1 Singapore’s social fabric rests upon the peaceful coexistence of persons of different races and faiths. In a society as plural and diverse as ours, where communities of different beliefs live, work and worship in close proximity, religious and racial harmony is not merely an aspirational ideal, but forms the very bedrock of public order and national cohesion. It is sustained only through mutual respect, restraint and forbearance on the part of all. Yet, such harmony is neither assured nor self-sustaining. It is inherently fragile, leaves little room for error and must therefore be vigilantly and jealously guarded.

2 This fragility is borne out by both history and contemporary events. Religion and race, while powerful sources of identity, meaning and community, may equally become potent fault lines capable of fracturing societies and generating deep and enduring divisions. Around the world, societies have witnessed how acts that inflame communal sensitivities, if tolerated or left unchecked, can swiftly erode trust and escalate into unrest, violence and protracted conflict. Once such fissures take root, they are exceedingly difficult to contain and even harder to repair.

3 It is against this backdrop that offences targeting religious communities or places of worship must be viewed. Acts deliberately calculated to wound the feelings of persons of a particular faith or provoke communal outrage, strike at the delicate social equilibrium upon which Singapore’s stability and progress depend. Such conduct threatens to corrode the bonds of trust between communities and undermine public peace. The law must therefore respond with unwavering and resolute firmness to make plain that conduct of this nature has no place in our society.

4 The accused has pleaded guilty to the following offences:

(a) Three charges under s 17F(4) of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act 1990 (“MRHA”) for knowingly wounding the religious feelings of persons of the Islamic faith by sending envelopes containing slices of pork and a note stating, amongst other things, “halal babi chop” (“Inflammatory Letters”), to three mosques in Singapore. These form the 1st, 3rd and 4th Charges (“MRHA Offences”). ¹

(b) One charge under s 3(1)(b) of the Protection from Harassment Act 2014 for intentionally causing harassment to a colleague at his workplace (“Ms G / the Workplace”), by sending the aforesaid Inflammatory Letters – which also disclosed Ms G’s mobile number and place of work – to seven mosques, intending that recipients of those letters would contact her. This forms the 8th Charge (“Harassment Offence”). ²

5 A further five charges have been taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing:

(a) Four relate to Inflammatory Letters sent to four additional mosques in Singapore. ³

(b) The remaining charge concerns the making of a threatening communication likely to cause harassment, by mailing an envelope containing ‘hell notes’ stapled to images of public figures to the Workplace (“Threatening Communication Charge”). ⁴

6 These ex tempore grounds set out the considerations underpinning the sentence imposed and may be supplemented should the need arise.

7 As observed above, offences involving community, race and/or religious relations do not merely injure individual victims, but carry the potential to undermine the social compact upon which Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-religious society rests. In view of the broader societal harm and risks posed by such offending, deterrence assumes primacy in sentencing: Public Prosecutor v Law Aik Meng [2007] 2 SLR 814 (“Law Aik Meng”) at [24(e)].

8 The structure of s 17F of the MRHA reflects two broad categories of prohibited conduct. Sections 17F(1) and (3) concern conduct that incites enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility against, or contempt for or ridicule of, a religious group. By contrast, ss 17F(2) and (4) concern conduct that insults a religion or wounds the religious feelings of another person. The provisions are further differentiated according to whether the offender is a religious leader and whether the conduct threatens public peace or public order in Singapore.

9 In relation to offences committed by religious leaders under ss 17F(1) and (2), there is no requirement to prove that the conduct threatened public peace or public order. The legislative premise is that religious leaders, by virtue of their position, have a greater ability to influence and mobilise their followers as compared to lay persons, even when speaking in their private capacities. Given the influence wielded by such persons over those under their care and guidance, they are held to a higher standard of responsibility. Parliament therefore imposed a lower threshold for criminal liability in respect of such persons: Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (7 October 2019), vol 94, Ms Sun Xueling, Senior Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Home Affairs.

10 For non-religious leaders however, Parliament imposed the further requirement that the impugned conduct “would threaten the public peace or public order in Singapore”. This additional element in ss 17F(3) and (4) reflects Parliament’s intention that criminal liability for lay persons would arise where the conduct carries broader societal implications extending beyond the immediate insult, ridicule or hostility generated.

11 The statutory structure does not suggest that any one category of offence under s 17F is invariably more serious than another. Ultimately, the assessment is a fact-sensitive one. In the absence of judicial guidance on sentencing for such offences, it is appropriate to approach sentencing with reference to: (a) the maximum prescribed punishment, (b) the harm occasioned or risked by the offending conduct and the offender’s culpability, and (c) any other aggravating or mitigating factors. This accords with the High Court’s recognition that the two principal parameters a sentencing court would generally consider in assessing the seriousness of an offence are the harm caused and the offender’s culpability: Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat [2017] 4 SLR 1099 at [41], endorsed in Newton, David Christopher v Public Prosecutor [2023] SGHC 266 at [62].

12 In my view, the same broad approach applies to the sentencing of offences under s 3(1) of the POHA, which may manifest in a myriad of ways across a broad spectrum of factual circumstances.

13 Against this backdrop, I turn to consider the appropriate sentences to be imposed in the present case.

14 The harm occasioned is serious. The accused deliberately targeted multiple mosques by sending letters containing pork, a substance expressly prohibited ⁵ in the Quran and regarded as impure and unclean in Islam. He further labelled the contents as “halal babi chop”. This was a calculated, deeply offensive and inherently inflammatory act designed to exploit deeply rooted religious sensitivities and wound the religious feelings of the Muslim community. The individuals handling and opening the letters would undoubtedly have experienced shock, disgust, distress and outrage upon discovering their contents. ⁶

15 The harm arising from the accused’s conduct extends well beyond the immediate recipients of the letters. It is materially aggravated by the fact that the offending conduct was deliberately directed at places of worship. Mosques occupy a central place within the religious life of the Muslim community. They serve not merely as physical venues for worship, but as spiritual sanctuaries integral to the observance, practice and expression of the faith. Conduct directed at such institutions therefore carries a uniquely provocative and pernicious quality. This was not a remote or abstract insult, but a desecratory affront brought into the very heart of the community’s sacred spaces, violating the sense of sanctity, dignity and security that worshippers are entitled to expect within such spaces.

16 I find no merit in the Defence’s submission that attacking the Muslim community or Islam was not the accused’s “primary objective”, and that the offending conduct was merely a means of exacting revenge against Ms G. ⁷ In pursuing that vendetta, the accused was prepared to wound the religious feelings of an entire religious community, employing means that derived their force and effect from religious insult and provocation – this was not incidental or collateral to the offending; it was central to his plan.

17 Conduct of this nature carries an obvious and very real potential to inflame religious tensions, foment broader inter-communal distrust and resentment, and threaten the public peace in Singapore. While the absence of actual disorder or unrest in the present case is relevant to sentence, I regard this as a matter of pure fortuity rather than an indication that the offending conduct lacked the inherent capacity to precipitate such harm. The accused can claim no credit for the absence of such consequences.

18 Apart from the broader communal harm caused by the MRHA Offences, the accused’s conduct also occasioned a distinct form of harm to Ms G, whose personal particulars were deliberately enclosed within the letters sent to the mosques. While such harm would ordinarily be relevant to the overall gravity of the offending, the accused faces a separate Harassment Offence arising from the same course of conduct. I therefore address this aspect of the harm in that context, so as to avoid double counting. I return to this below, at [22] to [23].

19 Turning to culpability, the offending reflects a planned and premeditated course of conduct rather than an impulsive or spontaneous act. A deterrent sentence must therefore be de rigeur, as planned wrongdoing is inherently more insidious and poses a greater threat to society: Public Prosecutor v Fernando Payagala Waduge Malitha Kumar [2007] SGHC 23 at [39] to [40]. Specific deterrence is also relevant: Law Aik Meng at [22].

20 The accused devised and executed a plan involving the preparation, assembly and dissemination of the Inflammatory Letters to the mosques. To carry out the plan, he purchased pork, paper and envelopes. He then used his laptop to prepare slips bearing the words “halal babi chop” together with Ms G’s mobile number and place of work, printed the slips, cut them into smaller pieces and inserted one into each envelope together with a slice of pork. Ms G’s phone number had been obtained from the school directory. After assembling the letters, the accused sent them by post. ⁸ The sequence of steps undertaken demonstrates deliberation, forethought and a sustained commitment to carrying the offending through to completion.

21 Drawing these threads together, and having regard to the prescribed punishment of up to five years’ imprisonment, as well as the grave actual and potential harm occasioned by offending conduct targeting places of worship, a custodial starting point of nine months’ imprisonment is warranted.

22  I turn next to the Harassment Offence. The gravamen of the offending lies in the accused’s weaponisation of the Inflammatory Letters to expose Ms G to public outrage and opprobrium by falsely associating her with conduct that would be deeply offensive to members of the Muslim community. By enclosing Ms G’s mobile number and workplace details within the letters sent to multiple mosques, the accused intended that recipients would “form the view [that Ms G] was responsible”, ⁹ direct their outrage toward her and contact her as a consequence. ¹⁰

23 This was not merely a private act of harassment directed at Ms G, but conduct calculated to enlist third parties in the harassment by inviting condemnation from recipients of the Inflammatory Letters. By falsely associating Ms G with the Inflammatory Letters, the accused exposed her to harassment, emotional distress and potential reputational harm. Indeed, Ms G was contacted by staff from one of the mosques after the letters were received. ¹¹ The harm occasioned by the Harassment Offence is therefore not insignificant.

24 Turning to culpability, I consider the accused’s motivation for the offence to be a relevant consideration. In this regard, the courts have recognised that offending driven by malice or spite warrants greater censure: Nicholas Tan Siew Chye v Public Prosecutor [2023] SGHC 35 at [80], citing Prasanth s/o Mogan [2022] SGDC 209 and Lim Ying Ying Luciana v Public Prosecutor [2016] 4 SLR 1220 at [45], citing Lim Siong Khee v Public Prosecutor [2001] 1 SLR(R) 631 at [21].

25 In the present case, the Harassment Offence was motivated by spite and malice towards Ms G, whom the accused blamed for the termination of his employment. ¹² The offence was also not impulsive, but carried out pursuant to a deliberate and premeditated course of conduct. This materially heightens culpability.

26 In my view, the custodial threshold is plainly crossed. A fine would neither adequately reflect the gravity of the offending, which involved the wilful exposure of Ms G to harassment, public ire and emotional distress through the exploitation of religious sensitivities, nor sufficiently advance the interests of deterrence. Having regard to the prescribed punishment of up to 6 months’ imprisonment, I find that a starting point of 10 weeks’ imprisonment is warranted.

27 I now turn to consider whether other factors warrant an adjustment to the starting points identified above.

28 It is well established that while a sentencing court is not bound to increase a sentence merely because there are charges taken into consideration, an uplift will ordinarily be warranted where such charges are of a similar nature: Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor [2017] SGCA 37 at [64(a)]. In the present case, there is aggravation arising from the Threatening Communication Charge taken into consideration, which involved the mailing of an envelope containing “hell notes” stapled to images of public figures to the Workplace in June 2025 (supra at [5]). Given the similarity in the nature of the offending, this warrants a modest uplift of one week to the starting point for the Harassment Offence, resulting in an adjusted sentence of 11 weeks’ imprisonment.

29 Apart from the accused’s plea of guilt, which I address at [30] below, I find no other mitigating factors warranting moderation of the sentences. In particular, I do not regard him as a true first offender, nor do I accept that the offences were isolated aberrations. Significantly, the Threatening Communication Charge – committed months before the accused learnt that his employment contract would not be renewed ¹³ – demonstrates that he had already engaged in provocative conduct prior to any employment-related grievance arising. This squarely undermines the Defence’s submission that the subsequent MRHA and Harassment Offences were wholly out of character. ¹⁴ In essence, while the accused has no antecedents in the sense of prior convictions, this is merely because the law had yet to catch up with him for his earlier misdeed: Chen Weixiong Jerriek v Public Prosecutor [2003] SGHC 103 at [15].

30 The final issue concerns the weight to be accorded to the plea of guilt. The accused indicated his intention to plead guilty at Stage 1 of the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s Guidelines on Reduction in Sentences for Guilty Pleas (“PG Guidelines”). In the circumstances, I consider the maximum reduction of 30% to be appropriate. This yields the following adjusted sentences:

(a) MRHA Offences: 6 months’ imprisonment on each charge; and

(b) Harassment Offence: 8 weeks’ imprisonment.

31 In my judgment, ordering the sentences for the three MRHA Offences to run consecutively is necessary to reflect the overall criminality, breadth and multiplicity of the accused’s offending, which extended to no fewer than seven mosques and eight victims.

32 As a general rule, a multiple offender who has committed unrelated offences should be separately punished for each offence, and this is achieved by ordering the individual sentences to run consecutively: Public Prosecutor v Raveen Balakrishnan [2018] SGHC 148 at [41]. Further, in ADF v Public Prosecutor [2010] 1 SLR 874, the Court of Appeal (at [146]) observed that there is no rule requiring distinct offences committed on the same day or in the course of the same criminal episode to run concurrently. The court further cautioned that the totality principle should not be unthinkingly invoked to minimise punishment for offenders who deliberately pursue a course of criminal conduct. Where the overall criminality of the offender’s conduct cannot adequately be encompassed in two consecutive sentences, the court may consider ordering further sentences to run consecutively, particularly where there is a pressing public interest concern in discouraging the type of criminal conduct being punished and where there are multiple victims.

33 Both considerations arise in the present case. Furthermore, on the facts, the MRHA Offences proceeded with concern separate acts directed at three different mosques and involve distinct victims. The sentences would therefore presumptively be ordered to run consecutively.

34 Taking a broad-brushed ‘last look’ at the facts and circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that an aggregate sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment is just and proportionate. To achieve this, I reduce the sentence imposed for each of the MRHA Offences to 5 months’ imprisonment and order these adjusted sentences to run consecutively. The sentence of 8 weeks’ imprisonment imposed for the Harassment Offence will run concurrently. I would emphasise that had the MRHA Offences in fact resulted in tangible disruption to public peace and order, a significantly heavier sentence would be warranted.

35 The aggregate sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment is backdated to the date of the accused’s arrest, 25 September 2025. ¹⁵

36 The present case is not analogous to the precedents cited by the parties. It involves an inflammatory affront directed at multiple places of worship, and is therefore of a fundamentally different character from the offending considered in Public Prosecutor v Elvin John Baptist (DAC 906827-2025 & 11 Others) and Public Prosecutor v Vikneswaran s/o V Moganaval (MAC-909523-2025 & 1 Other). It must be borne in mind that no two cases are ever alike, and the value of any sentencing precedent necessarily depends on the degree of factual similarity between the cases: Toh Suat Leng Jennifer v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGHC 146 at [34]. Ultimately, individualised justice requires that the sentence reflect the unique offence and offender-specific factors that are engaged: Dinesh Singh Bhathia s/o Amarjeet Singh v Public Prosecutor [2005] SGHC 63 at [24]. This is what I have sought to do here.

37 The religious and racial harmony that Singapore enjoys is hard-won and precious, but not invulnerable. The deliberate provocation of religious sensitivities cannot be treated as trivial or dismissed as mere mischief. Even isolated acts, if left unchecked, carry the potential to rapidly metastasise into distrust, deepen communal fault lines and erode the mutual respect and restraint upon which our social fabric depends. The courts must therefore respond firmly and unequivocally to conduct of this nature, to make unmistakably clear that acts capable of inflaming religious tensions, sowing discord and threatening public peace will be met with swift and stern sanction.