1 This appeal concerned a decision of the District Court arising out of injuries sustained by the respondent in a road traffic accident. As a result of those injuries, the respondent had received payouts from an insurance policy purchased by his employer. The tortfeasor’s insurer (ie, the appellant in this appeal and the intervenor in the hearing below) took the position that the amount of those payouts should be deducted from the damages the respondent would receive from the appellant.

2 The learned Deputy Registrar held that the payouts received by the respondent under the insurance policy maintained by his employer should not be deducted from damages payable by the tortfeasor (and in turn, the appellant) arising out of the accident. ¹ The Deputy Registrar’s decision was upheld on appeal to the learned District Judge and the District Judge granted the appellant leave to appeal his decision to the General Division of the High Court. ² I dismissed the appeal and my reasons are set out in these grounds of decision.

3 The appellant argued and the District Judge agreed that the issue at hand was of sufficient importance to grant leave to appeal. The issue concerned the rule against double recovery. In other words, should the payouts which the respondent received from his employer’s insurance be deducted from the damages payable by the tortfeasor? Both the Deputy Registrar and the District Judge agreed that this case fell within one of the exceptions to the rule against double recovery, the “Insurance Exception”, and that the respondent should be entitled to retain the damages payable by the tortfeasor (who was insured by the appellant) as well as the payouts from the insurance policy purchased by his employer.

4 The amount of the double recovery in this case was relatively modest. As the amount in dispute had not been resolved by either the Deputy Registrar or the District Judge, I directed the parties to agree on the amount of the alleged double recovery. The parties conferred and agreed to the tabulation of the disputed sum at $35,463.91. ³

5 The Court of Appeal discussed the Insurance Exception in Lo Kok Jong v Eng Beng [2024] 1 SLR 964 (“Eng Beng”) and laid out the test that should be applied when addressing the exceptions to the rule against double recovery. However, Eng Beng was decided against a factual matrix that concerned double recovery arising from government subsidies and grants rather than payments from another insurer (ie, the employer’s insurer in this case). That being the case, the appellant sought my decision on whether the Deputy Registrar’s decision (upheld by the District Judge) reached by applying the test in Eng Beng to the facts of this case was correct.

6 The District Judge’s decision was set out in his brief grounds on 27 August 2025. Whilst the District Judge analysed all four of the non-exhaustive indicia set out in Eng Beng, the most contentious point argued in this appeal was the question of whether the respondent had contributed to the medical insurance policy purchased by the employer, which made the payouts to his benefit. That medical insurance policy was part of the contract he signed with the employer, but it was the employer who paid the premiums for that insurance. ⁴

7 Both the Deputy Registrar and the District Judge agreed that as there was evidence that the respondent had agreed to accept a lower base salary with the knowledge that the employer would pay for medical and life insurance, the respondent had effectively contributed to the payment of premiums for the employer’s insurance. ⁵ The evidence given by the respondent on this point was that he did not just agree or look to the salary when he decided on accepting the position with the employer. He assessed the full package including bonuses, medical (insurance) coverage, life insurance and leave days. ⁶ Having considered this issue as well as the other indicia set out in Eng Beng, the District Judge concluded that the payouts from the employer’s insurer should not be deducted from the damages payable by the tortfeasor. ⁷

8 In relation to the appropriate level of appellate intervention, Lee Seiu Kin SJ held in Choo Yew Liang Sebastian v Koh Yew Teck [2024] SGHC 212 at [16]–[22] that the applicable principles were the same whether the General Division of the High Court was hearing an appeal from a District Judge’s first instance decision or an appeal from a District Judge’s review of a Deputy Registrar’s decision. Thus, the relevant principles as summarised by Goh Yihan J in Lim Chee Seng v Phang Yew Kiat [2024] SGHC 100 at [58]–[59] apply here. I set these out briefly below:

(a) An appellate court should be reluctant to overturn findings made by the trial judge as the appellate court, unlike the trial judge, would not have had the benefit of hearing the evidence of the witnesses and observing their demeanour.

(b) However, an appellate court should not shy away from overturning findings of fact when necessary. This will be the case where:

(i) the trial judge’s assessment is plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence; or

(ii) the appellate court can refer to documentary evidence instead of the evidence of witnesses during cross-examination.

(c) Further, an appellate court is in as good a position as a trial court to assess the veracity of a witness’s evidence in two situations:

(i) where the assessment of the witness’s credibility is based on inferences drawn from the internal consistency in the content of the witness’s evidence; or

(ii) where the assessment of the witness’s credibility is based on the external consistency between the content of the witness’ evidence and the extrinsic evidence.

(d) As to inferences of fact, an appellate court is entitled to engage in a de novo review. This is because an appellate judge is as competent as any trial judge to draw the necessary inferences of fact from the objective material.

9 In order to appreciate the genesis behind the decision in Eng Beng (as well as the indicia in question), I explored some of the key points raised by the Court of Appeal in Eng Beng where it concerned the Insurance Exception.

10 There was detailed discussion in Eng Beng at [18]–[28] of the common law search for a rule of general application to identify why certain collateral benefits should be exempt from the rule against double recovery. At the preliminary stage, it is important to determine if the rule against double recovery is even engaged (Eng Beng at [54]). Only if it is engaged will the court consider whether the payment in question (ie, here the insurance payouts) should fall under one of the exceptions to the rule against double recovery.

11 The Court of Appeal in Eng Beng settled on the test of objective intended purpose for determining whether a payment should be exempt from the rule against double recovery. In relation to the Insurance Exception, a plaintiff who takes out and pays for insurance intends to, and hence should be allowed to, enjoy the payouts from that insurance over and above damages payable by a tortfeasor. The court reasoned at [32] that this forms a separate pool of funds unrelated to damages from the tortfeasor and should not be considered a double recovery.

12 The test of objective intended purpose is thus key to determining whether a payment should be exempt from the rule against double recovery and, in the absence of clear intention, the default rule against double recovery should be reverted to. The intention of the provider of the payment should be assessed objectively (Eng Beng at [33]–[35]). The question of intent should be phrased as “whether the intended purpose of the payment, objectively judged, was to provide the plaintiff with a sum to be enjoyed over and above the damages payable” (at [36]). The Court of Appeal at [52] pointed to four (non-exhaustive) indicia that would help determine the intended purpose of the payment and these are summarised in more detail below.

(a) The first factor is whether the plaintiff contributed to the relevant payment. A contribution would show that the intended purpose of the payment, objectively judged, was to provide the plaintiff with a sum over and above any damages payable (at [38]) (“Contribution Factor”). The Court of Appeal examined some examples of contribution from English and Australian cases and noted the different approaches (at [39]). Under the English approach in Gaca v Pirelli General plc and others [2004] 1 WLR 2683 (“Gaca”), insurance payouts would not be deductible from damages payable to a plaintiff only if the plaintiff directly paid for and contributed to the premiums of that insurance policy. The Australian approach in Richard v Mills (2003) 27 WAR 200 (“Richard”) is that payouts from an insurance policy paid for entirely by the employer should not be deductible from damages payable to the employee, since the employee indirectly pays for the benefit by working for the employer. Importantly, however, the Court of Appeal in Eng Beng noted at [39] that these cases show a disagreement over fact (ie, when contribution may be found) rather than principle (ie, non-deductibility because of the plaintiff’s contribution).

(b) The second factor is whether the payment is in the nature of an indemnity for or is targeted directly at the type of loss for which damages were sought (“Indemnity Factor”), the logic being that if the payment were so targeted, it would be more difficult to say that the payment was intended to be given to the plaintiff over and above the damages payable (Eng Beng at [40]). However, the Court of Appeal also clarified at [59] that the Indemnity Factor is more important where the court is assessing the deductibility of pensions or wage benefits, but less important for insurance payouts where the focus would be on the Contribution Factor.   

(c) The source of the payment is the third factor (“Source Factor”). If the source of the payment were not from the tortfeasor or a government but from a third party, this would ordinarily indicate that the intended purpose of the payment was for the plaintiff to enjoy over and above the damages payable (Eng Beng at [45]).

(d) The fourth and final factor is the group of persons to whom the payment is made available (“Group Factor”). As noted by the Court of Appeal at [51]:

13 The indicia should not be applied in a mathematical or formulaic manner but should be considered holistically to form a judgment as to the intended purpose of the payment. The weight to be attached to each indicium for each case is fact-centric (Eng Beng at [58]).

14 The Court of Appeal at [66] also cautioned against placing excessive weight on public policy considerations in deciding whether a payment should be exempt from the rule against double recovery.

15 Applying the indicia in Eng Beng to the present case and considering the arguments of the parties, I reached the following conclusions with respect to each indicium.

16 The appellant disagreed vehemently with the District Judge’s finding on the Contribution Factor. The appellant took the position that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the respondent had made any contribution to the insurance purchased by his employer. ⁸ In fact, the insurance premiums were paid in full by the employer. ⁹ The appellant also argued that Richard (above at [12(a)]) was an outlier and this court should follow the approach in Gaca as well as the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in Cunningham v Wheeler (1994) 113 DLR (4th) 1 (“Cunningham”) cited in Gaca. ¹⁰ The appellant’s case was that both Cunningham and Gaca require evidence of bargaining, direct contribution or some form of consideration given up by the employee-victim. Only then can the Contribution Factor be satisfied. ¹¹ Specifically, the appellant contends that Gaca is authority for the proposition that the payment by an employer of premiums for the benefit of its employees is not to be treated as a contribution by that employee. ¹²

17 In my judgment, the position in Cunningham and Gaca (and indeed this was also the Court of Appeal’s conclusion in Eng Beng) is that there are no hard and fast rules as to what constitutes contribution for the Contribution Factor. The Court of Appeal in Eng Beng did not cast Richard aside as an outlier (see above at [12(a)]) but merely said that it reflected different facts from Gaca. In that regard, I disagreed with the appellant’s submission that the Deputy Registrar erred in giving too much consideration to Richard because it did not sit well with Eng Beng. ¹³

18 Similarly, Gaca does not close the door on the Contribution Factor merely because the employer paid the premiums for the employee’s insurance. Gaca says at [56] that such payment on its own cannot be conclusive of the Contribution Factor:

19 Similarly, the list of examples of bargaining and direct contribution raised at [98] of Cunningham was non-exhaustive:

 [Emphasis added]

20 In my judgment, both the Deputy Registrar and the District Judge were correct in concluding that the Contribution Factor had been established based on the evidence given by the respondent and thus the facts of this case. The evidence was not simply that the respondent’s employer paid for the insurance premiums, but that the respondent assessed the medical insurance as part of his employment package and there was a direct correlation between the salary that was sought and the package that was provided: ¹⁴

That being the case, there was evidence of consideration given up by the respondent in accepting a lower salary to establish the Contribution Factor.

21 The appellant made the case that the oral evidence of the respondent was insufficient on its own to establish the objective intention required to satisfy the exception to the rule against double recovery. ¹⁵ The appellant argued that documentary evidence or the calling of the employer to give evidence on the insurance it had purchased for its employees was required to satisfy the objective intention test. ¹⁶ The appellant noted that the only evidence on the Contribution Factor was the respondent’s assessment of the overall employment package. ¹⁷ In my judgment, this was sufficient to allow him to avail himself of and satisfy the Insurance Exception.

22 The evidential burden was thus on the appellant to adduce countervailing evidence specific to the Contribution Factor, in order to convince the court to revert to the general rule against double recovery. The appellant presented no evidence in this regard. The evidence thus showed that, as a factor in the respondent’s acceptance of the employment offer, the availability of medical insurance was more than just negligible. ¹⁸ That being the case, the District Judge was correct to conclude that the evidence from the respondent was sufficient to satisfy, objectively, that there was an intention for the payment to benefit the respondent over and above what he might receive from the tortfeasor. ¹⁹ This was what the respondent sought when assessing his employment options.

23 In my judgment, the Contribution Factor was conclusive of the objective intended purpose test in the present case. In Eng Beng, the Court of Appeal noted at [59] that “the test of objective intended purpose and the accompanying indicia serve to rationalise, not replace, the Insurance Exception … [which is] well-established in case law” [emphasis in original]. It was not disputed between the parties that the present case related to the Insurance Exception. They disagreed only on whether the Insurance Exception applied. Neither party sought to argue that this was some novel payment which required the court to determine, for the first time and by applying the objective intended purpose test, whether it should be exempt from the rule against double recovery. Thus, the objective intended purpose test should not replace the Insurance Exception, which considers only the question of contribution.

24 Nonetheless, since the Deputy Registrar and the District Judge applied and the parties in the present appeal argued on all four indicia, I set out my views on the remaining three indicia below, which did not affect the outcome of the appeal in any event.

25 The appellant contended that a greater emphasis should be placed on the Indemnity Factor because the insurance payouts from the employer’s insurer were by way of an indemnity. That being the case, the respondent should not be allowed to claim a second time from the tortfeasor, especially in the absence of any evidence on the Contribution Factor. ²⁰ However, as the District Judge pointed out in his oral judgment, ²¹ the Court of Appeal clarified this point later in its judgment in Eng Beng. The Indemnity Factor takes on less importance in the context of insurance payouts when compared to deductibility of pensions or wage benefits (above at [12(b)]). I thus agreed with the District Judge that less emphasis should be placed on the Indemnity Factor in this case. In any event, as I had found above (at [23]), the Contribution Factor had been clearly made out.

26 The appellant argued that the Source Factor should be a neutral factor in the present case. The appellant took the position that the Eng Beng decision was one that considered hospital subsidies instead of insurance payouts, so the reference to the Source Factor should not be taken out of context bearing in mind the facts of Eng Beng. ²² Again, I disagreed. The four indicia laid out by the Court of Appeal in Eng Beng were clearly meant for general application and not just for the facts of that case. In any event, the logic of the Source Factor is clearly sound. Where the source of payment arises from a third party (as it did in the present case), that should be a factor in the objective intended purpose test. However, it depends on the facts of each case how much weight should be placed on the Source Factor.

27 Finally, the appellant took the position that the insurance purchased by the respondent’s employer did not consider his specific circumstances at all but was merely an insurance policy made available to all employees. That being the case, any conclusion that the Group Factor should favour payouts to the respondent would be tantamount to allowing double recovery to a large class of plaintiffs. ²³ I disagreed. First, in so far as the appellant was seeking to make a public policy argument with respect to the Group Factor, the Court of Appeal had already warned against this (above at [14]). Each case should be addressed on its facts. In this case, I agreed with the District Judge that this last indicium has less relevance to the current case based on the Court of Appeal’s explanation that the Group Factor helps to explain the difference between private benevolence and government payments. ²⁴ Further, for the purpose of the Group Factor, while the insurance policy covered all employees, the insurance payouts were only enjoyed by a much smaller group upon fulfilment of the relevant criteria under the policy. The Group Factor accounts for the group of persons to whom the payment was made available (Eng Beng at [56(d)]).

28 As noted above (at [23]), the conclusion on the Contribution Factor was sufficient to dispose of the appeal in this case. However, even weighing the indicia holistically, I agreed with the District Judge that the objective intended purpose of the insurance payouts received from the respondent’s employer’s insurance was to benefit the respondent over and above damages payable by the tortfeasor. I therefore dismissed the appeal.