1 The accused, Kelvin Sunderesan s/o Retchagadas, claimed trial to one charge under s 3 of the Vandalism Act 1966 (“VA”). The charge alleged that on 11 July 2024 at or about 3.30 pm, at 391 New Bridge Road, Police Cantonment Complex, Regional Lock-up Cell No. 26P (“Cell”), the accused committed vandalism by peeling off the padding cover of the floor in the said padded Cell. At the conclusion of the trial, I found the accused guilty and convicted him. I imposed a sentence of 10 months’ imprisonment and three strokes of the cane.

2 The accused appealed against both conviction and sentence. He has since served his sentence for the present charge as it was backdated to 8 August 2025. The accused remains in remand in relation to 32 outstanding charges for which bail was not granted. I set out below the reasons for my decision on conviction and sentencing.

3 At the start of the trial, the accused made an application for MAC-904649-2025 “to be added into [the] trial and tried at [the] trial also” ¹ . The accused was charged under MAC-904649-2025 for committing an offence punishable under s 20 of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act 1906 by behaving in a disorderly manner, by shouting at police officers at block 1 Rochor Canal Road, Singapore 188504, a public place, on 11 July 2024 at about 6.14 am (“MOA offence”). The application was essentially for a joinder of the MOA and VA offences, such that they were to be tried in one trial.

4 The accused accepted that the MOA and VA offences were not of the same character. Nevertheless, he seemed to indicate that the arrest was not justified, and that the VA offence could not have been committed if the arrest had not been made for the MOA offence. He also submitted that the arresting officers were required as witnesses, and that the two offences, having occurred on the same day, formed part of one series of acts. ²

5 The Prosecution objected to the application on the basis that the MOA and VA offences were not part of the same series of offences or of a similar character and the accused should therefore not be tried for these offences together under s 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (“CPC”) ³ .

6  I dismissed the accused’s application for joinder of the VA and MOA offences for the purposes of trial and ruled that the trial before me was to proceed only in respect of the VA offence for the following reasons. Under s 132(1) of the CPC, every charge must be tried separately unless the exceptions in s 132(2) of the CPC apply, including those under ss 133 and 134.

7 Section 133 of the CPC allows for joinder if the offences form or are part of a series of offences of the same or a similar character. The MOA and VA offences plainly lacked legal and factual similarities required to constitute such a series. Section 134 of the CPC permits joinder if, in one series of acts connected so as to form the same transaction, two or more offences are committed by the same person. Although the MOA and VA offences occurred on the same day and the accused contended that the MOA offence led to the arrest that placed him in the Cell, there was no clear continuity of action between the alleged disorderly behaviour that formed the basis of the MOA charge and the subsequent alleged act of vandalism in the Cell. The offences did not form part of the same transaction. Finally, none of the other exceptions in s 132(2) of the CPC applied, and there was no consent from the Public Prosecutor for these offences to be tried together, under s 145(1) of the CPC.

8 The Prosecution’s case was that on 11 July 2024, the accused was arrested for drunkenness in public under s 14(1) of the Liquor Control (Supply and Consumption) Act 2015 (“LCA”) and brought to the Regional Lock-up at Police Cantonment Complex. He was placed in the Cell as he had earlier displayed violent and aggressive behaviour ⁴ . The Cell was a padded cell designed to prevent self-harm or harm to others by persons in custody (“PIC”) and to ensure the PIC’s safety. ⁵ At about 3.20 pm, SI Mohamed Faizal Bin Hamid ⁶ (“SI Faizal”) went down to the Cell and warned the accused to stop damaging the Cell, but the accused continued tearing the padding cover of the Cell. The accused was subsequently moved to another cell. ⁷ The Prosecution submitted that the accused had damaged public property by peeling off the padding cover when he was placed in the Cell, that his actions were intentional and that he was neither hallucinating nor of unsound mind at the material time. ⁸

9 The accused’s case was:

10 Section 3 of the VA provides in essence that any person who commits any act of vandalism or attempts to do any such act or causes any such act to be done shall be guilty of an offence, and also sets out the penalty for such acts. Section 2 of the VA lists the acts that fall within the definition of “act of vandalism”. In particular, an “act of vandalism” includes “stealing, destroying or damaging any public property”. “Public property” is defined in s 2 of the VA as “movable or immovable property belonging to the Government or to the government of any Commonwealth or foreign country or to any statutory body or authority or to any armed force lawfully present in Singapore”.

11 The elements of the VA offence are:

12 In respect of the last element, it is trite that s 3 of the VA requires the Prosecution to prove the mens rea of the intent to commit the act of vandalism: see Ng Chye Huay v Public Prosecutor [2017] 5 SLR 961 (“Ng Chye Huay”) at [28].

13 I will set out the undisputed facts and thereafter deal with each element and the accused’s case in turn.

14 The following facts were not disputed:

15 The Prosecution submitted that the Cell is located within the Regional Lock-Up at the Police Cantonment Complex, which is a facility operated by the Singapore Police Force (“SPF”), a government body. Therefore, the Cell and its contents, including the padding, belong to the government and fall squarely within the definition of “public property” in s 2 of the VA. ³¹

16 Investigation Officer Chen Yao Guang ³² (“IO Chen”), an assistant operational officer attached to the Police Custodial Branch located at the Cantonment Police Complex at the time of the offence ³³ , was called as a Defence witness. He testified that prior to 22 February 2024, there were ongoing talks to repair the Cell and another cell which led to the issuance of the 22 February 2024 PO to SMM for the replacement of padding for the two cells. His evidence was that he had handled this project. ³⁴

17 IO Chen testified that on 11 July 2024 when the accused was placed in the Cell, the Cell had not been handed over to SMM yet to perform the works as the Cell was still being used by the lock-up officers and operational. ³⁵ This was consistent with the accused’s position as he did not dispute that he was placed in the Cell on 11 July 2024. On 11 July 2024, IO Chen had been informed by the officers managing the lock-up that the Cell had been damaged by the accused. As he had to manage the repair, ³⁶ IO Chen requested one Wong Hou Jet (“Mr Wong”) from SMM, who he usually liaised with for such quotations, to provide the measurements for the fresh damage to the Cell caused on 11 July 2024, and the cost of the repair. This was provided by way of a quotation dated 16 July 2024 (Exhibit P5) ³⁷ , for the sum of $2,688. The works to the Cell only commenced after the incident involving the accused on 11 July 2024 ³⁸ , and were completed on 31 July 2024. ³⁹

18 The accused contended that the “damaged pads” of the Cell were handed over to SMM to be replaced and disposed on 22 February 2024 after the 22 February 2024 PO was issued, and the Cell was handed back to SPF on 31 July 2024. ⁴⁰ According to the accused, SMM therefore owned the “damaged pads” of the Cell from before 11 July 2024 to 30 July 2024 and these “damaged pads” were not public property. ⁴¹ I found the accused’s submissions unmeritorious for the following reasons.

19 First, the Cell remained operational and under SPF’s control on 11 July 2024. IO Chen testified that on 11 July 2024, the Cell was operational and still being used, and had not been handed over to SMM. ⁴² Mr Wong also gave evidence that based on the photographs of the work done in the Cell at page 9 of Exhibit P4, the earliest date that the repair works started in the Cell was 15 July 2024. ⁴³ The accused also did not dispute that he had been arrested by the police ⁴⁴ and was thereafter placed in the Cell on 11 July 2024: see paragraph 14(a) above.

20 Secondly, the evidence established that the Cell and its padding belonged to the Government. IO Chen’s evidence was that the Cell and its padding belonged to the Government and this would remain unchanged while SMM (as a vendor) was doing works to the property, with SMM having the responsibility to make sure the Cell was properly repaired. ⁴⁵ Mr Wong, a project manager from SMM who prepared the quotations set out in Exhibits P4 and P5 ⁴⁶ , also testified that the padding in the Cell belonged to the police. ⁴⁷ This was consistent with the 22 February 2024 PO issued by the Government of Singapore in respect of the Cell and Padded Cell 27P, which specified SPF as the buyer.

21 Thirdly, any handing over of the Cell to SMM would not have made any difference to the ownership of the Cell and the padding in the Cell, as SMM would not gain ownership of the same, but only a temporary contractual right of access for the purposes of completing the repair works. I therefore found that the Cell and its padding were public property on 11 July 2024.

22 CCTV footage of the accused in the Cell on 11 July 2024 was admitted as evidence during the trial, namely Exhibits P1 and P8. As mentioned above at paragraph 14(c), the accused did not dispute that he peeled off the protective layer of paintwork of the Cell’s padding system ⁴⁸ and that the CCTV footage showed the same. ⁴⁹

23 The accused argued that he did not commit an act of vandalism because:

(a) The CCTV footage did not show him peeling off the padding cover of the floor because there was no cover on the “damaged pads” in the Cell ⁵⁰ ; and

(b) the pads in the Cell were already damaged prior to him being placed in the Cell, and damaging a damaged property was not an “act of vandalism” under the VA. ⁵¹

24 The accused’s submission that he only peeled off the protective layer of paintwork of the Cell’s padding system and did not peel off the padding cover of the floor of the Cell because there was no cover was untenable. Mr Wong explained that the Cell’s padding system consisted of the padding as the first layer, and a paintwork system of one primer coat and two finish coats painted on the padding to form a protective layer ⁵² . It was clear to me from Mr Wong’s evidence and the CCTV footage showing the accused peeling off strips of material from the floor of the Cell, that the protective layer of paintwork over the padding was the same as the padding cover of the floor of the Cell, because the protective layer covered the padding.

25 I also did not accept the accused’s submission that damaging property that was already damaged was not an “act of vandalism” under the VA. The statutory language in s 2 of the VA is clear and unambiguous and it is unnecessary to look elsewhere for a meaning that constrains the express words found in the legislation: see Ng Chye Huay at [15]. Section 2 of the VA does not contain any words of limitation or qualification requiring that the public property must be originally undamaged before an act of vandalism can be said to be committed, and to impose such additional requirements extra-legislatively would be unwarranted and unjustifiable.

26 In any event, it was undisputed that while there was already some damage to the padding system of the Cell prior to 11 July 2024, the accused had caused fresh and separate damage to the Cell on 11 July 2024. This was also clear from the CCTV footage, which showed that the accused had damaged portions of the Cell floor which were not previously damaged.

27 For the reasons set out above, I found that the accused committed an act of vandalism by peeling off the padding cover of the floor in the Cell on 11 July 2024 at or about 3.30 pm.

28 The accused’s movements and the events occurring in the Regional Lock-up relevant to him, from the time his property was registered at the Charge Office on 11 July 2024 at 8.25 am to when he was released on 12 July 2024 at 3.50 pm, were recorded in an electronic station diary (“ESD”), which was tagged to the accused’s NRIC. ⁵³ IO Phua testified that the officers at the Regional Lock-up were responsible for updating the information in the ESD. ⁵⁴

29 There was one entry in the ESD relevant to the VA offence, namely an entry at 3.20 pm on 11 July 2024 (“3.20 pm ESD entry”):

IO Phua explained that “PIC” referred to the person-in-custody ⁵⁵ while “PICSO” referred to the person-in-custody senior officer or supervising officer. ⁵⁶

30 The 3.20 pm ESD entry was recorded by SI Faizal ⁵⁷ , who testified that this was his observation of what happened at that point in time ⁵⁸ and that DTL Jahanker was his supervisor then ⁵⁹ . SI Faizal’s evidence was that he had first observed the accused damaging the Cell by pulling the flooring, through the CCTV in his cluster office and had proceeded to go to the Cell to ask the accused to stop damaging the Cell ⁶⁰ . SI Faizal also testified that based on the ESD, when he had warned the accused to stop his action, the accused had shouted that he wanted to see the IO then or he would continue tearing the floor. ⁶¹

31 In my view, the 3.20 pm ESD entry and SI Faizal’s aforementioned evidence established that the accused had intentionally peeled off the padding cover of the floor of the Cell so that he could attract the attention of the police officers and demand to see the IO.

32 While the CCTV footage showed the accused peeling off the padding only around 3.31 pm and the ESD recorded the incident as occurring at 3.20 pm, I did not regard this discrepancy as material. In this regard, SI Faizal had clarified that he had recorded the 3.20 pm ESD entry after the incident happened and after the accused was moved to Cell 10M. While he recorded the “Date/Time of Occurrence” of the incident to be 3.20 pm, he did not remember the exact timing of the incident ⁶² . Given that the timing of the entry was entered only after the events had happened, I considered the timing stated to be an approximate record rather than a precise timestamp. I therefore found that this discrepancy did not undermine the credibility of SI Faizal’s evidence on the sequence of events, especially since his evidence was consistent with the CCTV footage and the 3.20 pm entry in the ESD, which was a contemporaneous record.

33 The accused submitted that SI Faizal gave false evidence by causing the Prosecution to form the erroneous opinion that the accused was still damaging the Cell when SI Faizal arrived at the Cell door to tell the accused to stop damaging the Cell. ⁶³ The basis of this submission was unclear. SI Faizal’s initial evidence during examination-in-chief was that he did not exactly remember whether the accused continued to damage the Cell even when SI Faizal had gone down to the Cell to tell the accused to stop damaging the Cell. ⁶⁴ He subsequently testified on further questioning during cross-examination and re-examination that he thought he saw the accused tearing up the flooring of the Cell when he arrived at the Cell and looked in and that after he told the accused to stop, the accused persisted on damaging it. ⁶⁵ I accepted that there was some inconsistency in SI Faizal’s recollection as to whether the accused continued damaging the Cell after SI Faizal arrived at the Cell door. However, this inconsistency was not material to the issues I had to determine. My findings above that the accused committed an act of vandalism and had intended to do so did not depend on whether the accused had continued to damage the Cell after SI Faizal arrived at the Cell door.

34 The first issue to be determined in respect of the accused’s defence was whether he was experiencing hallucinations due to alcohol withdrawal at the time of the offence, such that s 84 of the PC would operate and render any proven mens rea legally irrelevant: see Tan Kok Meng v Public Prosecutor [2021] 2 SLR 403 at [25]. To establish this, the accused would need to prove that, as a result of such hallucinations, he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act, incapable of knowing that what he was doing was wrong, or completely deprived of any power to control his actions. I therefore considered whether the accused had seen a centipede in the Cell at the time of the offence as he claimed, and whether the medical evidence supported a finding of hallucinations due to alcohol withdrawal.

35 The accused’s evidence was that the reason for peeling the padding was that he saw a big centipede in the Cell, panicked and wanted to kill it, the centipede had “ran into the hole” and the accused “started to pull out from the hole”. ⁶⁶ However, there was no other evidence supporting or corroborating the accused’s evidence in this regard and I did not think that the accused’s evidence was credible for the following reasons.

36 First, if the accused had indeed seen a centipede and wanted to seek help from the police officers to deal with the situation, he would have mentioned it when SI Faizal warned him to stop tearing up the floor of the Cell, but there was no evidence of such communication taking place. There was no mention of a centipede in the 3.20 pm ESD entry and the accused did not challenge the accuracy or completeness of the 3.20 pm ESD entry when cross-examining SI Faizal. This was so despite the accused having asked SI Faizal during cross-examination whether he had heard the accused calling out for help in the Cell ⁶⁷ and having put it to IO Phua that the accused had kicked the door of the Cell to call for assistance. ⁶⁸ The accused also made no mention during his examination in chief that he had told the police officer, who came to tell him to stop doing what he was doing, of the centipede. ⁶⁹

37 Secondly, while the accused testified during cross-examination that he had reported his hallucination symptoms to Dr Kang ⁷⁰ , this was inconsistent with Dr Kang’s evidence and the Medical Form completed by Dr Kang on 12 July 2024 ⁷¹ (“Medical Form”). Dr Kang testified that he had examined the accused at the lock-up on 12 July 2024 at 12.10 am ⁷² and at the time of examination, there was no complaint of any past medical history or psychiatric conditions ⁷³ and he also did not observe any signs of hallucinations or altered mental state in the accused. ⁷⁴ There was also no mention of any hallucination symptoms reported by the accused in the Medical Form. The credibility of the accused’s claim that he had reported such symptoms to Dr Kang was further diminished by the accused’s failure to ask Dr Kang during cross-examination on the alleged reporting of hallucination symptoms or to take issue with the accuracy of the Medical Form.

38 Thirdly, if the accused had indeed seen a centipede, it would seem incredible that he omitted to mention this as part of his complaints of hallucinations to Dr Shalini. Dr Shalini had examined the accused at SGH on 12 July 2024 at 9.00 am ⁷⁵ and the accused had informed her that he saw hallucinations at the Emergency Department but made no mention of the alleged sighting of the centipede. Dr Shalini’s evidence was that the accused’s only complaint in respect of the hallucinations was him saying that he saw some faces at the Emergency Department when he arrived at SGH. ⁷⁶ The accused’s reporting of experiencing visual hallucinations, specifically seeing faces on the wall since arrival at the hospital, was also recorded in the medical report dated 2 September 2025 produced by Dr Shalini (“Medical Report”) ⁷⁷ and the accused did not challenge the accuracy of the Medical Report during Dr Shalini’s cross-examination.

39 Both Dr Kang and Dr Shalini found the accused to be alert, coherent and able to describe his injuries or answer questions and ask for painkillers at the time of their respective examinations. ⁷⁸ In those circumstances, I considered the accused’s failure to mention the alleged sighting of the centipede to either doctor significant, particularly since he was able to describe his symptoms and other complaints. Taken together with his failure to mention the centipede to SI Faizal, I found that his account in respect of the centipede was an afterthought and did not accept it.

40 The accused also submitted that the police never certified that no centipede was found in the Cell. ⁷⁹ This submission did not assist the accused. His case at trial was not supported by any evidence that an actual centipede was present. This proposition was also not put to any of the Prosecution witnesses who could have addressed the condition of the Cell.

41 Having found that the accused’s account of seeing a centipede was not credible, I turn to consider whether the medical evidence nonetheless supported a finding that the accused was experiencing hallucinations due to alcohol withdrawal at the time of the offence. It would be helpful to set out the relevant timelines before analysing the medical evidence. The accused testified that he had his last drink of alcohol before the offence on 10 July 2024 in the morning. ⁸⁰ Based on the Medical Form, he was arrested on 11 July 2024 at 7.30 am for the LCA charge. ⁸¹ The offence took place on 11 July 2024 at around 3.30 pm. Dr Kang examined the accused on 12 July 2024 at 12.10 am. ⁸² The accused arrived at the Emergency department of SGH on 12 July 2024 at about 3.00 am. ⁸³ Dr Shalini examined the accused on 12 July 2024 around 9.00 am. ⁸⁴

42 It should first be noted that the accused’s claim that he had his last drink of alcohol on 10 July 2024 was directly contradicted by the Medical Report, which stated that the accused had denied alcohol use since 2023 as well as any illicit drug use ⁸⁵ , and Dr Shalini’s evidence that the accused had denied taking any alcohol. ⁸⁶ As mentioned at paragraph 38 above, the accused did not challenge the accuracy of the Medical Report during Dr Shalini’s cross-examination. However, as the evidence from IO Phua was that the accused was arrested for drunkenness in public prior to him being placed in the Cell ⁸⁷ and the Prosecution confirmed during the trial that they did not dispute that the accused was intoxicated at the point of arrest ⁸⁸ , I proceeded to consider the issue of whether the accused suffered from alcohol withdrawal and experienced hallucinations at the time of the offence, based on the accused’s claim that he had his last drink of alcohol on 10 July 2024.

43 According to Dr Shalini, alcohol withdrawal generally begins about 36 to 48 hours after a patient’s last drink, in a patient who is abusing alcohol. ⁸⁹ This starts with the patient starting to get a little bit restless, slightly agitated and then as things progress towards 48 hours and beyond, the patient might start to have hallucinations, generally seeing things crawling up the wall and start to have tremors, with the extreme end being the patient becoming very confused, not coherent and not being able to have any kind of lucid conversation, and finally being almost comatose. ⁹⁰

44 Taking the accused at his word that he had last consumed alcohol on the morning of 10 July 2024, the VA offence occurred at most some 39.5 hours thereafter. Dr Shalini’s evidence was that even if the accused had alcohol withdrawal on 12 July 2024 at 9.00 am, this was very mild and it would have been even milder prior to examination. ⁹¹ She also explained that based on her experience, patients who have very bad hallucinations are generally confused and would not be responsive and be able to answer questions coherently. By contrast, as testified by Dr Shalini, the accused was able to communicate with all the staff in the hospital and answer all questions relevantly throughout his stay in hospital and did not receive any medication for alcohol withdrawal. ⁹² In my view, this did not support the accused’s contention that he was experiencing hallucinations at the time of the offence.

45 Dr Shalini’s evidence was consistent with that of Dr Kang, who had examined the accused on 12 July 2024 at 12.10 am. ⁹³ Dr Kang stated that the accused appeared to be well and alert, able to describe his injuries and identify where it was painful, and alert enough to verbally inform Dr Kang that he did not want to have his blood tested. ⁹⁴ Dr Kang also testified that he did not observe any signs of hallucinations or altered mental state when examining the accused and that usually if he detected that the patient had psychiatric conditions, he would refer the patient to IMH or for a more formal mental state assessment. No such referral was made and the accused was only referred to A&E for X-ray and further treatment. ⁹⁵

46 Dr Shalini further explained that the need for medication for alcohol withdrawal is assessed by a scoring system. The accused was scored at 2 at the time of examination, which she described to be extremely mild on the spectrum and medication would not generally be given at that level. ⁹⁶ She assessed any possible alcohol withdrawal as “very, very mild”, with the score attributable solely to the accused’s subjective complaint of hallucinations and his slight agitation upon arrival at the hospital ⁹⁷ . The psychiatric team also found no primary psychotic disorder but felt that there was a possible alcohol intake disorder given that he was arrested under the LCA. ⁹⁸ In short, any possible alcohol withdrawal diagnosis rested entirely on the accused’s subjective complaint of experiencing hallucinations of faces on the wall since arrival at the hospital around 3.00 am and his slight agitation at that point in time. Taken together with Dr Kang’s earlier examination, during which no hallucinations or altered mental state were observed, the medical evidence did not support the accused’s contention that he had been hallucinating at about 3.30 pm on 11 July 2024.

47 The accused’s position was further weakened by his inconsistent answers on whether he was in fact experiencing hallucinations at the time of the offence. When he was questioned by the Prosecution on whether he was experiencing hallucinations on 11 July 2024 at about 3.30 pm, his response was “I don’t know” ⁹⁹ , but he subsequently disagreed with the Prosecution that he did not experience hallucinations at the time of the offence. ¹⁰⁰

48 The evidence of Dr Shalini and Dr Kang clearly showed that the accused was alert, coherent and able to specify his injuries and withhold his consent for a blood test at the time of their respective examinations. The accused also agreed during cross-examination that he was able to communicate with all staff at the hospital and answer all questions relevantly. ¹⁰¹ The accused therefore clearly knew what he was doing when he was examined by Dr Kang and when he was in the hospital. Further, as mentioned in paragraph 44 above, the accused’s symptoms of alcohol withdrawal, if any, would have been even milder at the time of the VA offence, which was about 12 hours before he arrived at SGH. In summary, the evidence did not support a finding that the accused was experiencing hallucinations at the time of the VA offence.

49 The accused’s defences under ss 81, 84 and 96 of the PC respectively were dependent on the accused having acted pursuant to hallucinations due to alcohol withdrawal. Having found that the accused was not experiencing hallucinations at the time of the VA offence, it was unnecessary to consider these defences further.

50 The accused also submitted that no costs were incurred by MHA due to the offence, and that Exhibit P5 was not an accurate or valid document to be used to assess the damage to the Cell on 11 July 2024. ¹⁰² The accused relied on the defence under s 95 of the PC ¹⁰³ , which provides that nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm. While he did not set out the specific basis of this defence, given his above-mentioned submissions on there being no loss caused to MHA, I considered these submissions together.

51 As a starting point, s 2 of the VA only requires there to be stealing, destroying or damaging any public property for there to be an act of vandalism, and does not further require loss to be caused to the owner of the public property. As mentioned above in paragraph 25, the Court in Ng Chye Huay made clear that to impose such additional requirements extra-legislatively would be unwarranted and unjustifiable. Therefore, even if there was no evidence of monetary loss caused to the owner of the public property, this did not affect whether the elements of the charge had been made out.

52 Notwithstanding the above, I accepted that MHA had already issued the 22 February 2024 PO to SMM to replace the Cell’s padding system prior to 11 July 2024. Although the works had not yet commenced, due to operational needs ¹⁰⁴ and because the existing damage had not rendered the Cell non-operational ¹⁰⁵ , a contract was already in place to replace the padding at the time of the offence, and the accused’s actions therefore did not cause further monetary loss to MHA. I agreed with the accused that the quotation dated 16 July 2024 that SMM had provided in assessing the repair works for the damage caused by the accused (Exhibit P5), would not reflect the monetary loss caused to the owner of the Cell, as it reflected only the potential cost of repair attributable to the accused absent the pre-existing contract between MHA and SMM. In any event, the extent of monetary loss caused to MHA is a matter that goes towards sentencing rather than the elements of the charge.

53 However, it did not follow that the accused’s actions caused no harm or loss. As IO Phua had testified, the Cell was no longer operational after the accused’s actions on 11 July 2024 and could not be used until after the restoration works were done. ¹⁰⁶ This was consistent with IO Chen’s evidence that if the damage to a cell was severe and significant enough, then normally they would not use the cell, but if it was just some slight damage, they would still continue to use the cell as per procedure. From IO Chen’s recollection, while there was some damage to the Cell, it was not severe enough to deem the Cell as non-usable. ¹⁰⁷ I found that the accused’s actions on 11 July 2024 in the Cell had rendered the Cell non-usable. This deprived MHA of the use of an otherwise operational Cell and necessitated immediate repair works which had been previously deferred for operational reasons.

54 In these circumstances, the harm was not so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm. The accused could not therefore avail himself of the defence under s 95 of the PC. Monetary loss is just one factor that can be taken into account for harm, which can also include non-monetary harm. As a result of the accused’s actions, although MHA did not incur additional monetary expenditure, the loss of use of the Cell constituted non-monetary harm and would have disrupted the smooth functioning of police operations. Section 95 of the PC therefore did not apply.

55 For completeness, I also address the accused’s submission that false evidence was given intentionally or fabricated by IO Phua and IO Chen in respect of Exhibits P4 and P5 respectively. ¹⁰⁸ These were serious allegations as the giving of and fabricating false evidence are offences under ss 191 and 192 of the PC. Specifically, the accused submitted that:

(a) IO Phua gave false evidence when he testified that the damage reflected at page 6 of Exhibit P4 were caused by the accused, and had prepared a false quotation in Exhibit P4 to be used in trial; and

(b) IO Chen fabricated false evidence as set out in Exhibit P5, as this document was a private document for which no Purchase Order was issued. Exhibit P5 was intended to be used to claim restitution from the accused, thereby cheating the accused since the damage to the Cell was already there when the accused entered the Cell.

56 Exhibit P4 was a 14-page document consisting of:

(a) the Estimate Quotation in respect of the “Reinstatement of padded cell at 26P and 27P” dated 4 January 2024 and signed by Mr Wong, for the sum of $35,784 ¹⁰⁹ ;

(b) the 22 February 2024 PO ¹¹⁰ ;

(c) A Service Report Job Completed Form in respect of the completed repair work to padded cell 27P ¹¹¹ ;

(d) the Job Chit in respect of “Reinstatement of padded cell at 26P and 27P” issued by SMM stating, among other things, that the replacement of the padding system at the Cell was completed and handed over on 31 July 2024. The Job Chit was accompanied by pictures of the Cell and cell 27P, pre-reinstatement and during the works. ¹¹² The Job Chit was acknowledged by IO Chen on 12 August 2024 ¹¹³ ;

(e) the Certificate of Completion in respect of “Replacement Works for Padded Cells 26P and 27P” ¹¹⁴ , which stated the date of completion for the Cell as 31 July 2024. While the date of 26 June 2024 was also stated as the “Date of Completion” on the same document, Mr Wong testified that this was an administrative error and that the correct date was 31 July 2024 ¹¹⁵ ; and

(f) the Final Bill of Quantity in respect of the reinstatement of the Cell and padded cell 27P dated 7 August 2024. ¹¹⁶ Mr Wong testified that this document was submitted after the job was completed as a finalised quotation. ¹¹⁷

57 The Prosecution had initially put forward Exhibit P4 as evidence of the cost of repair of the Cell arising from the accused’s act of vandalism on 11 July 2024, being $35,784. ¹¹⁸ During cross-examination of IO Phua on 8 October 2025 (Day 1 of the trial), the accused asked why he was told by the previous IO that the repair cost was $2,488 when he was in the hospital and IO Phua replied that he would not have knowledge as to how the accused had this figure as he would have no knowledge whether the amount was factual in the first place. ¹¹⁹ On 10 October 2025 (Day 2 of the trial), the Prosecution informed the court that upon review, they “also found an earlier quotation showing the cost of repairs to be $2,688” and believed the accused may have obtained the figure of $2,488 from this quotation. ¹²⁰ The Prosecution also stated that this was an initial quotation which was different from the final quotation tendered in Exhibit P4, which set out the amount that was eventually paid out as the cost of repairs for the damage to the Cell. ¹²¹

58 On 10 October 2025, it was put to IO Phua that the damage in the Cell shown on page 6 of Exhibit P4 (being photographs of the Cell labelled under the heading “Quotation for Reinstatement of padded cell at 26P (Floor Padding Replacement)” was not caused by the accused, and IO Phua disagreed. ¹²² As mentioned at paragraph 56(d) above, these photographs were annexed to the Job Chit and in particular, those at page 6 of Exhibit P4 showed the damage to the Cell pre-reinstatement. When the accused put it to IO Phua that the quotation at page 3 of Exhibit P4 was issued on 4 January 2024 and the 22 February 2024 PO at page 13 of P4 was issued on 22 February 2024, IO Phua stated that he would not be able to comment on that. ¹²³

59 In view of the line of questioning, I had asked the Prosecution if they had anything to say and whether there was an issue given that the offence date set out in the charge was 11 July 2024, which was after the dates of the quotation and 22 February 2024 PO in Exhibit P4. The Prosecution stated that they wished to check what the accused was asserting through this line of questioning before responding. I noted that the accused’s questions related to the date of the quotation in Exhibit P4, which he had established pre-dated his actions on 11 July 2024, and the accused confirmed that this was the case. ¹²⁴ However, as the accused confirmed that his position was that the quotation in P4 still applied to his case, the cross-examination of IO Phua continued. ¹²⁵

60 IO Phua was asked by the accused to refer to Exhibit P2, which comprised the crime scene photographs taken after the accused’s actions in the Cell on 11 July 2024, and to confirm whether the damage at page 6 of Exhibit P4 was done by the accused after comparing the two sets of photographs. IO Phua agreed that there were differences in the two sets of photographs but confirmed again that the damage at page 6 of Exhibit P4 was caused by the accused. ¹²⁶ In response to the accused’s request to explain why there was a quotation given for the Cell on 4 January 2024 for the dismantling and disposal of existing damaged padded foam (page 3 of Exhibit P4), IO Phua testified that he would have to check as this was given by the vendor. The accused then requested a stand-down to allow IO Phua to check, and the Prosecution similarly agreed that the stand-down would give them an opportunity to check on the dates of the quotation. ¹²⁷

61 The trial was then stood down before lunchtime and resumed after lunchtime. ¹²⁸ It was at that point that the following exchange took place during the accused’s cross-examination of IO Phua ¹²⁹ :

62 IO Phua was then asked again whether he agreed that the damage reflected in the photographs on page 6 of P4 was not done by the accused, and his response was “Yup, I can agree to that, that these photographs were taken before the incident”. ¹³⁰ IO Phua was also shown the quotation dated 16 July 2024 that was found by the Prosecution upon further review, which was admitted as Exhibit P5, and he explained the different amounts in the quotation in Exhibit P4 and P5 as follows ¹³¹ :

For context, the total sum quoted in Exhibit P5 was $3,200 but the subtotal was $2,688 after a contract adjustment amount of $512.

63 It is clear from the evidence summarised at paragraphs 57 to 62 above that IO Phua was initially mistaken when he attributed the damage shown in the photographs at page 6 of Exhibit P4 to the accused. After the chronology underlying Exhibit P4 was clarified and Exhibit P5 was produced, he accepted that those photographs had been taken before the incident involving the accused. It was this initial evidence which the accused alleged was false evidence given intentionally.

64 I did not rely on IO Phua’s initial and erroneous attribution of the damage shown at page 6 of Exhibit P4 to the accused. The Prosecution’s eventual position, which I accepted, was that the Cell had already sustained damage before 11 July 2024 and the 22 February 2024 PO had been issued for its reinstatement before the present offence. I also found at paragraph 52 above that the fresh damage caused by the accused did not cause MHA additional monetary loss. The error concerning the photographs in Exhibit P4 therefore did not affect my findings on the elements of the offence, nor did I consider it to undermine IO Phua’s evidence on the other matters on which I relied, which were either undisputed or independently supported by other evidence.

65 However, given the serious nature of the allegation, I observe that based solely on the record of proceedings before me, IO Phua did not intentionally give false evidence in respect of page 6 of Exhibit P4. His answers appeared to stem from a mistaken belief that Exhibit P4 set out the repair costs attributable to the accused. He ought to have checked the documents and their chronology more carefully. However, once the position was clarified, the relevant material in Exhibit P5 was disclosed and IO Phua corrected the evidence concerning the photographs at page 6 of Exhibit P4. There was therefore no prejudice caused to the accused.

66 As for the accused’s allegation that IO Phua had prepared a false quotation in Exhibit P4 to be used in trial and that IO Chen had fabricated false evidence as set out in Exhibit P5, I found no evidential basis for either allegation. Mr Wong testified that he was asked to prepare the quotation at P4 to quote for the works for the reinstatement of the Cell and padded cell 27P, which he submitted on 4 January 2024. ¹³² He also confirmed that he had prepared the quotation in Exhibit P5 as he was requested to submit a quotation to quote for the damages “caused by the vandalism” ¹³³ , and that the quotation was prepared after he was brought down to the Cell for a survey, and after he had invited his contractors to do another survey of the Cell. ¹³⁴ Mr Wong’s evidence was also that it was his contractors who had assessed and measured the damaged portion and provided him with the area of damage for the quotation in Exhibit P5. ¹³⁵ IO Chen testified that he had managed the project pursuant to which the quotation in Exhibit P4 was given ¹³⁶ and that from what he could recall, the quotation in Exhibit P4 was obtained from SMM due to the ongoing talks with them to repair the cells and the quotation in Exhibit P5 was requested to obtain the costs for the new damage found after the Cell was damaged by the accused, for provision to the IO. ¹³⁷

67 For the same reasons set out in paragraphs 33, 65 and 66 above, I was unable to accept the accused’s submission that IO Chen, IO Phua and SI Faizal and others “conspired together to cover up the use of a deutilised cell”, so as to “cover the fact that [the accused] being placed in a deutilised cell 26P”. ¹³⁸

68 Having carefully scrutinised the totality of the evidence, I was satisfied that the Prosecution had proved the charge against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, I found the accused guilty and convicted him of the VA charge.

69 The prescribed punishment for an offence under s 3 of the VA is a fine not exceeding $2,000 or an imprisonment term not exceeding three years, and caning of a minimum of three strokes and a maximum of eight strokes.

70 The accused had a long list of relevant antecedents which showed his lack of regard for the law, public order and law enforcement officers. These convictions and sentences imposed included:

71 The accused was also convicted and sentenced to 15 weeks’ imprisonment on 24 April 2026 for a s 6(1)(a) POHA offence committed on 30 May 2025. The sentence was backdated to 30 May 2025, which was the accused’s date of arrest: see Public Prosecutor v Kelvin Sunderesan S/O Retchagadas [2026] SGMC 74 at [3]. As the s 6(1)(a) POHA offence was committed after the VA offence in the present case, I did not regard this latest conviction and sentence as a relevant antecedent for the purpose of sentencing.

72 The Prosecution sought a sentence of 12 to 15 months’ imprisonment and the mandatory three strokes of the cane. Relying on Fricker Oliver v Public Prosecutor [2011] 1 SLR 84 (“Fricker”), Public Prosecutor v Chia Ching Sheng [2018] SGDC 258 (“Chia Ching Sheng”) and two unreported precedents cited in the latter case, and given the harm and culpability in the present case, the Prosecution submitted that the starting point should be six to seven months’ imprisonment. ¹³⁹

73 In respect of harm and culpability, the Prosecution submitted that the accused’s damage was to property in the law enforcement context and the harm caused was more serious as it disrupted law enforcement processes. The accused’s culpability was also elevated because it showed a specific disregard of law enforcement. The Prosecution argued that the accused’s belligerence was borne out by the facts, given that the accused was apprehended and placed in custody in the lock-up, and had proceeded to tear up the Cell as he was unhappy that he could not get to speak to an IO on demand and continued to do so despite being warned to stop by SI Faizal. ¹⁴⁰

74 The Prosecution’s position was that the Court must take into account the lengthy and relevant list of antecedents after deriving the starting point and the principle of escalation applied heavily against the accused, whether it be any metric of escalation in terms of similarity, recency, frequency or severity. In this regard, the Prosecution relied on Public Prosecutor v Low Ji Qing [2019] 5 SLR 769 and submitted that an uplift of six to eight months would be appropriate in view of the accused’s antecedents. ¹⁴¹

75 The s 3 VA offence in Fricker involved spray-painting the sides of two MRT train carriages, while that in Chia Ching Sheng involved spraying hair gel onto the lens housing of three CCTV cameras. As the VA offences in Fricker and Chia Ching Sheng did not involve property belonging to law enforcement agencies, I requested that parties consider three cases involving s 3 VA offences committed in respect of property belonging to the SPF, namely Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Fiqkri Jaffri [2022] SGDC 223 (“Fiqkri”), Public Prosecutor v Alwinder Singh [2022] SGDC 225 (“Alwinder Singh”) and Public Prosecutor v Seah Kian Li [2019] SGDC 174 (“Seah Kian Li”).

76 The Prosecution submitted that these cases reinforced the Prosecution’s submissions for a sentence of 12 to 15 months’ imprisonment and the mandatory three strokes of the cane, and that taking into account the discounts for the pleas of guilt in those cases, it would appear that the corresponding sentences following trial in those cases would have been in the region of about six to nine months’ imprisonment. In their view, once the accused’s far more chequered history of property damage, public disorder, and antagonism against law enforcement was given effect, a starting sentence in the range of 12 months’ imprisonment would be proportionate. ¹⁴²

77 The accused submitted as follows:

(a) the principle of escalation did not apply to the single VA charge and that the outstanding 32 charges against him which had not been tried did not determine his guilt.

(b) He did not target law enforcement or public servants but served his nation diligently. He did not target to vandalise the Cell as he was unarmed and placed in the damaged Cell by the police, when they should have brought him to the hospital immediately after the arrest for the LCA charge because the police had his medical history. It therefore could not be said that he was targeting the police.

(c) He did not mean to cause any damage and without the Cell being damaged already, he would not have been able to cause any further damage. ¹⁴³

(d) No cost was incurred by MHA due to his actions, nor was the work done by SMM disrupted.

(e) He had never vandalised any public property and this was his first VA conviction.

(f) He had told the IO that he would fix the damage for the SPF.

78 In view of the above, the accused sought a fine instead of a custodial sentence. ¹⁴⁴

79 In my view, the cases of Fiqkri, Alwinder Singh and to a more limited extent, Mohammed Mushtaq Khan Swati (SC-909029-2017, unreported) (“Mohammed Mushtaq”) cited in Seah Kian Li at [18], were of assistance in determining the appropriate sentence in the present case.

80 In Fiqkri, the offender had pleaded guilty to five charges, including a s 3 VA charge, and had two charges taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing: see Fiqkri at [2]. In respect of the s 3 VA charge, the offender had headbutted and kicked the window and door of a police car while in the police car, causing damage amounting to $1,255.48 and had only stopped when his legs were restrained. There was no restitution made. He had two relevant antecedents, with one where he was placed on probation and the other where he was sentenced to 8 weeks’ imprisonment. The Court in Fiqkri agreed with the Prosecution and Defence in that case that the appropriate sentence would be five months’ imprisonment and three strokes of the cane and noted that the s 3 VA offence was a serious offence where the law provided for mandatory caning: see Fiqkri at [33].

81 In Alwinder Singh, the offender pleaded guilty to 12 charges, including two s 3 VA charges, and had 15 charges taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing: see Alwinder Singh at [4]. While the offender was sentenced to corrective training, the Court indicated that the likely sentence for one of the vandalism offences would be at least 6 months’ imprisonment: see Alwinder Singh at [54(b)]. For that charge, the offender was seated in his car parked in a parking lot and the police officers had parked their police car in front of (and perpendicular to) the offender’s vehicle to prevent the offender from driving off. When the police officers approached the offender’s car and asked him to alight from the car, the offender refused to comply. Instead, he started the engine of his car and drove it straight into the side of the parked police vehicle at speed to push the police vehicle away. The offence of vandalism was committed by damaging the police vehicle, a public property: see Alwinder Singh at [13] to [18]. The other charge of vandalism also involved damaging a police vehicle, by driving a car and colliding into the left portion of a police vehicle blocking his exit point during a high-speed car chase: at [29]. The Court imposed the mandatory minimum three strokes of the cane for each of the two VA charges: at [64]. The offender’s relevant antecedents included three charges of voluntarily causing hurt, a previous criminal intimidation charge taken into consideration and an attempted criminal intimidation charge.

82 In Seah Kian Li, the offender pleaded guilty to a single charge under s 3 of the VA for unscrewing a tap valued at $171.20 from a police station toilet and made off with it. The sentence of 3 months’ imprisonment (including a one month’s imprisonment in lieu of caning pursuant to s 325(2) of the CPC) imposed by the lower court was reduced to 19 days’ imprisonment on appeal. As the facts in Seah Kian Li were clearly distinguishable from those in the present case, Seah Kian Li was of limited assistance. However, it is notable that in arriving at the sentence, the lower court had considered Mohammed Mushtaq, an unreported case with parallels to the present case. The offender in Mohammed Mushtaq was arrested and placed in a cell within the Ang Mo Kio Police Division Headquarters lock-up and while inside, he tore off two pieces of rubber padding that lined the cell, causing damage amounting to $1,236.96: see Seah Kian Li at [18].

83 The offender in Mohammed Mushtaq, had pleaded guilty to two charges, including a s 3 VA charge and was sentenced to 4 months’ imprisonment and three strokes of the cane for the VA charge. He had a prior conviction under s 427 of the PC for mischief where damage in excess of $500 was caused as well as drug-related antecedents. The factual similarity of that case provided some assistance. However, it was an unreported decision without reasoned grounds, and this limited its precedential value. As the High Court observed in Abdul Aziz bin Mohamed Hanib v Public Prosecutor and other appeals [2022] SGHC 101 at [173], caution must be exercised in relying on unreported decisions because these decisions often lack sufficient particulars to paint the entire factual landscape required to appreciate the precise sentences imposed.

84 The cases of Fiqkri, Alwinder Singh and to a more limited extent, Mohammed Mushtaq, provided useful reference points for vandalism offences involving damage to police property in the course of an arrest or while in custody. Custodial sentences were imposed in all of these cases, where the offenders pleaded guilty. Considering the precedents and that the accused committed an act of vandalism against police property whilst in custody, the custodial threshold was clearly crossed in the present case.

85 Notwithstanding the absence of monetary loss caused (at paragraph 52 above), the accused’s culpability was similar to that of the offender in Fiqkri as the accused threatened to continue tearing the Cell unless he saw the IO immediately and was subsequently transferred to another cell. His actions were deliberate and used as an attempt to compel police officers to accede to his demand. The accused’s culpability was also comparable to that of the offender in Alwinder Singh, as both committed their respective offences in the course of law enforcement operations.

86 However, the accused’s antecedents materially distinguished him from the offenders in Fiqkri and Alwinder Singh. The accused’s antecedents involving disorderly behaviour, mischief and abusive behaviour, voluntarily causing hurt to deter a public servant from his duty and the use of criminal force against public officers, demonstrated repeated offending involving public order and hostility towards persons performing law enforcement functions.

87 Taking into account the above and given the need for deterrence against disregard for law enforcement and disruption of police operations, I considered an appropriate starting point to be 7 months’ imprisonment before taking the accused’s antecedents into account. The principle of escalation warranted a significant uplift to the sentence.

88 The accused’s longest sentence involving disruption of a public servant’s duty was 5 months and 2 weeks’ imprisonment imposed on 24 January 2022, which ran consecutively with four sentences of 2 weeks’ imprisonment each for using indecent, threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards or to a public servant or public service worker in the execution of duty. Those sentences had not deterred him from further reoffending in a law enforcement setting. Having considered the accused’s continued reoffending, I was of the view that an uplift to 10 months’ imprisonment was appropriate. I also imposed the mandatory minimum of three strokes of the cane, in line with the precedents.

89 The accused also raised the issue of whether the sentence for the VA offence could be run concurrently with that imposed on 24 April 2026 for the s 6(1)(a) POHA offence ¹⁴⁵ : see paragraph 71 above. In this regard, the Singapore Prison Service confirmed that the sentence imposed for the s 6(1)(a) POHA offence had been ordered to commence on 30 May 2025 and his release date for that sentence was 8 August 2025. ¹⁴⁶ The Prosecution submitted that the sentences should run consecutively, as the two offences constituted different transactions infringing different legal interests. The Prosecution further submitted that a concurrent sentence would result in no additional punishment for the VA charge. ¹⁴⁷

90  In my view, as the accused had already completed serving his sentence for the s 6(1)(a) POHA offence by the time he was sentenced for the present VA offence, the question of whether the two sentences should run concurrently or consecutively did not arise. For the same reason, s 322(1) of the CPC, as set out below, did not apply. Section 322(1) confers on the court a discretion, where a person who is an escaped convict or is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced to a further term of imprisonment, to order the further sentence to commence either immediately or upon the expiration of the term of imprisonment to which he was previously sentenced.

91 The views of the Court of Appeal in Adeeb Ahmed Khan s/o Iqbal Ahmed Khan v Public Prosecutor [2022] 2 SLR 1197 (“Adeeb”), in the context of sentences imposed in separate proceedings, provided useful guidance. The Court of Appeal agreed with the observations made by the High Court in Teo Kian Leong v Public Prosecutor [2002] 1 SLR(R) 386 that the primary duty of the sentencing court was to determine the appropriate sentence which would best ensure that the ends of justice were met and that a relevant consideration was whether the totality of the sentence was proportionate to the inherent gravity of all the offences committed by the accused. In contemplating the totality of the sentences imposed, the court should consider whether, if all the offences had been before it, it would still have passed a sentence of similar length. If not, the sentence imposed for the latest offence should be adjusted in light of the aggregate sentence. In this regard, in principle, the court should, as far as possible, try to impose a sentence that is reflective of the gravity of the latest offence in question: see Adeeb at [42]. The Court of Appeal stated that the court had to consider all the charges that were proceeded on in the two separate proceedings, and in that light, consider what the appropriate sentence should be for the latter set of proceedings. Applying this test, the question was whether the position would have been different if these matters had been dealt with in one sitting instead of two: see Adeeb at [43].

92 I therefore considered whether, if the s 6(1)(a) POHA offence and the VA offence had both been before me, I would still have imposed an aggregate period of imprisonment of similar length. In determining this question, I considered the one-transaction rule and the totality principle. I agreed with the Prosecution that the s 6(1)(a) POHA offence, for which sentence was imposed on 24 April 2026, and the VA offence did not form part of a single transaction. The offences violated different legally protected interests. I was also satisfied that the aggregate period of imprisonment resulting from the two sentences was proportionate to the gravity of the two offences and the accused’s overall criminality. I therefore did not consider it necessary to adjust the sentence for the VA offence in light of the aggregate period of imprisonment.

93 For the reasons set out above, I sentenced the accused to 10 months’ imprisonment and three strokes of the cane. I further ordered the sentence to be backdated to 8 August 2025, being the date the accused completed his sentence for the s 6(1)(a) POHA offence and from which he remained in remand in relation to the present charge.