1 The Respondent claimed trial in the District Court to one charge of driving without due care and attention causing grievous hurt, an offence under s 65(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed) (“RTA”), punishable under s 65(3)(b) read with s 65(6)(d) of the RTA. The district judge (“DJ”) convicted the Respondent on this charge and sentenced him to a fine of $8,000 in default four weeks’ imprisonment. The DJ also ordered a disqualification period of five years.

2 The Respondent had initially appealed against his conviction and sentence. The Prosecution cross-appealed in turn against the sentence. The Respondent did not proceed with his appeal. The present appeal in HC/MA 9129/2025/02 is the Prosecution’s appeal seeking a custodial sentence.

3 Having heard the parties’ submissions, I allow the Prosecution’s appeal for the reasons set out below.

4 The Respondent was convicted after trial on the following charge in DAC-910825-2022:

5 The DJ’s grounds of decision are found in Public Prosecutor v Able Wang Ziyi [2026] SGDC 19 (“GD”). A fuller account of the facts is set out in the GD as well as the Statement of Agreed Facts that was tendered below. For present purposes, I shall only briefly outline the salient points. As the Respondent has not continued with his appeal, the DJ’s findings of fact are taken to be conclusive.

6 On 6 July 2021 at around 10.46pm, the Respondent was driving his car (“Car”) along Rifle Range Road towards Advance Material Engineering, Army, Singapore. The relevant stretch of road is a two-lane road with a continuous white line down the centre. The speed limit was 50km/h.

7 The Respondent braked to slow down as he approached a left bend at Rifle Range Road near lamp post no. 61. As he did so, he lost control and his Car skidded across to the opposite lane and collided into the railing and three parked motorcycles belonging to Mr Wong Chong Ming (“Mr Wong”) and his two friends, Mr Liew Wei Siong and Mr Wong Tik Wah. Mr Wong was hit either by the Car itself or by a motorcycle which had been flung onto him by the Car: GD at [63]. At the time of the collision, the weather was clear, the road surface was wet, visibility was clear, and traffic flow was light. The Car had no mechanical fault: GD at [9]–[11]. A photograph of the accident scene taken by the police after the collision is reproduced below:

8 Figure 1 below, prepared by the Prosecution’s expert witness Ms Lee Rui Lin (“Ms Lee”), a senior forensic scientist with the Health Sciences Authority, shows an overview of Rifle Range Road. The Respondent had been travelling from points A to D, and point D is the relevant bend in question where the Respondent lost control of the Car. The green triangle close to point D represents the approximate resting positions of the vehicles:

9 The “critical yaw speed of the bend” is the speed which, if exceeded, could cause a vehicle to lose traction and yaw out of the curvature of the road: GD at [39]. Based on the evidence of Ms Lee, the DJ found that the critical yaw speed of the bend was at least 46km/h: GD at [42]–[43]. Ms Lee had calculated the critical speed as between 36km/h and 46km/h, while the Defence’s expert had calculated it to be even lower, at 35.6km/h. It was common ground that the Respondent’s speed right at the start of the bend just after lamp post no. 61 was around 53km/h: GD at [30]. While the Respondent would also have been braking at around this point, the DJ did not make a specific finding on the speed of the Car pre-impact (which would have been slightly lower): GD at [35].

10 The DJ found that the Respondent had been speeding further up along Rifle Range Road immediately prior to the accident (GD at [27]–[28] and [48]):

(a) From points A to B: the Respondent was driving at between 71km/h and 97km/h.

(b) From points C to D: the Respondent was driving at between 53km/h and 73km/h.

11 At the material time, Mr Wong and his two friends had parked their motorcycles beside the road barrier of the opposite lane and were standing near their motorcycles. The DJ observed that Mr Wong and his two friends had parked there illegally, and they had been trespassing on state land to pick fruits: GD at [129].

12 As a result of the collision, Mr Wong suffered left lower limb multiple deep lacerations. He was hospitalised for 9 days and was subsequently issued 44 days of hospitalisation leave: GD at [14].

13 The Respondent had two relevant previous convictions:

(a) On 10 June 1998, he was convicted of speeding under s 63(4) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 1997 Rev Ed) and was fined $700.

(b) On 27 October 2004, he was convicted of speeding under the same provision of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 1997 Rev Ed) and was fined $1,000.

14 Section 65(8) of the RTA defines a “repeat offender” as a person who has been convicted on at least one other earlier occasion of any of the specified offences, which includes a prior conviction of the offence of speeding. As a result of his two previous speeding convictions, the Respondent is a “repeat offender” and is thus liable under s 65(3)(b) of the RTA to double the maximum sentence compared to a first-time offender:

15 The Respondent also had 25 compounded traffic offences on record, the most recent of which was dated 28 June 2019. Ten of these compounded offences were for speeding, and two were for beating a red-light signal. The remaining 13 related to parking offences.

16 The DJ accepted that the sentencing framework laid down in Chen Song v Public Prosecutor [2025] 3 SLR 509 (“Chen Song”) was applicable: GD at [117]. Chen Song sets out the following sentencing framework for first-time careless driving offences involving grievous hurt where the offender elects to claim trial (at [134]):

(a) First, identify the number of offence-specific factors under the categories of “harm” and “culpability”:

(b) Second, use the number of offence-specific factors present to determine whether there is “lesser harm” or “greater harm”, and “lower culpability” or “higher culpability”. There is “lesser harm”/“lower culpability” where there is one or no harm or culpability factor identified. Two or more harm or culpability factors would constitute “greater harm” and “higher culpability” respectively. Based on the assessment of harm and culpability, place the offender within one of the sentencing bands:

(c) Third, identify an indicative starting sentence having regard to all the primary harm and culpability factors identified, as well as the secondary harm factors.

(d) Fourth, adjust the starting point to take into account offender-specific aggravating and mitigating factors.

17 Pertinently, the court in Chen Song observed that the custodial threshold would typically be crossed where there are two or more offence-specific harm and/or culpability factors present (at [137]). Further, the court should remain alive to the possibility of imposing both a term of imprisonment and a fine (at [135]).

18 In respect of the primary harm factors, the DJ found that Mr Wong’s injuries fell on the lower side of “grievous hurt” such that the primary harm factor was “not fully engaged”. Although Mr Wong had to undergo two surgical procedures, he recovered well with no permanent disability: GD at [121]–[124].

19 As to the secondary harm factors, the DJ did not consider the damage to the road railing as there was no evidence before the court of the repair costs. The motorcycles incurred $16,321 in repair costs, although the DJ observed that the damage appeared “relatively superficial comprising mainly dents, cracks and scratches”. There was also potential harm to Mr Wong’s two friends who were standing nearby. This was, however, somewhat ameliorated by the “unusual situation” that Mr Wong and his friends were parking illegally to partake in their fruit-picking activities: GD at [126]–[129]. In the round, the DJ found one offence-specific harm factor.

20 In respect of the culpability factor, Chen Song recognises speeding as a form of dangerous driving behaviour which might engage this factor. The DJ found that while the Respondent had entered the bend at a speed of 53km/h (slightly above the 50km/h speed limit), this was “not an excessive speed”, especially because the Respondent had braked to slow down at that stage: GD at [132]–[133]. The Respondent had been careless by not slowing down the Car even further having regard to the wet road and the sharpness of the bend, but this was merely an element of the offence and the level of carelessness was not severe enough to constitute an additional offence-specific factor: GD at [134].

21 The DJ concluded that the custodial threshold had not been crossed as there was only one offence-specific factor in terms of the harm caused. The case fell within the lower harm-culpability band in Chen Song. Further, the Respondent’s driving record was not so aggravating as to tilt the balance in favour of a custodial sentence: GD at [135]–[137]. The Respondent’s speeding antecedents would be adequately dealt with by the imposition of a high fine as well as the disqualification order: GD at [139].

22 The Prosecution had sought a sentence of two weeks’ imprisonment while the Defence had sought a fine of $4,000. The Respondent was sentenced to a fine of $8,000 and a disqualification period of five years.

23 The Prosecution’s appeal against sentence is focused on the issue of whether the custodial threshold has been crossed. The Prosecution makes the following broad arguments in support of a sentence of two weeks’ imprisonment.

24 First, the Prosecution submits that the DJ had erred in failing to recognise that the Respondent’s act of speeding should have constituted an offence-specific culpability factor. According to the Prosecution, Chen Song did not introduce a “minimum threshold” of excess speed which had to be met before speeding qualifies as an offence-specific culpability factor; the DJ effectively imposed an additional threshold unsupported by authority. Further, the Respondent was driving at an excessive speed as he exceeded the critical yaw speed while rounding the bend (see above at [9]). He had also been speeding well in excess of the 50km/h speed limit in the road section leading up to the bend and this was proximate enough to the collision to factor into the assessment of the Respondent’s overall culpability.

25 Second, the DJ had erroneously applied the Chen Song framework without accounting for the fact that the Respondent was a repeat offender. According to the Prosecution, there should have been an uplift to the sentence derived from Chen Song to account for the fact that the maximum punishment for repeat offenders was double that applicable to first-time offenders.

26 Third, the DJ erred in giving weight to the fact that Mr Wong was parking illegally and trespassing, this being irrelevant to sentencing. Mr Wong and his friends were parked on the opposite side of the two-lane road; their conduct had no bearing on the Respondent’s culpability.

27 Fourth, apart from the above arguments, the Prosecution further asserts that the custodial threshold had been crossed because the DJ may have understated the amount of harm caused and the present case is more egregious than similar precedents.

28 The Respondent’s main arguments repeat what was submitted before the DJ. The Respondent submits that the DJ’s decision should be affirmed as there is insufficient basis to warrant appellate intervention with the DJ’s evaluation of the relevant sentencing factors. In calibrating the sentence as he did, the DJ had balanced the factors and accorded due weight to them.

29 In particular, the Respondent submits that the DJ was entitled to find that speeding did not amount to a separate offence-specific culpability factor on the facts. Taking into account his speeding as a separate culpability factor would risk double-counting since his excessive speed had already been relied on to establish his culpability for the offence of careless driving. The DJ also correctly considered that the illegal parking by Mr Wong and his friends was relevant to the overall assessment of harm and potential harm. In addition, the sentencing precedents did not support the imposition of a custodial sentence.

30 The Respondent further submits that the DJ had applied his mind to the Respondent’s status as a repeat offender in sentencing him to a fine of $8,000, which exceeds the maximum permissible fine of $5,000 which would apply to a first-time offender. In doing so, the DJ had justifiably given the dated previous convictions limited weight.

31 The following issues arise from the submissions on appeal:

(a) how the Chen Song framework should be applied to repeat offenders;

(b) whether the DJ erred in identifying only one offence-specific factor, which would necessitate a further inquiry into:

(i) whether the DJ understated the amount of harm caused;

(ii) whether the DJ should have recognised speeding as an additional culpability factor;

(iii) whether the DJ erred in considering Mr Wong’s “contributory negligence”; and

(c) having regard to the findings on the preceding issues and the Respondent’s repeat offender status, whether the DJ erred in finding that the custodial threshold had not been crossed.

32 First, I consider how Chen Song should be adjusted to account for the Respondent’s repeat offender status:

(a) The Prosecution’s position is that for repeat offenders, an uplift could be applied after deriving the indicative sentence under the Chen Song framework.

(b) The Respondent argues that the DJ had adopted the Prosecution’s suggested methodology of imposing an uplift.

33 I agree with the Prosecution’s suggestion that repeat offenders can be accounted for by imposing an uplift to the indicative sentence derived under the Chen Song framework. Additionally, in determining when the custodial threshold will be crossed for repeat offenders, the current guidance in Chen Song, viz, that the custodial threshold would typically only be crossed where there are two or more offence-specific factors present, would still be applicable. This is subject to the qualification that because the determination of whether a custodial sentence is warranted involves a holistic assessment of the overall harm and culpability (Tan Kai Yuan v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGHC 152 (“Tan Kai Yuan”) at [36]), in borderline cases it remains open to the sentencing judge to find that an offender’s repeated offending suffices to “tip the balance” into custodial territory.

34 This might be the case where, for example, a repeat offender is assessed to fall within Band 1 of the Chen Song framework (see [16] above) and would have fallen just shy of the custodial threshold had he been a first-time offender. However, a sentencing judge in such a case may be entitled to find that the offender’s prior conviction (especially if recent) warrants a more robust deterrent sentence. The resultant uplift may be such that the custodial threshold will be crossed.

35 As sentencing is a fact-specific exercise, I would also caution against laying down any general rule to the effect that a repeat offender would invariably receive a custodial sentence:

(a) Such an approach would be too blunt considering the myriad of circumstances under which a repeat offender might present themselves. For example, if the previous conviction occurred many years ago and has limited relevance to the offending behaviour in question, it would likely suffice to account for the prior conviction by imposing a substantially higher fine.

(b) Additionally, the fact that Parliament increased the maximum fine but did not impose any mandatory term of imprisonment suggests that it contemplated situations where a non-custodial sentence might still be appropriate for repeat offenders.

36 The Prosecution has not pursued this point seriously beyond making a passing statement that the DJ may have “understated the harm caused”. In any case, I do not think the DJ’s assessment was plainly wrong.

37 The harm here is comparable to some extent to the harm in Erh Zhi Huang, Alvan v Public Prosecutor (HC/MA 9204/2022/01, decided in Chen Song) (“Alvan Erh”). The offender was driving along the first (ie, innermost) lane of the three-lane Pan Island Expressway towards Tuas. Due to heavy traffic, the car in front of the offender braked and came to a stop. The offender abruptly switched lanes from lane one to lane two without keeping a proper lookout. This led to a collision with the victim, who was riding his motorcycle behind the offender in lane two (Chen Song at [37]).

38 In Alvan Erh, the victim suffered a traumatic amputation of the right little finger and a clavicle fracture; he received hospitalisation leave of 58 days. While permanent injury was caused to the victim, there was no evidence that the victim would suffer permanent hand disability and he was assessed as being likely to be able to return to work. Having regard to the victim’s injuries, the damage caused to the victim’s motorcycle, and the potential harm arising from the offender’s abrupt lane-change on the expressway during peak hour, the offender in Alvan Erh was placed in the higher end of the “low” harm category: Chen Song at [165]. For completeness, Alvan Erh had been sentenced under the then-applicable framework in Sue Chang v Public Prosecutor [2023] 3 SLR 440: Chen Song at [167].

39 In the instant case, Mr Wong received a lower amount of hospitalisation leave (44 days) and did not suffer any permanent injury. By all accounts, he recovered fully from his injuries. The DJ also observed that the damage to the three motorcycles appeared to be “relatively superficial, comprising mainly dents, cracks, and scratches”: GD at [126]. By comparison, the property damage in Alvan Erh seemed more serious: Chen Song at [39]. While I accept that there was potential harm to Mr Wong’s two friends, there was less potential harm than might have been caused by an abrupt lane-change during peak hour on an expressway. Apart from the presence of Mr Wong and his friends, the Respondent’s careless driving had occurred along a small, relatively secluded road, at night. On both primary and secondary harm factors, the instant case is less egregious than Alvan Erh. The DJ was therefore entitled to assess harm as being low, constituting one offence-specific factor.

40 I turn next to whether the DJ had erred in considering that Mr Wong and his two friends were parking illegally and trespassing in the area.

41 The Prosecution submits that the fact that Mr Wong and his friends had parked illegally in the area should have no bearing on the Respondent’s culpability. I am inclined to agree. The victim’s conduct may be relevant to sentencing where it “has a direct bearing on the culpability of the offender”: Guay Seng Tiong Nickson v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 1079 (“Nickson Guay”) at [65]; Chen Song at [133].

42 On the present facts, even if Mr Wong and his friends were trespassers and had parked their motorcycles illegally, this does not diminish the Respondent’s culpability. This is because nothing Mr Wong and his friends had done had any bearing on the manner of the Respondent’s careless driving. The Respondent failed to drive with due care and attention, and thus lost control of the Car and caused the collision. His actions had no connection whatsoever with the presence of Mr Wong and his friends at the scene. This is no different from a scenario where the Respondent, having lost control of the Car at the bend, had skidded across into the opposite lane and crashed into an oncoming vehicle or a pedestrian who may have been walking along the roadside.

43 The presence of Mr Wong and his friends is better characterised as a form of “moral (bad) luck” which resulted in more harm being caused than usual, but this simply has no bearing on the Respondent’s culpability. It is clear that “the outcome materiality principle trumps the control principle”, and therefore the sentence will not be affected even if the victim had contributed materially to the outcome: Nickson Guay at [70].

44 The Prosecution argues that the DJ had erred in taking into account the illegal nature of the presence of Mr Wong and his friends. To my mind, it is not clear that the DJ had erred in this regard. It is unclear whether or to what extent the DJ had relied on this as a basis for finding that the Respondent’s culpability was reduced. Rather, the DJ seems to have considered the presence of Mr Wong and his friends in the area as part of the assessment of the potential harm: GD at [128]. If anything, the DJ had rightly observed that potential harm should be assessed by reference to the reality on the ground and not based on hypothetical scenarios: see Chen Song at [130]; GD at [127]. For this reason, the DJ found that there was potential harm to Mr Wong’s two friends as they were standing nearby: GD at [127].

45 To the extent that the DJ had then observed that this was an “unusual situation” involving illegal parking and trespassing, this remark appears to have been made in passing. It does not appear that this consideration resulted in the DJ giving less weight to the factor of potential harm. Indeed, in the ensuing paragraph at [130] of the GD, the DJ went on to find “[o]n the whole” that one offence-specific harm factor was engaged, considering “actual harm, potential harm and physical damage”.

46 Even assuming that the DJ is taken to have erred in having considered the “unusual situation”, I do not think this error made any material difference to his overall assessment of the harm factor. As noted above, the DJ appears to have considered this issue as part of assessing the potential harm. It seems to me that he did not give the “unusual situation” significant weight, and even if this factor was removed, harm should still be considered “lesser”. The potential harm here would still be lower than in Alvan Erh (see above at [39]). I would therefore affirm the DJ’s decision to find one offence-specific harm factor.

47 I agree with the Prosecution that there was an additional culpability factor of speeding. This is presumptively so because the Respondent had been going 3km/h over the speed limit as he rounded the bend.

48 The DJ appears to have been of the view that the Respondent’s excess speed of 3km/h (relative to the operative 50km/h speed limit) was so de minimis as to have a negligible bearing on his culpability. This may have some intuitive force. The Prosecution nonetheless argues that his exceeding the speed limit even by 3km/h must be factored in because Chen Song did not impose a “minimum threshold” of speeding.

49 I am persuaded that the Prosecution’s approach is correct. I do not think that this would constitute an overly mechanistic approach which Chen Song has expressly cautioned against (at [123]). The fact remains that the Respondent was driving above the speed limit. Certainly, the court should also have regard to the “intensity of the relevant factors, as opposed to simply determining the binary question of whether the factor is engaged and adding [the factors] mechanically” [emphasis in original]: Tan Kai Yuan at [21]. This observation does no more than reiterate that there are two steps in the inquiry. The first step still requires the court to determine whether the relevant offence-specific factor is engaged in the first place. The intensity of the relevant factor involves an evaluative assessment which is engaged at the second step, ie, to determine the appropriate weight to be accorded to the relevant factor. I therefore find that the offence-specific factor of speeding was engaged.

50 I also agree with the Prosecution’s argument that the Respondent’s speed was excessive relative to the critical yaw speed of the bend which was between 35.6km/h and 46km/h. The critical yaw speed was below the speed limit of the road. In my view, “speeding” in the context of the Chen Song culpability factors was plainly established here as the Respondent was driving above the speed limit, without even further considering whether he ought to have been driving much more slowly and carefully given the wet road conditions. The Respondent’s failure to meet the critical yaw speed was part and parcel of his speeding under those conditions, which went towards demonstrating the extent of his careless driving, or in other words, the very charge of which he was convicted below. The Respondent’s failure to meet the critical yaw speed of the bend constitutes another element of the “speeding” culpability factor, which must be taken into account as well on the totality of the evidence.

51 In Chen Song, the court recognised that there must be something more than the basic elements of the careless driving offence before an additional factor is engaged (at [132]). In my assessment, the element of speeding clearly constitutes that “something more”. It bears reiterating that the nub of the careless driving offence was the Respondent’s failure to keep proper control of the Car while negotiating the bend, having regard to the nature and condition of the road. The basic elements of the careless driving offence lie in failing to drive with due care and attention, thus causing the collision which arose from his loss of control of the Car. These are the elements as specified in the charge (see [4] above). He was not charged with speeding per se, and speeding was not an ingredient of the careless driving charge. The DJ had found that the Respondent’s act of speeding had contributed substantially to his inability to control the Car and slow down in time at the bend while driving on a wet road: GD at [44]–[48]. I elaborate further on the significance of this point in turning next to consider the Respondent’s pattern of speeding in the immediate moments preceding the collision.

52 I agree with the Prosecution that the DJ should have also considered that the Respondent was speeding in the stretch of road leading up to the bend (ie, from points A to D – see above at [10]). This earlier act of speeding was sufficiently proximate to the offence such that it should also be considered in treating speeding as a separate aggravating factor.

53 The Respondent argues that the Prosecution is seeking to sentence the Respondent for “earlier driving conduct distinct from the manner in which the offence was ultimately committed”. However, there is nothing conceptually wrong with taking into account uncharged conduct preceding the offence so long as it is sufficiently proximate (Teo Seng Tiong v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 65 (“Teo Seng Tiong”) at [91]–[92], citing Public Prosecutor v Bong Sim Swan Suzanna [2020] 2 SLR 1001 and Chua Siew Peng v Public Prosecutor [2017] 4 SLR 1247):

54 In my view, the Respondent’s speeding on an earlier section of the road was sufficiently proximate so as to merit consideration for the purpose of determining if speeding should be recognised as an additional culpability factor pursuant to the Chen Song framework. The Respondent may not have been driving the Car at a speed far in excess of 50km/h at the time of the accident itself, but the unchallenged evidence is that he was certainly driving at relatively high speeds in the immediate lead-up to his loss of control when negotiating the bend: GD at [48]. Taken as a whole, this was plainly dangerous given the prevailing road conditions. The Respondent did manage to slow down significantly at the bend but only because, according to his counsel’s submission, he had to brake hard to do so. This is a significant concession on his part. The irresistible inference from this is that his earlier speed was dangerously excessive such that even though he braked hard, he could no longer control the Car at the bend. The Car thus skidded into the opposite lane. Had he chosen to drive as a prudent driver would have, he would have kept to a more reasonable speed on the earlier stretch of road, and would in all probability have been in a better position to slow down in time and possibly avoid losing control of the Car if not wholly, then at least to some extent.

55 The Respondent suggests that there was only evidence of carelessness and no deliberate flouting of traffic rules (viz, greatly exceeding the speed limit of 50km/h) when he lost control at the bend. He claims that there was no intentional violation of any traffic rules at that specific point. This may be arguable when the focus is solely on the speed at the point of the collision. But with respect, this is a highly artificial and narrow distinction to draw. He was speeding all along the entire stretch of Rifle Range Road from point A to point D. Only by sheer dint of his last-minute effort to brake before point D was he able to slow down substantially and rather fortuitously at the bend. Even then, as the DJ rightly put it, it was still “too little too late” to avoid losing control: GD at [47].

56 On the facts in the present case, it is not appropriate to view the evidence of speeding in isolation, limited only to the point in time when the collision occurred. The evidence of speeding must be evaluated in its totality and against its entire factual context. When this is done, it is manifestly clear that this was not simply a case of mere misjudgement or carelessness at the time of the collision. As rightly noted in Ling Zhao Bin v Public Prosecutor [2026] 3 SLR 1383 (at [54(c)]), there is a meaningful distinction between a considered decision resulting in an accident and a decision taken on the spur of the moment. The evidence suggests that the Respondent had consciously not kept to the speed limit from point A all the way up to point D along Rifle Range Road. In doing so, he had chosen to drive in a dangerous manner. The entirety of his conduct should be taken into account.

57 In Ng En You Jeremiah v Public Prosecutor [2025] 4 SLR 395, which concerned an offence of dangerous driving causing death, the court also seemed prepared to consider the appellant’s dangerous driving at extremely high speeds at earlier sections of the road prior to the actual collision (at [129]):

58 With respect, I am of the view that the DJ had erred in not factoring in the Respondent’s speed at the earlier sections of Rifle Range Road in the overall determination. This was an important consideration in evaluating the seriousness of the Respondent’s offending conduct.

59 The totality of the evidence of the Respondent’s speeding thus comprised: (a) driving 3km/h above the speed limit of 50km/h after braking hard at the bend; (b) failing to meet the critical yaw speed at that point; and (c) his prior speeding at higher speeds up to 97km/h along the earlier stretch of Rifle Range Road. Taken together, his act(s) of speeding constituted the “dangerous driving behaviour” contemplated in Chen Song that aggravates the careless driving offence.

60 For the above reasons, I am of the view that the DJ should have identified at least one additional culpability factor of speeding.

61 In my view, the DJ had erred in finding that the custodial threshold was not crossed. I am prepared to accept that the Respondent’s two previous speeding convictions should be accorded fairly limited weight. The last of these offences had occurred in August 2004, nearly 17 years prior to the present offence which was committed on 6 July 2021. They are clearly dated. Nevertheless, they should not be given no weight at all. To disregard these dated previous convictions would be wrong in principle as this would ignore the statutory intent of providing for enhanced penalties for repeat offenders in the RTA. For completeness, I note that under s 65(11)(b) of the current Road Traffic Act 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“RTA 1961”), the Respondent would not be considered a “repeat offender” had he committed the same offence today. This was, however, not the law at the time of the offence.

62 Even so, I do not entirely agree with the Prosecution’s submission that the DJ “failed to accord weight” to the Respondent’s repeat offender status. As the Respondent points out, the DJ must have factored in the Respondent’s repeat offender status because he had imposed an amount of fine which was only available to repeat offenders (the maximum fine for first-time offenders was $5,000). To my understanding, the Prosecution’s contention is essentially that the DJ had not accorded sufficient weight in sentencing the Respondent as a repeat offender, rather than not having accorded any weight at all.

63 The Respondent has a long list of compounded offences. His most recent compounded offence occurred approximately two years prior to the present offence. However, this offence was compounded prior to 1 November 2019. Section 139AA of the RTA 1961 provides that a court may take offences that have been compounded (on or after 1 November 2019) into account as an aggravating factor. At the hearing before me, it was common ground that the court may not take any of his compounded offences into account since they all pre-dated 1 November 2019. This is consistent with the reasoning of the District Court in Public Prosecutor v Jerome Ranatunga [2026] SGDC 246 (“Jerome Ranatunga”) at [55]–[63].

64 I pause at this juncture to make some further brief observations in connection with the compounded offences. In the proceedings below, the Prosecution had sought to rely on the compounded offences to demonstrate the Respondent’s poor driving history. This appears to have been premised on an earlier version of s 139AA of the RTA 1961, which was referred to by the Court of Appeal in Teo Seng Tiong at [17]. That earlier version of s 139AA permitted all compounded offences to be potentially considered in sentencing. Section 139AA of the RTA 1961 was however amended in 2021 (Jerome Ranatunga at [59]–[61]), but the amended provision was not brought to the DJ’s attention. As such, the DJ appears to have considered the Respondent’s pre-November 2019 compounded speeding offences by referring to his driving record that was “not exemplary, with a high number of speeding offences over the years” (GD at [135]). With respect, he had erred in doing so.

65 Nonetheless, this error was of no consequence and the Respondent was not prejudiced in any way. Notwithstanding having considered the Respondent’s poor driving record in the round, the DJ concluded in any event that this was not so aggravating as to tilt the balance to a custodial sentence if a fine was otherwise appropriate: GD at [135].

66  In my judgment, having found that there was an additional culpability factor of speeding, this must be weighed alongside the Respondent’s repeat offender status. As noted above (at [61]), there is nothing in law that allows the court to ignore his two previous speeding convictions. In both these previous instances, relatively modest fines were imposed. The previous convictions must still be taken into account, even if the weight to be accorded is somewhat attenuated on account of their being dated.

67 In the circumstances, there is one harm and one culpability factor on the application of the Chen Song sentencing framework. The harm factor may be said to be in the “lesser” category, applying the Chen Song framework, but the culpability factor of speeding cannot be similarly characterised as “lower”. It is appropriate in my view to consider the Respondent’s speeding as coming within the higher end of the “lower culpability” band at least. In addition, the Respondent’s status as a repeat offender also has to be given due weight. Presumptively, a custodial sentence would thus be warranted.

68 I am of the view that an uplift even to the maximum permissible fine of $10,000 is insufficient to register the gravity of the offence and to signal deterrence on both a general and individual level. On a holistic assessment, I find that the custodial threshold has been crossed and a short imprisonment term is warranted.

69 In calibrating the appropriate sentence, I am guided by three sentencing precedents.

70 The first case is Public Prosecutor v Johnson Tan Wee Kiat (Johnson Chen Weiji) [2026] SGHC 59 (“Johnson Tan”). The offender had failed to conform to a red-light signal when turning right at a cross junction; his vehicle collided into a motorcyclist who was travelling straight from the offender’s right and who had the right of way. The offender pleaded guilty to a charge of driving without reasonable consideration causing grievous hurt. There was only one harm factor in that the victim had suffered a rib fracture and superficial abrasions and tenderness. The injuries were of relatively low impact, with no surgery required and the victim receiving outpatient sick leave of 21 days (at [11]). There was limited property damage and potential harm (at [12]–[13]).

71 As to culpability, there was one factor of failing to conform to a traffic signal, and also conceivably a second culpability factor of a high degree of carelessness because there was a sustained period of inattention, given that the traffic light had been red for a relatively long duration prior to the accident (at [16]). The court exercised its discretion against treating this case as involving two discrete culpability factors which would have pushed the offender into the next sentencing band (at [17]). That said, an uplift remained warranted to account for the sustained period of inattention. The court decided that an indicative starting sentence of one month’s imprisonment was appropriate. This was reduced to three weeks’ imprisonment having regard to the offender’s plea of guilt.

72 The second case is Tan Kai Yuan. In that case, the offender had pleaded guilty to a charge of driving without reasonable consideration causing grievous hurt. He was driving along the fourth (ie, outermost) lane of the Ayer Rajah Expressway when he approached a split in the road. He braked abruptly and began filtering into the third lane, with the intention of crossing the white chevron markings to enter the second lane. The victim was riding his motorcycle behind the offender and collided into the offender’s car. The victim sustained multiple right hand/wrist fractures, underwent surgery, was warded in a hospital for two days, and was given 99 days of hospitalisation leave (at [20]). He had no permanent disability. This court found that there was one harm factor of “impact of injury” which was engaged to a limited degree (at [23]). The court considered there was a lower degree of harm than in Johnson Tan.

73 On culpability, the court found there was at least one factor of intending to flout traffic rules (ie, crossing the white chevrons). The offender’s act of filtering into the third lane was not a separate culpability factor as this had taken place in the context of a single driving manoeuvre (at [28] and [32]). The offender’s actions were also deliberate and carried out on a moderately busy expressway for his own convenience (at [38]). This court reduced his sentence from five days’ imprisonment to one day’s imprisonment (at [54]).

74 Lastly, when compared to Alvan Erh, the brief facts of which have been discussed above (at [37]–[39]), I find that case to be less egregious than the present case. The offender’s culpability in Alvan Erh was low – his offending conduct was a manifestation of the basic elements of the careless driving offence, and an indicative starting sentence of a $5,000 fine was appropriate (Chen Song at [166]–[167]). The fine was reduced to $4,000 on account of his plea of guilt and co-operation with the authorities (at [169]).

75 Johnson Tan, Tan Kai Yuan and Alvan Erh did not involve repeat offenders with previous convictions. Notably, the injuries sustained by Mr Wong in the present case were more serious than those in Tan Kai Yuan and possibly also more serious than those in Johnson Tan. Mr Wong required two surgical procedures and had to be warded in a hospital for nine days. The surgical interventions here were more complex than in Tan Kai Yuan (at [19]) – Mr Wong had to undergo debridement, split skin grafting, and the application of vacuum assisted closure: GD at [122]. There are also considerations of potential harm and property damage in this case which appear to be more significant than in Johnson Tan (at [11]) and Tan Kai Yuan (at [45]).

76 I find the Respondent somewhat less culpable than the offender in Johnson Tan insofar as I have found that there is only one culpability factor of speeding. Johnson Tan involved an outright violation of a traffic rule at a signalised traffic junction, with the offender’s prolonged inattention and carelessness resulting in the accident. I am also conscious, however, that Johnson Tan involved a plea of guilt, while the Respondent was convicted after trial and would therefore not have the benefit of any sentencing discount.

77 Although the court in Tan Kai Yuan had placed emphasis on the deliberate nature of the offender’s decision to switch lanes (at [38]), the offender’s actions nonetheless were part of a single driving manoeuvre (at [32]). Tan Kai Yuan would therefore involve lesser culpability when compared to the present case, in which the Respondent had been speeding along the relevant stretch of Rifle Range Road before losing control of the Car and causing the collision.

78 Turning to Alvan Erh, the Respondent contends that he is similarly situated and should therefore receive a non-custodial sentence. In this regard, shortly after the hearing, the Respondent wrote to court on 10 October 2026 seeking permission to make two “factual points of rebuttal” to the Prosecution’s oral submissions (the “further submissions”):

(a) The first point is that it is irrelevant that the Respondent was driving recreationally on the night of the incident.

(b) The second is that Alvan Erh did not involve an “emergency” and the contention that Erh had taken “evasive” action to avoid a crash is “purely speculative”.

79 I do not agree that the instant case is comparable to Alvan Erh. While I had observed above (at [39]) that the present case involved somewhat lesser harm than Alvan Erh, this is substantially outweighed by the Respondent’s markedly higher culpability. There were also other distinguishing features in that the offender in Alvan Erh was not a repeat offender, had pleaded guilty, and had co-operated with the authorities.

80 The Respondent’s further submissions did not assist his case. I have not placed any weight on the fact that the Respondent was driving recreationally on the night of the incident. Rather, as the Prosecution points out, the focus is on the manner of the Respondent’s driving. The second submission is plainly untenable. The court explicitly stated that the offender had abruptly changed lanes in order to avoid colliding with the vehicle in front of him: Chen Song at [166]. Alvan Erh therefore involved less culpability than the present case (see the reasoning above at [77] in respect of Tan Kai Yuan).

81 Weighing the sentencing factors, this case lies somewhere in between Johnson Tan and Tan Kai Yuan in terms of the seriousness of the offending conduct, and it was in any case more serious than Alvan Erh. I therefore agree with the Prosecution’s submission to calibrate the sentence at two weeks’ imprisonment.

82 As a consequential matter, the order for disqualification which was stayed pending the outcome of this appeal should commence from the date of the Respondent’s release from prison. This is in accordance with the guidance set out in Muhammad Saiful bin Ismail v Public Prosecutor [2014] 2 SLR 1028 at [46(a)].

83 I am persuaded that the Respondent’s speeding should have been considered as an additional offence-specific culpability factor. The sentence was wrong in principle and manifestly inadequate because the DJ ought not to have disregarded the Respondent’s speeding, which should have been considered alongside his status as a repeat offender.

84 For the above reasons, I allow the appeal and substitute the $8,000 fine with a sentence of two weeks’ imprisonment. The order of five years’ disqualification is to commence from the date of the Respondent’s release from prison.