1 HC/OA 1149/2025 (“OA 1149”) is an application to set aside in its entirety a partial final award (“Partial Final Award”), issued in an ad hoc domestic arbitration between the applicant and respondent. HC/OA 256/2026 (“OA 256”) is a related application to set aside in its entirety a partial award on costs (“Costs Award”) issued in the same arbitration. Both applications are made pursuant to s 48(1)(a)(iv) of the Arbitration Act 2001 (2020 Rev Ed) (“AA”), which allows an award to be set aside where it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, and s 48(1)(a)(v) of the AA, which allows an award to be set aside where the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. For the reasons set out below, I dismiss both applications.

2 The applicant is a construction company incorporated in Singapore. ¹

3 The respondent is a foreign construction and engineering company registered to carry on business in Singapore. ²

4 By way of a joint venture agreement dated 6 July 2015 (“JVA”), the applicant and respondent formed an unincorporated joint venture (“JV”) for the purpose of tendering for and carrying out a construction project in Singapore (“Project”). ³ Under the JVA, the applicant holds a 30% participation share, and the respondent holds a 70% participation share. ⁴ Clause 3.2.1 of the JVA provides that the parties are to share the profits and losses of the JV in proportion to their participation shares, and that their rights, duties and obligations vis-à-vis each other are several and not joint: ⁵

5 Clause 16.2 of the JVA provides for disputes under the JVA to be referred to arbitration administered by the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”), seated in Singapore, before a tribunal of three arbitrators. ⁶

6 The JV was awarded the Project on 22 October 2015. ⁷ It subsequently engaged the applicant as a subcontractor for certain works pursuant to a remeasurement subcontract dated 1 February 2016 (“Sub-Contract”). ⁸ The Sub-Contract thus governed the relationship between the JV, as the main contractor, and the applicant, as the subcontractor. ⁹ It is undisputed that the JVA and the Sub-Contract were designed to operate independently of one another. ¹⁰

7 The Sub-Contract’s dispute resolution provisions are found at Clause 35. Clause 35.2(1) provides for disputes to be referred to ad hoc domestic arbitration under the AA before an arbitrator. ¹¹ Clause 35.4 confers on the arbitrator full power to determine all matters in dispute submitted to him: ¹²

8 Disputes arose between the parties under both the JVA and the Sub-Contract. ¹³ On 24 June 2022, the applicant commenced two separate arbitrations simultaneously: an SIAC arbitration under the JVA against the respondent (“JVA Arbitration”) before a three-member tribunal (“JVA Tribunal”), and an ad hoc domestic arbitration under the Sub-Contract against the respondent (“Sub-Contract Arbitration”) before a sole arbitrator (“Arbitrator”). ¹⁴ The Sub-Contract Arbitration was commenced against the respondent alone, in its capacity as a constituent party of the JV. ¹⁵ This was because the applicant, as subcontractor, could not sue itself, and the unincorporated JV could not be sued as an entity. ¹⁶

9 A partial award was issued in the JVA Arbitration on 22 November 2024 (“JVA Award”), in which the JVA Tribunal dealt with the parties’ various claims and counterclaims under the JVA. ¹⁷ At [277B] of the JVA Award, the JVA Tribunal deferred the respondent’s “Counterclaim 3”, by which the respondent sought, among other things, an indemnity for sums that might be awarded against it in the Sub-Contract Arbitration, together with its costs of that arbitration. The JVA Tribunal ordered at [277B] as follows: ¹⁸

10 As will be seen, the Arbitrator later relied on this reservation as part of his reasons for leaving the question of apportionment to the JVA Tribunal. For the avoidance of doubt, the present applications concern only the awards issued in the Sub-Contract Arbitration, and not the JVA Award.

11 The Sub-Contract Arbitration proceeded as a construction dispute involving claims and counterclaims on matters including the value of works performed, extensions of time and delay damages. ¹⁹ Both parties sought orders for payment against the other. ²⁰ The respondent additionally advanced a contingent counterclaim for contribution and indemnity, framed as arising only where the applicant had made its claim in full against the respondent, and seeking that the applicant indemnify the respondent for 30% of any sum due from the respondent to the applicant. ²¹

12 Because the parties’ positions shifted over the course of the arbitration, and those shifts bear on the arguments now advanced before me, it is necessary for me to trace how the issue at the heart of these applications arose.

13 In its pleadings, the applicant took the position that any question of contribution and indemnity was not an issue before the Arbitrator and would be more properly dealt with by the JVA Tribunal. ²² By October 2024, both parties agreed that contribution and indemnity were not issues requiring the Arbitrator’s determination, and the matters were removed from the joint list of issues. ²³ In fact, the applicant had reiterated in its opening submissions that it was outside the Arbitrator’s jurisdiction to determine any issue of contribution and indemnity under the JVA. ²⁴

14 On the first day of the evidentiary hearing on 29 October 2024, the Arbitrator raised, of his own motion, a concern about the form any award might take. ²⁵ He observed that this was the first time he had encountered such a situation in his experience, and asked how he could issue a dispositive award against the respondent alone in circumstances where he was aware that the JVA provided for a division of profits and losses between the constituent members of the JV. ²⁶ He put the difficulty in terms of the applicant, in substance, “seeking to sue itself”. ²⁷

15 In response, the applicant submitted that the division of liability at the JV level was not a matter for the Arbitrator, and that he should award any sums due in full (that is, 100%) against the respondent, leaving the respondent to pursue any contribution at the JV level. ²⁸ The respondent, by contrast, submitted that the Arbitrator should confine himself to valuing the claims and counterclaims without issuing any dispositive payment order, with that valuation to be taken forward in the JVA arbitration. ²⁹ The Arbitrator indicated a reluctance to issue an award requiring immediate payment, or indeed any payment, and invited the parties to discuss the matter. ³⁰

16 The matter was revisited on the ninth day of the hearing on 7 November 2024. The applicant proposed, as one option, that the respondent bear 70% liability “both ways”, consistent with the parties’ participation shares under the JVA. ³¹ In other words, the respondent would bear 70% of any sums awarded to the applicant, and the applicant would bear 30% of any sums awarded to the respondent. The applicant explained that its concern was to avoid a “paper” award that would not yield an enforceable order for payment. ³² The Arbitrator did not find this attractive and directed the parties to attempt to reach agreement on the form of the award, failing which he would require submissions. ³³

17 The parties were unable to agree. ³⁴ In post-hearing submissions, the applicant maintained that the Arbitrator was obliged to make a payment order and that a payment order was the most appropriate form of award. ³⁵ In its reply, it submitted that it was even open to the Arbitrator to order payment to the applicant amounting to 70% of any sums awarded. ³⁶ The respondent maintained that the Arbitrator should confine himself to a valuation, with any payment order to follow the JVA Tribunal’s determination of the apportionment question. ³⁷

18 On 14 July 2025, the Arbitrator issued the Partial Final Award. ³⁸ He valued the applicants’ claims at S$2,058,955.64 and respondent’s counterclaims at S$20,476,186.57. ³⁹ No order for payment was made. The Arbitrator characterised the issue as one concerning the proper form of the award (at [1387] of the Partial Final Award): ⁴⁰

19 The Arbitrator identified four possible forms the award might take (at [1405] of the Partial Final Award): ⁴¹

(a) an award in which any amounts awarded to the applicant are discounted by 30%, and any amounts awarded to the respondent are discounted by 30% (“Form 1”);

(b) an award in which amounts are awarded to the parties in full, but each party is then allowed a contribution or indemnity according to their respective interests in the JV (“Form 2”);

(c) an award in which amounts are awarded to the parties in full, with the apportionment of that award a question for the JVA Arbitration (“Form 3”); or

(d) an award in which the quantum of the parties’ liabilities is assessed, with the apportionment of that quantum and the order for payment of sums to await the attention of the JVA Tribunal to this assessment of liabilities (“Form 4”).

20 The Arbitrator rejected Forms 1 and 2 on the basis that both would involve applying to the Sub-Contract Arbitration an apportionment regime found in a different contract governed by a separately constituted tribunal (at [1407] of the Partial Final Award). ⁴² He also declined to adopt Form 3. He considered that there was “a real and difficult uncertainty underpinning the Subcontract” as to whether the liability of the JV’s constituent members was intended to be joint and several, or proportionate to their respective interests under the JVA (at [1412] of the Partial Final Award), and observed that the commencement of the Sub-Contract Arbitration against the respondent alone did not conclusively determine that the arbitration was one between the applicant and the respondent (at [1413] of the Partial Final Award). ⁴³

21 The Arbitrator took the view that it would be highly undesirable for the award to be issued in a form that might attract jurisdictional challenge, and that the proper course was to leave matters of apportionment to the JVA Tribunal (at [1416] of the Partial Final Award). ⁴⁴ He noted that this was the course contemplated in the JVA Arbitration, the JVA Tribunal having reserved jurisdiction at [277B] of the JVA Award to deal with, among other things, Counterclaim 3 (at [1417] of the Partial Final Award). ⁴⁵ He therefore adopted Form 4 and ordered (at [1447] of the Partial Final Award): ⁴⁶

22 The Arbitrator issued the Costs Award on 9 December 2025, valuing the respondent’s claim for costs in the Sub-Contract Arbitration at S$5,333,026.88 plus US$4,117,240.57. ⁴⁷ As with the Partial Final Award, no order for payment was made. ⁴⁸ The Arbitrator identified a jurisdictional issue of a similar nature to that addressed in the Partial Final Award, concerning the distinction between the respondent and the JV as the proper respondent in the Sub-Contract Arbitration, and reserved jurisdiction to make a final costs payment order in materially the same terms as before, consequent on the parties bringing the question of any indemnity or contribution under the JVA to the JVA Tribunal. ⁴⁹

23 The Costs Award has one feature that distinguishes it from the Partial Final Award, and to which I will return in my analysis below. In their costs submissions, both parties took the position that a dispositive order for payment of costs should be made. The applicant maintained its position that the Arbitrator should decide who was to pay and make an order for payment. ⁵⁰ The respondent, for its part, contended that the costs it claimed had been incurred solely in its own name in defending the Sub-Contract Arbitration, were not costs of the JV, and were therefore not subject to apportionment under the JVA, with the result that it should be awarded 100% of these costs immediately. ⁵¹

24 The Arbitrator accepted neither position. He considered that there was an inherent difficulty in the respondent’s submission, in that the respondent could not maintain both that it had represented the JV in the Sub-Contract Arbitration and that the costs it had incurred were solely its own. ⁵² Notwithstanding that both parties sought a payment order, the Arbitrator declined to make one and adopted the same approach as in the Partial Final Award, deferring the making of a payment order pending the JVA Tribunal’s determination of apportionment. ⁵³

25 I set out below the parties’ respective cases as advanced in their supporting affidavits and written submissions, and then as developed in oral arguments before me. I do so because the oral submissions on both sides departed in some ways from their written cases.

26  The applicant advances a single overarching complaint in both applications: ⁵⁴ that the Arbitrator abdicated and/or delegated his duty to decide by issuing valuations-only awards without making orders for payment, and by requiring the parties to bring the question of any indemnity or contribution under the JVA to the JVA Tribunal. It contends that this conduct amounted to both an excess of jurisdiction under s 48(1)(a)(iv) of the AA and to a breach of the agreed arbitral procedure under s 48(1)(a)(v) of the AA. ⁵⁵

27 In support of this complaint, the applicant advances the following arguments:

(a) The arbitration agreement, in particular Clause 35.4 of the Sub-Contract, obliged the Arbitrator to determine all matters in dispute submitted to him, including by making dispositive orders for payment. ⁵⁶ More specifically, the Arbitrator was obliged to decide: (i) who were the parties to the Sub-Contract; (ii) whether the claims and counterclaims in the Sub-Contract Arbitration had been made by, and against, the correct party; and (iii) if they had, how much each party was to pay the other in respect of each claim and counterclaim. ⁵⁷ An arbitrator’s duty to decide is personal and non-delegable, and the arbitration agreement did not permit the Arbitrator to abdicate that duty or to delegate any part of it to another tribunal or party. ⁵⁸

(b)  Both parties had expressly sought dispositive payment orders against the other in their pleadings, and neither had taken the position that the Arbitrator was entitled to refer any issue to another tribunal for decision. ⁵⁹ The agreed arbitral procedure accordingly required the Arbitrator to determine not only the value of the claims and counterclaims but also who should pay whom, and how much. ⁶⁰

(c) There was no genuine difficulty precluding a payment order. Unincorporated joint ventures are commonly encountered as the contracting vehicle in construction projects, and arbitrators and courts have dealt with such structures without difficulty. ⁶¹ The Arbitrator should have made a full payment order against the respondent, leaving apportionment under the JVA to be dealt with at the JV level. ⁶²

(d) The applicant challenges the Arbitrator’s reliance on [277B] of the JVA Award (set out at [9] above), by which the JVA Tribunal deferred the respondent’s Counterclaim 3 for an indemnity and costs “to be dealt with if necessary following the issuance of the award in the Subcontract Arbitration or as otherwise may be ordered”. It was misconceived for the Arbitrator to treat that order as confirming that apportionment under the JVA was reserved for the JVA Tribunal, and to rely on it in leaving apportionment to the JVA Tribunal. ⁶³ Counterclaim 3 is engaged only if sums are awarded against the respondent in the Sub-Contract Arbitration, which has not occurred because the Arbitrator declined to make any payment order. ⁶⁴ In any event, Counterclaim 3 does not extend to sums that may be awarded against the applicant. ⁶⁵ The premise on which the Arbitrator deferred to the JVA Tribunal was therefore wrong.

(e) The applicant has suffered real prejudice. ⁶⁶ By requiring the parties to bring fresh issues before the JVA Tribunal, the Arbitrator’s approach has given rise to new disputes, including over whether Counterclaim 3 is engaged at all, whether it extends to the respondent’s counterclaims, and whether the respondent may amend Counterclaim 3 to enlarge its scope. ⁶⁷ An arbitration agreement whose object was to resolve disputes has instead multiplied them. ⁶⁸

28 Regarding the Costs Award, the applicant advances two further arguments. First, and in contrast to the Partial Final Award, both parties took the position that a dispositive order for payment of costs ought to be made. ⁶⁹ Yet the Arbitrator “doubled down”, declining to make any such order and simply reiterating the reasoning he had given in the Partial Final Award. ⁷⁰ Second, the Costs Award is premised on the Arbitrator’s findings on jurisdiction and liability in the Partial Final Award, so that, if the Partial Final Award is set aside, the Costs Award must also be set aside in its entirety. ⁷¹

29 On relief, the applicant submits that remission is inappropriate. ⁷² The defect goes to jurisdiction and concerns a matter central to the awards, and the error was made knowingly despite the applicant’s submission to the contrary. ⁷³ A fair-minded observer would reasonably apprehend that the applicant might not receive a fair process on any remitted issue, given that the applicant has brought these applications. ⁷⁴

30 The respondent submits that both applications should be dismissed. Its case, in essence, is that the Arbitrator determined the dispute referred to him, namely the value of the parties’ claims and counterclaims. He did not fail or refuse to decide anything, but reserved jurisdiction to make a final order for payment in due course.

31 On s 48(1)(a)(iv) of the AA, the respondent advances the following arguments:

(a) The provision is directed only at ultra petita challenges, where a tribunal exceeds its mandate by deciding something outside the scope of the submission. It does not cover the converse case, where a tribunal is said to have failed to deal with an issue referred to it. Such a complaint is an infra petita complaint, which must be brought under s 48(1)(a)(vii) as a breach of the rules of natural justice. ⁷⁵ The applicant’s complaint is in substance an infra petita challenge, yet the applicant has not invoked s 48(1)(a)(vii). The applicant cannot now introduce a new ground, its grounds having been fixed by its supporting affidavits. ⁷⁶

(b) Even if treated as an infra petita challenge, the complaint fails on the four cumulative conditions required to establish such a challenge. ⁷⁷ In particular, the respondent claims that:

(i) It cannot be said that the Arbitrator completely failed to consider the question of payment: he raised it of his own motion, invited submissions, and devoted 34 paragraphs of the Partial Final Award to it before reaching a deliberate conclusion. ⁷⁸

(ii) The reserved question of payment is not essential to the awards. ⁷⁹ The Arbitrator’s uncontested determinations on the merits and quantum are unaffected by the question of when, and in what form, a payment order is made. ⁸⁰

(iii) There is no real or actual prejudice. ⁸¹ The Arbitrator has reserved jurisdiction to make a final payment order. ⁸² The respondent offered to agree on apportionment terms that would have permitted an immediate payment order, which the applicant rejected, and the applicant has itself sought to obstruct the JVA Tribunal’s determination of apportionment. ⁸³

32 On s 48(1)(a)(v) of the AA, the respondent advances the following arguments:

(a) There was no agreed arbitral procedure requiring the Arbitrator to make an immediate payment order. ⁸⁴ The form of the award was never agreed and was heavily contested throughout. ⁸⁵ As master of his own procedure, the Arbitrator was entitled to determine when and how to deal with the payment question. ⁸⁶

(b) The decision to reserve the payment order is, at most, a procedural decision, and s 48(1)(a)(v) cannot be invoked to challenge the substance of an award or the outcome of the procedure the tribunal adopted. ⁸⁷

(c) The applicant itself acknowledged the Arbitrator’s procedural discretion in its reply costs submissions, stating that it would “leave the Tribunal to make his decision as to whether it is appropriate for the Tribunal to make an order for payment against [the applicant] in light of the Tribunal’s valuation only approach in the Partial Award”. ⁸⁸ It cannot now contend that the same approach breached the agreed procedure. ⁸⁹

(d) There was no material breach and no prejudice. The Arbitrator’s findings on the merits and quantum would not have been different had a payment order been made. ⁹⁰

33 The respondent advances three further points:

(a) The applicant is precluded from approbating and reprobating. ⁹¹ Its pleaded case in the Sub-Contract Arbitration, maintained up to the ninth day of the hearing, was that contribution and indemnity were not for the Arbitrator and were to be dealt with by the JVA Tribunal, and it agreed to their removal from the joint list of issues. ⁹² It cannot now complain that the Arbitrator did not determine those issues. ⁹³

(b) The applicant failed to seek remedial measures. ⁹⁴ It could have requested an additional award under s 43(4) of the AA, or challenged any negative jurisdictional ruling under s 21, but did neither. ⁹⁵

(c) The applicant’s complaint that the Arbitrator failed to decide “who are the parties to the Sub-Contract” is a new ground, not raised in its supporting affidavits, time-barred, and a non-issue in any event, it being common ground that the parties to the Sub-Contract were the applicant and the JV. ⁹⁶

34 As to the Costs Award, the respondent further submits that even if the Partial Final Award were set aside, the Costs Award need not be, because the costs the Arbitrator valued were incurred by the respondent alone in defending the Sub-Contract Arbitration and his valuation of them is unaffected by any dispute over apportionment. ⁹⁷

35 As to relief, the respondent’s primary position is that no ground for setting aside is made out. In the alternative, if any ground were established, the respondent submits that the appropriate course would be remission and not setting aside, as the impugned matter does not affect the substantive determinations. ⁹⁸

36 Mr Cavinder Bull SC (“Mr Bull SC”), who appeared for the applicant, developed the applicant’s case in oral argument. I lay out the aspects in which the applicant’s oral case departed from or added to the written case set out above.

37 At the outset of the hearing, I asked Mr Bull SC to identify the applicant’s case. I asked, in particular, whether the applicant’s case was that the Arbitrator should have, but did not, make an order for payment on the claim and the counterclaim. ⁹⁹ Mr Bull SC confirmed that it was. ¹⁰⁰ This was consistent with what I understood the applicant’s case in its supporting affidavits and written submissions to be, that the Arbitrator had “abdicate[d] and/or delegate[d]” his duty to decide. ¹⁰¹

38 However, Mr Bull SC later resisted that characterisation. He submitted that the Arbitrator had not failed to decide but had made a positive decision, namely a decision that the JVA Tribunal would decide the matter, and that “an order that says ‘no order’ is an order”. ¹⁰² The applicant’s complaint thus shifted from a failure to decide into a positive decision to delegate the decision-making function to the JVA Tribunal.

39 In addition, Mr Bull SC developed the following points in oral submissions:

(a) Regarding the delegation of the Arbitrator’s decision-making function, Mr Bull SC laid particular emphasis on the word “consequent”. Specifically, that the Arbitrator was wrong to have reserved to himself only the power to make an order “consequent on” the JVA Tribunal’s determination. ¹⁰³ The Arbitrator had not reserved a free power to decide the payment order afresh, but had tied himself to the outcome of the proceedings before the JVA Tribunal, so that what he had deferred was a matter of substance, and could not be characterised as procedural. ¹⁰⁴

(b) While the applicant’s written submissions advanced a series of questions that the Arbitrator was said to have left undecided (see [27(a)] above), in oral argument, Mr Bull SC confirmed that the applicant’s position was that the Arbitrator should have adopted Form 3. ¹⁰⁵ That is, the Arbitrator should have awarded the sums in full and made an immediate order for payment, leaving any question of apportionment to the JVA Arbitration. ¹⁰⁶ He accepted that, had the Arbitrator done so, the applicant would have had no objection, and the present complaint would not arise. ¹⁰⁷

(c) The Arbitrator’s reliance on the JVA Tribunal was misplaced. The JVA Tribunal could determine questions of contribution and indemnity, but it could not resolve what Mr Bull SC described as the Arbitrator’s “real difficulty”, namely who are the true parties to the Sub-Contract Arbitration and whether a payment order could be made in favour of, or against, one constituent member of the JV alone. ¹⁰⁸ The matter could not therefore sensibly be resolved by remitting it to the JVA Tribunal and returning it to the Arbitrator, and the parties had been left in a “quagmire”. ¹⁰⁹

40 Mr Chan Leng Sun SC (“Mr Chan SC”), who appeared for the respondent, distilled the respondent’s position to two propositions which, he submitted, were dispositive:

(a)  The Arbitrator could not have delegated a power or jurisdiction that he did not possess. ¹¹⁰ It was common ground that the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to decide the questions of apportionment and indemnity arising under the JVA. ¹¹¹ Since he could not himself have decided those questions, he could not have delegated their determination to the JVA Tribunal. ¹¹²

(b) The Arbitrator had not delegated the making of the payment order. ¹¹³ He had just reserved his jurisdiction to make that order himself. ¹¹⁴ That was a procedural decision, akin to a decision to bifurcate. ¹¹⁵ A procedural order of that kind is not final. ¹¹⁶ It may be reconsidered and revised until the tribunal becomes functus officio on the issue of its final award, and it cannot be nullified by the court. ¹¹⁷ The title “Partial Final Award” signals the Arbitrator’s intent to issue a final one with a payment order. ¹¹⁸ It is not a failure to make a dispositive order on payment as he will come back to it. ¹¹⁹

41 In response to Mr Bull SC’s point that the Arbitrator ought not to have reserved to himself the power to decide “consequent” on the JVA Tribunal’s determination, and that the JVA Tribunal was left in a fix as it could not resolve who the true parties to the Sub-Contract Arbitration were or whether a payment order could be made against or in favour of a single JV member, Mr Chan SC submitted that the point did not bear the weight placed on it. The Arbitrator, not yet having made his final payment order, was not functus officio and remained free to make whatever order he considered appropriate, including an order for immediate payment of the net sum if the parties agreed or circumstances required. ¹²⁰ He was not bound by the JVA Tribunal’s determination and could revisit his position, for instance if the JVA Arbitration were delayed or withdrawn. ¹²¹

42 As to Mr Bull SC’s argument that the Arbitrator should have adopted Form 3, Mr Chan SC submitted that the decision not to adopt Form 3 “at that point in time” was within the Arbitrator’s procedural discretion, and that everything else he had done, in declining to trespass on the JVA Tribunal's jurisdiction over apportionment, was correct. ¹²²

43 Finally, both counsel confirmed that since it was common ground that the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to decide the questions of apportionment and indemnity arising under the JVA, the question of challenging a negative jurisdictional ruling under s 21 of the AA (which the respondent raised in its written submissions) no longer arose. ¹²³

44 The applicant’s characterisation of its own complaint has not been straightforward. The applicant’s position shifted between written and oral submissions, and the respondent’s oral submissions had to, in turn, meet the case as recast. For clarity, I deal with the two grounds of setting aside relied on by the applicant, addressing both its written and oral submissions under each. The two grounds are whether the Arbitrator, by failing to make orders for payment in the Partial Final Award and the Costs Award: (a) exceeded his jurisdiction under s 48(1)(a)(iv) of the AA; and/or (b) acted in breach of the agreed arbitral procedure under s 48(1)(a)(v) of the AA.

45 In a setting aside application, it is well-established that the court’s role is supervisory and not appellate. The court does not re-evaluate the merits of the tribunal’s findings or substitute its own view for that of the arbitrator: AKN v ALC [2015] 3 SLR 488 (“AKN”) at [37]–[38]. Parties to an arbitration do not have a right to a “correct” decision from the arbitral tribunal, but a right to a decision within the ambit of their consent, arrived at using a fair process: AKN at [38]. It follows that the court will not intervene merely because it might have decided differently, and that an error of law or fact, without more, is not a ground for setting aside: Prometheus Marine Pte Ltd v Ann Rita King [2018] 1 SLR 1 (“Prometheus Marine”) at [57]. Given the narrow compass of the court’s supervisory role in arbitration proceedings, it must be alert to the “ingenuity of counsel”, by which a party, dissatisfied with the outcome of an award, seeks to reframe that dissatisfaction to bring it within one of the limited grounds for setting aside: AKN at [39].

46 Section 48(1)(a)(iv) of the AA provides:

47 In determining whether this ground is established, the central question is whether the issue that is alleged to be outside of the scope of submission was part of, or related to, the basket of issues “requiring determination” by the tribunal: Darius Chan, Paul Tan, and Nicholas Poon, The Law and Theory of International Commercial Arbitration in Singapore (Academy Publishing 2022) at para 8.108, citing Sui Southern Gas Co Ltd v Habibullah Coastal Power Co (Pte) Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 1 at [36]. In other words, the court is concerned with whether the tribunal had the jurisdiction to decide the issue in question.

48 I am unable to see how the applicant’s complaint demonstrates that the Arbitrator exceeded the scope of his jurisdiction. At its core, the applicant’s complaint in its affidavit and written submissions is that the Arbitrator failed to decide the disputes referred to him, namely who were the parties to the Sub-Contract, whether the claims and counterclaims were correctly constituted, and who was to pay whom and how much, and instead impermissibly required the parties to take those questions to the JVA Tribunal. This is borne out by the following paragraphs in its written submissions, which I set out for clarity as to where I have understood its case to lie:

49 The applicant’s case, simply put, is that the Arbitrator ought to have decided these questions and did not. It is well-established that a complaint of an arbitrator’s failure to decide does not engage s 48(1)(a)(iv) of the AA as a ground for setting aside. In DEM v DEL [2025] 1 SLR 29 (“DEM”), the Court of Appeal considered the scope of Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“Model Law”), which is in pari materia to s 48(1)(a)(iv) of the AA (at [54]–[56]):

50 It is clear that s 48(1)(a)(iv) of the AA is engaged only where the arbitral tribunal decided something outside its mandate, something it was not asked to decide. It does not extend to the converse case, where a tribunal is said to have failed to deal with a matter within the parties’ submissions. Such a complaint is an infra petita challenge, which should be brought under the natural justice ground of s 48(1)(a)(vii) of the AA.

51 This deficiency cannot be cured by treating the applicant’s complaint as a natural justice challenge under s 48(1)(a)(vii) of the AA, because the applicant did not invoke that ground in its supporting affidavit and originating application. The supporting affidavit, read with the originating application, must set out the entirety of an applicant’s case for setting aside: DPT v DPV [2025] SGHC(I) 29 at [107]. Given that the applicant has confined its grounds to ss 48(1)(a)(iv) and 48(1)(a)(v), it is not for the court to recast the complaint as one of natural justice and adjudicate a ground the applicant chose not to advance. The question of whether natural justice was breached therefore does not arise before me.

52 In oral argument, Mr Bull SC appeared to recognise this difficulty. He submitted that the applicant’s case was not that the Arbitrator had failed to decide, but that he had made a positive decision to delegate the matter to the JVA Tribunal, and that this was impermissible. The relevant portions of the transcript are reproduced below:

53 That was, in my view, the applicant’s attempt to reframe what is an infra petita challenge into an ultra petita one. However, such a recharacterisation does not assist the applicant. Whether the applicant’s complaint is that the Arbitrator failed to decide some questions, or “decided” to leave certain questions to the JVA Tribunal, the complaint remains, in substance, one of the Arbitrator’s failure to decide which falls outside of an ultra petita challenge under s 48(1)(a)(iv) of the AA.

54 Even leaving aside the question of the proper ground of challenge, the applicant’s arguments are, in my view, defeated by logic. The applicant relied in its written submissions on the principle that a tribunal’s duty to decide is personal and non-delegable. However, those authorities do not advance the applicant’s case. It is unclear to me whether the applicant’s complaint is that the Arbitrator improperly delegated the determination of the apportionment and indemnity question, or that he delegated the making of the payment order. In either case, its argument fails.

55 On the former complaint, it is common ground between the parties that the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to determine the questions of apportionment and indemnity, given that those questions arise under the JVA which is a separate contract with its own arbitration agreement and its own tribunal (see above at [43]). The respondent had, in its written submissions, raised s 21 of the AA, on the assumption that the applicant might be contending that the Arbitrator had wrongly ruled he lacked jurisdiction over apportionment and indemnity. At the hearing, however, it became clear that this was not the applicant’s case, and that both parties were in agreement that the Arbitrator had no such jurisdiction. On that footing, the s 21 point fell away and was not pursued. That much was confirmed by counsel at the hearing before me:

56 I accept Mr Chan SC’s submission that one cannot delegate a power one does not possess. Since the parties agree that the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to determine apportionment and indemnity, it is impossible for him to have delegated their determination to the JVA Tribunal. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Arbitrator had acted outside of his mandate.

57 On the latter complaint, that the Arbitrator delegated the making of the payment order, it plainly does not withstand examination of what he in fact did. The Arbitrator did not surrender the making of the payment order to the JVA Tribunal, he had reserved it for the reason that the sum ultimately payable could not be fixed without first resolving an apportionment question that lay under the JVA and was not his to decide.

58 The material passages in the Final Partial Award are as follows:

59 As stated above at [21], the Final Partial Award provides at [1447] that the Arbitrator “reserves jurisdiction to make a final order of payment … consequent on the Parties bringing the question of any indemnity or contribution under the JVA to the JVA Tribunal”. Plainly, the Arbitrator had reserved to himself the power to make the payment order once the apportionment question has been dealt with in its proper forum. To that end, I do not accept Mr Bull SC’s argument at the oral hearing that the word “consequent” means that the Arbitrator tied himself to the outcome of the JVA proceedings, and so declined to decide a question he was bound to decide. The Partial Final Award does not provide that the JVA Tribunal will make the payment order, nor that the Arbitrator will be bound by its conclusion.

60 For the reasons above, the applicant’s complaint is in substance that the Arbitrator failed to decide, which is an infra petita complaint falling outside s 48(1)(a)(iv), and, in any event, the Arbitrator neither delegated nor exceeded his jurisdiction but merely reserved the payment order to himself. The challenge under s 48(1)(a)(iv) is dismissed.

61 Section 48(1)(a)(v) of the AA provides:

62 Section 48(1)(a)(v) of the AA, which is in pari materia to Art 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law, is directed at the manner in which the arbitration is conducted. As Belinda Ang J (as she then was) explained in PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK v CRW Joint Operation [2010] 4 SLR 672 at [39]:

63 The corollary is that s 48(1)(a)(v) of the AA cannot be invoked to impugn the substance of an award, or the outcome of the arbitral procedure the tribunal adopted: CEF v CEH [2022] 2 SLR 918 (“CEF (CA)”) at [59], affirming CEF v CEH [2021] SGHC 114 (“CEF (HC)”) at [39]. In CEF (HC), the plaintiffs had been engaged to design and build a steel-making plant for the defendant. A dispute arose and the defendant counterclaimed for rescission of the contract on the ground of misrepresentation. The tribunal upheld the defendant’s claim and one of the orders it made was for the defendant to transfer title to the plant back to the plaintiffs in return for payment. The plaintiffs sought to set aside this order on the ground that the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement. In particular, the plaintiffs argued that the parties’ arbitration agreement and the Model Law required any award to be enforceable, and that the order was not enforceable because the plant had become a fixture of the site under Ruritanian law such that there was no separate title capable of being transferred. Vinodh Coomaraswamy J rejected that argument, holding that the plaintiffs’ complaints were “in truth complaints about the substance of the [order], not about the arbitral procedure which the tribunal adopted in arriving at the order”, such that dealing with them “would require [the court] to examine the merits of the tribunal’s analysis underlying the [order]” (CEF (HC) at [39]). Coomaraswamy J reasoned that Art 34(2)(a)(iv) “cannot possibly apply to the substance of an award, ie to the outcome of the arbitral procedure which the tribunal adopted”, since to extend it to the outcome would be “an open invitation to the court to look into the merits of the tribunal’s analysis underlying its decision and orders” (CEF (HC) at [39]). The Court of Appeal affirmed that reasoning (CEF (CA) at [59]).

64 In its affidavit and written submissions, the applicant contends that the parties’ agreed arbitral procedure required the Arbitrator to decide their claims and counterclaims, on both liability and quantum, and to make a dispositive order for payment. I quote the relevant passages of its written submissions:

65 In my view, the applicant’s complaint is of the same character as that in CEF (HC). What it impugns is not any procedure the Arbitrator failed to follow, but the substance of his decision on the form the award should take. That much emerged plainly when I asked Mr Bull SC what, on the applicant’s case, the Arbitrator ought to have done:

66 The applicant’s grievance, stripped to its core, is therefore no more than the absence of an immediate order for payment. Its complaint lies in the difference between Form 4, a valuation with the payment order reserved, and Form 3, a valuation with the payment order made at once. What the applicant asks of this court is that it holds that the Arbitrator ought to have adopted the one form rather than the other.

67 In my view, the form of the award is not a procedural matter of mere timetabling or case management. It is substantive, going to the parties’ rights and liabilities. In choosing the form of the award, the Arbitrator had to evaluate a series of substantive questions: who the true parties to the Sub-Contract were, whether the liability of the JV’s constituent members was joint and several or proportionate to their interests under the JVA, and whether these questions of apportionment fell to be decided by him or by the JVA Tribunal. He concluded that these were questions of substance arising under the JVA, that they turned on the proper apportionment of liability between the constituent members of the JV, and that they were not his to decide, apportionment being, as is common ground, outside his jurisdiction. He declined Form 3 because there was “a real and difficult uncertainty underpinning the Subcontract” as to whether the JV members’ liability was joint and several or proportionate to their interests under the JVA (Partial Final Award at [1412]), and because the commencement of the arbitration against the respondent alone did not conclusively establish that the arbitration lay between the applicant and the respondent (at [1413]). It was for that reason, and not as a matter of scheduling, that he adopted Form 4 and reserved the payment order. He considered that an immediate order under Form 3 could not properly be made without trespassing on questions that belonged to the JVA Tribunal.

68 The substantive character of the Arbitrator’s decision is confirmed by asking what a challenge to it would require of this court. To hold that the Arbitrator should have adopted Form 3 and made an immediate payment order, the court would have to be satisfied either that the questions that the Arbitrator had identified above were his to decide, or that an immediate order could properly have been made without resolving them at all. Neither can be determined without the court forming its own view on the very matters of substance the Arbitrator addressed, the identity of the true parties, the character of the JV members’ liability, and the province of the JVA Tribunal over apportionment.

69 The applicant’s complaint is thus plainly a challenge to the merits. It stands in contrast to a genuine case-management decision, such as a decision to determine liability before quantum, which may be reviewed, if at all, without the court expressing any view on the parties’ substantive rights. The reservation here was not of that kind. Between the valuation and any payment order lay an unresolved question of apportionment under a different contract, which is common ground the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to decide and which the JVA Tribunal was the proper forum to resolve. The reference of that question to the JVA Tribunal under Form 4 was necessitated by, and inseparable from, the Arbitrator’s substantive conclusions. It cannot be treated as the mere procedural sequencing of a decision.

70 Accordingly, the applicant’s arguments in its written submissions, that there was no genuine difficulty precluding a payment order, that Form 3 ought to have been adopted in preference to Form 4, and that arbitrators have made payment orders in unincorporated joint venture cases without difficulty, are each directed to the correctness of the Arbitrator’s substantive conclusion. To decide whether Form 3 was to be preferred to Form 4 would require this court to enter upon the Arbitrator’s reasoning and to substitute its own view of the appropriate form of award for his. That is not the function of a supervisory court, which does not sit in appeal on the merits of an arbitral award (AKN at [37]; Prometheus Marine at [57]; see above at [45]).

71 My decision that the applicant’s complaint is not about the arbitral procedure but about the substance of the Partial Final Award, suffices to dispose of the applicant’s challenge under s 48(1)(a)(v) of the AA in limine. However, even if I am wrong on that point and the complaint is properly characterised as one relating to the arbitral procedure, the challenge fails for the further reason that there was no agreed procedure between the parties requiring the Arbitrator to make an immediate payment order.

72 The applicant argues that the agreement was “[b]ased on the pleadings that were served in the Sub-Contract Arbitration that were before the Arbitrator” (see above at [64]). This was far from the case. If anything, the course of the arbitral proceedings demonstrates the opposite of an agreement. The form of the award was a live and heavily contested point from the first day of the evidentiary hearing (see above at [14]). The parties were so far from agreement that the Arbitrator had to invite them to attempt to reach agreement on the form of the award, and when they could not, he directed them to address the issue in post-hearing submissions (see above at [16]). In post-hearing submissions, the parties again took contrasting positions (see above at [17]). The very fact that the parties were unable to agree on the form of the award and had to put the matter to the Arbitrator for determination is itself fatal to the applicant’s case. There can be no breach of an agreed procedure where no such agreement existed in the first place.

73 For these reasons, the applicant’s complaint under this ground is untenable. It is fundamentally not a complaint about the arbitral procedure at all, but a challenge to the substance of the Arbitrator’s award and to the merits of his conclusion on the form it should take. In any case, there is no doubt in my mind that there was plainly no agreement between the parties as to the form of the award. The challenge under s 48(1)(a)(v) is accordingly dismissed.

74 The applicant advances no ground of challenge to the Costs Award that is independent of its challenge to the Partial Final Award. OA 256 stands or falls with OA 1149, and the two grounds of challenge considered above, under s 48(1)(a)(iv) and s 48(1)(a)(v), fail in respect of the Costs Award for the same reasons.

75 There is one point of distinction, which the applicant emphasised but which does not assist it. For the Partial Final Award, the parties were divided on the form of the award: the applicant sought a payment order and the respondent resisted one. As to costs, both parties asked the Arbitrator to make a dispositive order for payment, though for different reasons. The applicant maintained its position that the Arbitrator should decide who was to pay and make an order accordingly. The respondent sought immediate payment of its costs for the reason that those costs had been incurred solely in its own name in defending the Sub-Contract Arbitration, were not costs of the JV, and were therefore not subject to any apportionment under the JVA. Notwithstanding that both parties sought an order for payment as to costs, the Arbitrator declined to make one and adopted the same course as he had in the Partial Final Award.

76 That the parties were, in this limited respect, of one mind does not alter the above analysis. There was no common position for the Arbitrator to give effect to, as the parties sought an order for payment on inconsistent bases. Even if the parties agreed on this matter, a tribunal is not bound to make an order merely because both parties seek it, and the form and timing of the award remained substantive matters for the Arbitrator’s determination. The Arbitrator was entitled to find that it was inconsistent for the respondent to maintain simultaneously that it had represented the JV in the Sub-Contract Arbitration and that the costs it had incurred were solely its own. That was a substantive determination on the character of the costs, which, for the reasons already given, is not a matter this court will review. Accordingly, the setting aside challenge to the Costs Award fails and the Arbitrator was entitled to reserve the payment order on costs as he had done for the Partial Final Award.

77 For the foregoing reasons, I dismiss both OA 1149 and OA 256. I award the respondent costs of both applications, to be agreed on by the parties. If the parties cannot agree, they are to file written submissions, of no more than 10 pages each, within two weeks of the date of this judgment.