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IN THE STATE COURTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
[2026] SGMC 84
Magistrate Arrest Case No. 908840 of 2024
Public Prosecutor
Against
Liu Emin
JUDGMENT
Criminal Law — Offences — Section 22(1)(d) of the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act 1990 (2020 Rev Ed) — Applicability of the presumptions under section 15(1) of the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act 1990 (2020 Rev Ed)
Criminal Law — Offences — Section 22(1)(d) of the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act 1990 (2020 Rev Ed) — Whether knowledge is established when the accused person did not read the statement

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
FACTS 2
MR HUANG SEEKS EMPLOYMENT WITH PING AN 2
MOM’S DETECTION OF THE FALSE STATEMENT OFFENCE 6
THE ISSUES 7
THE FIRST AND SECOND ELEMENTS ARE ESTABLISHED – PING AN MADE A STATEMENT TO THE CONTROLLER IN
CONNECTION WITH THE EP APPLICATION 9
THE THIRD ELEMENT IS ESTABLISHED – PING AN IS PRESUMED TO HAVE KNOWN THAT THE 8K STATEMENT
IS FALSE IN MATERIAL PARTICULAR 10
THE APPROACH TOWARDS THE THIRD ELEMENT 10
The legislative history of s 22(1)(d) of the EFMA 10
The Section 15 Presumptions 12
THRESHOLD A: PING AN IS PRESUMED TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE
8K STATEMENT 16
The Management Team 17
The FD Staff 23
Conclusion on Threshold A 24
THRESHOLD B: THE 8K STATEMENT IS FALSE IN MATERIAL
PARTICULAR 25
PING AN IS PRESUMED TO HAVE KNOWN THAT THE 8K STATEMENT IS
FALSE IN MATERIAL PARTICULAR 26

i

THE FOURTH ELEMENT IS NOT ESTABLISHED – MS LIU DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE 8K STATEMENT AND COULD
NOT HAVE CONSENTED TO IT 26
SECTION 20(1)(A) OF THE EFMA 26
THE 10 JAN 2023 SUBMISSION 27
THE 26 JAN 2023 SIGNING 28
CONCLUSION ON THE FOURTH ELEMENT 30
CONCLUSION 32

ii

This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports.
Public Prosecutor
v
Liu Emin
[2026] SGMC 84
Magistrate Arrest Case No. 908840 of 2024
District Judge Samuel Wee
9-11 March 2026, 8 June 2026
1 July 2026 Judgment reserved.
District Judge Samuel Wee:
Introduction
1 Ping An Dentist Pte Ltd (“Ping An”) submitted an Employment Pass
(“EP”) application for Mr Huang Hsin Yuan (“Mr Huang”), which incorrectly stated his monthly salary as $8,000 (“EP Application”).1 Ping An’s director, Ms Liu Emin (“Ms Liu”), had permitted her staff to use her CorpPass account to complete and submit the EP Application to the Ministry of Manpower (“MOM”),2 and subsequently signed a related Declaration Form without realising it reflected Mr Huang’s salary as $8,000.3
1 Prosecution’s Closing Submissions (“PPClosingSubs”)_[1]; P9.
2 PPClosingSubs_[12(b)] and [29].
3 P4.

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
2 Ms Liu was charged under s 22(1)(d) read with s 20(1)(a), punishable
under s 22(1)(i) of the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act 1990 (2020 Rev Ed) (“EFMA”) for consenting to Ping An making a statement to the Controller of Work Passes (“Controller”) in connection with the EP Application which Ping An knew was false in a material particular (“False Statement Offence”).4 The charge states:5
You ... are charged that, on or about 10 January 2023, in Singapore, [Ping An], a body corporate of which you were a Director, in connection with an application for an Employment Pass for [Mr Huang], did make a statement which [Ping An] knew was false in a material particular to the Controller of Work Passes (the “Controller”) of the Ministry of Manpower (“MOM”) in a Declaration Form (the “Form”) which was submitted to the Work Pass Division, MOM, which offence was committed with your consent, to wit, in your capacity as Director of [Ping An], you declared for and on behalf of [Ping An] in the Form that the fixed monthly salary of the said [Mr Huang] was to be $8,000, when you knew this was false and you have thereby committed an offence under section 22(1)(d) read with section 20(1)(a) of the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act 1990 (“EFMA”), which offence is punishable under section 22(1)(i) of the EFMA.
Facts
Mr Huang seeks employment with Ping An
3 Ping An employed Mr Huang in August 2022 under a Work Permit,6
with a starting basic monthly salary of $5,000 plus potential monthly variable incentives of up to $800.7 During his recruitment interviews, Mr Huang told Ping An’s management team (“Management Team”, comprising Ms Liu and Mr
4 PPClosingSubs_[3]; C1A.
5 C1A.
6 P2.
7 PPClosingSubs_[1], [20(a)] and [21(a)]; P1_[2.1]-[2.2].

2

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
Wong Leong Wei (“Mr Wong”))8 that he wanted assistance in applying for an S Pass or EP, which he believed would improve his chances of becoming a Permanent Resident in Singapore.9
4 Mr Huang completed his probation in November 2022 and his basic
monthly salary was increased to $5,500 (“5.5k Salary”).10 Ping An decided to help Mr Huang apply for an EP (rather than an S Pass) because the Management Team believed that Mr Huang’s 5.5k Salary met the requirements for both11 – the Prosecution’s witness, Mr Wong, confirmed that Ping An saw no difference between an S Pass and an EP application for Mr Huang as the 5.5k Salary “[f]its both categories”.12
5 On 10 January 2023, Ms Liu logged into her CorpPass account and
permitted her front desk staff (“FD Staff”) to complete and submit the EP Application.13
(a) She wrote the details for the EP Application (including Mr
Huang’s 5.5k Salary) on a piece of paper (“Information Paper”) and provided it to the FD Staff to complete and submit.14 Ms Liu was unable
8 1TRANS_PDF17:26-PDF18:25; 2TRANS_PDF41:15-28, PDF44:4-PDF45:20;
3TRANS_PDF42:1-14.
9 PPClosingSubs_[12(c)], [13]; 1TRANS_PDF19:29-PDF20:15, PDF39:11-PDF42:16, PDF61:1-25, PDF64:28-PDF65:4; 2TRANS_PDF59:3-13, PDF61:22-PDF62:26, PDF69:31-PDF70:5; 3TRANS_PDF42:14-16.
10 PPClosingSubs_[1], [20(b)] and [21(b)]; P3; 1TRANS_PDF35:30-PDF37:22; 2TRANS_PDF58:17-27; 3TRANS_PDF42:25-27.
11 3TRANS_PDF42:25-27.
12 2TRANS_PDF63:21-PDF64:5, PDF75:11-28, PDF77:17-PDF78:25.
13 PPClosingSubs_[29]-[30]; 2TRANS_PDF54:29-PDF55:24, PDF56:12-22, PDF57:26-PDF58:10, PDF63:18-26; 3TRANS_PDF43:10-17, PDF59:6-16, PDF74:24-26.
14 3TRANS_PDF60:6-18.

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Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
to recall the identity of the FD Staff due to Ping An’s numerous employees.15
(b) At the time, the Management Team did not know that the EP Application16 submitted by the FD Staff listed Mr Huang’s fixed monthly salary as $8,000 (“8k Statement”),17 comprising a basic monthly salary of $5,500 and fixed monthly allowances of $2,500.18 In this regard, there is no evidence that Ms Liu read the EP Application to verify the details before its submission to MOM.
6 On 26 January 2023, MOM issued its in-principle written approval of the EP Application,19 following which both Ping An and Mr Huang had to sign the Declaration Form.20
(a) The Declaration Form comprised five pages.21
(i) The first page reflected Mr Huang’s details, the 8k Statement, and other declarations relating to Mr Huang.
(ii) The second page contained further declarations relating to Mr Huang. In particular, it stated:
I declare that the information in this Application for an Employment Pass, Declaration Form and any appeals are, to the best of my knowledge,
15 3TRANS_PDF43:4-13, PDF44:15-18.
16 P9.
17 PPClosingSubs_[15]; P9-1 (at the bottom of the page).
18 P9-2 (at the top of the page).
19 P5; A1.
20 A1-3: “Have these documents ready ... The original and completed Declaration Form duly signed by the pass holder, local Employer ...”.
21 P4; A1-5to9.

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Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
true and correct; and that all documents submitted in support for this Application, Declaration Form and any appeals, are true copies of the original.
(iii) The third page was for Mr Huang to sign.
(iv) The fourth page reflected declarations relating to Ping An.
(v) The fifth page contained further declarations relating to Ping An and was for Ping An to sign. In particular, it stated:
I declare that the information in this Application for a Employment Pass, Declaration Form and any appeals are, to the best of my knowledge, true and correct; and that all documents submitted in support for this Application, Declaration Form and any appeals, are true copies of the originals.
(b) Ms Liu signed the Declaration Form for Ping An on 26 January 202322 without reading it and was not aware of the 8k Statement on the first page.23 Contrary to the Prosecution’s assertion, there is no evidence showing that she had read or been aware of the contents of the EP Application (particularly the 8k Statement) when she signed the Declaration Form (see [58]-[59] below).
(c) Mr Huang signed the Declaration Form on 28 January 2023. Like Ms Liu, he did not read the Declaration Form and was not aware of the 8k Statement.24 Mr Huang also testified that Ping An never discussed a
22 3TRANS_PDF53:2-10.
23 3TRANS_PDF43:16-17, PDF43:26-28, PDF46:13-29, PDF54:1-6, PDF56:25-PDF57:13, PDF57:31-PDF58:4, PDF63:22-32, PDF75:6-16.
24 Defendant’s Closing Submissions (“DFClosingSubs”)_[12]; 1TRANS_PDF43:30-PDF45:17, PDF48:15-30, PDF64:1-18, PDF65:20-PDF66:2; 2TRANS_PDF33:22-29.

5

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
potential monthly salary of $8,000 with him,25 and there is no evidence to substantiate the Prosecution’s assertion that Ms Liu had deliberately hidden the 8k Statement from Mr Huang to get him to sign the Declaration Form.26
7 The signed Declaration Form was submitted and Mr Huang received his EP.
8 Based on Mr Huang’s income statements, his salary did not exceed $5,500 from November 2022 to July 2023.27
MOM’s detection of the False Statement Offence
9 Mr Huang ceased employment with Ping An in July 2023.28
10 He filed a complaint with MOM concerning unpaid amounts relating to his 5.5k Salary,29 which resulted in MOM discovering that the 8k Statement was false.30 The details of this complaint are unrelated to the 8k Statement and the present proceedings.31
11 After investigations by MOM, Ms Liu was charged for the False Statement Offence on 19 November 2024. She provided her statement under s
25 PPClosingSubs_[20(c)]; 1TRANS_PDF45:13-17, PDF48:15-20, PDF64:12-18.
26 DFClosingSubs_[8]; 3TRANS_PDF61:13-PDF63:14, PDF64:9-32.
27 P6.
28 1TRANS_PDF49:17-22, PDF58:8-20.
29 1TRANS_PDF23:20-PDF24:11, PDF58:8-24.
30 2TRANS_PDF6:4-22, PDF13:5-32.
31 2TRANS_PDF70:31-PDF71:3.

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Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
23 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Section 23 Statement”) in Mandarin, which was translated as follows:32
The application was not made by me.
I employed a lot of workers.
I cannot recall the application was made by who.
It has been a long time since the application was made via my Singpass.
That was a mistake by the admin.
I know that since I am the boss of the company, I will be responsible. I plead with the authority to give me a chance.
The issues
12 For Ms Liu to be convicted of the False Statement Offence, the
Prosecution must establish four elements:33
(a) Ping An must have made a statement to the Controller (“First Element”).
(b) The statement must have been made in connection with an application for a work pass (“Second Element”).
(c) Ping An must have known that the statement was false in a material particular (“Third Element”).
(d) Ms Liu must have known about and consented to Ping An’s making of the false statement (“Fourth Element”).
32 P10-4to5; 2TRANS_PDF20:31-PDF24:23.
33 PPClosingSubs_[5].
7

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
13 The First to Third Elements deal with whether Ping An (as a primary offender) has committed an offence under s 22(1)(d) of the EFMA, while the Fourth Element addresses whether Ms Liu (as a secondary offender) should be personally liable for Ping An’s offence.34
14 The Prosecution contends that all four elements are met.
(a) It asserts that the First and Second Elements are apparent from the incontrovertible facts.35
(b) It contends that the Third Element is established, by relying on s 15(1) of the EFMA to argue that Ms Liu is presumed to have knowledge of the 8k Statement and that she bears the burden of proving its truth (“Section 15 Presumptions”).36
(c) It argues that the Fourth Element is established based on the following:
(i) Ms Liu must have instructed the FD Staff to include the 8k Statement and therefore knew of its inclusion in the EP Application;37
(ii) Ms Liu’s signing of the Declaration Form proves her knowledge of the 8k Statement and her consent to it;38 and
34 Prosecution’s Responsive Submissions (“PPResponsiveSubs”)_[20].
35 PPClosingSubs_[11].
36 PPClosingSubs_[38]-[40].
37 PPClosingSubs_[1], [24], [28]-[33], [38]-[40], [52].
38 PPClosingSubs_[1], [24], [41]-[47], [52].

8

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
(iii) Ms Liu’s motive for making a false statement to the
Controller was to reward Mr Huang, while Ping An would “likely” also benefit from not having to pay a foreign worker levy for Mr Huang.39
15 Based on Ms Liu’s Closing Submissions, her defence centres on the
following assertions:40
(a) She merely instructed the FD Staff to input Mr Huang’s 5.5k Salary into the EP Application, and had no knowledge that the 8k Statement was included.
(b) The FD Staff must have keyed the 8k Statement in error.
16 I find that the Prosecution has failed to establish the Fourth Element
beyond a reasonable doubt and acquit Ms Liu of the False Statement Offence.
The First and Second Elements are established – Ping An made a statement to the Controller in connection with the EP Application
17 The First and Second Elements are established.
18 It is clear from the EP Application that the 8k Statement was made to
the Controller in connection with an application for an EP,41 and Ms Liu confirmed during cross-examination that it was Ping An that submitted the EP Application for Mr Huang.42
39 PPClosingSubs_[1], [24] and [53]-[54].
40 DFClosingSubs_[7], [10] -[13] and [18(ii)].
41 PPClosingSubs_[17].
42 3TRANS_PDF74:7-10.
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Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
The Third Element is established – Ping An is presumed to have known that the 8k Statement is false in material particular
The approach towards the Third Element
19 The Third Element requires Ping An to have knowledge that the 8k
Statement is false in material particular.
20 Having reviewed the legislative history of s 22(1)(d) of the EFMA, there
are, in my view, two factual thresholds that must be established before I can answer the main question of whether Ping An had knowledge that the 8k Statement is false in material particular:
(a) First, that Ping An had knowledge of the 8k Statement in the EP Application (“Threshold A”).
(b) Second, that the 8k Statement is false in material particular (“Threshold B”).
The legislative history of s 22(1)(d) of the EFMA
21 The legislative history of s 22(1)(d) of the EFMA reveals that the
requirement that the applicant has knowledge of the false statement (“Knowledge Requirement”) was deliberately introduced.
22 Initially, s 22(1)(d) of the Employment of Foreign Workers Act (Cap
91A, 1997 Rev Ed) (which was the predecessor of the EFMA) did not contain the Knowledge Requirement and provided:
Any person who ... makes any statement or furnishes any information to the Controller or an employment inspector under this Act which is false in any material particular or is misleading by reason of the omission of any material particular ... shall be guilty of an offence ...

10

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
23 Subsequently, the Knowledge Requirement was introduced on 1 July
2007 through the Employment of Foreign Workers (Amendment) Act 2007 (Act No 30 of 2007), whereupon the Act was renamed the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Cap 91A, 1997 Rev Ed) and s 22(1)(d) provided:
Any person who ... makes any statement or furnishes any information to the Controller or an employment inspector under this Act which he knows or ought reasonably to know is false in any material particular or is misleading by reason of the omission of any material particular ... shall be guilty of an offence ...
24 Finally, the current iteration of s 22(1)(d) of the EFMA, which retained
the Knowledge Requirement, was introduced in November 2012 through the Employment of Foreign Manpower (Amendment) Act 2012 (Act No 24 of 2012) and states:
Any person who ... in connection with any application for or to renew a work pass or for any other purpose under this Act, makes any statement or provides any information to the Controller or an authorised officer or employment inspector which the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, is false in any material particular or is misleading by reason of the omission of any material particular ... shall be guilty of an offence ...
25 The Knowledge Requirement means that liability requires more than
just making a false statement to the Controller in connection with an application for a work pass. The Prosecution must prove that the person knew that the statement was in the application and that it was false.43
26 This view is supported by the Parliamentary Debates during the Second
Reading of the Employment of Foreign Manpower Bill (Bill No 22 of 2012) on 11 September 2012, where the then Acting Minister for Manpower Mr Tan
43 PPResponsiveSubs_[26].
11

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
Chuan-Jin emphasised the link between a person’s innocence and his lack of knowledge of the relevant statement (albeit in the context of the Section 15 Presumptions) (see Singapore Parl Debates; Vol 89, Sitting No 7; Page 730; [11 September 2012]) :44
Second, we will prosecute foreign workers that submit forged educational qualifications to circumvent MOM's criteria for educational qualifications, especially for S Pass and EP holders. Offenders will be subject to a maximum fine of $20,000, or to a maximum imprisonment term of two years, or to both. Foreign workers have also been known to submit forged educational qualifications and subsequently feign ignorance of the submission, which hampers our enforcement efforts in proving that they had knowledge of the falsehood. Hence, we will now presume that a work pass applicant has knowledge of the information provided in his application, including that of the qualifications which have been submitted. The burden of proof will now be placed on the errant workers. My Ministry will ensure that enforcement action is targeted at culpable workers. An innocent worker can rebut the presumption by proving that he did not have knowledge of the submission of false qualifications when the declaration was made. For instance, he can prove that the employment agency or employer had submitted the forged certificate on his behalf without his knowledge. My Ministry will take action against other culpable parties, such as errant employers and employment agents, if they have abetted such acts.
[Emphasis added.]
The Section 15 Presumptions
27 The Section 15 Presumptions are set out in s 15 of the EFMA, which
states:
Burden of proof, etc.
15.—(1) For the purposes of section 7, and any proceedings in respect of any prescribed infringement or any offence under this Act —
(a) a person who makes an application for a work pass is presumed, until the contrary is proved, to have
44 PPResponsiveSubs_[11].
12

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
knowledge of the information provided in the application; and
(b) subject to subsection (2), the burden of proving the truth of the contents of an application for a work pass is on the person who makes the application.
(2) Where any application for a work pass is made by more than one person, then for the purposes specified in subsection (1), each applicant bears the burden of proving the truth of the contents of the application that relate to the applicant.
28 The Section 15 Presumptions apply to “a person who makes an
application for a work pass” (“Section 15 Applicant”) and have two aspects.45
(a) Under s 15(1)(a), the Section 15 Applicant is presumed to have knowledge of the information in the application unless the contrary is proven (“Knowledge Presumption”), which relates to Threshold A.
(b) Under s 15(1)(b), the Section 15 Applicant bears the burden of proving the truth of the statement (“Falsity Presumption”), which relates to Threshold B.
The Prosecution asserts that the two aspects of the Section 15 Presumptions are disjunctive, and that the Falsity Presumption applies even if the Prosecution does not rely on the Knowledge Presumption.46
29 Both Mr Huang and Ping An fall within the definition of a Section 15
Applicant in the present case.
45 PPResponsiveSubs_[14].
46 PPResponsiveSubs_[14].
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Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
(a) Under regs 4(a), 5(a) and 6(a) of the Employment of Foreign
Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations 2012, an application for a work pass would typically be made by two co-applicants:47
(i) the foreign employee (“Co-Applicant 1”); and
(ii) the employer, or on behalf of the employer by a person authorised by the employer (“Co-Applicant 2”).
(b) Co-Applicant 1 is Mr Huang (the foreign employee),48 while Co-
Applicant 2 is Ping An (the employer). This is apparent from the fact that MOM addressed the in-principle written approval of the EP Application to both Mr Huang and Ping An.49
(c) In this regard, I disagree with the Prosecution’s argument that
Co-Applicant 2 should be Ms Liu rather than Ping An.50
(i) The Prosecution characterised Ms Liu as “being the employer of [Mr Huang]”51 because the EP Application was submitted using her CorpPass account,52 she had given instructions for the submission of Mr Huang’s EP Application, and she was the one who signed the Declaration Form on Ping An’s behalf.53
47 PPResponsiveSubs_[15].
48 A1-1and11.
49 A1-1and11.
50 PPResponsiveSubs_[16].
51 PPResponsiveSubs_[16].
52 P9-1.
53 PPResponsiveSubs_[16].
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Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
(ii) This cannot be correct, as it conflates the identity of Ping
An with its director, Ms Liu, which is inconsistent with the doctrine of separate legal personalities.
(iii) The Prosecution’s position is also contradicted by the
documentary evidence that shows that Ping An was Mr Huang’s employer:
(A) The initial Work Permit application reflects Ping An under the “Name of Employer”.54
(B) The EP Application reflects Ping An under the “Company name”.55
(C) The in-principle written approval of the EP Application reflects Ping An under the “Name of Employer/Sponsor”.56
(D) The employment documents that the Prosecution relied on were all issued by Ping An (as the employer).57
(iv) The Prosecution’s position is also fundamentally inconsistent with the charge for the False Statement Offence (see [2] above), which positions Ping An as the primary offender of an offence under s 22(1)(d) of the EFMA and Ms Liu as the secondary offender under s 20(1)(a) of the EFMA in her capacity as a director of Ping An.58
54 P2.
55 P9.
56 A1-5.
57 P1, P3 and P6.
58 PPResponsiveSubs_[20].
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Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
(d) In any event, the outcome of this case would remain the same
even if Ms Liu is treated as Co-Applicant 2 for the reasons set out at [56]-[57] below.
Threshold A: Ping An is presumed to have knowledge of the 8k Statement
30 The Prosecution relies on the Knowledge Presumption to argue that Ping
An is presumed to have knowledge of the 8k Statement in the EP Application when it was submitted on 10 January 2023 (“10 Jan 2023 Submission”).59
31 As set out at [29] above, Ping An is a Section 15 Applicant to whom the
Knowledge Presumption applies. Ping An is therefore presumed to have knowledge of the 8k Statement in the 10 Jan 2023 Submission.
32 To rebut the Knowledge Presumption, it must be established that two
categories of people were not aware of the 8k Statement in the 10 Jan 2023 Submission:
(a) The Management Team, comprising Ms Liu and Mr Wong.
(b) The FD Staff who submitted the EP Application using Ms Liu’s CorpPass account.
33 While there is evidence that the Management Team had no knowledge
of the 8k Statement in the 10 Jan 2023 Submission, there is no evidence that the FD Staff had no knowledge.
59 PPClosingSubs_[38]-[39].
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Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
The Management Team
34 There is sufficient evidence that both Ms Liu and Mr Wong were not
aware of the 8k Statement in the 10 Jan 2023 Submission.
(a) Ms Liu testified that she left the FD Staff to fill in and submit the EP Application, and did not know that the 8k Statement was included (see [5] above). Her testimony is consistent with and corroborated by her Section 23 Statement (see [11] above).60
(b) Mr Wong likewise testified that he was not aware of the 8k Statement and that it must have been an error.61
(c) There is no evidence of anyone from Ping An ever discussing a salary of $8,000 for Mr Huang,62 which supports Ms Liu’s position. Indeed, Mr Wong confirmed during trial that this salary was never discussed by Ping An’s Management Team (who had intended the 5.5k Salary),63 and Mr Huang maintained that it was never conveyed to him.64
35 Furthermore, the Prosecution’s failure to establish the following two
points means that there is no objective basis to cast doubt on the credibility of Ms Liu’s evidence.
60 DFClosingSubs_[8].
61 2TRANS_PDF64:6-PDF65:8.
62 PPClosingSubs_[19(c)] and [20(c)]; 3TRANS_PDF46:30-32, PDF50:4-10, PDF61:5-12.
63 2TRANS_PDF70:13-23.
64 1TRANS_PDF45:13-17, PDF48:15-20, PDF64:12-18.

17

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
36 First, the Prosecution has not proven that Ms Liu gave the FD Staff
express instructions to input the 8k Statement in the 10 Jan 2023 Submission.65
(a) It is not disputed that Ms Liu was the one who provided the details for the EP Application to the FD Staff to fill in and submit by writing the relevant details on the Information Paper for the FD Staff to refer to (see [5] above).
(b) However, there is no evidence that the Information Paper listed Mr Huang’s salary as $8,000 instead of the 5.5k Salary, or of anyone from Ping An ever discussing a salary of $8,000 for Mr Huang (see [34(c)] above).
(c) Moreover, there is a reasonable possibility that the 8k Statement was keyed in error:
(i) According to Ms Penny Lai (“Ms Lai”, the Prosecution’s witness from MOM), a primary entry is inputted for the fixed monthly salary (“Primary Entry”) before two secondary entries can be made for the basic monthly salary (“Secondary Entry 1”) and fixed monthly allowances (“Secondary Entry 2”).66
(ii) Ms Lai testified that she was unsure whether any data would be automatically populated in Secondary Entry 1 and Secondary Entry 2 in response to an entry into the Primary Entry.67 For example, if $8,000 was keyed into the Primary Entry, she was uncertain whether Secondary Entry 1 would
65 DFClosingSubs_[7], [10] -[13] and [18(ii)].
66 PPClosingSubs_[31] and [33].
67 DFClosingSubs_[17].
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Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
automatically show $8,000 by default, or whether Secondary Entry 1 and Secondary Entry 2 would remain blank for manual input. Ms Lai was also unsure whether an entry of $5,500 in Secondary Entry 1 would result in an automatic adjustment in Secondary Entry 2 to $2,500 (to ensure the total tallied with the Primary Entry).68
(iii) Consequently, it remains reasonably possible that the FD
Staff may have keyed the Primary Entry erroneously, and thereafter sought to “fix” the error by inputting the 5.5k Salary under Secondary Entry 1, without noticing the figure in Secondary Entry 2 or that he (or she) also had to change the Primary Entry to the 5.5k Salary.
(d) I therefore do not agree with the Prosecution that it is “wholly unlikely that [the FD Staff] would have been mistaken in keying the relevant details”,69 and find that the Prosecution’s assertion that Ms Liu “proceeded to instruct her staff to key in [Mr] Huang’s fixed monthly salary as $8,000”70 is not substantiated.
(e) I also do not agree with the Prosecution’s argument that Ms Liu’s testimony under cross-examination was a “volte-face from her Evidence-in-Chief where she claimed that one of her many workers had filled in the salary details in [Mr Huang’s EP Application] and she had
68 3TRANS_PDF10:1-PDF11:3, PDF18:22-PDF21:5, PDF26:25-PDF29:32.
69 PPClosingSubs_[32].
70 PPClosingSubs_[52].

19

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
therefore neither control nor awareness of what was being filled in”, and that she was attempting to conceal the truth.71
(i) The Prosecution relies on the following extract from Ms Liu’s testimony during her evidence-in-chief (“EIC Extract”) to assert that the EP Application in its entirety was submitted by the FD Staff “without [Ms Liu’s] knowledge and instruction”:72
I don’t even have my own personal workspace. I could only work using the computer at the front desk, and there will be many staff who would use the computer at the front desk. Although this application - that is, this EP application - was made using my Corppass account, but it was my worker who had filled in the details at that time ...73
I also just want to summarise by saying there is no evidence from the Ministry of Manpower that
I was the one who had filled this in, directed this information to be filled in, because I do not have any need to do so. I had many workers at that time, and it was very fluid. There were about 20 to 30 workers, including students, interns, part-timers and full-timers. I do not know which one of these workers had filled in this $2,500 allowance.74
(ii) T disagree with the Prosecution’s position. Viewed in context, the ETC Extract merely conveys that Ms Liu did not know what the FD Staff had inputted for a specific part of the EP Application (ie. the fixed monthly allowance of $2,500), and cannot be read to mean that Ms Liu was unaware that the FD Staff had submitted the EP Application in its entirety.
71 PPClosingSubs_[30]; PPResponsiveSubs_[4]-[6].
72 PPResponsiveSubs_[4]-[5].
73 3TRANS_PDF43:7-13.
74 3TRANS_PDF44:12-18.

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Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
(iii) The EIC Extract is therefore consistent with Ms Liu’s
testimony during cross-examination, where she explained the following:75
(A) She wrote the details of the EP Application (including Mr Huang’s 5.5k Salary) on the Information Paper and provided it to the FD Staff to complete and submit (see [5(a)] above).
(B) She was unable to recall the identity of the FD Staff due to Ping An’s numerous employees (see [5(a)] above).
(C) She did not know that the EP Application reflected a fixed monthly allowance of $2,500 (see [5(b)] above).
37 Second, the Prosecution has not established any intention by Ms Liu to
make a false statement to the Controller for Ping An’s benefit.76
(a) Ping An’s Management Team believed that Mr Huang’s 5.5k
Salary met the requirements for an S Pass and an EP, and saw no difference between applying for either (see [4] above). While the Prosecution has adduced evidence showing that this is incorrect (see [48] below), the Management Team’s misconceived view extinguishes the possibility that Ping An was trying to gain an advantage by making a false statement to the Controller.
75 PPResponsiveSubs_[5].
76 PPClosingSubs_[25(d)] and [54].
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Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
(b) The Prosecution has also failed to establish actual savings by
Ping An on insurance or levy payments (which do not have to be paid by employers for employees holding an EP).77
(i) The Prosecution provided no evidence that Ping An failed to pay insurance or levy payments for Mr Huang after the EP Application was approved. Pertinently, the Prosecution’s Closing Submissions refrained from asserting an actual benefit to Ping An and instead referred to a “likely” (and speculative) benefit arising from savings in work permit levies.78
(ii) In contrast, Ms Liu testified that Ping An continued to pay for Mr Huang’s insurance and believed it was still paying the foreign worker levy for Mr Huang.79 In this regard, Ms Liu’s failure to produce documentary evidence is not fatal, as the burden remained on the Prosecution to prove actual savings (s 105 of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed)).
(c) The Prosecution’s argument that Ms Liu was motivated to
commit the False Statement Offence to “fulfil [a] promise” to Mr Huang to get him an EP or S Pass (see [3]-[4] above) is unconvincing.80 There is no evidence that Ms Liu guaranteed Mr Huang an S Pass or EP,81 nor evidence of any benefit that Ping An would gain (eg. there is no evidence that Mr Huang threatened to quit if Ping An’s application for an S Pass or EP failed).
77 PPClosingSubs_[1]; DFClosingSubs_[15].
78 PPClosingSubs_[1], [24] and [54].
79 3TRANS_PDF65:28-PDF67:19.
80 PPClosingSubs_[53].
81 1TRANS_PDF61:9-12, PDF64:20-27; 2TRANS_PDF70:6-12.

22

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
(d) I also considered whether Ping An sought to obtain Mr Huang an EP to avoid utilising its existing quotas for S Passes or Work Permits. However, the Prosecution did not raise this, and there was no evidence on this issue. Moreover, this case is unique: Ping An had already employed Mr Huang and did not need the EP to keep him employed; Ping An was applying for the EP to help Mr Huang (see [3] above);82 and both Ms Liu and Mr Huang have given evidence that they signed the Declaration Form without reading it and realising the 8k Statement existed (see [6] above).
38 While it may have been careless to leave the FD Staff’s use of her
CorpPass account unsupervised83 (which conduct may arguably constitute a separate offence), such carelessness cannot equate to Ping An’s actual knowledge of the 8k Statement in the 10 Jan 2023 Submission.84
The FD Staff
39 The Knowledge Presumption remains unrebutted in respect of the FD
Staff’s knowledge of the 8k Statement in the 10 Jan 2023 Submission.
40 Ms Liu relies on the possibility that the FD Staff keyed the 8k Statement
in error.85
82 PPClosingSubs_[53].
83 PPClosingSubs_[25(b)] and [29].
84 PPResponsiveSubs_[18].
85 DFClosingSubs_[7], [10]-[13] and [18(ii)].
23

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
41 However, as the FD Staff who completed and submitted the EP
Application remains unidentified (see [5(a)] above), it is not possible to ascertain whether he (or she) was unaware of the 8k Statement.86
42 Consequently, it has not been established that the FD Staff made an
error, and the Knowledge Presumption is not rebutted.
Conclusion on Threshold A
43 The Prosecution has established that Ping An is presumed to have
knowledge of the 8k Statement by virtue of the Knowledge Presumption, as there is insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption (eg. by showing that the FD Staff made an error in the EP Application).87
44 That said, the presumption of Ping An’s knowledge of the 8k Statement
by virtue of the Knowledge Presumption does not equate to Ms Liu’s knowledge of the 8k Statement for the purposes of the Fourth Element, which is discussed at [52]-[62] below.
45 For completeness, had it not been for the Knowledge Presumption, I
would have found that the Prosecution failed to prove Ping An’s actual knowledge of the 8k Statement in the 10 Jan 2023 Submission because:
(a) There is sufficient evidence showing that both Ms Liu and Mr
Wong did not know that the 8k Statement was in the 10 Jan 2023 Submission (see [34]-[38] above).
86 PPClosingSubs_[25(a)].
87 PPClosingSubs_[40].
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Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
(b) The evidence disclosed a reasonable possibility that the 8k
Statement was keyed in error (see [36(c)] above).
Threshold B: The 8k Statement is false in material particular
46 Under the Falsity Presumption, the burden of proving the truth of the 8k
Statement falls on Ping An (as the Section 15 Applicant).
47 This burden has not been discharged, as it is clear from the facts that the
8k Statement is false since Mr Huang’s salary did not exceed $5,500 from November 2022 to July 2023 (see [8] above).88
48 Moreover, the falsehood is material because MOM would not have
approved the EP Application if it had known that Mr Huang’s fixed monthly salary was $5,500.89
(a) The Prosecution’s witness from MOM, Ms Lai, testified that based on Mr Huang’s age of approximately 32 years in January 2023, he would have needed a fixed monthly salary of $7,250 to qualify for an EP.90
(b) While Ping An’s Management Team believed that Mr Huang’s 5.5k Salary was sufficient to qualify for an EP (see [4] above), this was mistaken. Ms Lai explained that whilst the form for the EP Application lists a salary range of $5,000 to $10,000, this range is merely indicative and the actual qualifying salary depends on the applicant’s age. She further explained that Ping An should have used MOM’s online self-
88 PPClosingSubs_[19(e)] and [21(c)].
89 PPClosingSubs_[22]-[23].
90 PPClosingSubs_[23]; 3TRANS_PDF13:12-14, PDF13:29-PDF14:1.

25

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
assessment tool to determine whether the 5.5k Salary was sufficient for Mr Huang’s age.91
Ping An is presumed to have known that the 8k Statement is false in material particular
49 Having established Thresholds A and B, I now consider whether Ping
An is deemed to have known that the 8k Statement is false in material particular.
50 Since there is no evidence suggesting that Ping An did not know that the
8k Statement was false, I am bound to find that the Third Element is established.
51 The First to Third Elements are thus established, and the Prosecution has
proven that Ping An (as a primary offender) has committed an offence under s 22(1)(d) of the EFMA.
The Fourth Element is not established – Ms Liu did not know about the 8k Statement and could not have consented to it
Section 20(1)(a) of the EFMA
52 Under s 20(1)(a) of the EFMA, Ms Liu would be liable for Ping An’s
offence under s 22(1)(d) of the EFMA if the Prosecution proves that it was “committed with the consent or connivance” of Ms Liu.
53 In Dao Thi Boi v Public Prosecutor [2024] 6 SLR 277, the General
Division of the High Court determined that the test for consent by an officer of a corporation under s 20(1)(a) of the Endangered Species (Import and Export) Act (Cap 92A, 2008 Rev Ed) is “whether the offender can be shown to have known the material facts that constituted the offence by the body corporate in
91 3TRANS_PDF13:15-23.
26

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
which he is an officer and to have agreed to its conduct of the business on the basis of those facts”. I see no reason why a similar test should not apply under the EFMA.
54 For Ms Liu to be liable for the False Statement Offence, she must
therefore have known the material facts of Ping An’s offence under s 22(1)(d) of the EFMA (namely, that the 8k Statement was part of the EP Application) and consented to its submission to the Controller.
55 There are two distinct points in time that the Prosecution relies on to
argue that Ms Liu had knowledge of the 8k Statement:92 (a) in the 10 Jan 2023 Submission; and (b) when she signed the Declaration Form on 26 January 2023 (“26 Jan 2023 Signing”).
The 10 Jan 2023 Submission
56 The Prosecution has not established that Ms Liu had knowledge of the
8k Statement in the 10 Jan 2023 Submission for the reasons at [34]-[38] above.
57 As mentioned at [29] above, contrary to the Prosecution’s contention,
Ms Liu does not qualify as a Section 15 Applicant and the Knowledge Presumption does not apply.93 Even if the Knowledge Presumption applied, the outcome would be the same as I would have found that Ms Liu had rebutted the presumption for the same reasons at [34]-[38] above.
92 PPClosingSubs_[24].
93 PPClosingSubs_[38]-[40]; PPResponsiveSubs_[17].

27

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
The 26 Jan 2023 Signing
58 The Prosecution has not proven that Ms Liu knew about the 8k
Statement during the 26 Jan 2023 Signing.94
59 Although Ms Liu signed the Declaration Form declaring that the
information was “true and correct” (see [6(a)(v)] above),95 she has given coherent and consistent evidence that she signed it without reading:
(a) Ms Liu’s testimony that she did not read the Declaration Form before endorsing it remained steadfast throughout the trial and there was no evidential basis to doubt her evidence (see [6(b)] above).
(b) She has given a credible explanation for why she did not read it – she was facing a heavy workload that day and was less concerned with the paperwork because Mr Huang was already employed by Ping An under a Work Permit.96 Importantly, the 8k Statement was not on the same page that Ms Liu signed (see [6(a)] above),97 which supports her explanation.
(c) Ms Liu’s explanation is believable, given that the Prosecution’s witness, Mr Huang, himself signed the Declaration Form without reading or noticing the 8k Statement (see [6(c)] above), which suggests that such hasty signing was characteristic of the working environment.
94 PPClosingSubs_[41]-[52].
95 PPClosingSubs_[41].
96 3TRANS_PDF56:25-PDF57:4.
97 PPClosingSubs_[43].
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Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
(d) Further, there is no evidential basis for me to doubt the credibility of Ms Liu’s evidence for the reasons set out at [35]-[37] above, and given that the following two arguments raised by the Prosecution are unfounded:
(i) The Prosecution argues that Ms Liu’s experience as an employer means that she must have known it was the “employer’s responsibility to check through [the] documents before signing”.98 As explained at [59(b)] above, Ms Liu has given a credible explanation for why she did not read the Declaration Form before signing it. Even if she was careless, such carelessness does not amount to knowledge and consent for the purposes of s 20(1)(a) of the EFMA.99
(ii) The Prosecution argues that Ms Liu must have known that the 5.5k Salary would not satisfy the criteria for an EP.100 However, the evidence shows that Ping An’s Management Team believed that Mr Huang’s 5.5k Salary met the requirements for both an EP and an S Pass (see [4] above).
60 For completeness, the Prosecution indicated that it was not relying on
the Knowledge Presumption in respect of the 26 Jan 2023 Signing.101
98 PPClosingSubs_[42]-[47].
99 PPResponsiveSubs_[18].
100 PPClosingSubs_[46].
101 PPResponsiveSubs_[18].
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Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
Conclusion on the Fourth Element
61 The Prosecution has therefore failed to prove that Ms Liu was aware of the 8k Statement in either the 10 Jan 2023 Submission or during the 26 Jan 2023 Signing, and has not proven the Fourth Element.
62 For clarity and completeness:
(a) It was not necessary to consider wilful blindness as the Prosecution did not raise this issue. In any event, wilful blindness would not have been established, as there is no evidence that Ms Liu was aware of the 8k Statement so as to arouse suspicion requiring further investigation (Tan Kiam Peng v Public Prosecutor [2008] 1 SLR(R) 1).
(b) I placed no weight on Ms Liu’s assertion that MOM’s online EP Application system was flawed or faulty,102 as Ms Liu did not provide adequate evidence of alleged flaws relating directly to the 8k Statement.103
(c) I considered whether Ms Liu’s broad knowledge of and consent to the submission of the EP Application in its entirety, without knowledge of its specific contents (such as the 8k Statement), would suffice to establish the Fourth Element. This approach is unsuitable as it would render other officers of Ping An (such as Mr Wong) liable for the False Statement Offence merely for knowing of the EP Application’s submission regardless of its contents, and would also be inconsistent with the Knowledge Requirement under the Third Element.
102 PPClosingSubs_[25(c)]; DFClosingSubs_[17]; 3TRANS_PDF70:10-PDF71:4.
103 PPClosingSubs_[34]-[37].

30

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
(d) While the evidence suggests that Ms Liu may have been careless
in signing the Declaration Form without reading it (see [59(d)(i)] above), I decline to exercise my discretion under s 128(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) to alter the charge to reflect the alternative fault element of neglect under s 20(1)(b) of the EFMA as this would be prejudicial to Ms Liu.
(i) In Goh Chin Soon v Public Prosecutor [2021] 4 SLR 401 (“Goh Chin Soon”) at [84], the High Court indicated that a charge should be amended at a late stage in the trial only where the defence that the accused person would have to run for the amended charge is likely to be substantially similar to the defence run for the original charge.
(ii) The present charge requires the Prosecution to prove the Fourth Element – that Ms Liu knew about and consented to Ping An’s making of the false statement. Ms Liu’s defence accordingly centred on showing that she did not know the 8k Statement was included in the EP Application, and was accompanied by her acknowledgment that she should have read the Declaration Form before signing it.104
(iii) Altering the charge to reflect the alternative fault element of neglect would therefore render Ms Liu’s current defence untenable and require her to mount an entirely different defence. Consequently, in line with Goh Chin Soon, it is not appropriate for the charge against Ms Liu to be altered to reflect the
104 3TRANS_PDF46:22-26, PDF54:1-6, PDF57:10-13.

31

Public Prosecutor v Liu Emin [2026] SGMC 84
alternative fault element of neglect under s 20(1)(b) of the EFMA.
(iv) Moreover, the Prosecution sought to alter the charge only
after all sets of Closing Submissions had been filed,105 without explaining why the alternative fault element was not raised earlier.
Conclusion
63 The Prosecution has failed to establish the Fourth Element of the False
Statement Offence, and I therefore acquit Ms Liu of the False Statement Offence.


Samuel Wee
District Judge
Houston Johannus (Ministry of Manpower) for the Prosecution;
The Defendant in person.
105 PPResponsiveSubs_[27].
32
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Version No 1: 23 Oct 2026 (10:20 hrs)