1 The appellant pleaded guilty in a district court to a single charge under s 5(1) of the Payment Services Act 2019 (2020 Rev Ed) (“PSA”), punishable under s 5(3)(a) of the PSA. The District Judge (“DJ”) sentenced the appellant to seven months and three weeks’ imprisonment and a fine of $1000.00 in default four days’ imprisonment. The DJ’s grounds of decision are set out in Public Prosecutor v Nur Diyanah Binte Mohamed Ramdan [2026] SGDC 43 (“GD”).

2 In HC/MA 9028/2026/01 (“MA 9028”), the appellant appealed against the sentence of imprisonment. Having considered the parties’ submissions, I allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to 15 weeks’ imprisonment. In allowing the appeal, brief reasons for my decision were delivered orally. I now set out the full grounds of my decision.

3 The factual basis for the appellant’s conviction on her plea of guilt is extensively set out in the GD. I outline the salient facts briefly as follows.

4 In October 2023, the appellant was contacted by one “Larry Xiaohui” (“Larry”) on Facebook, who offered her a job as an administrative staff with a promised salary of $4,000. The appellant accepted the offer. At Larry’s request, the appellant sent Larry the account number of her POSB bank account (“POSB Bank Account”).

5 On Larry’s instructions, the appellant created a trading account on crypto.com (an online cryptocurrency trading platform) and proceeded to:

6 After a few weeks, the POSB Bank Account was frozen by the bank, and upon the appellant making enquiries with the bank, the appellant was informed that her POSB Bank Account was frozen due to suspected scam and money laundering activities. The appellant informed Larry of this, and in response, Larry requested that the appellant provide another bank account. The appellant then gave Larry the account number of her OCBC bank account (“OCBC Bank Account”) through which she performed the same transactions described at [5]. The OCBC Bank Account was also eventually frozen.

7 In total, between October 2023 and November 2023, the appellant performed 48 transactions involving $159,731.90. Of this, 40 transactions involving a total of $139,580.90 were done using the appellant’s POSB Bank Account, and eight transactions involving a total of $20,151 were done using the appellant’s OCBC Bank Account. The POSB and OCBC Bank Accounts were linked to eight police reports, and at least $43,196 was traceable to scam proceeds.

8 The appellant received a total of $1,000 from Larry for performing these transactions. The appellant had also admitted that she suspected from the beginning that the money she received on Larry’s instructions could have been illegal proceeds.

9 In the court below, the Prosecution sought a sentence of between 10 and 12 weeks’ imprisonment, as well as a fine of $1,000.

10 Specifically, the Prosecution relied on the sentencing framework set out by this court in Vijay Kumar v Public Prosecutor [2023] 5 SLR 983 (“Vijay Kumar”). The Prosecution acknowledged that in Vijay Kumar, the starting point for an offender (on a claim trial basis) in an archetypal case of an individual providing unlicensed money transfer services under the PSA is three weeks’ imprisonment. The Prosecution then sought an uplift, to account for the following offence-specific aggravating factors:

(a) On harm, the Prosecution asserted that the total value involved was high, at $159,731.90. The Prosecution also asserted that the number of transactions involved was significant, at 48 transactions. Further, the Prosecution highlighted that $43,196 was confirmed to be scam proceeds, and lastly, the Prosecution highlighted that the appellant’s offending lasted approximately two months.

(b) On culpability, the Prosecution highlighted that the appellant had accrued a financial benefit of $1,000. The Prosecution also emphasised that the appellant had persisted in offending even after her POSB Bank Account had been frozen, and after she had been informed that it was frozen because of suspected scam and money laundering activities.

11 The Prosecution submitted that the appropriate sentence, on a claim trial basis, would be between 14 and 17 weeks’ imprisonment. This would then be reduced by 30% to between 10 and 12 weeks’ imprisonment, on account of the appellant’s plea of guilt under Stage 1 of the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s Guidelines on Reduction in Sentences for Guilty Pleas (“PG Guidelines”). For good measure, the Prosecution tendered sentencing precedents which involved offences under s 5 of the PSA and submitted that a sentence of between 10 and 12 weeks’ imprisonment would be in line with these precedents.

12 Conversely, the appellant sought a sentence of six weeks’ imprisonment and a fine of $1,000.

13 The appellant agreed that the applicable sentencing framework was to be found in Vijay Kumar. The appellant also agreed that the offence-specific aggravating factors identified by the Prosecution (recounted above at [10]) were present. However, the appellant submitted that an uplift of six weeks’ imprisonment would be commensurate with these offence-specific aggravating factors. This resulted in an indicative sentence of nine weeks’ imprisonment, which would then be adjusted downwards to six weeks’ imprisonment on account of the appellant’s plea of guilt under Stage 1 of the PG Guidelines.

14 The DJ applied the sentencing framework in Vijay Kumar, and found that the following aggravating factors were present:

(a) First, the money laundering risk had materialised, as $43,196 in scam proceeds were funnelled through the appellant’s accounts (GD at [23]).

(b) Second, the appellant’s bank accounts were linked to eight police reports, which suggested that multiple victims were harmed by her criminal conduct (GD at [24]).

(c) Third, the total amount of money transferred, at $159,731.90, was substantial (GD at [25]).

(d) Fourth, the appellant had offended over a sustained period, as she had made 48 transactions over a span of between one and two months. The DJ reasoned that the appellant was essentially a serial offender, who through her repeated offending, had demonstrated heightened criminal persistence and recalcitrance (GD at [26]).

(e) Fifth, the appellant had offended for personal gain, as she had received $1,000 in profit (GD at [27]).

(f) Lastly, the appellant persisted in offending despite having her suspicions confirmed when the bank froze her POSB Bank Account. Indeed, the appellant opened her OCBC Bank Account instead. The DJ reasoned that this amounted to wilful blindness to the criminal nature of the proceeds, which was tantamount to actual knowledge of the same, and provided a basis to find that the appellant had heightened criminality (GD at [28]).

15 On the following premise, the DJ accorded a significant uplift to the three-week starting point in Vijay Kumar and found that the starting point sentence should be 11 months’ imprisonment (GD at [29]). After accounting for a 30% reduction on account of the appellant’s plea of guilt under Stage 1 of the PG Guidelines, the DJ derived a sentence of seven months and three weeks’ imprisonment (GD at [32]).

16 Thereafter, the DJ proceeded to distinguish the sentencing precedents tendered by the Prosecution, on the basis that none of them involved analogous facts and that the harm and culpability in those cases were measurably lower (GD at [33]).

17 The DJ then proceeded to consider Public Prosecutor v Ederlina Uton Duran [2025] SGDC 251 (“Ederlina”), which neither party relied upon (GD at [34]). In Ederlina, an offender pleaded guilty to one proceeded charge under s 55A of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CDSA”) and had one charge under s 5(1) of the PSA taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing (“TIC”). She received a global sentence of eight months’ imprisonment.

18 The DJ explicitly acknowledged that the sentencing framework in Vijay Kumar was inapplicable to s 55A of the CDSA. Nonetheless, the DJ drew the following parallels (GD at [35]):

19 Consequently, the DJ concluded that some guidance may be drawn from the sentencing factors and precedents under s 55A of the CDSA (GD at [35]). The DJ then compared the facts in Ederlina with those in the appellant’s case and concluded that the latter case featured greater harm and elevated criminality, but that the offender in the former case had a TIC charge (GD at [34]). Accordingly, the DJ determined that a custodial term of seven months and three weeks’ imprisonment was appropriate.

20 In MA 9028, the appellant argued that the DJ had erred in imposing a sentence of seven months and three weeks’ imprisonment, for the following reasons:

(a) The DJ erred in referring to Ederlina, which effectively led to the DJ sentencing the appellant as though she was facing a CDSA charge when the offence was not in force at the material time.

(b) The DJ erred in calibrating a starting point sentence of 11 months’ imprisonment, as this was a disproportionate uplift which reflected an excessive emphasis on general deterrence.

21 Instead, the appellant submitted that a sentence of six weeks’ imprisonment would be appropriate. Further and in the alternative, the appellant submitted that a sentence of 10 weeks’ imprisonment (ie, the lowest end of the Prosecution’s position below) should be imposed instead.

22 Conversely, the Prosecution submitted that the DJ had correctly assessed the relevant sentencing factors and had correctly calibrated the appellant’s sentence. The Prosecution’s submissions in MA 9028 largely echoed and endorsed the DJ’s reasons found in the GD. Accordingly, the Prosecution submitted that MA 9028 ought to be dismissed.

23 The issues to be determined were as follows:

24 In my view, although the DJ was correct to apply the Vijay Kumar framework, the DJ erred in relying on Ederlina as a precedent in calibrating the sentence imposed on the appellant.

25 As rightly pointed out by the appellant, case law states that in sentencing an offender, it is impermissible for the court to consider that an alternative charge might have been brought and sentence the offender as though he had been convicted on that alternative charge. In Public Prosecutor v Ng Sae Kiat [2015] SGHC 191 (“Ng Sae Kiat”), the offenders were charged with offences under the Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289, 2006 Rev Ed), and the Prosecution had urged this court to take into account benchmark sentences for other Penal Code offences in determining the appropriate sentence. This court rejected the Prosecution’s invitation to do so (at [70]) for the following reasons:

26 At this juncture, I should clarify that in sentencing an offender, reference to precedent involving other offence-creating provisions is not always impermissible. Indeed, it is perfectly acceptable to consider the sentencing framework and precedents relating to other offences for the purpose of ensuring ordinal proportionality, or in other words, the relative gravity of one offence compared to another (see Kow Keng Siong, Sentencing Principles in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2019) at para 08.044).

27 In addition, case law states that reference to precedent involving other offence-creating provisions would not, without more, impugn the correctness of a sentencing decision so long as it does not affect the reasoning adopted by the court. For instance, in Sim Gek Yong v Public Prosecutor [1995] 1 SLR(R) 185 (cited in Ng Sae Kiat at [70]), the district judge below had, in passing sentence, compared an offender’s case under s 137(a) of the Customs Act (Cap 70, 1985 Rev Ed) with an offence under s 353 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed). On appeal, Yong Pung How CJ made the following observations (at [16]):

28 The same cannot be said of the DJ’s reasons in the GD. In my view, the DJ’s reliance on Ederlina had the practical effect of considering the possibility that an alternative charge featuring a graver sentencing benchmark (ie, s 55A(1)(b)(iii) of the CDSA) might have been brought against the appellant. Though s 55A(1)(b)(iii) of the CDSA and s 5(3)(a) of the PSA both carry a maximum sentence of three years’ imprisonment, it remains the case that the applicable sentencing benchmark for s 5(3)(a) of the PSA is the three-week starting point sentence in the Vijay Kumar framework, whereas the sentencing benchmark applied in Ederlina was the six-month starting point set out in the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s Guidelines for Scams-Related Offences (“Scam Offences Guidelines”).

29 Indeed, though the DJ did not explicitly state that he had followed Ederlina, the reasons in his GD indicate that he had placed significant weight on Ederlina in calibrating the uplift applied to the three-week starting point sentence. As recounted above (at [14]–[19]), the DJ had derived a starting point sentence of 11 months’ imprisonment and justified this uplift by referencing the aggravating factors which were present and what he termed as “the imperative of applying general deterrence to combat the scam epidemic” (GD at [29]). However, the DJ did not particularise the specific weight he accorded to each aggravating factor and did not situate the appellant’s case among the PSA precedents placed before him. Instead, the DJ considered Ederlina and the worsening scam situation in Singapore and then proceeded to distinguish two other precedents. The DJ then derived an eventual sentence of seven months and three weeks’ imprisonment, which was merely one week less than the sentence of eight months’ imprisonment imposed in Ederlina.

30 In short, Ederlina was the only precedent which the DJ referred to for sentencing guidance in his GD (save for Vijay Kumar). The eventual sentence which the DJ imposed was extremely close to the sentence imposed in Ederlina.

31 In my view, Ederlina is of doubtful precedential value. With respect, the DJ’s reliance on Ederlina in sentencing the appellant was misplaced.

32 As recounted above (at [17]), the offender in Ederlina pleaded guilty to one charge under s 55A(1)(a)(i) read with s 55A(1)(b)(iii) of the CDSA and punishable under s 55A(5) of the CDSA. The district judge in Ederlina acknowledged that the Scam Offences Guidelines did not cover charges under s 55A of the CDSA, and instead targeted offenders who hand over control of their bank accounts. Nonetheless, the district judge in Ederlina proceeded to rely on the Scam Offences Guidelines as useful guidance anyway, because in his view, the gravamen of an offence under s 55A(1)(b)(iii) of the CDSA was the same as those offences covered by the Scam Offences Guidelines (at [33]–[35]).

33 On that premise, the district judge in Ederlina (at [39]) expressly applied the same starting sentence in the Scam Offences Guidelines, of six months’ imprisonment. The district judge then noted that the Scam Offences Guidelines recommended an uplift of at least 25% from the starting sentence if an amount equal to or more than $100,000 moved through the bank account or if a vulnerable person was affected by the scam (at paras 13(f) and 14 of the Scam Offences Guidelines respectively). Accordingly, the district judge adjusted the starting sentence from six months’ imprisonment to nine months’ imprisonment (at [40]–[41]). The district judge then factored in the offender’s TIC charge, status as a first-time offender and plea of guilt under Stage 1 of the PG Guidelines and derived a sentence of eight months’ imprisonment (at [43]–[45]).

34 In the recent decision of Galvez Mary Joe Blanco v Public Prosecutor [2026] 3 SLR 1427 (“Galvez”), a three-Judge panel of the High Court held (at [30]) that the Scam Offences Guidelines are not directly relevant to offences under s 55A(1)(b)(iii) of the CDSA, as they do not involve the handing over of control of a bank account. Nevertheless, the court held that the policy considerations discussed in the Scam Offences Guidelines in relation to scams-related offences are useful. The court then went on to set out a Logachev-style sentencing framework (see Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 609) for offences under s 55A(1)(b)(iii) of the CDSA which incorporates an even escalation of indicative sentencing ranges for each tier of harm and culpability (at [47]).

35 It would be fair to observe that Ederlina and the DJ’s decision in the present case both pre-dated Galvez and this necessarily meant that the district judges in both these cases did not have the benefit of guidance from the decision in Galvez. Had the chronological sequence in which these cases were decided been reversed, the district judges would foreseeably have refrained from applying the Scam Offences Guidelines directly to derive the eventual sentence imposed.

36 Leaving aside for a moment the observations in Galvez (at [30]), it remains the case that Ederlina cannot be an appropriate comparator in calibrating the appellant’s sentence. In my view, the facts surrounding the offence in Ederlina (and thus, the offence-specific aggravating factors disclosed) are distinct from the facts surrounding the appellant’s offence. Indeed, though the offender in Ederlina and the appellant both handled comparable sums, offended for comparable durations, and played similar roles in the commission of their offences, the offender in Ederlina had a TIC charge and received over twice the personal gain compared to the appellant. Although it is true that the appellant’s offending involved more victims and a correspondingly higher sum of criminal proceeds, I was hesitant to conclude that these two factors aggravated the appellant’s offending to the same extent that the TIC charge and higher personal gain had in Ederlina.

37 In any event, I considered whether the sentence imposed by the DJ was manifestly excessive, and having had regard to the precedents placed before the court, I concluded that the sentence of seven months and three weeks’ imprisonment was indeed manifestly excessive.

38 In my view, the DJ had correctly identified the offence-specific aggravating factors which were present in this case (recounted above at [14]). These aggravating factors plainly warranted a sentencing approach that was more appropriately commensurate to the present factual context, which reflected much more serious offending conduct and consequential harm than the scenario in Vijay Kumar. In particular, the appellant’s offence involved scam proceeds of a substantial amount of $43,196 with eight police reports and multiple victims involved. These factors did not feature at all in Vijay Kumar, where the offending conduct essentially revolved around the offender’s provision of payment services without a licence, with no known adverse impact on any other parties. However, to my mind, the offence-specific aggravating factors in the present case cannot justify such a significant uplift from the three-week starting point contemplated in Vijay Kumar to the 11-month starting point sentence derived by the DJ (GD at [29]).

39 Before me, the appellant submitted that a sentence of six weeks’ imprisonment would be condign. In support of this proposed six-week sentence, the appellant relied primarily on Public Prosecutor v Abdul Bashar Khan [2016] SGDC 203 (“Abdul Bashar Khan”), where I had imposed a sentence of six weeks’ imprisonment on appeal. In the alternative, the appellant submitted that a sentence of 10 weeks’ imprisonment would suffice. In support of this alternative position, the appellant asserted that the circumstances of her offending were analogous to Public Prosecutor v Tan Khoon Yong [2022] SGMC 43 (“Tan Khoon Yong”) where a sentence of 10 weeks’ imprisonment was imposed.

40 In my view, Abdul Bashar Khan was of no assistance in calibrating the weight which ought to be accorded to the identified aggravating factors in the appellant’s case and thus, the appropriate uplift to be imposed. The principal reason is that Abdul Bashar Khan did not involve an offence under s 5(1) of the PSA but an offence under s 6(1) of the Money-Changing and Remittance Businesses Act (Cap 187, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MCRBA”) instead, a statute which has since been repealed. Moreover, the factual circumstances in Abdul Bashar Khan were unusual, in that the offender had in fact openly arranged for the funds to be transmitted through a licenced remittance agent. As I held in Vijay Kumar (at [30]–[36]), sentencing precedents under s 6(2) of the MCRBA ought to be treated with caution and may be helpful only insofar as they provide the relevant sentencing factors for consideration within the sentencing framework set out in Vijay Kumar. Accordingly, I rejected the appellant’s submission that Abdul Bashar Khan was a relevant sentencing precedent for a six-week imprisonment term.

41 In Tan Khoon Yong, the offender had pleaded guilty to one charge under s 5(1) of the PSA punishable under s 5(3)(a) of the PSA, for receiving $208,890 across 38 inward transfers and making 32 outward transfers to Malaysian recipients. Of this sum, $6,000 was traced to a scam victim, and the offender received $5,165.32 as commission. The offence was committed for a duration of over one month. The principal district judge who dealt with Tan Khoon Yong sentenced the offender to 10 weeks’ imprisonment.

42 I was conscious that Tan Khoon Yong was decided before Vijay Kumar, and consequently did not apply the sentencing framework set out therein. Nevertheless, Tan Khoon Yong remains useful as a sentencing precedent because it is well-reasoned and correctly identifies the offence-specific aggravating factors which were subsequently confirmed to be relevant under the framework in Vijay Kumar. Indeed, in Tan Khoon Yong, the principal district judge expressly disregarded MCRBA sentencing precedents, and instead focused on the number of transactions, amount of money transferred, amount of criminal proceeds, duration of offending, personal gain (and lack of restitution), and the transnational element in the offence (at [42], [43] and [47]).

43 Notwithstanding these observations, I disagreed with the appellant’s contention that Tan Khoon Yong was comparable to her own case. To illustrate this, I present the relevant sentencing factors in both cases in a comparative table below:

44 The offender in Tan Khoon Yong had dealt with a higher quantum of moneys and secured a larger personal gain as compared to the appellant in the instant case, and the offence involved a transnational element. That being said, the appellant had dealt with a significantly higher quantum of criminal proceeds and offended over a slightly longer duration. Her offence involved more victims, and crucially, the appellant had persisted in offending despite the bank informing her that the POSB Bank Account was frozen because of suspected scam and money laundering activities. Taken together, I was satisfied that the harm caused by the appellant’s offence, as well as the appellant’s culpability in the commission of the offence, was considerably higher than that in Tan Khoon Yong. Accordingly, I rejected the appellant’s submission in the alternative that 10 weeks’ imprisonment was appropriate.

45 For completeness, I rejected the Prosecution’s submission that there was an inherent transnational element in the appellant’s offending. At the hearing before me, the Prosecution highlighted that the appellant had transferred cryptocurrency to digital payment token wallets and asserted that these wallets “could be accessed anywhere in the world”, and that there was therefore an additional harm-specific aggravating factor in the appellant’s case. I was unable to accept this line of argument, as it was bereft of factual basis, and was speculative at best.

46 I turned also to consider Public Prosecutor v Zin Nwe Nyunt [2025] SGDC 184 (“Zin Nwe Nyunt”), which both parties had referred to in the course of their submissions. In Zin Nwe Nyunt, the offender had incorporated a company and opened bank accounts under the company’s name to facilitate money transfer services. The offender then handed over the internet banking facility token of these corporate bank accounts to a principal offender who operated all transactions which flowed through these accounts. Nonetheless, the offender was made aware of funds being transferred through the bank accounts for the purpose of computing the commission amount she was to be paid. Eventually, the police received information that proceeds of an investment scam, amounting to $480,652.80, were transferred into the corporate account opened by the offender. As a result, the offender was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, the following charges:

(a) one proceeded charge under s 5(1) of the PSA punishable under s 5(3)(a) of the PSA read with s 109 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“PC”), wherein the offender received US$152,147,155;

(b) another proceeded charge under s 5(1) of the PSA punishable under s 5(3)(a) of the PSA read with s 109 of the PC, wherein the offender received US$251,934,635.25;

(c) one TIC charge under s 5(1) of the PSA punishable under s 5(3)(a) of the PSA; and

(d) another TIC charge under s 6(2) of the MCRBA.

47 The district judge sentenced the offender in Zin Nwe Nyunt to nine months’ imprisonment for each PSA charge, and ran both sentences consecutively, to derive a global sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment. The Prosecution initially appealed against the sentence but subsequently withdrew the appeal.

48 In my view, though the district judge in Zin Nwe Nyunt had applied the Vijay Kumar framework and correctly identified the relevant sentencing factors which were present, Zin Nwe Nyunt was of limited utility as a sentencing precedent. With respect, the sentence was inordinately lenient. The district judge in Zin Nwe Nyunt had ascribed insufficient aggravating weight to the astronomical sums involved (US$152,147,155 and US$251,934,635.25 respectively), the lengthy duration of offending (more than six months and eight months respectively), the two TIC charges which were present, and the very substantial tainted funds handled by the offender (totalling $480,652.80). Indeed, the global sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment in Zin Nwe Nyunt was incommensurate with the overall criminality on those facts. Accordingly, I placed no weight on Zin Nwe Nyunt.

49 Having considered the offence-specific aggravating factors present in the appellant’s case, I determined that an uplift of 18 weeks’ imprisonment, scaling up from the starting point sentence of three weeks’ imprisonment in the Vijay Kumar framework, would be appropriate. The indicative sentence was therefore 21 weeks’ imprisonment (on a claim trial basis), which was then reduced by 30% to account for the appellant’s plea of guilt under Stage 1 of the PG Guidelines. This resulted in a sentence of 15 weeks’ imprisonment.

50 For the foregoing reasons, I allowed the appellant’s appeal against the sentence and reduced her sentence from seven months and three weeks’ imprisonment to 15 weeks’ imprisonment.

51 There was no appeal against the fine of $1,000 which was imposed by the DJ, and I did not disturb this component of the appellant’s sentence. In any event, the fine has already been paid by the appellant.