1 This case arises from investigations conducted by the Commercial Affairs Department (“CAD”) against one Mr Yong Khung Lin (“David Yong”) and various entities associated with him. David Yong is the Chief Executive Officer of Evergreen Group Holdings Pte Ltd (“EG Holdings”), which is part of a group of entities called the Evergreen Group. David Yong has been charged in court for various offences, including an amalgamated charge under s 240(7) of the Securities and Futures Act 2001 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SFA Charge”) for consenting to EG Holdings offering securities (in the form of promissory notes) without a prospectus.

2 In the course of CAD’s investigations, which commenced in early August 2024, assets from various entities in the Evergreen Group were seized. These included the funds in nine accounts with various banks and financial service providers (“Nine Accounts”) held in the names of EG Holdings and two other companies in the Evergreen Group: EGH Management Pte Ltd (“EGHM”) and EverVentures Pte Ltd (“EVPL”). These three companies are collectively referred to as the “Companies”.

3 A law enforcement agency which has seized assets pursuant to the powers of seizure conferred by s 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) and which seeks to retain custody of those assets for more than a year after the seizure is obliged to “make a report of the seizure to the relevant court” under s 370(1)(b) CPC. Accordingly, at the end of July 2025, CAD prepared a report under s 370(1)(b) CPC (“CAD Report”) and filed the same with the court. The CAD Report sought the court’s sanction for continued seizure of the assets that had been seized from the Companies – including the funds in the Nine Accounts – beyond the one-year mark. The CAD Report was placed before the learned magistrate below (“Magistrate”) who, after hearing submissions from both the Prosecution and counsel for the Companies, dismissed CAD’s application for continued seizure in respect of the funds in the Nine Accounts. However, despite dismissing CAD’s application, the Magistrate refused to order the return of the funds in the Nine Accounts to the Companies. Instead, she ordered that the funds be dealt with in accordance with the process under s 372(1) CPC, whereby the funds would remain in CAD’s custody pending claims filed by any third parties asserting ownership over the funds.

4 The Magistrate’s decisions above prompted the following applications in relation to the funds in the Nine Accounts:

(a) The Prosecution filed HC/CR 4/2026 (“CR 4”) seeking a revision of the Magistrate’s dismissal of its application for continued seizure of the funds.

(b) The Companies filed HC/CR 2/2026 (“CR 2”) seeking a revision of the Magistrate’s refusal to release the funds to them.

For the reasons set out below, I dismiss both CR 4 and CR 2.

5 Between 2 August and 30 October 2024, CAD seized a wide range of assets belonging to entities from the Evergreen Group, pursuant to its investigations against David Yong for the SFA Charge. ¹ These included the funds in the Nine Accounts, which CAD seized pursuant to its powers under s 35(1)(a) CPC. CAD had seized these funds on suspicion that they constituted proceeds of crime – specifically, monies from investors to whom the promissory notes under the SFA Charge (alluded to at [1] above) had been offered. The Nine Accounts were listed in Annex A to the CAD Report, at serial numbers 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 18 and 19. Each of the Nine Accounts is referred to in this judgment by its serial number in Annex A, eg, the account at serial number 4 of Annex A to the CAD Report is referred to as “Account No. 4”, and so on.

6 According to the CAD Report, the Nine Accounts were used to create three layers through which funds from investors in the promissory notes were channelled:

(a) The first layer comprised the following three accounts, which had been designated to receive funds from investors: ²

(b) The second layer comprised the following five accounts, which had received funds from two of the accounts at the first layer (being Account Nos. 1 and 4): ³

(c) The third layer comprised the following account, which had received funds from one of the accounts at the second layer (being Account No. 6): ⁴

As at the point of seizure, the Nine Accounts collectively held a balance of S$6,026,652.65 and US$42,656.12.

7 CAD wanted to retain custody of many of the assets which it had seized from the Evergreen Group entities – including the funds in the Nine Accounts seized from the Companies – beyond the one-year anniversary of the seizure. To obtain the court’s sanction for continued seizure beyond the one-year mark, CAD prepared the CAD Report in accordance with s 370(1)(b) CPC and filed the same with the court on 31 July 2025.

8  Upon receipt of a report under s 370(1)(b) CPC, the court may sanction a law enforcement agency’s continued seizure of the seized assets if any of the three limbs in subsection s 370(3) CPC (extracted below) applies:

For ease of reference, the three limbs of s 370(3) CPC above will be referred to in this judgment as “limb (a)”, “limb (b)” and “limb (c)”.

9 For the vast majority of assets that CAD had seized from the Evergreen Group entities, the CAD Report sought to justify continued seizure by relying on limb (b) of s 370(3) CPC, ie, that the seized assets were relevant for the purpose of CAD’s investigations. However, as regards the funds in the Nine Accounts, the CAD Report sought to justify continued seizure on the basis of limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC, which allows for continued seizure if there is a “pending court proceeding … in relation to” the seized assets. Specifically, the relevant section of the CAD Report relating to the Nine Accounts prayed for “no order of disposal to be made under [limb (a) of s 370(3)] CPC as there are pending court proceedings in relation to” the funds in the Nine Accounts. ⁵ In preparation for the hearing before the Magistrate, the Prosecution filed written submissions explaining, inter alia, that continued seizure was necessary for the preservation of the funds in the Nine Accounts, with a view to potential disposal proceedings under s 364 CPC. ⁶

10 CAD’s application for continued seizure was heard by the Magistrate at an inter partes hearing on 4 February 2026, during which the Companies opposed the application, particularly in relation to the funds in the Nine Accounts. As alluded to at [3] above, the Magistrate dismissed CAD’s application for continued seizure of the funds in the Nine Accounts. Prior to the Magistrate pronouncing her dismissal, both parties had – in contemplation that CAD’s application for continued seizure might be dismissed – sought to make submissions to the Magistrate as to how the funds in the Nine Accounts should be dealt with if continued seizure were disallowed. On this, both sides predictably took diverging positions: ⁷

(a) The Companies wanted the Magistrate to order the release of the funds in the Nine Accounts to them and, to that end, sought to present submissions to the Magistrate establishing their right to these funds.

(b) The Prosecution sought to present submissions that the funds in the Nine Accounts should be forfeited.

However, the Magistrate was not minded to receive submissions or evidence on these claims and instead ordered that the funds in the Nine Accounts be dealt with in accordance with the process under s 372 CPC. Under that process, CAD would issue a public notice requiring any third parties laying claim to the funds to file their claims with the court. These claims were to be filed within six months from the date of the public notice, with the funds in the Nine Accounts remaining under CAD’s custody in the interim. The public notice has since been duly issued by CAD. ⁸

11 As explained at [4] above:

(a) The Prosecution filed CR 4 challenging the dismissal of CAD’s application for continued seizure of the funds in the Nine Accounts.

(b) The Companies filed CR 2 to set aside the Magistrate’s order that the funds in the Nine Accounts be dealt with under the s 372 CPC process, contending that the funds should be released to them instead.

12 I begin by setting out very briefly the test for when revisionary intervention by the High Court is justified. It is trite that the threshold to be crossed for the exercise of revisionary jurisdiction is that of “serious injustice” – that threshold may be crossed in instances where there is something “palpably wrong in the decision that strikes at its basis as an exercise of judicial power”: Rajendar Prasad Rai v Public Prosecutor [2017] 4 SLR 333 (“Rajendar Prasad”) at [24], citing Public Prosecutor v Yang Yin [2015] 2 SLR 78 at [25]). Revisionary jurisdiction should only be exercised “sparingly” (Rajendar Prasad at [24]) and not be used as a backdoor appeal: Ng Siam Cheng Sufiah v Public Prosecutor [2020] 4 SLR 659 (“Ng Siam Cheng Sufiah”) at [35]. Accordingly, a “mere difference in the view of the law” does not amount to serious injustice, for “that would lie very much in the province of the appellate process”: Ang Poh Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 SLR(R) 929 at [24].

13 In my view, the grounds raised in both CR 2 and CR 4 fail to cross the threshold for revision. The following sets out the reasons for my decision.

14 In applying for continued seizure of the funds in the Nine Accounts, CAD sought to rely on limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC (see at [9] above), ie, that there was a “pending court proceeding … in relation to” the Nine Accounts. To better understand CAD’s position, it is helpful for present purposes to view the criminal trial process – at a very simplistic level – as comprising two portions:

(a) The initial portion commences from the point the charge is filed in court against the accused person and stretches to the conclusion of the trial of that charge – I refer to this portion as the “main proceedings”.

(b) The subsequent portion typically occurs at the end of the trial, ie, after the court issues its verdict on the charge. This portion, which I refer to as the “disposal proceedings”, entails the court determining the fate of any assets seized during investigations, including those purported to be proceeds of the crime underlying the charge in the main proceedings.

There does not appear to be any dispute between the parties that once the charge for a crime has been filed in court, the main proceedings in respect of that crime can be described as “pending”.

15 As seen from the extract at [8] above, limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC allows for continued seizure of property if there is any “pending court proceeding … in relation to the property” [emphasis added]. Before the Magistrate, the Prosecution contended that there was such a “pending court proceeding … in relation to” the Nine Accounts. Specifically:

(a) Given that the SFA Charge had already been filed in court against David Yong, the main proceedings were now “pending”. ⁹

(b) Further, these proceedings were “in relation to” the Nine Accounts because they would likely culminate in the purported proceeds of crime – including the funds in the Nine Accounts – being dealt with by way of disposal proceedings. ¹⁰

Accordingly, the Prosecution contended that limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC was satisfied, in respect of the Nine Accounts.

16 The Magistrate rejected the Prosecution’s construction, holding that there was no “pending court proceeding … in relation to” the Nine Accounts, as required by limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC. In the Magistrate’s view, the mere fact that the main proceedings (ie, for the crime that David Yong has been charged with) were pending, having been triggered by the filing of the SFA Charge in court, was not enough to bring limb (a) into operation. This was because the main proceedings, unlike the disposal proceedings, were focused on the charge against David Yong and not on the seized assets. In the Magistrate’s view, to fall within the term “court proceeding … in relation to” the seized property as set out in limb (a), the proceedings must bear “a direct connection where the seized property itself constitutes the subject matter of the proceedings”. ¹¹ In other words, the pending “court proceeding” must be the disposal proceedings focused on the seized proceeds of crime and not the anterior main proceedings focused on the trial of the charge for that crime. The Magistrate concluded that this requirement was not met here: ¹²

This construction by the Magistrate – with which the Companies agree – means that since the disposal proceedings in relation to the funds in the Nine Accounts are far from commencing, there is no “pending court proceeding … in relation to” [emphasis added] the funds, as required by limb (a).

17 With respect, the Magistrate’s construction of limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC strikes me as somewhat narrow. In the case of seized assets alleged to be the proceeds of a crime (such as the funds in the Nine Accounts), once the main proceedings – ie, pertaining to the charge for that crime – are pending, it is almost a matter of course that those very assets will be the subject of disposal proceedings later on. The disposal proceedings could take the form of a disposal order summarily issued by the trial judge at the end of the trial or, if the party with lawful right to possession cannot be summarily determined, by way of a disposal inquiry conducted by the trial judge after trial. The disposal proceedings could also comprise confiscation proceedings. It cannot be gainsaid that procedurally, the relational nexus between the disposal proceedings centring on the proceeds of crime and the anterior main proceedings where the charge for that crime was tried is extremely close. If one were to adopt a plain reading of limb (a)’s reference to “court proceeding … in relation to” [emphasis added] the seized assets, it seems quite artificial to construe the requisite court proceeding as encompassing only the disposal proceedings and excluding the main proceedings, given how the former tend to flow from the latter. In a nutshell, once the charge for a crime is filed in court, such that the main proceedings for that crime are now pending, this suffices to constitute the “pending court proceeding … in relation to” any purported proceeds of that crime. This also appears to have been the premise adopted in Public Prosecutor v Top Excel Network Distribution Ltd [2021] SGMC 68 (“Top Excel”) at [109].

18 The Magistrate was nevertheless concerned that construing the term “pending court proceeding” in limb (a) as extending to the anterior main proceedings might enlarge the scope of limb (a) to the point that it encroaches into the realm of limb (b) of s 370(3) CPC. This, feared the Magistrate, would render the latter limb superfluous and thereby offend against the rule of statutory construction that Parliament shuns tautology. The Magistrate held: ¹³

19 While it is true that Parliament shuns tautology and does not legislate in vain (see Tan Cheng Bok v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 at [38]), this does not require the court to interpret statutes in a fashion that eradicates all overlap: Tan Liang Joo John v Attorney-General [2020] 5 SLR 1314 at [35]. More importantly, interpreting the term “pending court proceeding” as extending to the main proceedings does not lead to limb (a) impermissibly encroaching into the realm of limb (b) of 370(3) CPC – certainly not to the point of rendering limb (b) superfluous. This is apparent when one considers the criminal trial process before and after the filing of the charge:

(a) Pre-charge: During this phase, the charge for the underlying crime has yet to be filed in court. Limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC would consequently not apply as there still is no “pending court proceeding” to speak of (the main proceedings having yet to commence). To apply for continued seizure, the law enforcement agency needs to proceed under limb (b) of 370(3) CPC.

(b) Post-charge: This phase commences once the charge is filed in court, upon which the main proceedings for the crime (culminating in the trial of the charge) commences. Construing the main proceedings as a “pending court proceeding” [emphasis added] contemplated by limb (a) means that the law enforcement agency can now file an application for continued seizure under limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC.

In short, so long as the charge in the main proceedings has yet to be filed, limb (b) of 370(3) CPC remains as the governing limb. Leaving aside proceeds of crime, limb (b) would also continue applying to a broad range of seized items, even after the charge is filed, including objects serving as evidence of the criminal activity (eg, electronic devices, recordings etc). It is thus difficult to see how limb (b) has been rendered superfluous by the construction above.

20 It should also be highlighted that in the course of the main proceedings, once the trial of the charge commences, the rights of parties claiming possession of the seized assets cease to be governed by s 370 CPC and fall to be governed by s 364 CPC instead: see Mustafa Ahunbay v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 SLR 903 (“Mustafa Ahunbay”) at [9]. This statutory occurrence illustrates how the Magistrate’s narrow construction could potentially leave limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC with a very restricted scope of application, especially in relation to proceeds of crime for which a charge has been filed:

(a) Prior to the charge for the crime being filed in court, limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC would not apply as there would be no pending “court proceeding” to speak of (the main proceedings having yet to commence).

(b) After the charge is filed in court, the main proceedings would now be “pending”. Yet, under the Magistrate’s interpretation, limb (a) continues to be inoperative because the main proceedings do not qualify as a pending “court proceeding” contemplated by limb (a). Under the Magistrate’s interpretation, the “court proceeding” must be the disposal proceedings relating to the seized proceeds of the crime underlying the charge which has just been filed. Those proceedings will likely commence only after the conclusion of trial.

(c) Once the trial of the charge commences, limb (a) would again not apply. This is because – as highlighted in Mustafa Ahunbay (at [9]) – the rights of parties claiming to be entitled to the seized assets cease to be governed by s 370 CPC and fall to be governed by s 364 CPC instead. Any disposal proceedings conducted by the trial judge after the trial would thus be governed by s 364 CPC instead.

It would thus appear that in a bid to avoid having the scope of limb (a) overlap with that of limb (b) of s 370(3) CPC, the Magistrate may have preferred an interpretation which curtails the scope of limb (a) to a much greater extent than necessary.

21 I also touch briefly on the Magistrate’s view ¹⁴ that the Prosecution had breached what the parties had termed the “One Report Rule”. In Lee Chen Seong Jeremy v Public Prosecutor [2019] 4 SLR 867 (“Jeremy Lee”), See Kee Oon J (as he then was) held that if the law enforcement agency seeks continued seizure under s 370 CPC, it should do so by way of a single report to the relevant court. See J explained (at [47]):

See J also explained the rationale for the One Report Rule (at [49]–[50]):

22 Reverting to the present case, the Magistrate was of the view that the Prosecution had breached the One Report Rule in the following manner:

(a) The CAD Report sought to justify continued seizure of the Nine Accounts by referencing limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC, ie, on account of there being a “pending court proceeding” relating to the funds therein.

(b) However, as explained at [9] above, the Prosecution’s subsequent written submissions before the Magistrate elaborated that seizure was necessary for the purpose of preserving the funds in the Nine Accounts for potential disposal proceedings under s 364 CPC.

The Magistrate opined that the purpose stated in the CAD Report in (a) above was entirely different from the purpose subsequently set out in the Prosecution’s written submission in (b) above, such that taking the latter into account would breach the “One Report Rule”.

23 Respectfully, I do not think that the purpose stated in the Prosecution’s written submissions – being that seizure was necessary to preserve the funds in the Nine Accounts for potential disposal proceedings ¹⁵ – constituted a new purpose detracting from that stated in the CAD Report. It was clear from the CAD Report that the funds in the Nine Accounts were alleged to be proceeds of crime – the alleged crime being the underlying SFA Charge alluded to at [1] above. As explained at [17] above, the “pending court proceeding” relating to any seized proceeds of crime would necessarily encompass both the main proceedings (where the charge for the crime is dealt with) and the disposal proceedings focused on the proceeds. Consequently, the reference to disposal proceedings in the Prosecution’s written submissions was not a “new purpose” but simply an elaboration of what the “pending court proceeding” stipulated in the CAD Report would likely extend to.

24 Nevertheless, there is one area of caution sounded by the Magistrate which merits deeper consideration. Specifically, she was concerned that interpreting “pending court proceeding” in limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC as extending beyond disposal proceedings and encompassing the main proceedings could lead to the scope of limb (a) becoming overly broad in terms of its practical application. The Magistrate feared that this could dilute the accountability mechanism that s 370(3) CPC was meant to afford: ¹⁶

25 The Companies echo the Magistrate’s concern above, arguing that interpreting the term “pending court proceeding” in limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC so broadly as to encompass even the main proceedings would set the bar for continued retention at too low a level. ¹⁷ Specifically, law enforcement agencies could justify continued seizure indefinitely, from as early as when the charge is filed in court (at which point the main proceedings become “pending”), simply by alluding to vague prospects of the main proceedings culminating in disposal proceedings at some unspecified point in the future. ¹⁸ The Companies argue that this would allow the law enforcement agencies to secure continued seizure in practically every case where the charge has been filed, with little judicial oversight. The Companies say that denying property owners of access to their assets for such an extended duration is objectionable, not least because limb (a) can be satisfied without the law enforcement agency being put through the paces of demonstrating the relevance of the seized assets. In contrast, if the door to limb (a) is closed, the law enforcement agency would now be compelled to justify continued seizure under limb (b) of s 370(3) CPC, in which case it would at the very least have to satisfy the court as to the relevance of the seized assets to the investigations (see the extract of limb (b) at [8] above). ¹⁹

26 While I would not dismiss these concerns out of hand, it is apparent to me that the degree of judicial oversight in applications for continued seizure under limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC is not as lax as what the Companies might think. As a preliminary observation, limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC is triggered only when there is a pending court proceeding. In other words, the matter would already be placed before the court with the filing of the charge. Regular case conferences would be held with a view to shunting the matter to trial. It is thus not as if the law enforcement agency will have free reign to delay the matter indefinitely, without court supervision, while holding on to the seized assets.

27 More importantly, to satisfy limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC, the law enforcement agency must establish the requisite relational nexus between the seized assets and the court proceeding that is pending. In Rajendar Prasad, Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon explained (at [48]) that it is not sufficient for the law enforcement agency to justify seizure under limb (b) of s 370(3) CPC with “a bland assertion … to the effect that investigations are continuing and that the seized assets are relevant”. In like vein, I am of the view that it would not suffice for CAD to justify seizure under limb (a) with a bland assertion that the seized assets are the proceeds of crime. Where (as in this case) the law enforcement agency’s position is that the seized assets constitute proceeds of crime and will thus be the subject of disposal proceedings later on, there must be some information within the report filed under s 370(1)(b) CPC supporting that proposition. This would include information on the provenance of the assets for which continued seizure is sought. Absent sufficient nexus between the origins of the seized assets and the crime, I imagine that it would be rather difficult for the law enforcement agency to satisfy the limb (a) requirement that the “pending court proceeding” pertaining to that crime is “in relation to” those seized assets. The court will thus naturally scrutinise the provenance of the seized assets to determine if the required relational nexus exists, meaning that limb (a) does not pose as low a degree of judicial oversight as the Companies would suggest.

28 In fact, that is precisely what happened in the present case, where the Magistrate carefully scrutinised the CAD Report to ascertain the provenance of the funds in the Nine Accounts. The Magistrate did so with a view to assessing CAD’s claim that the funds were proceeds of the crime underlying the SFA Charge at [1] above. After doing so, the Magistrate concluded that the CAD Report failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the proceeds of the alleged crime had indeed been transferred to any of the Nine Accounts, especially the three first layer accounts that had been designated to receive investor monies: ²⁰

In their written submissions, the Companies align themselves with the Magistrate’s finding above, saying that “there was zero reference or evidence in the CAD Report that such transfers of funds in fact occurred”. ²¹

29 This then brings to me to what I view to be the primary difficulty underlying CAD’s reliance on limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC, being that CAD had relied on limb (a) to justify continued seizure of all the funds in Account Nos. 1 and 4 (these were the two first layer accounts from which allegedly tainted funds were then channelled to the accounts at the second layer: see [6(b)] above). This was problematic because the CAD Report alluded to the provenance of only a fraction of the funds in these two accounts. From the numbers at [6(a)] above, one sees that:

(a) as regards Account No. 1, investor monies of $110,000 constituted only 6.6% of the seized balance of $1,655,899.77; and

(b) in relation to Account No. 4, investor monies of $520,000 comprised only 18.4% of the seized balance of $2,827,012.41.

The CAD Report contained no allusion as to where the vast remainder of the funds in both these accounts came from. While the CAD Report professed that the three accounts at the first layer (including Account Nos. 1 and 4) were “designated to receive funds directly from investors”, ²² this offered no insight into whether the remaining funds in both accounts (ie, sans the investor monies in (a) and (b) above) actually came from investors or from untainted sources.

30 One could conceive of a situation where CAD seizes a bank account containing funds of $100, in which CAD is only able to furnish information that $1 of these funds originated from criminal activity. It does not strike me as reasonable – absent any indication as to where the remaining $99 came from – for CAD to then assert that the entire bank balance should be regarded as proceeds of crime that will be the subject of disposal proceedings later on, thereby qualifying for continued seizure under limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC. Insofar as limb (a) is concerned, the information provided by CAD in support of continued seizure should speak to the amount to which the pending court proceeding relates. Thus, if CAD seeks continued seizure of the entire balance in the bank account on the premise that all the funds therein are proceeds of crime that will be the subject of disposal proceedings later, the information furnished in support of continued seizure should similarly address the entire balance, and not just a small fraction of it. Absent such information, I am hesitant to simply assume that the entire balance in Account Nos. 1 and 4 should be regarded as proceeds of crime that will be the subject of disposal proceedings down the road. My hesitation accords with the principle that the law enforcement agency needs to provide information shedding light on the provenance of any assets which it claims to be proceeds of crime. As Menon CJ observed in Rajendar Prasad (at [49]):

31 As alluded to at [6(b)] above, the CAD Report also stated that the five accounts at the second layer – Account Nos. 6, 8, 9, 18 and 19 – received funds from Account Nos. 1 and 4. ²³ Since the CAD Report did not contain information as to whether the bulk of the funds in Account Nos. 1 and 4 might have been tainted, the same uncertainty cascades downstream to all the accounts at the second layer, which the CAD Report claimed to have received funds from these two accounts. Furthermore, that uncertainty flows further downstream to the account at the third layer – Account No. 7 – which was described by the CAD Report (see [6(c)] above) as having received funds from an account at the second layer (ie, Account No. 6, which was in turn alleged to have received funds from Account No. 4). ²⁴ In short, it cannot be ruled out at this juncture that the funds in the accounts at the second and third layers were untainted. This poses an obstacle to CAD’s reliance on limb (a) of s 370 CPC.

32 Funds tracing is a complex and time-consuming exercise, often having a cross-border dimension, which law enforcement agencies often require extended time frames to conduct. At the earlier stages of investigations, it is understandable that the law enforcement agency may only be able to provide information touching on the provenance of but a small proportion of the balance in the bank account concerned. Under such circumstances, the law enforcement agency could potentially consider applying for continued seizure of the funds in the bank account under limb (b) of s 370(3) CPC, with a view to facilitating further investigations into the provenance of the rest of the account balance. To satisfy that limb, the law enforcement agency would then need to establish the relevance of the funds “for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding”. As per the observations of the learned Chief Justice in Rajendar Prasad extracted at [30] above, that relevance can pertain to possible disposal orders down the road. If there is information to suggest that some of the monies entering the bank account were proceeds of crime, this could (depending on the facts) conceivably demonstrate the relevance of the bank account, allowing the law enforcement agency to prevail upon limb (b) to ask for more time to look into whether the rest of the account balance similarly came from tainted origins. Unfortunately, CAD did not avail itself of limb (b) in respect of the Nine Accounts and instead put all its eggs in the limb (a) basket.

33 In applying for criminal revision, the Prosecution contends that even if continued seizure of the Nine Accounts could not be justified under limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC, the Magistrate should nevertheless have exercised her discretion to order continued seizure under limb (b). ²⁵ This submission is, with respect, untenable when one considers what actually transpired before the Magistrate. This is not a case where, during the hearing before the Magistrate, the Prosecution had clarified the CAD Report by explaining to the Magistrate that apart from limb (a), limb (b) of s 370(3) CPC would also have been applicable. Rather, the transcripts show that the Prosecution was explicit in telling the Magistrate that CAD was proceeding under limb (a) and not limb (b). ²⁶ Critically, no submissions were tendered before the Magistrate to explain how the funds in the Nine Accounts might have satisfied the test of relevance under limb (b). I agree with the Companies’ submission ²⁷ that the Magistrate could not be expected to casually ignore the Prosecution’s position and, on her own motion, direct that the Prosecution make its case under limb (b) instead. That plainly runs against the trite proposition that it is not for the court to plug gaps in the Prosecution’s case: see Mui Jia Jun v Public Prosecutor [2018] 2 SLR 1087 at [73]–[76].

34 That said, I would make a qualification to the Magistrate’s view, extracted at [28] above, that the CAD Report failed to sufficiently set out the provenance of the balance in the accounts at the first layer. ²⁸ Rather than blandly reciting that the three accounts at the first layer were designated to receive investor monies associated with the SFA Charge, the CAD Report actually made pinpoint references to specific amounts of investor monies flowing into the accounts at the first layer. ²⁹ As alluded to at [6(a)] above:

(a) Account No. 1 (which contained $1,655,899.77 at the point of seizure) had received investor monies of $110,000;

(b) Account No. 4 (which contained $2,827,012.41 at the point of seizure) had received investor monies of $520,000; and

(c) Account No. 10 had received investor monies of $270,000, although the balance had dwindled to only $7,933.84 by the point of seizure.

If the CAD Report had sufficiently demonstrated that the monies in (a) to (b) above as well as the entire sum of $7,933.84 in (c) above did indeed emanate from investors, the Prosecution would, in my view, have sufficiently made out its case under limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC – at least in respect of these amounts.

35 The Magistrate nevertheless took issue with the fact that CAD did not append the transaction records (such as bank statements) showing the flow of investor monies into the accounts concerned (see extract at [28] above). I would hesitate to lay down a general rule that transaction records must be furnished for every report under s 370(1)(b) CPC pertaining to seized bank accounts, especially if the impugned fund flows are undisputed. However, on the facts of this case, it would appear prudent to require CAD to adduce such records, to justify continued seizure under limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC. I explain. As stated at [6(a)] above, the CAD Report indicated that Account Nos. 1 and 4 had (respectively) received investor monies of $110,000 and $520,000. The SFA Charge contained a list of investors who had invested in the promissory notes – the investor who had invested the $110,000 was at s/no. 81 of that list, while the investor who had invested the $520,000 was at s/no. 1140 of that list. After the hearing of the appeal before me, the Prosecution sent a letter to court to qualify its position, explaining that the $110,000 and $520,000 did not go directly into Account Nos. 1 and 4. Specifically, para 6 of the Prosecution’s letter clarified:

36 Reading the Prosecution’s letter in conjunction with the CAD Report gives rise to a number of salient questions. The Prosecution’s letter stated that the sums of $110,000 and $520,000 were not transferred directly into Account Nos. 1 and 4, leaving one to ask if this meant that these sums had been indirectly transferred into these two accounts. If so, there was no indication in the CAD Report as to the manner in which these monies had made their way into Account Nos. 1 and 4. The Prosecution’s letter also stated that monies from other investors (ie, other than the two investors who invested the $110,000 and $520,000) had been paid into Account Nos. 1 and 4. However, the CAD Report did not allude to these other investors and referred only to the investors who invested the $110,000 and $520,000. There is also no indication as to how much monies from these other investors found their way into Account Nos. 1 and 4.

37 Consequently, I am unable to tell how much of the funds in Account Nos. 1 and 4 actually originated from investors. Insofar as Account No. 10 is concerned (see [6(a)] above), I am also not prepared to assume (given the latest pivot in the Prosecution’s position) that the $7,933.84 came from investors, without supporting material. The upshot is that the CAD Report contains insufficient information to satisfy me as to just how much of the funds in the first layer accounts constitute proceeds of crime that will be the subject of disposal proceedings later on, as required by limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC. As for the second and third layer accounts, any purportedly tainted funds therein were ultimately traced by the CAD Report back to Account Nos. 1 and No. 4 (see [6(b) and (c)] above). Given the insufficient detail as to the provenance of the bulk of the funds in these two accounts, it follows that CAD is similarly unable to sustain its claim for continued seizure of the funds in the second and third layer accounts, under limb (a). As the Magistrate rightly observed, “transfers between several of the Accounts … are irrelevant without evidence linking the underlying funds to the alleged criminal activity”. ³⁰

38 To conclude, the Magistrate’s decision to refuse continued seizure of the funds in the Nine Accounts was not wrong, to the extent that there was insufficient material in the CAD Report to satisfy limb (a) of s 370(3) CPC. The threshold for revision has thus not been crossed. CR 4 is accordingly dismissed.

39 As explained at [10] above, prior to the Magistrate issuing her verdict dismissing CAD’s application for continued seizure, both parties had (in contemplation of that application being dismissed) sought to make submissions as regards how the funds in the Nine Accounts should be dealt with:

(a) The Companies wanted the Magistrate to order the release of the funds to them and, to that end, proposed to make submissions on their right to the funds. ³¹

(b) The Prosecution wanted to make submissions that the funds should be forfeited. ³²

40 The Magistrate declined to deal with these submissions or receive any further evidence in support of them. ³³ She held that once an application for continued seizure under s 370 CPC is rejected, the court should then make an order under s 370(2) CPC as to how the seized assets should be dealt with. The Magistrate further opined that in doing so, the court does not have the jurisdiction to receive further evidence from parties as to who might have the right to possession of the assets, upon lifting of the seizure. ³⁴ In the Magistrate’s view, embarking on an adjudication of parties’ competing claims to the seized assets would transform the focused supervisory exercise under s 370 CPC into something resembling a civil dispute or extended criminal inquiry. ³⁵ Rather, the Magistrate held that after rejecting the application for continued seizure, the court should proceed to make an order under s 370(2) CPC (as to how the seized assets should be dealt with) on the basis of the report prepared under s 370(1)(b) CPC – being the CAD Report in this case. ³⁶ On that premise, Magistrate held that based on the CAD Report, she was unable to arrive at any definitive conclusion as regards the Companies’ entitlement to the funds. In her view, the mere fact that the Nine Accounts were seized from the Companies was insufficient to establish that they were in lawful possession of the funds therein. ³⁷ Accordingly, the Magistrate rejected the Companies’ request that the funds in the Nine Accounts be released to them and instead issued an order, pursuant to s 370(2) CPC, that the funds be dealt with in accordance with the s 372 CPC process (see [10] above).

41 The Companies have accordingly filed CR 2, arguing that the Magistrate ought to have conducted a deeper probe into their claims that they were lawfully entitled to possession of the funds in the Nine Accounts. In this respect, the Companies cite ³⁸ the High Court’s observations in Public Prosecutor v Marlene Wise [2025] 3 SLR 1603 (“Marlene Wise”) at [64]:

The Companies object to how their claims of being entitled to possession of the funds in the Nine Accounts were not addressed, contending that the Magistrate sidestepped the issue with an erroneous assumption that she lacked jurisdiction to receive further evidence under the auspices of the s 370 CPC framework. ³⁹

42 As for the Prosecution, their written submissions in response to CR 2 had endorsed the Magistrate’s decision to disallow both sides from adducing further evidence for the purpose of determining who was entitled to possession of the funds in the Nine Accounts. ⁴⁰ However, during the oral hearing before me, the Prosecution walked back on this position somewhat, submitting that the Magistrate’s view that she had no jurisdiction to receive evidence during the s 370 CPC proceedings “does not appear to be right”. ⁴¹

43 In my view, the Magistrate erred in ruling that she lacked jurisdiction, after having disallowed continued seizure, to receive further evidence that might assist the court in making an appropriate order under s 370(2) CPC as to how the seized assets should be dealt with. There appears to be nothing in s 370 CPC stopping the court from receiving further evidence or submissions casting light on who may be entitled to possession of the seized assets. Such further evidence would not breach the One Report Rule (referred to at [21] above) because the evidence is not being used to buttress the law enforcement agency’s application for continued seizure. Rather, it is being used to assist the court in deciding on the appropriate fate of the seized assets upon that application being disallowed and seizure consequently coming to an end: Top Excel at [97], citing Ng Siam Cheng Sufiah at [86].

44 Having said that, I am nevertheless of the view that there is insufficient cause for me to exercise my powers of revision. Even if the Magistrate erred in thinking that she lacked the jurisdiction to receive further evidence after rejecting CAD’s application for continued seizure, she did possess the discretion to decline exercising that jurisdiction and instead fix the matter for disposal proceedings at a more appropriate forum. Such a discretion is clearly conferred by s 370(2)(e)(ii) CPC. It is not apparent to me that had the Magistrate properly applied her mind to the exercise of that discretion, she would have arrived at a different outcome.

45 The Companies do not dispute that the Magistrate did possess the discretion to direct that the matter be dealt with under the s 372 CPC process. However, they maintain that the discretion was wrongly exercised, arguing that she ought to have heard the evidence from both sides and made an order under s 370(2) CPC (specifically, 370(2)(e)(i) CPC) returning the funds in the Nine Accounts to the persons entitled to possession. The Companies say that such an exercise would have culminated in the funds being returned to them. ⁴² In this respect, the Companies cite ⁴³ the following passage from the judgment in Marlene Wise, where the High Court observed that a claimant who is laying claim to seized funds can establish that the funds originated from a lawful source simply by showing that they came from the claimant’s own bank account, without having to further demonstrate that the entire balance in the claimant’s bank account came from lawful sources (at [63]):

46 Substantively, I find it difficult to see how the above extract from the Marlene Wise decision assists the Companies’ case. In Marlene Wise, the claimant was the victim of a scam who had been deceived into transferring monies from her bank account into the bank account of one Sun Jian. The funds in Sun Jian’s bank account were subsequently seized by the police and formed the subject of disposal proceedings under s 372 CPC. During those proceedings, the claimant laid claim to the seized funds on the basis that they originated from her bank account. It was in this context that the High Court opined, as per the extract above, that “showing that the [seized] funds came from the claimant’s bank account would suffice to meet this standard” [emphasis added] – there being no further need for the claimant to show that the entire balance in her bank account (from which monies had been channelled into Sun Jian’s bank account) came from lawful sources. The High Court’s comments pertaining to “the claimant’s bank account” were thus directed at the victim’s bank account and not the destination account (ie, Sun Jian’s bank account) into which the tainted funds had been channelled. Any attempt to port the court’s observation to the present facts is thus, with respect, misguided. Since the Nine Accounts here were held in the names of the putative claimant (being the Companies), this is also a case where the “the [seized] funds came from the claimant’s bank account”. However, that statement of fact plainly carries no heft insofar as the Companies’ claim to possession is concerned – CAD’s case is that the Nine Accounts were the destination to which tainted funds from the activities of an individual associated with the Companies had been channelled. The mere fact that the Companies own the Nine Accounts has no bearing on the concerns about whether the funds channelled into the accounts came from tainted sources.

47 It is also abundantly clear from the extract of the Marlene Wise decision at [45] above that the High Court had subjected its comments to the caveat that there be no suspicious circumstances. That was obviously not the case in respect of the Nine Accounts, where CAD indicated that three of the accounts at the first layer were designated to receive funds directly from investors. Furthermore, the CAD Report also indicated that at least some of the funds in these three accounts comprised investor monies that were the subject of the SFA Charge (even if the CAD Report did not detail just how much of the funds in these accounts were investor monies). These circumstances clearly gave some cause for suspicion as to whether the funds in the Nine Accounts had originated from tainted sources. Given that funds from two of the first layer accounts (ie, Account Nos. 1 and 4) were then transferred to accounts at the second and third layers, that same suspicion consequently infected the latter two layers.

48 From a procedural perspective, I also see little merit in the Companies’ complaint that the Magistrate should have proceeded to make a determination under s 370(2) CPC as to whether the Companies were entitled to possession, rather than directing that the contesting claims to possession be dealt with under the s 372 CPC process. In Marlene Wise, the magistrate dealing with CAD’s application for continued seizure under s 370 CPC made the same type of order as the Magistrate did in the present case, ie, initiating the s 372 CPC process so that competing claims to possession of the seized assets could be determined there: Marlene Wise at [7]. The High Court in Marlene Wise had made certain pronouncements on errors arising from determinations made at the s 372 CPC proceedings. However, there is nothing in the High Court’s judgment endorsing the suggestion that a magistrate who has rejected an application for continued seizure under s 370 CPC must necessarily proceed to receive further evidence and conduct an appraisal of the competing claims for possession, under s 370(2) CPC. There is nothing in that judgment to suggest that fixing the matter for subsequent determination under the s 372 CPC process is objectionable in and of itself. In doing just that, the Magistrate in the present case had not occasioned any “serious injustice” warranting criminal revision (see [12] above), especially since the Companies will have every opportunity at the s 372 CPC proceedings to ventilate their claims to the funds in the Nine Accounts.

49 During the hearing before me, counsel for the Companies pointed out that the Magistrate’s decision to initiate the process under s 372 CPC meant that there was going to be further delay. In this regard, counsel submitted that the mere fact of a delay preventing persons entitled to possession of the seized assets from immediately accessing the same would, in and of itself, constitute sufficient prejudice as to warrant revisionary intervention. ⁴⁴ I am not persuaded by this submission. For a start, it presupposes that the Companies were entitled to possession of the funds in the Nine Accounts to begin with. However, that is something which plainly cannot be taken for granted at this juncture, especially given the grounds cited in the CAD Report for suspecting otherwise.

50 Furthermore, it is doubtful that the threshold of what constitutes “serious injustice” attracting the exercise of revisionary powers (see [12] above) should be pegged at such a low bar that any delay would in and of itself suffice to warrant intervention by the High Court. It also bears highlighting that counsel for the Companies agreed that even if the Magistrate had been minded to deal with the competing claims for possession (after having dismissed CAD’s application for continued seizure) under the auspices of the s 370 CPC process, the Companies would still have sought an adjournment to prepare an affidavit evidencing their entitlement to the funds. Counsel also conceded that the Prosecution should similarly be afforded time to prepare an affidavit. ⁴⁵ In short, the right to possession of the funds was not an issue which the Magistrate could have addressed on the spot, after rejecting CAD’s application for continued seizure – a delay was going to be occasioned in any case. It is thus difficult to see how adjourning the determination to subsequent proceedings under s 372 CPC gave rise to “serious injustice”, simply by virtue of the resultant delay.

51 Undoubtedly, it would have been entirely within the Magistrate’s remit (after having rejected CAD’s application for continued seizure) to proceed to determine the issue of rightful possession and receive further evidence and submissions on the same. However, the course she had adopted was not necessarily wrong either. Having the issue of rightful possession determined in accordance with the s 372 CPC process will allow it to be dealt with in a structured and orderly fashion. Relevant parties can marshal their positions on the appropriate fate of the funds and, more importantly, any third parties laying claim to the funds (whom the Magistrate had no visibility of) can file their papers and be heard. The court presiding over the s 372 CPC process can then arrive at its decision after a more holistic appraisal of the facts. The Companies have not demonstrated why any attendant delay from this process should be regarded as “serious injustice” warranting criminal revision. Arguably, the process might even serve to enhance the achievement of substantive justice.

52 Accordingly, I decline to disturb the order that the funds in the Nine Accounts be dealt with under the s 372 CPC process. CR 2 is thus dismissed.

53 For the foregoing reasons, both CR 4 and CR 2 are dismissed.