1 The fugitive, Mr Ge Zhi @ ZHI “JOSH” GE or GEZ (“Mr Ge”), is wanted by the United States of America (“the US”) to stand trial on six charges of securities fraud and money-laundering of illicit proceeds from securities fraud. This was an application by the State for Mr Ge to be committed to prison to await the warrant of the Minister for Law (“the Minister”) for his surrender to the US pursuant to s 16(8) of the Extradition Act 1968.

2 After hearing submissions from both the State and Mr Ge, I found that every legal requirement under s 16(8) of the Extradition Act had been satisfied. I accordingly issued the warrant for his commitment.

3 When I delivered my decision on 22 September 2026, I provided brief oral remarks. These are the full grounds of my decision.

4 On 28 June 2024, the US Embassy made a provisional request for the arrest of Mr Ge for the purpose of extradition on securities fraud and money-laundering charges. ¹

5 Pursuant to this request, on the same day, Commercial Affairs Officer Jerlyn Teo (“CAO Teo”) of the Commercial Affairs Department of the Singapore Police Force applied for a Warrant of Apprehension under the Extradition Act for Mr Ge. ² This was supported by a complaint setting out the key evidence against Mr Ge, as set out in the US request, undergirding offences alleged to have been committed. ³

6 A Warrant of Apprehension was issued by a Magistrate on the same day pursuant to s 12(1)(b) of the Extradition Act. ⁴

7 Mr Ge was subsequently arrested pursuant to the Warrant of Apprehension on 3 July 2024. ⁵ He was produced in the mentions court (Court 4A) on 4 July 2024 and was in remand until I ordered his commitment to await the warrant of the Minister for his surrender on 22 September 2026.

8 On 29 August 2024, the US submitted a formal extradition request in relation to Mr Ge, ⁶ attaching an affidavit of Ian J. Stearns, an Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA Stearns”) for the District of Massachusetts employed by the United States Department of Justice. The affidavit enclosed the indictment of Mr Ge by a grand jury sitting in Boston, Massachusetts, on six counts of securities fraud and money-laundering offences:

(a) Count One: conspiracy to commit securities fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1349, which is punishable by a maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment;

(b) Count Two: conspiracy to commit securities fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, which is punishable by a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment;

(c) Count Three: securities fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1348, and aiding and abetting that offence, under Title 18, United States Code, Section 2, which is punishable by a maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment;

(d) Count Four: securities fraud, in violation of Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78j(b) and 78ff(a) and Title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 240.10b-5, and aiding and abetting that offence, under Title 18, United States Code, Section 2, which is punishable by a maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment;

(e) Count Five: conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(h), which is punishable by a maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment; and

(f) Count Six: money laundering, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), and aiding and abetting that offence, under Title 18, United States Code, Section 2, which is punishable by a maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment.

9 AUSA Stearns’ affidavit contained a summary of facts and evidence in relation to the six charges. It attached the affidavit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Special Agent Thomas Corbolotti (“Agent Corbolotti”), which set out in greater detail the evidence obtained against Mr Ge in the course of the FBI’s investigations. AUSA Stearns’ affidavit also appended a Warrant of Arrest for Mr Ge signed by the Honourable United States Magistrate Judge Jennifer C. Boal on 7 September 2024, based on the indictment filed by the grand jury.

10 On 18 October 2024, the Minister issued a written notice under s 11(1)(b) of the Extradition Act, stating that a request had been made to him by the US for the surrender of Mr Ge on six counts of securities fraud and money-laundering offences.

11 As Mr Ge did not at any time consent to his surrender to the US as the requesting state, the matter was eventually set down for a committal hearing to determine whether an order should be made pursuant to s 16(8) of the Extradition Act to commit Mr Ge to prison to await the warrant of the Minister for his surrender to the US.

12 I should state at the outset, as I have recognised elsewhere (see In the matter of Wang Yunhe [2025] SGMC 39 at [30]), that extradition is founded on international comity and reciprocity (In Re Paul Kan [1993] 2 HKLR 34116 at 348(35)). It is not intended to be a long-drawn process; indeed, Parliament had expressly stated that “it is not in states’ interest to afford refuge to criminals from other countries”. After all, the alleged offences were not committed within Singapore’s jurisdiction. Extradition is instead meant to be a summary, expeditious process, because it is “in states' interests to return fugitives for trial and punishment to the state in which the offence was committed”: Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (4 April 2022) vol 95 (Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai, Second Minister for Law), quoting Mr E W Barker, then-Minister for National Development during the introduction of the Extradition Act in 1968.

13 It is with these principles in mind that I consider it necessary to set out, in some detail, why the matter took more than two years from the first time Mr Ge was produced in Court 4A, and more than a year after the first committal hearing dates were set down, to conclude.

14 The matter was first set down for committal hearing on 22 and 23 May 2025, with 29 and 30 May 2025 in reserve (“the May 2025 Committal Hearing”). Mr Ge was at that time represented by Mr Alfred Dodwell (“Mr Dodwell”) and Ms Lolita Andrew (“Ms Andrew”). However, about a week before the May 2025 Committal Hearing, on 14 May 2025, all the hearing dates were vacated as Mr Dodwell was on hospitalisation leave.

15 Committal hearing dates were promptly re-fixed thereafter on the parties’ next mutually available dates on 20 and 21 August 2025, with 22 August 2025 in reserve (“the August 2025 Committal Hearing”).

16 On 11 August 2025, which was again about a week before the August 2025 Committal Hearing, Ms Andrew filed an application to vacate the hearing for a second time, on the ground that counsel intended to file a criminal motion in the High Court for Mr Ge to be released on bail, pursuant to s 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (“CPC”). The application was on the basis that Mr Ge was allegedly “sick or infirm”, a specified exception in r 6(1) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2018 that permitted release on bail. Based on medical reports from private psychiatrists engaged by Mr Ge, he suffered from bipolar disorder and his condition had worsened during his period in remand. ⁷ I pause to note that by this point, an application for Mr Ge to be released on bail had already been heard and denied by a District Judge (“DJ”) in Court 4A eight months prior, in December 2024.

17 When specifically queried on why the criminal motion had not been filed despite the long lapse in time since the DJ’s decision, Ms Andrew stated that the latest of multiple psychiatric reports on Mr Ge’s condition had only been received in late July 2025. ⁸ She further made the curious submission that leave was required from the District Court before a criminal motion could be filed in the High Court, and that such leave had not been obtained. Ms Andrew was not, however, able to point me to any provision that required such leave. She only stated that this was advice given to her by a member of staff in the High Court. ⁹

18  The State objected to this application. The State highlighted that no criminal motion had been filed despite counsel having more than seven months to do so. The committal hearing had already been vacated once, and this appeared to be an attempt by Mr Ge to further delay the proceedings. There was also no reason why Mr Ge could not prepare his case while in remand. ¹⁰

19 I heard parties on the application on 14 August 2025. I dismissed the application for vacation of the August 2025 Committal Hearing dates. I noted that no steps had been taken to file the criminal motion, even though it had been almost eight months since the DJ’s decision on Mr Ge’s bail application in December 2024. Even if further evidence in the form of a further psychiatric report was to be tendered in the High Court, the criminal motion could have been filed first, with supporting documents submitted by way of supplementary affidavit later. I also did not find any basis in law or precedent for Ms Andrew’s assertion that leave was required from the District Court to file a criminal motion in the High Court. Simply stated, no such leave was required (or ever applied for prior to the criminal motion that was eventually filed). ¹¹

20 I further considered that Mr Ge had been in remand for more than a year at that point. I noted that a vacation of the August 2025 Committal Hearing would be prejudicial to him and contrary to the spirit and purpose of extradition proceedings. For these reasons, I declined to vacate the August 2025 Committal Hearing dates. ¹²

21 On the first day of August 2025 Committal Hearing, being 20 August 2025, the State was ready to proceed with the substantive hearing. However, before the commencement of court proceedings, Mr Ge was observed to be behaving erratically by his counsel, the court interpreter and the court officer. When the hearing began, Mr Dodwell submitted that Mr Ge was unable to communicate clearly with the interpreter and with him, and might be suffering from a relapse of his bipolar disorder that day. According to Mr Dodwell, based on the latest psychiatric report by Dr Jacob Rajesh of Promises Clinic, Mr Ge suffered from bipolar disorder and was at a “very high risk of relapse”. ¹³ Mr Dodwell therefore submitted that Mr Ge might not be able to understand the proceedings and that it would be “dangerous” to continue in the circumstances. He indicated that he was unable to take further instructions from Mr Ge, and that proceedings should not continue until Mr Ge was “properly assessed, treated and medicated”. He asked the Court to consider remanding Mr Ge under s 247 of the CPC for psychiatric assessment. ¹⁴ Section 247 of the CPC allows the court to remand an accused in criminal proceedings in a psychiatric institution for observation when it has reason to suspect that the accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind or any physical or mental condition, is incapable of making his defence.

22 Mr Dodwell further informed the Court that a criminal motion had just been filed in the High Court for bail to be granted to Mr Ge. ¹⁵

23 I asked the parties to make further submissions on several issues, including whether s 247 of the CPC applied in the context of extradition proceedings when the Court had reason to suspect that a fugitive might be of unsound mind or have a condition which might affect the way in which he participated in proceedings. ¹⁶

24 When parties returned the next day, 21 August 2025, the State proposed that it make arrangements for Mr Ge to be assessed by a psychiatrist from the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”), Singapore’s only tertiary psychiatric care institution, while Mr Ge was in remand. ¹⁷ The Court could then make a decision on the fitness of Mr Ge to proceed based on the IMH psychiatrist’s report. Mr Ge’s counsel indicated that they consented to this arrangement. ¹⁸ This thus obviated the need for me to make any orders or directions for Mr Ge to be assessed by a psychiatrist, or consider the applicability of s 247 of the CPC to extradition proceedings. I directed that the psychiatric reports from Mr Ge’s Prison Medical Centre reviews and four previous reports by Mr Ge’s private psychiatrists be forwarded to the IMH psychiatrist for review in preparing his opinion. All the further August 2025 Committal Hearing dates were thus vacated pending the receipt of the IMH report.

25 On 16 October 2025, Dr Cheow Enquan (“Dr Cheow”), a senior consultant at IMH, produced a psychiatric report after interviewing Mr Ge and considering all his past psychiatric records. Dr Cheow found that Mr Ge had a history of bipolar disorder since his late teens, but had not suffered from any relapse since 2015, despite not taking medication. He had also not been forthcoming about his history of substance use, which would have likely amounted to substance use disorder. His heavy use of hallucinogens alone would have been sufficient to cause a prolonged drug-induced mania with psychosis even if he did not have an underlying bipolar disorder.

26 Dr Cheow noted that Mr Ge was reviewed multiple times by prison psychiatrists while in remand, including during two admissions to the Prisons’ medical centre for close observation over several days. He had not been observed to have any psychiatric symptoms, including those of bipolar disorder. During the assessment period, he was not observed to be psychotic, manic or hypomanic. Thus, Dr Cheow opined that it was “entirely possible” that Mr Ge’s claims during the assessment that he was persecuted by the US, and by Singapore Prisons, were “motivated by secondary gain as he [sought] to avoid extradition to face charges in the United States on mental health grounds” [emphasis added].

27 In Dr Cheow’s opinion, there was “no evidence that [Mr Ge] currently suffer[ed] from any active mental disorder”. He did not require any psychiatric treatment, and was “clearly of sound mind, able to instruct his lawyers, follow court proceedings and give evidence in court”. Regarding his presentation in court on 20 August 2025, where he claimed to have suffered a “dissociative episode”, Dr Cheow stated that Mr Ge did not suffer from a genuine dissociative disorder, given that there was no previous documented history of such episodes and no history of significant psychological trauma. Dr Cheow concluded, “[g]iven that he [was] clearly fit to plead, his behaviour could be attributed to a lack of willingness to cooperate with court proceedings” [emphasis added].

28 Following the IMH report, at a pre-trial conference (“PTC”) on 28 November 2025, the State indicated that it was ready to take a third set of committal hearing dates. However, Mr Dodwell sought an adjournment for at least another month before hearing dates were given, because Mr Ge wanted to obtain a fifth psychiatric report on his condition following Dr Cheow’s report. Mr Dodwell also indicated that the criminal motion on bail was still pending in the High Court.

29 This application was fixed before me for determination on 4 December 2025. Ms Andrew made similar arguments for more time before committal hearing dates were set down. This was on the ground that (a) Mr Ge wanted to refute the IMH report by Dr Cheow and counsel was in the midst of obtaining yet another psychiatric report on whether Mr Ge was suffering from bipolar disorder and was of sound mind to proceed. This report would only be ready by 12 December 2025; ¹⁹ and (b) the criminal motion before the High Court should be heard and determined before the committal hearing, as the former would give guidance on whether and how Prisons could manage Mr Ge’s mental condition. ²⁰

30 The State objected to the application. It argued that there was no evidence that Mr Ge was not of sound mind based on the existing psychiatric reports, including those by Mr Ge’s own psychiatrists. The purpose of the criminal motion on bail was also not to challenge whether Mr Ge was of sound mind to continue with the proceedings. Committal hearings should thus be given forthwith. ²¹

31 I found that on the present evidence, including the IMH report (the main findings of which are summarised at [25]-[27] above), Mr Ge was clearly of sound mind, able to instruct lawyers, follow court proceedings and give evidence in court. Given that Mr Ge had been in remand for one year and five months at that point, and two tranches of committal hearing dates had already been fixed and vacated, there was no basis for the matter to be delayed any further. I directed that committal hearing dates were to be taken forthwith, concurrently with the determination of the criminal motion in the High Court. ²²

32 A third set of committal hearing dates was promptly given at another PTC on 16 December 2025, for 23 and 24 March 2026 (“the March 2026 Committal Hearing”).

33 Three working days before the March 2026 Committal Hearing, on 18 March 2026, Ms Andrew filed an application to discharge herself as counsel for Mr Ge. By this time, Ms Andrew had moved to another law firm, and Mr Dodwell had ceased to be Mr Ge’s counsel on record. The matter was fixed in Court 4A for hearing the next day, 19 March 2026. As Mr Ge was on medical leave on 19 March 2026, the DJ adjourned the matter to 20 March 2026 (ie, one working day before the March 2026 Committal Hearing dates). Given the proximity to the commencement of the committal hearing, the DJ declined to deal with the application and directed that the application be made before me on the first day of committal hearing on 23 March 2026.

34 On 23 March 2026, Ms Andrew made the application before me to discharge herself as counsel for Mr Ge. This was on account of Mr Ge’s previous counsel, Mr Dodwell, allegedly “fail[ing] and/or refus[ing] to furnish documents” “despite repeated requests”, which resulted in Ms Andrew’s inability to take meaningful instructions from Mr Ge. ²³ On my questioning, it appeared that the documents that were allegedly not handed over mainly related to contemporaneous notes of interviews conducted with Mr Ge, ²⁴ as many of the main documents relating to the case (including detailed affidavits by the US authorities setting out the main grounds for the six charges) had already been uploaded onto the Court’s Integrated Case Management System (“ICMS”), accessible to all parties, since 2024. Later in the hearing, Ms Andrew made a further allegation that Mr Dodwell had also not handed over the remaining funds in Mr Ge’s client account to her, with the result that Ms Andrew was unable to continue work for Mr Ge pro bono. ²⁵

35 It transpired during the hearing that these issues regarding documents and fees arose as early as January 2026, when Ms Andrew left Mr Dodwell’s eponymous firm. ²⁶ When I asked Ms Andrew why she did not attempt to take instructions from Mr Ge since January 2026 or raise this issue in Court earlier, she said that there were issues with Prisons’ allocation of visiting hours for Mr Ge which were shorter than what she had requested. ²⁷

36 Given the unusual turn of events described above, and bearing in mind that Mr Ge had been in remand for a long period, I invited Mr Dodwell to appear to assist the court with a view to moving the matter forward without further delay. I made clear that I was not making any findings of fact in relation to the allegations regarding Mr Dodwell’s conduct. ²⁸

37 Mr Dodwell appeared in court the following day, 24 March 2026. He explained that he had handed over a thumbdrive containing all the documents relating to Mr Ge’s case to Ms Andrew as early as 5 January 2026. ²⁹ In response, Ms Andrew claimed that she never received the said thumbdrive. Without making any determination on this matter, I asked Mr Dodwell whether he would consider furnishing the requisite documents to Ms Andrew to expedite the case. Mr Dodwell indicated that he would provide the thumbdrive by 2pm on that day. ³⁰

38 As for the funds in Mr Ge’s client account, Mr Dodwell indicated that the funds had been exhausted by the work done on the matter, and there was thus nothing left to transfer. Ms Andrew argued that such funds were dissipated “without prior notice” to Mr Ge and his family. ³¹

39 Since the issue regarding the handover of documents appeared to be the verge of being resolved, I declined to grant the discharge application at that juncture. I also informed Ms Andrew that it appeared unsatisfactory to me that (a) she only made an application to discharge herself a few days before the March 2026 Committal Hearing dates, even though this had been an unresolved matter since January 2026. There would have been ample opportunity for her to raise the matter earlier, as Mr Ge was produced in Court 4A every seven days; (b) she failed to take instructions from Mr Ge in the interim to mitigate the issue. I also indicated to Ms Andrew that she should consider Mr Ge’s best interests because if she were to be discharged as counsel, he would be prejudiced by a further delay to the matter. This was especially because she had been counsel on record for most of the proceedings. I invited Ms Andrew to discuss the matter with Mr Ge further, including on the issue of fees. ³² By that time, the March 2026 Committal Hearing dates had been exhausted without the matter proceeding to the substantive hearing.

40 On 2 April 2026, the parties appeared before me again. Ms Andrew made a further application to discharge herself, claiming that Mr Dodwell had still not provided her with a full set of documents and that Mr Ge had no funds to continue paying her firm. ³³ She also alleged that I would in effect be compelling her to breach her professional obligations under the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules if I still refused to grant the discharge. ³⁴

41 Given this allegation, I explained to the parties again why I did not grant the discharge the previous week, having regard to Mr Ge’s best interests (set out at [39] above). ³⁵ I then stated that since there was still a dispute as to whether the documents were properly handed over, and as Mr Ge, having had some time to consider the matter, confirmed that he still wished to discharge Ms Andrew as his counsel, ³⁶ I would grant the discharge. I gave Mr Ge one month (until 2 May 2026) to engage new counsel. This was, in my view, a reasonable amount of time given his period of remand and the fact that three tranches of committal hearing dates had already been vacated. I indicated that if he failed to do so within that month, committal hearing dates would be fixed and he would have to represent himself. ³⁷

42 On 4 May 2026, Mr Ge made an application before me for an extension of time to engage new counsel. He stated that he had just submitted supporting documents to the Public Defender’s Office (“PDO”) and was awaiting its response. ³⁸ I granted him a final extension of time to 1 June 2026 to engage counsel, failing which committal hearing dates would be taken. ³⁹

43 In the meantime, the criminal motion on bail was heard in the High Court on 22 May 2026, with the grounds of decision published on 26 May 2026 (Ge Zhi v Attorney-General [2026] SGHC 114). The High Court dismissed Mr Ge’s application for bail. It found (at [29]-[31]), among other things, that Mr Ge was not suffering from bipolar disorder or any relapse of his bipolar disorder for the past ten years, had declined prescription and maintenance treatment for bipolar disorder and had not been on treatment for the past ten years.

44 At a PTC on 12 June 2026, a fourth set of committal hearing dates was set for 20 and 31 August 2026 (“the August 2026 Committal Hearing”).

45 On 3 August 2026, about two weeks before the August 2026 Committal Hearing, Mr Ge made an application in Court 4A to be granted Internet access by Prisons to assist in his preparation for the committal hearing. This application was fixed before me for hearing on 11 August 2026.

46 At the hearing, Mr Ge applied for a court order for him to be given “supervised Internet access” by Prisons. In particular, he wanted to be granted access to legal materials, such as LawNet, SG Law Watch, the statutes of Singapore and two specific cases. ⁴⁰ He suggested that “supervised access” meant that all his activities on the Internet would be monitored by a Prisons officer, all his key logs, timestamps and actions recorded, and all social media websites blocked from access. ⁴¹

47 The application was premised on three grounds: first, that the Internet was already being used in Prisons, such as for video-conferencing facilities where inmates were produced for court hearings; second, that unlike other remandees, he was not being represented by PDO or any other legal aid organisations because he had not been charged for any offences in Singapore; and third, that there were no other options available to him under the CPC and Penal Code. ⁴²

48 The State objected to this application because it was not clear on what basis the application was made. The State pointed out that Internet access was not a right and was also not available to other remandees. The State also observed that he was represented for most of the proceedings before counsel was discharged in March 2026 and that the proceedings had already been postponed three times since May 2025. ⁴³

49 After considering the submissions, I dismissed the application for Internet access, even in the attenuated form proposed by Mr Ge (assuming that this was even operationally feasible in the first place).

50 Whether to grant a person remanded in prison access to the Internet, including open, unmonitored access to the general Internet or supervised access thereof, was a matter exclusively within Prisons’ remit, subject to Prisons’ operational considerations. It was not disputed that remandees were not generally granted Internet access by Prisons. Mr Ge’s application thus suffered from a fundamental issue. Although it was framed as an application for a “court order” for Internet access, he was in essence asking this Court to quash Prisons’ decision not to grant remandees such as himself Internet access, and to mandate that Prisons grant Internet access to him. This Court did not have such supervisory jurisdiction over the exercise of Prisons’ discretion. Mr Ge’s application was in effect, a judicial review application to set aside Prisons’ decision, which was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court and not the lower courts (see Wang Yunhe v Attorney-General [2026] 1 SLR 1134 at [26]). For this reason alone, I would have dismissed the application.

51 Even if I had jurisdiction to hear the matter, I would still have dismissed the application. Mr Ge had provided no basis for the Court to order Prisons to allow him access to the Internet, or in essence, to grant him differentiated treatment from the rest of the remandees in the same premises. The fact that Prisons was using the Internet in other areas such as video-conferencing facilities for court hearings was irrelevant as it was an entirely different matter from remandees themselves having access to the Internet. His lack of legal representation by the PDO or other legal aid organisations was also irrelevant. Mr Ge was not precluded from engaging his own counsel, which he did for the majority of the time until he applied to discharge his counsel in March 2026. His references to the CPC and the Penal Code were also irrelevant, as these provisions governed domestic criminal law and had no application to extradition proceedings generally. I further noted that Mr Ge was not precluded from obtaining assistance, where allowed by Prisons’ operational considerations, from his family members or his counsel should he decide to engage one. ⁴⁴

52 As for the statutes and two cases mentioned specifically by Mr Ge, I asked the State to consider furnishing hard copies of these materials to Mr Ge, which it did within a few days.

53 On the first day of the August 2026 Committal Hearing, 20 August 2026, the substantive committal hearing was finally underway. The State called its only witness, CAO Teo. She completed her evidence in less than one hour. Mr Ge was then called on to give his evidence.

54 However, Mr Ge insisted that he would only be ready to give evidence on the second day of the committal hearing fixed, ie, 31 August 2026. He claimed that at the PTC on 12 June 2026, the DJ had told him that his case was only to start on 31 August 2026, and he thus needed more time to prepare. Having examined the court records, I informed Mr Ge that no such direction was made. ⁴⁵ I then stood down the matter at about 10.35am for him to prepare for his evidence. The hearing resumed at 2.30pm. Mr Ge again claimed that he “[would] not be taking the stand” that day as he was “not adequately prepared because [he] was made to believe during the PTC that [he] would be representing himself only on [31 August 2026]”. ⁴⁶

55 I reiterated that there was no such direction at the PTC. I also noted that he had had the relevant documents from the State for about three months, and the case had been pending for more than two years. ⁴⁷ Nonetheless, I told him that I was prepared to grant his application to adjourn the matter to 31 August 2026. I clearly explained to him what he could expect in terms of procedure on that day, and informed him that he should be prepared with the relevant documents he needed to give evidence. ⁴⁸ This, however, meant that the hearing, which could have been completed on 20 August 2026 was adjourned for a further 11 days at Mr Ge’s request.

56 When the hearing resumed on 31 August 2026, Mr Ge again asked for more time to prepare for his case, primarily because he indicated that his friend had helped him to retain counsel. ⁴⁹ I declined his application. ⁵⁰ It should be noted that no such counsel appeared either on that day or during any subsequent hearings.

57 Mr Ge then made an inexplicable application to give evidence without being sworn or affirmed. ⁵¹ I did not allow the application. Mr Ge was eventually affirmed and gave evidence.

58 The following is evident from the long and complex procedural history of the case before the substantive committal hearing eventually commenced on 20 August 2026:

(a) First, a total of three sets of committal hearing dates were fixed and vacated between May 2025 and March 2026, before the substantive committal hearing commenced in August 2026.

(b) Second, every application between May 2025 and August 2026 was brought by Mr Ge and/or his counsel. Each application sought to delay or vacate committal hearing dates for widely varying reasons. Even after the substantive committal hearing started on 20 August 2026, Mr Ge attempted to seek further adjournments before eventually giving evidence.

(c) Third, there were significant delays in bringing the applications to adjourn or vacate committal hearing dates. Most of the applications were brought at the doorstep of the committal hearings fixed, leaving the Court little to no time to deal with them until the first day of the committal hearing. Despite his then-counsel’s best efforts to explain the delays, there was in my view no good reason for most of these applications to be brought at the last minute. By the time the applications were dealt with, the committal hearing dates originally fixed were exhausted without progress to the substantive hearing.

(d) Fourth, Mr Ge attempted to characterise the vacation of committal dates as arising from unforeseen circumstances beyond his control, such as the alleged conduct of Mr Dodwell. ⁵² As I explained earlier, it was not this Court’s role to make a determination on these allegations. Even putting that aside, the repeated applications for adjournments on the ground of the intended and actual criminal motion on bail in the High Court were, for the reasons I explained above, without merit. The IMH report further concluded that he did not suffer from a relapse of his bipolar disorder, with which the High Court agreed.

(e) Fifth, at every juncture in the court proceedings, the Court had sought to move matters forward as promptly as possible. This was because the Court was always cognisant of the period Mr Ge had been in remand and the expeditious nature of extradition proceedings. However, new issues were constantly raised in different applications at and in between the committal hearing dates fixed, compelling the Court to deal with such applications, often on an urgent basis. This resulted in a significant drain on judicial resources, especially considering that Mr Ge had to be produced in Court 4A once every seven days for the past two years pursuant to s 15A(2) of the Extradition Act 1968.

59 In the circumstances, notwithstanding the Court's sustained efforts to advance the matter expeditiously, the inevitable conclusion was that the delays to the proceedings were attributable solely and directly to Mr Ge's own applications. These applications continually sought to adjourn and vacate committal hearing dates, consequently extending his remand period.

60 The committal hearing eventually commenced on 20 August 2026. It took place over two days on 20 and 31 August 2026. The State called CAO Teo as its only witness. Mr Ge also elected to give evidence.

61 Section 16(8) of the Extradition Act states:

62 Pursuant to s 16(8), three conditions must be satisfied before the Magistrate could commit Mr Ge to prison to await the warrant of the Minister for his surrender to the US:

(a) First, there must be produced to the Magistrate a duly authenticated foreign warrant in respect of Mr Ge issued in the foreign State that made the request for the surrender, ie, the US.

(b) Second, the Magistrate must be satisfied that, in the case of a person like Mr Ge who is accused of an extradition offence, there is a prima facie case that would justify his trial if the act or omission constituting that offence had taken place in, or within the jurisdiction of, Singapore.

(c) Third, the Magistrate must be satisfied, after hearing any evidence tendered by Mr Ge, that he is liable to be surrendered to the foreign State that made the request for the surrender.

63 The State’s case was based on the affidavit of AUSA Stearns, enclosing the affidavit of Agent Corbolotti, which set out in detail the evidence supporting the six alleged offences. These spanned information obtained from electronic documents, records, photographs, and other images; numerous electronic communications between Mr Ge and his co-conspirators, such as through e-mail, Facebook, Telegram and other encrypted messaging platforms; financial records, including trading records and other bank and brokerage records; statements of witnesses; and information obtained from the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. ⁵³ I will elaborate on these later in this judgment.

64 The State argued that all three conditions under s 16(8) of the Extradition Act had been met for Mr Ge to be committed to prison to await the warrant of the Minister for surrender to the US. In particular, the evidence presented by the US authorities disclosed a prima facie case against Mr Ge on all six charges. For the insider trading charges, these constituted offences in Singapore under s 219(2)(a) or (3) read with s 213(b)(iii) of the Securities and Futures Act (“SFA”), and ss 108B and 109 or s 120B of the Penal Code. For the money-laundering charges, these were offences under ss 47(1)(a) or (b) of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (“CDSA”), read with ss 108B and 109 of the Penal Code. ⁵⁴

65 Mr Ge’s case was broadly that he did not possess MNPI and merely traded based on, and provided to others, publicly available information he gathered across different platforms. ⁵⁵ Mr Ge contended that the evidence produced by the US authorities “cherry-pick[ed] winning trades” and did not reflect the large losses suffered by him on other trades, which only served to confirm that he never possessed any MNPI. ⁵⁶

66 Under s 2(1) of the Extradition Act, a “foreign warrant” is
“a judicial or other document issued under the law of…a foreign State and authorising the apprehension of a person”.

67 A “foreign State” is defined in s 2(1) as any foreign State between which and Singapore an extradition treaty is in force. The US is a foreign State as there exists an extradition treaty between Singapore and the US, derived from the extradition treaty entered into between the United Kingdom and the US on 22 December 1931, given effect to by the United States of America (Extradition) Order in Council 1935, and extended to every “British possession” including colonies (see In the matter of Chester YANG Yang, Jr. @ “Chester Yang, Jr”, “Pian He Yang” and “Tian He Yang” [2022] SGDC 228 (“Chester Yang”) at [5] and Wong Yuh Lan v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2012] 4 SLR 845 (“Wong Yuh Lan”) at [4]). The Extradition Act applies to the Order in Council by virtue of s 3(1) of the Act.

68 A foreign warrant is “duly authenticated” under s 43(2)(d) of the Extradition Act if it purports to be signed by a Judge, Magistrate or officer in or of the foreign State, and the signature of the Judge, Magistrate or officer purports to be authenticated by the oath, declaration or affirmation of a witness, or the document purports to be sealed with an official seal or public seal, or stamped with an official stamp, of the foreign State, or of a Minister, a department or an official of the Government, of that foreign State.

69 An arrest warrant was issued by the US District Court for the District of Massachusetts (“the Massachusetts District Court”) in respect of Mr Ge. It was signed by the Honourable Jennifer C. Boal, US Magistrate Judge, Boston, Massachusetts, on 7 September 2024 and sealed with the stamp of the Massachusetts District Court commanding the arrest of Mr Ge. ⁵⁷ A certified true copy of the arrest warrant was authenticated by oath by AUSA Stearns, who obtained the certified true copy of the arrest warrant from a clerk of the court. ⁵⁸ The arrest warrant was accompanied by the formal extradition request which included a certificate of authentication from the US Secretary of State and an official seal. It is thus a duly authenticated foreign warrant pursuant to s 43(2)(d) of the Extradition Act.

70  An “extradition offence” is defined in s 2(1) of the Extradition Act as:

(a) An offence against the law of the foreign State that carries a maximum punishment of imprisonment for not less than two years or any other more severe punishment, or aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of, or being an accessory to, or attempting or conspiring to commit such an offence;

(b) The act or omission constituting the offence or the equivalent act or omission would, if it took place in or within the jurisdiction of Singapore, constitute an offence against the law in force in Singapore that also carries the same maximum punishment, and is not an excluded offence.

71 The six counts of offences for which Mr Ge is wanted in the US are extradition offences. They each carry a maximum of between five and 25 years’ imprisonment in the US, and between seven and 10 years’ imprisonment when transposed to equivalent offences in Singapore. These are summarised in the table below:

72 The offences are not excluded offences listed in the First Schedule to the Extradition Act.

73 Finally, there must be a prima facie case that would justify the trial of Mr Ge, if the act or omission constituting the offence had taken place in, or within the jurisdiction of, Singapore. To establish a prima facie case, there must be some evidence not inherently incredible, which, if unrebutted, would prove each and every element of the offence: Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor [1981-1982] SLR(R) 133 at [17], cited in Chester Yang at [69]. The Court’s role is not to determine in these proceedings Mr Ge’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: Chester Yang at [70].

74 Based on the evidence of CAO Teo and the documents tendered by the State in Exhibits S1 to S6, I was satisfied that a prima facie case had been established.

75 Counts one to four of the charges, when transposed to Singapore, would constitute prima facie offences under s 219(2)(a) or (3), punishable under s 221(1) of the SFA, read with ss 108B and 109, or s 120B, of the Penal Code. The relevant provisions state:

76 The affidavit of Agent Corbolotti set out the manner in which Mr Ge was recruited by Eamma Safi (“Safi”) and Co-Conspirator 1 (“CC-1”) in Paris in or around November 2016, at a restaurant co-owned by Safi and CC-1, following which a continuing conspiracy for insider trading using material non-public information (“MNPI”) took place. The scheme involved participants in the US and multiple other countries. ⁶⁰ As one example, Mr Ge subsequently recruited Cooperating Witness 1 (“CW-1”), who admitted to participating in the scheme from around 2017 to 2020 to trade in stocks while in possession of MNPI, in his own name and in accounts that he controlled in the names of other individuals. CW-1 has pleaded guilty in the US to charges against him on 20 December 2023. ⁶¹

77 In furtherance of the conspiracy, Mr Ge and Safi connected with individuals to recruit investment bankers and other corporate insiders with access to MNPI about the financial performance and merger-and-acquisition activity of publicly traded companies, and who were willing to share such MNPI. ⁶² For example, Mr Ge exchanged the following messages with a friend, Individual 6, who worked as an actor in the New York area: ⁶³

78 Mr Ge also informed Safi of his intentions to build such networks with individuals in possession of MNPI. Safi warned Mr Ge to be cautious and discreet when recruiting such individuals in the US: ⁶⁴

79 Mr Ge and Safi themselves traded securities in publicly listed companies while in possession of the MNPI that they obtained. They also provided the MNPI to other parties who also traded in or procured others to trade in the securities of these companies. ⁶⁶

80 The communications between Mr Ge and his co-conspirators were designed to conceal the scheme from regulators, law enforcement and others, for example through the use of disposable or “burner” phones, coded language, and encrypted or ephemeral messaging applications like Signal with auto-deleting messages. ⁶⁷ They used “socks” and “shoes” as code for disposable mobile phones and SIM cards, “greens” for money, “running” or “racing” for recruiting traders to the scheme and “races” for forthcoming corporate announcements that were not yet public. ⁶⁸ A message exchange between Safi and Mr Ge is reproduced below to illustrate this: ⁶⁹

81 Mr Ge generally insisted on making calls or meeting with persons to whom he was providing MNPI. He warned his co-conspirators when the messages were, in his view, getting too explicit. To illustrate, I set out below conversations between Mr Ge, Safi and Individual 8 as well as CC-5, ⁷⁰ concerning an agreement between Banvit S.A., a Turkish poultry company, and the sovereign wealth fund of Qatar to purchase the operations of Banvit in a joint venture, which led to an increase in Banvit’s stock price:

82 Less than 30 seconds later, Mr Ge intervened by initiating a Facebook voice call to CC-5, following which CC-5 said he “understood” and proceeded the following day to send a more coded message about the Banvit acquisition:

83 Agent Corbolotti’s affidavit contained more than a dozen examples of how Mr Ge and his co-conspirators both traded using MNPI, and communicated MNPI for others to trade in the securities of publicly listed companies. These included the Advisory Board Company, Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc (“Alexion”), Atos S.E. (“Atos”), Cytokinetics Inc, Gemalto N.V. (“Gemalto”), Ingenico Group S.A. (“Ingenico”), Kindred Healthcare Inc (“Kindred”), Medidata Solutions (“Medidata”), MorphoSys A.G., Pinnacle Foods Inc (“Pinnacle”), Principia Biopharma Inc, Syntel Inc, Tiffany & Co, Wright Medical Group N.V. and Walgreen Boots Alliance Inc.

84 In the following sections, I will set out five examples of such conduct to explain why a prima facie case is established in relation to a conspiracy to commit insider trading offences under s 219(2)(a) and (3) punishable under s 221(1) of the SFA, read with s 108B and s 109, or s 120B, of the Penal Code. Many of the examples are based on the evidence of CW-1.

85 Safi purchased shares of Kindred on 18 April 2017 and shares of Pinnacle on 15 May 2017, prior to material public announcements. ⁷¹

86 Mr Ge supplied CW-1 with MNPI from Pinnacle and Kindred on or around 31 May 2017. ⁷²

87 On the same day, CW-1 purchased Pinnacle and Kindred call options. At the direction of Safi and Mr Ge, CW-1 took steps to conceal the scheme by communicating about it only in person, over disposable mobile phones or ephemeral messaging applications like Signal, using coded language. ⁷³ Mr Ge and Safi also discreetly referred to these companies by female names “Patricia” and “Kelly”, which had the same first letter as that of the companies. ⁷⁴

88 After markets closed, the Reuters news service reported that Conagra Brands had approached Pinnacle to express interest in acquiring the company. Pinnacle’s stock price increased more than nine percent. ⁷⁵ Satisfied with this outcome, CW-1 thanked Mr Ge for “hooking [him] up with [Mr Ge’s] girlfriends” (code for the companies) and that “if [Mr Ge had] any more hot girls like that for [CW-1], to “[hit him up]”. ⁷⁶

89 Mr Ge further communicated MNPI on Pinnacle and Kindred to CC-4 on 2 June 2017, the same day as a CNBC report about deal talks between Conagra Brands and Pinnacle having concluded. Mr Ge assured CC-4 that the “stuff” he gave was “still good”. When CC-4 expressly mentioned that “[his] guy can’t find the symbol on Nasdaq”, Mr Ge asked him to call to discuss, or to communicate on the Telegram or Signal messaging platforms instead. ⁷⁷

90 On 6 June 2017, Mr Ge exchanged messages with CC-6, with CC-6 asking for the “stock tip” regarding “Pinnacle Foods”. Mr Ge responded “yeah but better talk in person…not wise to talk here” [emphasis added]. ⁷⁸

91 Around 27 June 2017, Mr Ge separately advised CW-1, CC-4 and CC-6 to sell Kindred securities as a transaction involving Kindred was delayed. The conversation between Mr Ge and CC-6 using coded language is set out below: ⁷⁹

92 According to CW-1, Safi tipped him off that Atos planned to make a bid to acquire Gemalto, ahead of the public announcement by Atos of the same. A connected person was specifically identified as CC-2, who worked at Atos as vice president of mergers and acquisitions and corporate development, and had access to MNPI regarding Atos’ offer for Gemalto prior to the public announcement. CC-2 was also an investor in the restaurant co-owned by Safi and CC-1. ⁸⁰

93 On 24 November 2017, Safi began to purchase shares of Gemalto. ⁸¹

94 On 29 November 2017, CW-1 began to purchase American depository receipts in Gemalto. On 8 December 2017, the last trading day before Atos’ public announcement on its bid for Gemalto, CW-1 told Individual 1 (his close relative) that it was the latter’s “last chance” to purchase Gemalto shares based on the MNPI he had obtained from Safi. ⁸²

95 On 11 December 2017, Atos announced that it had made a formal proposal to acquire Gemalto for approximately 4.3 billion euros, a premium of about 36 percent to Gemalto’s prior stock price. ⁸³ Later that day, CW-1 deleted Safi as a Facebook friend in an attempt to conceal their relationship. ⁸⁴

96 In or about October 2018, Safi tipped CW-1 off about Atos’ imminent announcement of a negative profit warning. On or around 22 October 2018, a brokerage account CW-1 controlled in the name of Individual 2 (his girlfriend and for a period of time, his spouse) began selling short Atos contracts for difference. The next day, on 23 October 2018, Atos’ stock price dropped more than 20 percent after the company announced that it was reducing its profit outlook for the remainder of 2018. ⁸⁵

97 According to CW-1, Mr Ge and Safi tipped him off ahead of the June 2019 public announcement that the French company Dassault Systems had agreed to acquire Medidata. On or around 19 February 2019, CW-1 began purchasing Medidata securities, including call options. On or about 2 April 2019, CW-1 sent a message to Individual 1, stating that he was “loading up the truck on Medidata”. On 14 May 2019, Mr Ge and CW-1 engaged in coded messages regarding “Maria”, a coded reference to Medidata. ⁸⁶

98 On 7 May 2019, Mr Ge told another co-conspirator, CC-8, to “get ready”. CC-8 then began to purchase Medidata shares. On 31 May 2019, Mr Ge told CC-8 that “kaching” (imitating the sound of a cash register) would happen the following week, likely referring to their anticipation of profit in the wake of the upcoming public announcement of Medidata’s acquisition. ⁸⁷

99 Indeed, on or about 12 June 2019, Dassault Systems announced that it was acquiring Medidata for approximately US$5.8 billion, representing a premium of more than six percent over Medidata’s share price over the prior 50 days. CW-1 and CC-8 thereafter sold the Medidata shares that they had purchased. ⁸⁸

100 According to CW-1, Safi tipped him off ahead of the news that Worldline, which had previously spun off from Atos, planned to acquire Ingenico. CC-2 was at that time employed as Worldline’s deputy head of mergers and acquisitions and had access to MNPI regarding the deal before it was announced.

101 On or about 14 October 2019, a brokerage account controlled by CW-1 began purchasing Ingenico call options.

102 On or about 16 October 2019 and 19 December 2019, CC-8 also began purchasing Ingenico call options.

103 On or about 23 October 2019, Safi purchased Ingenico securities.

104 On or about 3 February 2020, Worldline announced that it had agreed to acquire Ingenico at a price that implied a premium of approximately 16 percent to Ingenico’s closing share price the previous day. ⁸⁹

105 On or about 21 August 2020, Safi told Mr Ge about what he described as a “blockbuster” valued at US$40 billion. This was based on MNPI about AstraZeneca’s upcoming acquisition of Alexion. On or about 28 August 2020, approximately one week after Safi’s tip off, Mr Ge traded in Alexion securities. Safi himself traded in Alexion securities even earlier, on or around 18 August 2020. ⁹⁰

106 On Safi’s instructions, Mr Ge further provided CC-3 with MNPI regarding Alexion’s securities. On 31 August 2020, Safi sent messages to Mr Ge, touting this as the “deal of the year”, trading at a “huge discount”. He further stated, “market not having the info that they are on sale” [emphasis added], resulting in an “upside” of “15-20%” on “this weeks leak” and “50-60%” on “deal closing”. On the same day, CC-3 updated Mr Ge that he had bought 65,000 Alexion shares at US$113.55 per share, which matched his actual and contemporaneous trading records in Alexion securities. ⁹¹

107 On or about 12 December 2020, AstraZeneca and Alexion announced a definitive agreement for AstraZeneca to acquire Alexion for approximately US$39 billion, or about US$175 per share, a 45 percent premium to Alexion’s closing price the previous day. ⁹²

108 The above evidence demonstrates the same modus operandi deployed by Mr Ge, Safi and their co-conspirators – obtaining MNPI from insiders (such as CC-2) who had access to such information before public announcements, trading securities using the MNPI on their own or communicating it to others for the purpose of trade. This allowed large profits to be made or losses avoided.

109 I agreed with the State’s position that at least on a prima facie level, Mr Ge engaged in a conspiracy with his co-conspirators (such as Safi) to commit the offence of insider trading. The following elements needed to be shown for this offence to be disclosed:

(a) There was an agreement between Mr Ge, Safi and other co-conspirators;

(b) The object of the agreement was for themselves to trade in securities, or to communicate information for others to so trade, based on information on the securities that were not publicly available;

(c) Mr Ge and his co-conspirators were insiders who possessed information that was not generally available, but, if the information were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a material effect on the price or value of securities, and Mr Ge knew this;

(d) He and his co-conspirators subscribed for, purchased or sold securities while in possession of such information; or

(e) He and his co-conspirators directly or indirectly communicated the information to another person, and knew or ought reasonably to know that the other person would or would be likely to subscribe for, purchase or sell securities or procure a third person to do so while in possession of such information.

110 On the evidence presented before the Court, Mr Ge had agreed with Safi and others to commit insider trading by:

(a) subscribing for or purchasing the relevant securities themselves;

(b) communicating the MNPI to others (like CW-1, CC-3, CC-4, CC-6 and CC-8) knowing that they were likely to subscribe for, purchase or sell the securities; and

(c) communicating the MNPI to others when he ought reasonably to know that some of them (like CW-1) were likely to procure a third person (such as Individual 1 or Individual 2) to subscribe for, purchase or sell the securities

while in the possession of MNPI.

111 The covert nature of the communications with co-conspirators and steps taken to conceal the scheme from regulators, law enforcement and others, demonstrated that Mr Ge also knew that the information was not generally available and which, if generally available, might have a material effect on the price or value of the security.

112 In light of the foregoing, prima facie offences under s 219(2)(a) or (3) punishable under s 221(1) of the SFA, read with s 108B and s 109, or s 120B, of the Penal Code, are disclosed.

113 Counts five and six of the charges, when transposed to Singapore, would constitute prima facie offences under s 47(1)(a) or (b), punishable under s 47(6)(a) read with ss 108B and 109 or s 120B of the Penal Code. The relevant provisions state:

114 Based on Agent Corbolotti’s affidavit, Mr Ge, Safi and others received kickbacks, or a percentage of the trading profits made by the individuals to whom he provided MNPI, in exchange for the provision of the MNPI. For example, after initially giving CW-1 MNPI in relation to Pinnacle and Kindred (see [86] above), he explained that while these first samples of MNPI were free, “promoters take 50% profit off the door sales”, code for the kickback percentage on future provisions of MNPI leading to profitable sales. ⁹³ On or about 13 August 2018, CW-1 delivered 100,000 Euros in cash to Safi, drawn from the bank account of Individual 2, which he controlled, as partial payment for the MNPI he received. ⁹⁴

115 Mr Ge also paid a share of his trading profits based on MNPI provided by Safi, through CC-10, an individual who participated in the conspiracy by collecting and laundering the illicit trading proceeds on behalf of Safi and CC-1. On 27 March 2019, CC-10 and Mr Ge discussed the latter kicking back US$40,000 in trading profits, coded as “40 kg of meat”. ⁹⁵ Mr Ge said he did not have this “meat” in his “personal fridge” (which I understood to mean in his personal bank account), and he had to “move around a bit”. On or about 2 April 2019, Mr Ge asked if the meat “should be us meat or sg meat” (which I understood to mean whether the $40,000 should be paid in US dollars or Singapore dollars). CC-10 replied that Mr Ge was to deposit “american meat…Directly on [CC-10’s] personal fridge”, and provided Mr Ge with his bank account information. On 4 April 2019, based on bank records, Mr Ge wired US$40,000 to the bank account in the name of CC-10. ⁹⁶

116 CW-1 admitted to having been instructed by Safi and Mr Ge to wire US$300,000 of his insider trading proceeds to a Hong Kong bank account held in the name of Individual 7, the father of CC-3. When CW-1 expressed concern to Mr Ge that wiring US$300,000 to Hong Kong would look suspicious, Mr Ge instructed CW-1 to tell the bank that the money was a payment to an antique watch dealer that only accepted cash. Mr Ge even went so far as to cause a box to be purportedly sent from Individual 7’s address in Hong Kong to CW-1. CW-1 thus wired US$300,000 from his Bank of America account in the US, to Individual 7’s account in Hong Kong, listing the reason for the transfer as for “personal goods”. This transfer was supported by the wire transfer records from CW-1’s bank and Individual 7’s bank, and an image of the shipping label on the box that Mr Ge caused to be sent to CW-1, purportedly from Individual 7 in Hong Kong. ⁹⁷

117 To establish the State’s case, there must be prima facie evidence that would justify trying Mr Ge for an offence under ss 47(1)(a) and (b) of the CDSA. The following elements needed to be shown for this offence to be disclosed:

(a) There was an agreement between Mr Ge, Safi and other co-conspirators, or instigation on the part of Mr Ge;

(b) The object of the agreement was for CW-1’s own benefits of criminal conduct, namely, his proceeds from insider trading under s 219 of the SFA, to be concealed, disguised or transferred;

(c) CW-1 concealed or disguised any property representing his benefits from criminal conduct, or transferred that property.

118 “Criminal conduct” is defined in s 2(1) of the CDSA to mean doing or being concerned in, whether in Singapore or elsewhere, any act constituting a serious offence or a foreign serious offence. Serious offences are set out in the Second Schedule to the CDSA. They include a conspiracy to commit those offences, or aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of those offences. A foreign serious offence means an offence against the law of a foreign country that consists of or includes conduct which, if the conduct had occurred in Singapore, would have constituted a serious offence.

119 I agreed with the State’s submission that CW-1 concealed or disguised his property, by portraying the transfer of US$300,000 as a transfer for “personal goods” in connection with payment to a fictitious antique watch dealer. In fact, the money represented his benefits from insider trading under s 219 of the SFA. Insider trading was within the list of serious offences in the Second Schedule to the CDSA. Even though the conduct occurred outside Singapore, this would still constitute the predicate “foreign serious offence” (see [71] above). The US$300,000 in question thus constituted benefits from CW-1’s “criminal conduct” as defined in s 2(1) of the CDSA.

120 CW-1 further transferred property representing his benefits from insider trading from his Bank of America account to Individual 7’s account in Hong Kong. ⁹⁸

121 Mr Ge’s conduct of instructing CW-1 to lie about the purpose of the transfer of US$300,000 in proceeds of insider trading amounted to a prima facie offence of abetment by instigation to conceal or disguise CW-1’s own benefits of criminal conduct, under ss 47(1)(a) punishable under s 47(6)(a) of the CDSA read with ss 108B and 109, or s 120B, of the Penal Code. ⁹⁹

122 Mr Ge’s and Safi’s instructions to CW-1 to transfer the said funds to Individual 7’s Hong Kong bank account from his Bank of America account constituted a prima facie offence of conspiracy to transfer CW-1’s own benefits of criminal conduct, under ss 47(1)(b) punishable under s 47(6)(a) of the CDSA, read with ss 108B and 109, or s 120B, of the Penal Code.

123 Third, I considered whether Mr Ge was liable to be surrendered to the US.

124 At the committal hearing stage, it was “not the Magistrate’s duty to consider possible lines of defence to the charge which may be raised or decide whether there are sufficient grounds for convicting the fugitive” (Chester Yang at [70]). The appropriate forum to test the fugitive’s defences and the quality and weight of the evidence is the criminal trial in the foreign requesting country, ie, the US (Chester Yang at [75] and Wong Yuh Lan at [39]). Insofar as Mr Ge was contending that he was never in possession of MNPI, and had traded based on and provided information that was publicly available, this was a matter for which he could adduce evidence in his trial in the US. At present, there was nothing in his testimony which challenged the prima facie case that was established by the State based on the evidence of the US authorities.

125 Pursuant to s 7(1) of the Extradition Act, every fugitive from the foreign State or territory is liable to be apprehended and surrendered to that State. There were no limitations, conditions, exceptions or qualifications which would render Mr Ge not liable to be surrendered under s 8 of the Extradition Act. Given that none of the statutory exceptions applied, Mr Ge was liable to be surrendered under s 7(1) of the Extradition Act.

126 For the above reasons, every legal requirement under s 16(8) of the Extradition Act had been satisfied for the committal of Mr Ge to prison to await the warrant of the Minister for his surrender to the US. I so ordered and explained the order to Mr Ge. I also informed him that he could apply to the General Division of the High Court for an order of review of the detention, or waive his right to do so. He would not be surrendered until after the expiration of 15 days from the date of the committal, unless he waived his right to apply for a review of the detention (s 19(1) of the Extradition Act). Mr Ge asked for two days to consider whether he wanted to waive his right to apply for an order of review, which I granted.

127 On 24 September 2026, Mr Ge confirmed that he would not be waiving his right to apply for a review of the detention.