alone does not quite suffice to form a pattern of conduct. Unlike Mr Ng, Ms Koh’s Defamation Action against Mr Cheng survives. She is also not involved in the Defamation Action against Mr Wong – the surrounding circumstances of which point to Mr Ng habitually instituting defamation actions where the publication of the Rice Media Article is concerned, despite the initial failure of the Defamation Action against Rice Media (see [73]–[74] above). The lack of such conduct on Ms Koh’s part exhibiting habituality, at this point in time, means that the case against her falls short on this aspect.

93 For the reasons above, I find that the requirements of s 74(1) of the SCJA are not fully satisfied. It has not been established that Ms Koh habitually instituted vexatious legal proceedings. Thus, I do not grant the Vexatious Litigant Order against Ms Koh. With that, I turn to consider the alternative order the AG seeks against Ms Koh, ie, the GCRO.

94 In 2019, Parliament introduced a gradated system of civil restraint orders by way of ss 73A to 73D of the SCJA, so as to complement s 74 of the SCJA. The parliamentary intention was to allow the courts to take a more nuanced and flexible approach when calibrating the type of order to be made against a vexatious litigant, depending on varying levels of culpability: Singapore Parl Debates; Vol 94, Sitting No 84 [2 October 2018] (Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai, Senior Minister of State for Law) (“Hansard”).

95 I list the civil restraint orders in ascending order of severity: (a) limited civil restraint orders under s 73B of the SCJA; (b) extended civil restraint orders under s 73C of the SCJA; and (c) general civil restraint orders under s 73D of the SCJA. The policy underpinning the civil restraint orders regime and vexatious litigant orders is broadly similar (see [32] above).

96 I reproduce the material parts of s 73D of the SCJA:

97 I pause to note that the UK also has a similar civil restraint orders regime and, as mentioned in the Hansard, the approach adopted by the English courts may be persuasive.

98 Again, it is not seriously disputed by the parties that there are three substantive conditions for a general civil restraint order to be made: (a) persistence in commencing actions or making applications; (b) the actions or applications are totally without merit; and (c) the circumstances are such that an extended civil restraint order is not sufficient or appropriate. It appears that this is the first case concerning general civil restraint orders. As requirements (a) and (b) are also to be satisfied in relation to an extended civil restraint order, I find the case law concerning s 73C of the SCJA to be instructive.

99 In relation to the first requirement, the litigant must have “persisted” in commencing actions or making applications. As the AG submits, given the requirement for at least two applications which are totally without merit for a limited civil restraint order under s 73B of the SCJA, and Parliament’s intent for the civil restraint order regime to be gradated, it would be aligned with the object of ss 73C and 73D of the SCJA to similarly require at least two actions or applications for the making of an extended civil restraint order or a general civil restraint order. ⁷⁷ In this connection, it was held in Loke Wei Sue v Paul Jeyasingham Edwards [2024] SGHC 45 (“Loke Wei Sue”) at [43] that an interlocutory application constitutes a separate “application” for the purposes of an extended civil restraint order. Likewise, the same would apply in so far as a general civil restraint order is concerned. Again, the parties do not seriously dispute this.

100 Turning to the second requirement, the actions or applications must have been “totally without merit”. The lack of merit must be clear from the facts, arguments, judgment or grounds of decision (whether by way of dicta or apparent from its reasoning): Loke Wei Sue at [42]; The National University of Singapore v Ten Leu Jiun Jeanne-Marie [2023] SGHC 191 (“Jeanne-Marie”) at [57]. It may be plain that a prior court has found a matter to be wholly without merit where, for example:

(a) a matter has been struck out or dismissed for disclosing no reasonable cause of action (Loke Wei Sue at [42]);

(b) an application is barred by res judicata, wholly misconceived, time-barred, or based on statutory provisions that are plainly inapplicable (Joseph Clement Louis Arokiasamy v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2020] 5 SLR 869 at [12]–[32]); or

(c) an application was bound to fail (Jeanne-Marie at [58(e)]).

101 As the AG points out, the element of “totally without merit” may overlap with the assessment of whether a proceeding was brought “without reasonable ground” under s 74(1) of the SCJA. ⁷⁸

102 The third requirement is that the circumstances must be that an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate. The key distinction between the scope of an extended civil restraint order and a general civil restraint order is as follows. The former only restrains the litigant from commencing any action or making any application without the court’s permission, concerning any matter in respect of which the order is made. In contrast, the latter prevents the litigant from commencing any action or making any application without the court’s permission.

103 As explained in the Hansard, a general civil restraint order may be more appropriate than an extended civil restraint order where, for example, a litigant adopts a “blunderbuss approach” to litigation such that he may bring a slew of grievances against different parties within a short period of time, without focusing on a particular single grievance. An extended civil restraint order may not adequately capture the situation where a “scattergun approach to litigation on a number of different grievances without necessarily exhibiting such an obsessive approach to a single topic”: Howell v Evans [2020] EWHC 2729 (QB) at [10], citing R (Kumar) v Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs [2007] 1 WLR 536 at [60]. In a similar vein, an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate where the court needs to restrain “unidentified but anticipated” proceedings: Moosun v HSBC Bank PLC (t/a First Direct) [2015] EWHC 3308 (Ch) (“Moosun”) at [63]. Additionally, a general civil restraint order would be more appropriate to avoid any argument on whether a fresh proceeding would be caught by an extended civil restraint order: Moosun at [64].

104 Generally, as discussed in the Hansard, in terms of how and when a general civil restraint order should be made, the court must consider all the facts and circumstances before exercising its discretion on whether to impose such an order. With this, I turn to the case against Ms Koh.

105 In applying for the GCRO against Ms Koh, the AG relies on the same facts and arguments put forth in relation to the Vexatious Litigant Order. ⁷⁹ The AG’s position is that the facts and circumstances show that Ms Koh has persisted in commencing actions or making applications that are totally without merit, and that the court’s exercise of discretion to grant the GCRO is warranted. In addition, an extended civil restraint order is not sufficient or appropriate given the “indeterminate nature” of what Ms Koh “may say on any subject matter” and the “class of persons which [she] may target”. ⁸⁰

106 While there is overlap between the Vexatious Litigant Order and the GCRO sought, the AG highlights that there are also two important distinctions. First, the former has “an effect on both existing and new proceedings while the latter is limited to new proceedings”. ⁸¹ Before me, the AG further clarified that the GCRO “only stops new actions”. Second, the GCRO is limited to a period of two years. However, the period may be extended by the court, if the court considers it appropriate to do so.

107 Ms Koh asserts that the requirements of the GCRO are not satisfied. She maintains that her proceedings were not “totally without merit” as, inter alia, the Action against NUS suffered from a “pleading defect”, the HSA JR Action disclosed no reasonable cause of action only on standing, and Ms Koh’s claim in the Defamation Action against Mr Cheng was not struck out. ⁸² Ms Koh denies that persistence is made out as she only has two actions that were struck out and she did not commence appeals. ⁸³ Ms Koh also states that the AG has not explained why a “limited order” or an “extended order confined to the specific subject-matter said to give rise to concern” would not suffice. ⁸⁴ Ms Koh again relies on the general point that the imposition of the GCRO would be disproportionate, carry a real risk of injustice and make access to justice materially harder for a SRP responding to genuine grievances. ⁸⁵

108 Whether the GCRO should be imposed on Ms Koh turns on the requirement that an extended civil restraint order is not sufficient or appropriate. This is because the other requirements of persistence in commencing actions or making applications that are totally without merit are plainly satisfied, given my earlier findings that Ms Koh instituted the relevant legal proceedings persistently and without any reasonable ground (see [86] and [90] above). I disagree with Ms Koh’s argument that persistence cannot be made out as only two of her claims have been struck out. The seven applications are also relevant; they should be considered (see [99] above). To reiterate, the lack of merits in the relevant legal proceedings specified in [86] above is clear from the reasoning of the respective courts in each of the proceedings.

109 In my view, an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate. This is because Ms Koh appears to adopt a “blunderbuss approach” to litigation, evident from how she commences proceedings against different parties pertaining to different subject matter. I agree with the AG that the nature and class of persons that Ms Koh might commence proceedings against is indeterminate such that an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient. ⁸⁶ A general civil restraint order would be appropriate to counter such a scattergun approach to litigation.

110 Accordingly, for all the reasons above, I find that the requirements for the GCRO are satisfied in relation to Ms Koh. In respect of Ms Koh’s argument that I should not exercise my discretion to impose the GCRO, it is apposite to repeat my findings at [76] above. Thus, I see it fit to impose the GCRO on Ms Koh.

111 For completeness, as stated at [106] above, the AG points out that the GCRO is meant to have effect only on new proceedings. However, the GCRO as framed by the AG (see [3] above), may be ambiguous on this aspect. In imposing the GCRO on the terms as set out at [113] below, I clarify that it affects the commencement of new proceedings, and not the continuation of ongoing proceedings.

112 To sum up, as against Mr Ng, I impose the Vexatious Litigant Order on the terms as follows:

(a) No civil proceedings are to be instituted without the permission of the GDHC by Mr Ng in any court or subordinate court.

(b) Any civil proceedings instituted by Mr Ng in any court or subordinate court before the making of this order must not be continued by Mr Ng without the permission of the GDHC.

113 As for Ms Koh, I impose the GCRO on the terms as follows:

(a) Ms Koh is restrained from commencing any civil action or making any civil application, in any court or subordinate court, without the permission of the GDHC. For the avoidance of doubt, Ms Koh is not restrained from continuing with her ongoing civil actions and civil applications, or from making further applications within them.

(b) Ms Koh may apply to amend, vary or discharge the GCRO, provided that the GDHC grants permission to make that application.

(c) The GCRO is to remain in force for a period of two years from the date it is made, or such time as may be extended by the court.

114 Considering the facts and circumstances, I make no order as to costs.

115 I return to the Respondents’ argument that these orders are disproportionate to their conduct as SRPs and materially curtail their access to justice. It is worth emphasising that these orders do not deprive the Respondents of the right of access to justice; the orders merely qualify the exercise of that right. Given the Respondents’ conduct which gives rise to grave concerns, I am satisfied that it is important to qualify their right of access to justice by requiring permission from the court, to serve as a “filter” to assess the prima facie merits and procedural propriety of Mr Ng’s existing civil proceedings, as well as any future civil proceedings contemplated by the Respondents.

116 These orders will not only serve to prevent an abuse of court processes, but will also be in the interests of opposing parties. It would also be in the Respondents’ interests not to persist in instituting legal proceedings, which are vexatious or totally without merit (see [32] and [95] above). Ultimately, the Respondents will not be precluded from vindicating any of their legitimate rights under the law, or to seek legal redress for genuine grievances. They must simply seek the court’s permission before doing so.

117 In closing, I should mention that Mr Daniel Koh (“Mr Koh”) and Mr Nicholas Narayanan (“Mr Narayanan”) were respectively appointed by the court as counsel for Mr Ng and Ms Koh. This was pursuant to s 74(2) of the SCJA, which provides that a person against whom a vexatious litigant order is sought may be assigned a lawyer should he or she lack means to retain counsel. After OA 988 was brought, the Respondents each made an application pursuant to this subsection, which I granted. It leaves me to record my appreciation to Mr Koh and Mr Narayanan, as well as Mr Vincent Leow for the AG, for their invaluable assistance to the court.