1 The claimant is a registered traditional Chinese medicine (“TCM”) physician working at Kin Teck Tong TCM Clinic (“KTT”), Plaza Singapura branch (the “Clinic”). The defendant was a customer of KTT who received acupuncture treatment from the claimant at the Clinic.

2 The claimant alleged that the defendant had made statements on the Clinic’s Google page that were defamatory of her.

3 Having reviewed the evidence and parties’ submissions, I allow the claim in part and award the claimant $10,000 in general damages and $2,500 in aggravated damages. However, I decline to grant the injunction sought against the defendant. These are my reasons.

4 It is undisputed that the defendant had visited the claimant for TCM treatment on 17 November 2024, presenting with neck and shoulder ache, and that the claimant administered acupuncture on the defendant. Another therapist, one Miao Miao, performed cupping and “tui na” treatment on the defendant. ¹

5 According to the defendant, on the night of 17 November 2024/ in the early hours of 18 November 2024, she experienced severe pain in her neck and shoulders. In the morning of 18 November 2024, she experienced weakness and could not lift her right arm to brush her teeth. ²

6 The defendant called the Clinic on 18 November 2024 and spoke to the claimant to inform her what had happened. ³

7 The claimant said that she asked the defendant to attend at the Clinic without delay to determine the cause, and if her condition was due to muscle soreness after “tuina” and cupping, a piece of medicated dressing costing $25 would suffice. The defendant refused to attend when her request to get free medicated dressing was not promised by the claimant. ⁴ According to the defendant however, the claimant did not tell her to come down without delay but said that she had encountered patients with similar symptoms and whose pain improved after a few days. The defendant denied requesting for free medicated dressing and merely enquired whether she will be charged. The defendant decided not to attend at the Clinic on 18 November 2024 as she felt reassured by the claimant’s statement that her pain was normal and would improve in a few days. ⁵

8 On 19 November 2024, the Clinic’s manager Ms Tang Yee Na (“Ms Tang”) called the defendant to enquire about her condition. The claimant said that the defendant agreed to go to the Clinic for an examination after finding out the claimant was not working that day. ⁶ The defendant said however that she informed the staff that her condition had not improved, and the staff suggested she return to the Clinic the same day for a follow-up check. ⁷

9 On the same day, the defendant returned to the Clinic and was examined by two senior physicians, Ms Chu Jia Yi (“Ms Chu”) and Mr Ng Ng Hock (“Mr Ng”). ⁸ According to the defendant, the more senior physician, identified in these proceedings as Mr Ng, said that he was not sure why the claimant had administered acupuncture under the defendant’s arm. Mr Ng and Ms Tang told her that if her situation did not improve by the next day, she should go to the Accident and Emergency department (“A&E”) of a hospital. ⁹

10 On 20 November 2024, the defendant attended at the National University of Singapore (“NUH”)’s A&E. The defendant was diagnosed with neurapraxia of upper extremity and cervical radiculopathy. The claimant said that nothing specific was found to link her acupuncture treatment to the defendant’s alleged pain. ¹⁰ According to the defendant however, the doctor at NUH’s A&E, identified in these proceedings as Dr Balakrishnan Srinesh (“Dr Srinesh”), said it may have been possible that the defendant’s condition was caused by the acupuncture treatment and referred the defendant to a specialist for follow up. ¹¹

11 There was a further call between the defendant and Ms Tang on 20 November 2024. The claimant said the defendant asked for a refund of what she paid KTT, her A&E expenses and the costs of all future orthopaedic consultations and treatments. Ms Tang asked for a copy of the defendant’s A&E medical report and receipt but the defendant did not provide these. ¹² The defendant, however, said she had only asked if it was possible to refund the costs of her TCM treatment and A&E expenses. Ms Tang did not ask for a copy of any reports or receipts, but said she would check with the Human Resource department. ¹³

12 On 21 November 2024, the defendant posted a review on Google (the “First Google Review”). ¹⁴ The claimant said it contained the following defamatory words ¹⁵ :

13 On 26 November 2024, the defendant went to the Clinic. The claimant said that the defendant asked for a refund and compensation but did not produce any medical report or receipt. She then threatened Ms Tang that she would continue to post negative reviews on Google until she was compensated. ¹⁶ The defendant however said that she went to request for an update on KTT’s internal review and to seek a refund. She said that the invoices from NUH were in her possession and she would have produced them had KTT been prepared to discuss possible compensation. She denied threatening Ms Tang or saying that she would continue to post negative reviews on Google until she was compensated. ¹⁷

14 On 2 December 2024, KTT posted a comment on the First Google Review, stating that “there might have been discrepancies between the treatments rendered and what was being mentioned in the review”. ¹⁸ The claimant said that this was based on KTT’s management internal review. ¹⁹

15 On 3 December 2024, Ms Tang informed the defendant that KTT would not refund her TCM or A&E expenses. ²⁰ The defendant allegedly threatened Ms Tang that she would make a police report and post more negative Google reviews. ²¹

16 On 10 December 2024, the defendant posted additional paragraphs on the Clinic’s Google page. ²² The claimant said that the additional paragraphs contained the following defamatory words ²³ :

17 Both parties had, in pleadings, referred to the additional paragraphs posted on 10 December 2024 as a second Google review (the “Second Google Review”). ²⁴ I will refer to both the First Google Review and Second Google Review collectively as the “Google Reviews”.

18 The Google Reviews were accessible until 17 December 2024. The claimant said they were deleted by Google, citing violation of Google’s policies. ²⁵

19 On 20 December 2024, the claimant’s solicitors issued a letter of demand to the defendant, demanding that she immediately cease and desist from posting anything defamatory of the claimant, provide an apology and undertaking in the terms provided, and compensate the claimant by way of damages and costs. ²⁶

20 The defendant’s solicitors replied on 23 January 2025. The defendant agreed to retract the reviews and not to repeat or circulate the statements to any third party, which she said was in the spirit of amicable resolution and without admission on liability but she refused to provide an apology or compensate the claimant. ²⁷

21 The claimant commenced the present proceedings on 2 June 2025, seeking damages, including aggravated damages, and an injunction to restrain the defendant from publishing or causing to be published any similar words defamatory of the claimant.

22 The defendant accepted that there was publication but asserted that the Google Reviews did not refer to the claimant and were not defamatory, In any event, she relied on the defences of justification and fair comment.

23 The defendant submitted that when the claimant was asked under cross-examination if it was her case that every single word in the Google Reviews was defamatory of her, she only identified several excerpts which she considered to be defamatory ²⁸ . The defendant submitted that the claimant had therefore abandoned her claim in respect of all remaining portions of the Google Reviews.

24 In closing submissions, however, the claimant continued to maintain that the Google Reviews, read as a whole, were defamatory. ²⁹ I therefore consider whether, based on the claimant’s case as pleaded, the statements in the Google Reviews were defamatory.

25 The claimant bears the burden of proving:

(a) There was a statement bearing a defamatory meaning;

(b) There was publication to a third party; and

(c) Reference was made to the claimant.

Golden Season v Kairos Holdings [2015] 2 SLR 751 (“Golden Season”) at [35]).

26 In the defendant’s affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”), she said she had, on 10 December 2024, merely amended the First Google Review. ³⁰ The claimant had in closing submissions, asserted that the effect of the Second Google Review was to repeat or republish the First Google Review, because the Second Google Review appeared as an update and, when published, merged with the First Google Review as a single post. ³¹

27 I express doubt as to whether the effect of the defendant’s amendment of the First Google Review to include additional paragraphs was to republish the First Google Review. In any case, the claimant has not stated what, if anything, turns on this. The defendant conceded that the element of publication has been satisfied for both the First Google Review, and the additional paragraphs which form the Second Google Review. ³²

28 As the defendant denied that the words were understood to refer to and/or were capable of referring to the claimant specifically or that the words in their natural and ordinary meaning bore or were capable of bearing the meanings pleaded or any meaning defamatory of the claimant, it is these elements I turn to next.

29 The question is whether a reasonable person could identify the claimant based on the publication. There is no need for the claimant to be named, but it must be shown that the words would be understood by ordinary people to refer to the claimant: Golden Season at [38], [46] – [47].

30 In my view, the Google Reviews clearly referred to the claimant.

31 In the First Google Review, while there had initially also been references to a therapist, the rest of the assertions were made specifically in relation to the claimant, who was identified as the physician who attended to the defendant. The defendant specifically identified "physician Pheabe Chau” as the one who “did acupuncture”. She mentioned that when she called to ask if her arm weakness was normal, “physician Pheabe” told her to wait until Thursday. She then mentioned “Pheabe” two more times, in the context of the defendant having consulted a senior physician who was “younger than Pheabe”, and who mentioned that “he wasn’t sure why Pheabe poked a certain area”.

32 In the Second Google Review, the defendant once again specifically identified “physician Pheabe” as the one who “did acupuncture.” She then recounted her call with the Clinic’s reception staff, who stated that they found that “the acupuncture by Physician Pheabe is right and she did not poke wrong”, and her retort, questioning if they were “in there with [her] when physician Pheabe poked”.

33 On the stand, the defendant agreed that she was referring to the claimant when she wrote “Physician Pheabe”. ³³ Ms Lim Jia Yu (“Ms Lim”), a customer of the claimant, gave evidence that that she understood the Google Reviews to refer to the claimant. ³⁴

34 A reasonable person would therefore understand the Google Reviews to refer to the claimant.

35 A statement is considered defamatory of a person if it lowers that person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, causes the person to be shunned or avoided, and/or exposes the person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule: Golden Season at [36].

36 Whether a statement is defamatory is determined based on construing the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used or based on an innuendo meaning.

37 The following principles apply in determining the natural and ordinary meaning of words used (Golden Season at [37]):

(a) The natural and ordinary meaning of a word is the meaning conveyed to an ordinary reasonable person;

(b) As the test is objective, the meaning which the defendant intended to convey is irrelevant;

(c) The ordinary reasonable person is not avid for scandal but can read between the lines and draw inferences;

(d) Where there are a number of possible interpretations, some of which may be non-defamatory, such a person will not seize only on the defamatory meaning(s);

(e) The ordinary reasonable reader is treated as having read the publication as a whole in determining its meaning, thus “the bane and the antidote must be taken together”; and

(f) The ordinary reasonable person will take note of the circumstances and manner of publication.

38 An innuendo meaning is some other meaning that is not defamatory to the ordinary man but is defamatory to people with knowledge of the special meaning of the words or of extrinsic facts: Chang Yeh Hong v Teh Chong Sian Johnson [2025] SGDC 12 (“Chang Yeh Hong”) at [(17(a)].

39 The claimant pleaded the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in the First Google Review as ³⁵ :

(a) The claimant was unqualified to administer or provide acupuncture treatment as she did not undergo the relevant course of study and training and therefore did not have the proper knowledge, training, and experience of providing acupuncture treatments;

(b) The claimant obtained her employment from KTT TCM Clinic by fraudulent means as she did not have the relevant qualifications;

(c) The claimant was incompetent in her work and/or profession and/or business and/or trade;

(d) The claimant was ignorant or negligent in providing the acupuncture treatment by using an acupuncture needle to poke on a wrong part of the defendant's body; and/or

(e) The quality of the claimant's work was so bad that she did not deserve and/or ought not to be paid for it.

40 I find that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in the First Google Review was that the claimant was possibly unqualified to administer acupuncture treatment.

41 The defendant did not state definitively that the claimant was unqualified. What she had stated was “or maybe just the specific physician or therapist is not qualified.” A reasonable reader would not read it the way the claimant argued, being that “maybe not all the physicians or therapists but a certain physician or therapist are unqualified”. ³⁶ Contrary to the claimant’s submission, the defendant did not concede the claimant’s interpretation. ³⁷ A reasonable reading of the words used, bearing in mind the placement of the word “maybe”, would instead be that the defendant was merely putting forward the possibility that the specific physician or therapist was not qualified, rather than stating it as a certainty.

42 I do not however, find that the words in their natural and ordinary meaning meant that the claimant had used the acupuncture needle to poke on a wrong part of the defendant’s body. The defendant was only recounting her conversations with Mr Ng and Dr Srinesh, how Mr Ng allegedly stated that it was the first time he had seen such an incident in his decades of practice and that he “wasn’t sure why [the claimant] poked a certain area”, and how Dr Srinesh allegedly indicated that “it could be the needle poked into wrong area…” She did not assert that they had determined that the claimant had administered acupuncture on a wrong part of her body.

43 I also do not find the natural and ordinary meaning of the words to mean that the claimant did not undergo the relevant course of study and training and therefore did not have the proper knowledge, training, and experience of providing acupuncture treatments.

44 There is no mention in the First Google Review of the claimant’s education or training. The claimant agreed that a person may lack qualifications for a job even if he had studied or trained for that job. ³⁸ The assertion that the claimant was possibly unqualified simply meant that she was possibly not fit, or lacked the right skills or qualities, to be a TCM physician. It did not necessarily mean that she did not undergo the necessary relevant course of study or training.

45 Neither did the words mean that the claimant obtained her employment from KTT TCM clinic by fraudulent means as she did not have the relevant qualifications.

46 A reasonable person would not infer from an assertion that the claimant might be unqualified that she had used fraudulent means to obtain employment with KTT. Nowhere in the First Google Review are any words suggestive of fraud used, or any assertion regarding how the claimant obtained employment with KTT. The claimant agreed that someone can be unqualified for a job without having cheated. ³⁹

47 I also do not read the First Google Review as asserting that the claimant was incompetent in her work and/or profession and/or business and/or trade.

48 The defendant had only referred to her single experience with the claimant’s acupuncture and queried if it was possible that the claimant was unqualified. A reasonable reader would not understand this to mean that the claimant was generally incompetent. Ms Chu agreed that to say that a physician poked a patient wrongly, is different from asserting that a physician is incompetent. ⁴⁰

49 Lastly, the First Google Review did not assert, in its natural and ordinary meaning, that the quality of the claimant's work was so bad that she did not deserve and/or ought not to be paid for it. There is no reference to payment, much less an assertion that the claimant should not be paid for her work.

50 The claimant pleaded that the words in the Second Google Review, in their natural and ordinary meaning, meant that ⁴¹ :

(a) The claimant was unqualified to administer or provide acupuncture treatment as she did not undergo the relevant course of study and training and therefore did not have the proper knowledge, training, and experience of providing acupuncture treatments;

(b) The claimant was incompetent in her work and/or profession and/or business and/or trade;

(c) The claimant was ignorant or negligent in providing the acupuncture treatment by using an acupuncture needle to poke on a wrong part of the defendant's body;

(d) The quality of the claimant's work was so bad that she did not deserve and/or ought not to be paid for it; and/or

(e) The quality of the claimant's work was so bad that she should be responsible for the defendant's future orthopaedic consultations and treatments.

51 I find that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in the Second Google Review was that the claimant was incompetent in administering acupuncture and was ignorant or negligent in providing acupuncture treatment by using an acupuncture needle on a wrong part of the defendant's body.

52 In the Second Google Review, the defendant once again mentioned that the claimant had performed acupuncture. This time however, she did not stop at warning readers to “BE CAREFUL when going in for acupuncture on neck/shoulder here”. Instead, she went further and asserted that “going here for TCM caused [her] to lose [her] arm strength & have to pay for A&E & Ortho!!” She even asserted “how can this be such a coincidence if not for the acupuncture poking wrong?” She also recounted her conversation to KTT’s reception and challenged how they knew or saw that “[the claimant] did not poke wrongly on [her]?”

53 A reasonable reader would therefore understand the defendant to be alleging that the claimant had performed acupuncture ignorantly or negligently on a wrong part of the defendant’s body. Further, as the defendant asserted that the claimant’s acupuncture even caused her to lose arm strength and that she had to visit the A&E and orthopaedic specialist as a result, this would convey to a reasonable reader that the claimant was incompetent to administer acupuncture.

54 However, the words did not go so far as to mean that the claimant did not undergo the relevant course of study and training and therefore did not have the proper knowledge, training, and experience of providing acupuncture treatments. As was the case with the First Google Review, the Second Google Review contained no reference to the claimant’s education or training, or lack thereof.

55 The Second Google Review also did not in its natural and ordinary meaning, convey that the quality of the claimant's work was so bad that she did not deserve and/or ought not to be paid for it and/or that she should be responsible for the defendant's future orthopaedic consultations and treatments.

56 There was no assertion that the claimant should not be paid. The claimant agreed that any payment would have been made to KTT, and not her personally. ⁴² The defendant merely mentioned that she had sought a refund from KTT. While the defendant stated that she had to incur A&E and orthopaedic expenses as a result, she did not assert that the claimant should personally be responsible for her future orthopaedic consultations or treatments.

57 The claimant pleaded further and/or alternatively, by way of innuendo, that the words in the Google Reviews alleged that the claimant was a fraud or a quack. ⁴³

58 In the claimant’s further and better particulars, she relied on the following extrinsic facts for the pleaded innuendo meanings and for the assertion that a reader would have knowledge of these said extrinsic facts:

(a) The claimant’s TCM qualifications were stated on KTT’s website;

(b) The claimant’s Certificate of Registration from the Singapore Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Board was displayed in her consultation room and clearly visible to any patient or customer of the claimant;

(c) The claimant’s name and TCM registration number were printed on the memo which she issued to her patients for making any insurance claims;

(d) The claimant was known among her patients, customers, colleagues and members of the public as a registered TCM physician practising at the Clinic; and;

(e) Readers of the Google Reviews were either patients, prospective customers, colleagues or members of the public familiar with the Singapore Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Board’s regulatory regime and/or were aware or believed that the claimant had the necessary professional TCM qualifications.

59 Additionally, to access the Google Reviews, a reader had to go to the Google Maps page where the word “Reviews’ appears on the same page listing KTT’s website address, which a reader could then access to check on the claimant’s qualifications.

60 I do not see how mere knowledge of the claimant’s status as a registered TCM practitioner would cause the words in the Google Reviews to additionally convey to a reasonable reader possessing this knowledge that the claimant was a fraud or a quack. The Google Reviews merely questioned the quality of her skills in administering acupuncture.

61 The defendant had argued that the Google Reviews were not defamatory of the claimant, because when Ms Chu and Ms Lim were asked to identify the portions of the Google Reviews that were allegedly defamatory, they did not identify all of the excerpts which the claimant had identified on the stand as defamatory. ⁴⁴

62 Ms Chu however maintained on the stand that the Google Reviews called into question whether the claimant was qualified. ⁴⁵ On Ms Lim’s part, she also maintained that the Google Reviews implied that the claimant was not qualified and that she had inserted the acupuncture needle wrongly. ⁴⁶ In any case, it is ultimately for this court to determine whether the publication complained of is defamatory

63 I find that the natural and ordinary meanings of the Google Reviews would tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. The First Google Review called into question her qualifications to administer acupuncture treatment. As for the Second Google Review, it asserted that she was incompetent, ignorant or negligent in performing acupuncture, resulting in injury to the defendant.

64 To succeed in the defence of justification, the defendant must prove that the meaning which the relevant statement is held to bear is true, and this defence will not succeed if a materially less serious meaning is proven to be true. It is the imputation contained in the words which has to be justified, not the literal truth of the word: Golden Season at [85].

65 For the reasons I come to shortly, the defendant has not made out the defence of justification in respect of the Google Reviews.

66 The defendant pleaded that insofar as the First Google Review consisted of statements of fact, they were true ⁴⁷ :

(a) The defendant had done acupuncture three times, and she was visiting the Clinic for a second time on 17 November 2024, having been to the Clinic once for an ankle injury. She had a good experience previously, so she came back to the Clinic;

(b) The defendant visited the Clinic on Sunday, 17 November 2024, for neck and shoulder ache, and the claimant administered acupuncture on her;

(c) After the session on 17 November 2024, the defendant’s pain went away, but she experienced severe pain in the early hours of the morning on 18 November 2024 and she had to take painkillers to sleep;

(d) On the morning of 18 November 2024, the defendant felt her arm was weak while she was brushing her teeth, and she could not raise her arm above her shoulders;

(e) The defendant called the Clinic on 18 November 2024 and was told by the claimant that she had encountered patients who shared similar symptoms, and their pain improved after a few days. The claimant told the defendant she could come back to the Clinic on Thursday (i.e. 21 November 2024) if her pain did not improve by then;

(f) By 19 November 2024, the defendant’s symptoms did not improve, and she received a call from the Clinic, whose staff suggested that the defendant return to the Clinic that same day for a check by a senior physician. The defendant had the impression that even the Clinic thought it was unusual for her to be experiencing the loss of arm strength;

(g) At the visit to the Clinic on 19 November 2024, the defendant was seen by two other physicians. The first physician could not diagnose the defendant with anything;

(h) Mr Ng told the defendant that this was an unusual case and mentioned that he was not sure why the claimant had administered acupuncture in a certain area of the defendant’s body. Mr Ng and Ms Tang gave two patches to the defendant to place on the area of the defendant’s body which felt paralysed, with the view to improve the defendant’s blood circulation.

(i) By 20 November 2024, the defendant’s symptoms had not improved, and she visited NUH’s A&E. Dr Srinesh said that it may be the case that the acupuncture needle had been inserted into the wrong area resulting in the defendant sustaining an injury, but indicated that it was an unknown injury, and referred the defendant to a specialist for an appointment; and

(j) At the time of the First Google Review on 21 November 2024, the defendant was still waiting to see a specialist.

67 The claimant contended that: (1) the statement “seems like they think it’s unusual too” was opinion, not fact; (2) Mr Ng did not mention that it was his first time seeing such an incident and that he was not sure why the claimant “poked a certain area”; and (3) Dr Srinesh did not indicate to the defendant that it could be that the acupuncture needle was poked in the wrong area. ⁴⁸

68 However, it is the sting of the defamation that the defendant must prove. Given my finding that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in the First Google Reviews was that the claimant was possibly unqualified to administer acupuncture treatment, that is what the defendant must prove to succeed in a defence of justification.

69 The defendant has not sought to justify this meaning. Her own position was that the reference to the claimant possibly being unqualified was a comment rather than a fact. ⁴⁹ . As such, even if the above matters at [66] were true (i.e. her account of the treatment received, her symptoms, and her conversations with Mr Ng and Dr Srinesh), this is not sufficient to make out a defence in justification.

70 As for the Second Google Review, the defendant pleaded that insofar as it consisted of statements of fact, they were true ⁵⁰ :

(a) The defendant visited the Clinic on 17 November 2024 because of neck and shoulder ache;

(b) The claimant administered acupuncture on the defendant and another clinic staff by the name of Miao Miao did “tuina” and cupping on the defendant;

(c) On 18 November 2024, the defendant lost her arm strength;

(d) By 10 December 2024, the defendant was still experiencing weakness in her arm. The defendant was experiencing difficulty in lifting her child and hooking her bra and other activities of daily living;

(e) The defendant was told by the Clinic’s receptionist that she would be contacted after the Clinic had conducted their internal review, but as the Clinic did not contact the defendant, she went to the Clinic to request an update and to seek a refund. When speaking to the receptionist at the Clinic, the receptionist told the defendant that she thought that the HR department from the Clinic had followed up with the defendant; and

(f) On or around 3 December 2024, the defendant received a call from the Clinic’s receptionist and was told that the Clinic found that the acupuncture done by the claimant was right and in their view, the claimant did not “poke” the defendant wrongly. In response, the defendant questioned how the Clinic came to such a conclusion, when no one else was present during the acupuncture treatment. The Clinic’s receptionist did not give a reply.

71 The claimant contended that the following statements were actually comments or were not justified by the evidence: (1) “lost my arm strength the next morning”; (2) “3 weeks since, my arm is still weak”; (3) “Can’t even lift up my child or even hook my bra”; (4) “then I asked, where they in there with me when physician Pheabe poked?”; and (5) “how do they know or ‘see’ she did not poke wrongly on me”. ⁵¹

72 I had found the sting of the defamation to be that the claimant was incompetent in administering acupuncture and was ignorant or negligent in providing acupuncture treatment by using an acupuncture needle on a wrong part of the defendant's body. That is what the defendant must prove to succeed in the defence of justification.

73 Again, the defendant has not sought to justify these meanings. Indeed, her position was that the assertions that the claimant’s acupuncture treatment caused her to lose her arm strength and incur A&E and orthopaedic fees, and that the acupuncture “poked” wrongly, were comments rather than fact. ⁵² Even in these proceedings, the defendant has not taken the position that the claimant’s acupuncture caused her loss of arm strength.

74 Hence, even if the defendant succeeded in proving the facts at [70] above, this is not sufficient to make out a defence in justification.

75 In the circumstances, the defendant is not entitled to rely on the defence of justification for the Second Google Review as well.

76 I note that the claimant made various arguments on why her acupuncture could not have caused the defendant’s loss of arm strength, such as the existence of allegedly pre-existing conditions, that the defendant was only scheduled to consult a specialist 4 months after her visit to A&E ⁵³ , the defendant’s failure to undergo electromyogram or nerve conduction tests that would allegedly prove nerve damage, and the alleged lack of swelling, bleeding or bruising experienced by the defendant ⁵⁴ . However, given that it is not even the defendant’s case that the claimant’s acupuncture caused her loss of arm strength, there is no need for me to make any findings on this.

77 To succeed in a defence of fair comment, the defendant must prove that:

(a) The words complained of are comments, though they may consist of or include inferences of fact;

(b) The comment is on a matter of public interest;

(c) The comment is based on facts; and

(d) The comment is one which a fair-minded person can honestly make on the facts proved.

Golden Season at [93].

78 In determining whether a statement is one of fact or comment, a common-sense approach is taken. Much will depend on the context, and the court must consider how the statement would strike the ordinary reasonable person, i.e. whether it would be recognised by the ordinary reader as comment or fact. Where such a reader cannot readily distinguish whether the defendant is stating a fact or making a comment, then the proper approach will be to deny the defendant the benefit of the defence: Golden Season at [94], [100].

79 As I will elaborate below, the defendant is only entitled to rely on the defence of fair comment in respect of the First Google Review.

80 The defendant pleaded that the following statements in the First Google Review were comments ⁵⁵ :

(a) “Be careful if you’re going in for neck/shoulderache for acupuncture. Or maybe just the specific physician or therapist are not qualified. Sharing my experience for awareness & so others may think twice”;

(b) “While the other short haired lady did tuina, guasha. I can stand the pressure & roughness and all but when she asked me if it’s any better, I said it wasn’t really. She gave me the look and responded as if it’s surprising but that’s the truth. Then she did cupping but the way the cupping was placed around doesn’t seemed right, did it all over the place perhaps cz she’s not happy when I told her after the tuina & guasha the pain was not any better? Idk.”; and

(c) “Praying this is not a permanent damage!”

81 First, were the above statements facts or comments? Of the 3 statements above, the claimant has only contended that the first statement “Be careful if you’re going in for neck/shoulderache for acupuncture. Or maybe just the specific physician or therapist are not qualified. Sharing my experience for awareness & so others may think twice” was a statement of fact, not comment. I find for the reasons at [41] above, that this was an expression of opinion, not fact.

82 Secondly, the comments were on a matter of public interest. The defendant submitted that it affected a significant number of people at large who may have a legitimate interest in the subject matter. ⁵⁶ In submissions, the defendant more specifically identified the public interest as “exercising care when seeking medical treatment” ⁵⁷ .

83 In the claimant’s AEIC, she stated that the alleged comments do not relate to a matter of legitimate public interest as this was a single patient’s unsubstantiated personal grievance about one treatment. ⁵⁸ On the stand, however, the claimant agreed that medical treatment by service providers was an important public issue. ⁵⁹ The claimant has not in her closing submissions sought to address this element. I therefore take it that the claimant is no longer disputing the existence of public interest.

84 In any event, I accept that the appropriateness of medical treatment would be a matter of public interest.

85 Thirdly, I accept that to some extent, the defendant’s comments were based on fact.

86 The defendant pleaded that her comments were based on the following facts ⁶⁰ :

(a) The defendant received acupuncture treatment from the claimant on 17 November 2024 but experienced severe pain in her neck and shoulders on the night of 17 November 2024/in the early hours of 18 November 2024, and further, that in the morning of 18 November 2024, she experienced weakness and could not lift her right arm to brush her teeth;

(b) On 18 November 2024, the defendant consulted two colleagues/ex-colleagues who are both certified TCM physicians, whom the defendant identified as one Philip Lim Liok Keong (“Phillip”) and one Tan Pok Loon, Eric (“Eric”), as she was concerned about her persistent symptoms. They shared the view that the defendant ought to go to the A&E to check herself out as a matter of urgency, because it was risky for any physician to administer acupuncture to the neck area, especially physicians who lacked experience, and that the symptoms that the defendant had complained about/experienced suggested that her nerve may have been injured or hurt during the acupuncture session on 17 November 2024;

(c) She called KTT on 18 November 2024, described her situation to the claimant and was told to visit KTT again if needed;.

(d) She returned to the Clinic on 19 November 2024 and was examined by 2 senior physicians. Mr Ng said he was not sure why the claimant had administered acupuncture under the defendant’s arm; and

(e) She attended at NUH’s A&E on 20 November 2024 and was diagnosed with neurapraxia of upper extremity and cervical radiculopathy. Dr Srinesh said that it may have been possible that her condition was caused by the acupuncture treatment and referred her to a specialist.

87 Additionally, the defendant asserted that she had trawled the internet for information about the possible side effects of acupuncture and found articles detailing possible links between acupuncture and nerve damage. ⁶¹

88 The dates of the defendant’s visits to KTT and A&E and the persons she was treated by or had spoken with, were not disputed.

89 I accept that the defendant did experience the symptoms described. The claimant had contended in closing submissions that the defendant’s contemporaneous WhatsApp messages to Eric/Philip contradicted her claim of severe pain ⁶² . However, all the defendant had stated was “neck, shoulder, no pain now” or “my neck and shoulders are better now”. ⁶³ In other words, the defendant had only stated that the pain had subsided. The messages therefore did not contradict her claim that she suffered pain after the acupuncture treatment. Further, the defendant had, in the same messages, maintained that she had no arm strength on her right.

90 While the claimant said that she did not know if the defendant had in fact lost arm strength the next day ⁶⁴ , Ms Chu’s evidence was that when she examined the defendant, the defendant could not flex her arm fully. She agreed she had no reason to think that the defendant was malingering. ⁶⁵ It was also Mr Ng’s evidence that he had asked the defendant to move her right arm in various ways, and there were some things she could do, but others that she could not. ⁶⁶ The symptoms were also serious enough for the defendant to visit the A&E on 20 November 2024, where she was diagnosed with neurapraxia of upper extremity and cervical radiculopathy.

91 The claimant did not dispute that the defendant had received advice from two colleagues/ex-colleagues, or that she had found articles online regarding possible side effects of acupuncture. The defendant has produced her WhatsApp messages with Philip and Eric which contained their respective views ⁶⁷ , and the articles which she found online. ⁶⁸

92 The claimant only disputed that the defendant’s accounts of what Mr Ng and Dr Srinesh allegedly informed her.

93 I accept the defendant’s account that Mr Ng had told her that he was not sure why the claimant had administered acupuncture under the defendant’s arm.

94 Mr Ng’s evidence on this was initially equivocal. He first caveated in his AEIC that he only had a “vague memory of the details”, which statement he confirmed on the stand. ⁶⁹ His AEIC evidence was that he did not recall saying that it was an unusual case or that he was not sure why the claimant had administered acupuncture in a certain area of the defendant’s body. Having said that he did not recall making such statements, he went on to qualify that even if he had, he might have been misunderstood or misquoted, and what he meant was that the acupuncture treatment described by the defendant could not have caused her loss of arm strength, and that he doubted if the defendant had pointed to the correct acupoint area (the back of the shoulder). ⁷⁰

95 When Mr Ng took the stand however, he claimed that he actually had a better memory of the events, as he had been pondering the matter further since signing his AEIC. ⁷¹ This time, he took a different position from his AEIC and asserted that he had in fact mentioned to the defendant that he found her condition to be unusual, though he claimed that meant that her reaction was out of the norm ⁷² .

96 Ms Tang’s evidence was similarly equivocal. She said that she was present when Mr Ng had examined the defendant and “[did] not recall” him saying to the defendant that it was an unusual case or that he was not sure why the claimant had administered acupuncture in a certain area. However, despite saying that she did not recall such statements being made, she went on to give her impression of what he might have meant – that from what she remembered, he was trying to say that he was doubtful whether the defendant pointed to the correct acupoints. ⁷³

97 In contrast, the defendant’s evidence, which she maintained on the stand, was that Mr Ng had remarked that he had not seen such an issue before, and he was unsure why the claimant had performed acupuncture under the defendant’s arm. ⁷⁴

98 In an attempt to discredit the defendant, the claimant had pointed to several alleged inconsistencies in her evidence. ⁷⁵ These relate to her evidence on what caused her neck and shoulder stiffness before consulting the claimant, whether Philip had physically examined her, or whether she had noticed the claimant’s registration certificate displayed in the claimant’s room. However, these alleged inconsistencies, if any, did not detract from her consistent account of what Mr Ng had informed her during the consultation.

99 In the circumstances, I preferred the defendant’s account of her conversation with Mr Ng, over that of Mr Ng and Ms Tang.

100 On the other hand, the defendant has not discharged her burden of proving that Dr Srinesh had informed her that the claimant’s acupuncture treatment could have caused the defendant’s condition.

101 The referral letter Dr Srinesh had signed off on only diagnosed the defendant with neurapraxia of upper extremity and cervical radiculopathy. There was however no mention of the defendant having undergone acupuncture, much less anything to the effect that the defendant’s condition could have been caused by the claimant’s acupuncture treatment. ⁷⁶ The defendant’s AEIC was also silent on her alleged discussion with Dr Srinesh. ⁷⁷ It was only on the stand that she asserted Dr Srinesh had informed her that there was a possibility that the acupuncture caused her to lose her right arm strength ⁷⁸ , and that the acupuncture needle could have poked the wrong area. ⁷⁹

102 The defendant did not call Dr Srinesh as a witness. Nevertheless, I decline to draw an adverse inference against the defendant for this. The defendant had not been cross-examined on why she did not call Dr Srinesh as a witness and was therefore not given a chance to explain her reasons. As it stands however, it remains only the defendant’s bare assertion on the stand that such a conversation took place.

103 Regardless, even without Dr Srinesh’s alleged statement to the defendant that the claimant’s acupuncture treatment caused the defendant’s condition, and even though the defendant had no conclusive evidence that the claimant’s acupuncture caused her to lose her arm strength. ⁸⁰ , I find that a fair-minded person could still have honestly made the defendant’s comments based on the other facts proved: namely Mr Ng’s remarks, the advice from Eric/Philip, and the medical articles she found online. All she had commented was that it was a possibility that the claimant was unqualified to administer acupuncture.

104 Philip had informed the defendant that the claimant may not have had sufficient experience, whereas Eric said that the defendant’s symptoms were unusual and he would not administer acupuncture on patients’ necks due to the risks. ⁸¹

105 Even though they had not physically examined her and had given their opinions based on what she had shared with them on 18 November 2024 ⁸² , it was not unreasonable for the defendant to rely on their opinions in forming a view. Eric was a registered TCM physician ⁸³ . While Philip was not a registered TCM physician, based on his LinkedIn Profile, Philip also had TCM qualifications. ⁸⁴

106 I do not see the defendant’s failure to call Eric and Philip as witnesses as fatal to her defence of fair comment. She was not relying on the truth of what they said, but the fact that she had received advice from them. As noted earlier, the claimant did not dispute that the defendant did receive such advice from Eric and Philip, as evidenced by their WhatsApp messages.

107 The claimant had contended that the medical articles did not provide the defendant any basis for saying that the claimant’s acupuncture treatment caused the defendant to lose arm strength, because they described symptoms of wrist drop and radial nerve injury, but the defendant admitted that she did not experience a wrist drop or spasms. ⁸⁵

108 There was only 1 article which mentioned an instance where a patient reported symptoms of spasms and wrist drop. ⁸⁶ Even then, the article did not assert that there can only be injury from acupuncture if such symptoms were experienced. It bears reiterating that the defendant did not, at least in the First Google Review, assert that the claimant had administered acupuncture wrongly or caused her loss of arm strength. Given that the articles highlighted potential nerve injuries post-acupuncture, it was not unreasonable for the defendant to have made the comment she did. ⁸⁷ I note that it was also Ms Chu’s evidence that nerve paralysis or damage from acupuncture, while rare, was still possible. ⁸⁸

109 The defendant has therefore satisfied the elements of the defence of fair comment in respect of the First Google Review.

110 The defendant pleaded that the following statements in the Second Google Review were comments ⁸⁹ :

(a) “BE CAREFUL when going in for acupuncture on neck/shoulder here. Pls think twice! Going here for TCM caused me to lose my arm strength & have to pay for A&E & Ortho!!”

(b) “BS. Probably hoping I’ll let this go. Wrote a review & their HR’s reply was discrepancies? How can this be such a coincidence if not for the acupuncture poking wrongly?”

(c) “Only a money making business with many retails. Not at all about wellness of client.”

111 For the above reasons, I find that the statements were on a matter of public interest (see [82] – [84] above).

112 However, the first two statements were presented as facts rather than comments. Unlike the First Google Review where the defendant had only questioned whether the claimant was qualified, her statements in the Second Google Review came across as definitive, as she asserted a causative link between the claimant’s acupuncture treatment and her loss of arm strength and having to incur A&E and orthopaedic fees. She dismissed KTT’s reply and asserted that the only explanation was the “acupuncture poking wrongly”. As for the third statement, while it came across as comment rather than fact, nothing turned on this since this statement was directed at KTT, rather than the claimant personally.

113 Even if they were all comments, these were not statements based on fact.

114 The defendant pleaded that they were based on facts (see [66(a), (c) – (e)] and [70] above). ⁹⁰ Again, the dates of the defendant’s visits to KTT and A&E and the identities of the persons she was treated by or had spoken with were not disputed. I accepted that the defendant experienced the symptoms claimed and her account of what Mr Ng informed her, though I rejected her claim on what Dr Srinesh allegedly informed her (see [88] – [102]).

115 Even if I accept that all the matters which the defendant claimed her alleged comments were based on were true, a fair-minded person could not have honestly come to the view, based on these matters, that the claimant’s acupuncture treatment caused the defendant’s loss of arm strength or that the claimant had administered acupuncture on a wrong part of the defendant’s body.

116 By the defendant’s own account, Mr Ng had only remarked that he had not seen such an issue before and was unsure why the claimant had performed acupuncture under the defendant’s arm. He did not say that the claimant had administered an acupuncture needle in a wrong area or diagnosed the claimant’s acupuncture as the cause of the defendant’s loss of arm strength.

117 Similarly, according to the defendant, all Dr Srinesh had informed her was that there was a possibility that the claimant’s acupuncture treatment could have caused the defendant’s condition. He did not conclude that there was a causative link. ⁹¹ Further, the defendant herself recognised that Dr Srinesh was unable to advise her further as he was not a specialist. ⁹²

118 Even in these proceedings, the defendant has not taken the position that the claimant’s acupuncture caused her loss of arm strength.

119 Hence, even taking the defendant’s case at its highest, the defence of fair comment has not been made out on the Second Google Review.

120 The claimant argued that the defendant had an improper motive in venting her anger against the claimant because the defendant was not able to get a refund, and because KTT allegedly did not get back to her about her complaint and did not find anything wrong with the claimant’s acupuncture treatment ⁹³ . The defendant’s motivations are not relevant for the purpose of defeating the defence of fair comment. Malice in the context of defeating the defence of fair comment, required proof that the defendant did not genuinely believe what she stated: Golden Season at [93].

121 In my view, the claimant has not proven that the defendant lacked genuine belief in her comments in the First Google Review. She had honestly come to the view that the claimant was possibly unqualified, based on what she heard from Mr Ng, the medical literature she found, and the feedback from Philip and Eric (see [103] – [108] above).

122 There was also no evidence before the defendant which would have put her on notice that her loss of arm strength was actually due to any underlying conditions.

123 The defendant had presented at the Clinic with tightness and pain in her neck and shoulders which was more severe on the right side, had difficulty turning her head, and numbness in her right ring finger, and had difficulty sleeping. ⁹⁴ The defendant had numbness in her right ring finger throughout the years. ⁹⁵ Dr Srinesh’s referral letter had diagnosed her with neurapraxia of upper extremity and cervical radiculopathy. ⁹⁶ Her X-ray report dated 20 November 2024 recorded that she had reversal of normal cervical lordosis, narrowing of C5-C6 disc space and bilateral cervical ribs variant. ⁹⁷

124 The claimant has not proven that these were existing/congenital conditions or that these were responsible for her loss of arm strength. The claimant did not have any qualifications in Western Medicine ⁹⁸ and did not call any expert witness to substantiate her assertion.

125 The claimant has not asserted that the defendant possessed medical knowledge. There was nothing in the referral letter (or even the X-ray report) to suggest that the conditions listed were congenital or could have been the cause of her loss of arm strength.

126 The defendant’s evidence was that Dr Srinesh did not discuss the contents of the X-ray report with her and she did not obtain a copy of the X-ray report. ⁹⁹ She did not ask Dr Srinesh what these conditions in the X-ray meant or whether they caused the neurapraxia. ¹⁰⁰ Dr Srinesh had only explained that neurapraxia and cervical radiculopathy meant that she could not lift her arm but did not give her the reasons for this. ¹⁰¹

127 The claimant has therefore not proven malice which would defeat the defence of fair comment in respect of the First Google Review.

128 Having established the defendant’s liability in respect of the Second Google Review, I now consider if the claimant is entitled to substantial damages, and if so, how much.

129 The claimant submitted that a reasonable award would be $35,000 in general damages and $15,000 in aggravated damages. The defendant submitted that the claimant was only entitled to nominal damages of $1; alternatively, no more than $8,000.

130 The defendant argued that nominal damages were warranted on 2 grounds: (1) publication was extremely limited; and (2) the claimant has not proven any actual damage to her reputation and only made a bare allegation that she suffered distress.

131 In respect of the first argument, the defendant relied on Ng Kai Hoe Raymond v Wong Peng Kong [2026] SGDC 136 (“Ng Kai Hoe Raymond”). There, the learned Deputy Registrar held that a court may in certain circumstances award nominal damages if it is satisfied that there was no harm to a claimant’s reputation, such as: (1) where the publication of the defamatory material was limited such that the damage to reputation is in effect de minimis; or (2) where the claimant’s reputation was not worthy of legal protection (at [24] – [25]).

132 In Ng Kai Hoe Raymond, there was no direct evidence of widespread publication. The claimant only relied on hearsay evidence that one individual encountered the defamatory Facebook post, and there was no evidence as to whether the individual accessed it in Singapore. The indirect evidence the claimant relied on also did not support an inference of substantial publication to readers in Singapore, as the defendant’s Facebook post only attracted 1 reaction and 1 share after more than 3 years. It was additionally unclear if the defendant’s account had been set to “public”, and how many of his 584 Facebook “friends” were based in Singapore (at [40]).

133 For the reasons I will come to later, unlike Ng Kai Hoe Raymond, the claimant has shown that there was publication in Singapore. While it cannot be characterised as extensive or widespread, that would only be a factor bearing on the quantum of damages.

134 Further, I note that in Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan [2025] SGHC 54 (“Foo Diana”), the General Division of the High Court held that the starting point is that an award of general damages for defamation would be more than nominal. The quantum of such damages, is however, a different matter (at [67]). The court in Foo Diana had also assessed substantial damages for a review published on a Google page, even though it described the extent of publication as “negligible” with “minor” republication in the form of the grapevine effect ([6], [107]).

135 As for the claimant’s alleged failure to prove actual loss, the defendant argued that the claimant had no evidence that she suffered any drop in earnings or business, or any change in attitude from her clients. The claimant’s own evidence was that some of her clients were colleagues and clients from her previous role as head of investment advisory for a foreign private bank, who would come to her directly instead of booking her services online. ¹⁰² She has only made a bare assertion that she suffered much distress and many sleepless nights ¹⁰³ , which the defendant submitted was likely exaggerated.

136 An award of general damages for defamation serves three purposes which correspond to three presumed heads of injury: (a) it repairs the injury to a claimant’s reputation; (b) it serves to vindicate the claimant’s reputation; and (c) it acts as a consolation to the claimant’s hurt feelings. It is thus trite that the law presumes that some damage would flow in the ordinary course of things from the mere invasion of a claimant’s absolute right to reputation, and a claimant therefore need not establish actual loss or that any person actually thought lower of her as a result of the defamatory statement in order to be entitled to substantial damages: Foo Diana at [19].

137 Hence, even if the claimant cannot prove actual loss of reputation, she was still entitled to substantial (as opposed to nominal) damages.

138 In considering what would be an appropriate quantum of damages, the court will have regard to various factors, including:

(a) The nature and gravity of the defamation;

(b) The conduct, position and standing of the claimant and defendant; and

(c) The mode and extent of publication.

Foo Diana at [20], [114] – [117], [120] – [123].

139 To elaborate:

(a) The more closely a defamatory statement touches on the claimant’s personal integrity, professional reputation, honour, courage, loyalty, and the core attributes of his personality, the more serious it is likely to be: Foo Diana at [69];

(b) The higher the claimant’s standing, the higher the damages will be awarded: Foo Diana at [78]; and

(c) The claimant must prove the extent of publication either by direct proof or establishing a platform of facts from which the court can properly infer that substantial publication has taken place: Foo Diana at [91].

140 I find the allegations in the Second Google Review to be of moderate severity. They directly impinged on the claimant’s professional reputation, in particular, her abilities as a TCM physician and even alleged that her acupuncture treatment led to a customer losing her arm strength. However, these allegations were of lower severity than in Foo Diana, where the sting of the defamatory statements was that the plaintiff engaged in illegal activities, amongst other allegations.

141 Further, the claimant and the defendant do not hold any position in society over that of the ordinary citizen.

142 Moreover, the extent of the publication was limited. The Second Google Review was only posted on 10 December 2024 and removed by Google on 17 December 2024 (i.e. a period of about 8 days).

143 The claimant said that she had spoken to 10 colleagues, 10 friends and 20 clients between 2 March to 1 April 2025 to ask if they had seen the Google Reviews. ¹⁰⁴ The claimant produced statements from 17 of them, purportedly confirming that they had read the Google Reviews. ¹⁰⁵ Only 15 were in English or accompanied by English translations. ¹⁰⁶ The claimant only called 4 witnesses (Mr Li Yong ¹⁰⁷ , Ms Chu ¹⁰⁸ , Ms Lim ¹⁰⁹ , and Ms Tang ¹¹⁰ ) who confirmed that they had seen the Google Reviews. The claimant agreed that she could have subpoenaed the others, but chose not to. ¹¹¹ To the extent that the claimant did not call the maker of the written statements, this amounted to hearsay evidence, which the claimant was not entitled to rely on. Similarly, insofar as Mr Li Yong had stated that there was also a customer service person-in-charge known as Jade and a marketing person-in-charge who had read the Google Reviews, this also amounted to hearsay evidence. ¹¹²

144 Beyond this, the claimant only asserted that KTT was established in 1967 and had many physicians and a large client basis, and therefore the Google Reviews were “probably” read by a “large number of the public who would have looked at online reviews prior to booking appointments with a particular physician. ¹¹³ However, the claimant acknowledged that her only basis for inferring that a large number of users would have read the Google Reviews was based on the mere fact that they were posted on Google. ¹¹⁴ However, one cannot assume substantial publication merely because a defamatory statement was published on the internet: Foo Diana at [90].

145 The claimant has therefore no evidence from which substantial publication beyond these 4 individuals can be inferred.

146 In considering an appropriate quantum, I had regard to the following cases cited by parties:

(a) In Foo Diana, a lawyer was awarded $25,000 for a Google review which alleged that she was knowingly involved in illegal dealings and forced the defendant to participate in illegal dealings. The review was available online for over a year, received a single “thumbs up reaction” and a comment, and there was some evidence of minor republication in the form of the grapevine effect (i.e. the possibility that the defamatory statement was repeated to persons other than those to whom the defendant communicated the defamatory words). The plaintiff was awarded $8,000 for a complaint to the Law Society of Singapore which alleged that she engaged in unlawful financial activities, made unwanted sexual advances to the defendant and did not conduct herself professionally. Publication was limited to the members of the Law Society’s Council, Inquiry Panel and a 2-man Review Committee. As these allegations were dismissed, the taint to the recipients of the statements would have been substantially cleared, resulting in no real loss of reputation.

(b) In Golden Season, a businessman was awarded $30,000 for 8 emails that asserted that he was involved in dishonest conduct, which were sent to individuals in Mercy Relief, a customer and an organisation that his company worked with;

(c) In Lee Kok Choy v Leong Keng Woo [2022] SGHC 3, $45,000 was awarded to an executive director of a listed company for statements which asserted that he was dishonest, abused his position and engaged in corruption, cheating, abuse, and criminal breach of trust. The statements were published to a varying number of members of the company’s board;

(d) In Lai Chong Meng v Liew Leong Wan [2016] SGDC 252, $30,000 was awarded to a member of the Singapore Island Country Club, in respect of a post on an online forum asserting that he was hypocritical and despicable for allegedly circulating a viral email of two staff members which infringed on their privacy, which post had 3585 views and 107 replies; and

(e) In Tan Tor Teng Jerome v Koh Nai Hock (DC 1184/2012), $40,000 was awarded to a property investment adviser in respect of a Facebook post by the defendant who had 2,921 friends (though not all would have personally known the plaintiff) asserting that the plaintiff had many charges of fraud brought against him, that he was dishonest and a cheat.

147 Considering that the defamatory imputations in the Second Google Review were less grave than those in the above cases which concerned dishonesty or criminal conduct, that the claimant and defendant were not of any particular standing, and the limited extent of publication, a sum of $10,000 in general damages would, in my view, be a reasonable award.

148 In assessing aggravated damages, the court would consider:

(a) The conduct of the defendant from the time the defamatory statement was published to the very moment of the verdict;

(b) The failure to apologise and retract the defamatory statement; and

(c) The presence of malice.

Foo Diana at [120] – [123].

149 Malice comprises any ill-will, spite or some wrong or improper motive. It may be proven by knowledge of falsity, recklessness or lack of belief in the defamatory statement, or where there is a genuine or honest belief in the truth, but the defendant acts with the dominant motive of injuring the claimant or some other improper motive: Foo Diana at [125].

150 The claimant argued that she was entitled to aggravated damages, because:

(a) The defendant refused to apologise or retract the statements, even when she allegedly found out that she had pre-existing conditions that could have caused her symptoms, and her inability to prove that her loss of arm strength was due to the claimant’s acupuncture;

(b) The defendant’s motive in publishing the Google Reviews was to obtain a refund and to retaliate against KTT’s refusal to give her a refund; and

(c) The defendant did not honestly believe in the truth of her statements.

151 I am not persuaded that the defendant was aware that she had pre-existing conditions which could explain her symptoms (see [122] – [126]). Additionally, the NUH radiological report dated 16 January 2025 ¹¹⁵ which showed that the defendant had multilevel cervical spondylosis, worst at C5-C6, was not in existence when she published the Second Google Review. There is also no evidence that this was a congenital condition that was responsible for her loss of arm strength.

152 While the defendant has not apologised, I note that she had, on 23 January 2025, offered to retract the Google Reviews and agree not to repeat or circulate the statements made, on a without admission of liability basis. ¹¹⁶

153 On the other hand, I accept that the defendant was, at the very least, reckless as to the truth of her statements in the Second Google Review. She had no basis for stating that the claimant had administered acupuncture on a wrong part of her body or that the claimant’s acupuncture caused her to lose arm strength, as all she was informed at most, was that it was a mere possibility (see [93] – [102], [115] – [118] above).

154 I also find that the defendant’s motive in publishing the Second Google Review was, more likely than not, to retaliate against KTT’s refusal to give her refund and/or to obtain a refund.

155 The defendant had argued that she had merely criticised KTT’s failure to engage meaningfully with her feedback, and not its refusal to refund her, and that her Google Reviews did not contain any threat to pursue further action if no refund was made. She denied having, on 3 December 2024, threatened to file a police report or write a further Google review and said there could have been a miscommunication. ¹¹⁷

156 However, Ms Tang’s account of their phone conversion on 3 December 2024 was supported by contemporaneous evidence, in the form of Ms Tang’s WeChat messages to Mr Li Yong on 3 December 2024. She had reported to him that the defendant had said that if no refund was received, she would report them to the police and write a further Google review. ¹¹⁸

157 Moreover, the defendant had already posted the First Google Review which narrated her experience with the claimant’s acupuncture and suggested the possibility that the claimant was unqualified. Between that and the Second Google Review, she did not consult any other medical practitioners and only consulted a physical therapist to manage her condition. ¹¹⁹ There were no new facts which would have given her additional grounds to believe that it was no longer just a possibility, but a certainty, that the claimant had administered acupuncture wrongly and caused her to lose her arm strength.

158 Instead, the only intervening events after the First Google Review were her discussions with Ms Tang on 26 November 2024, her call with Ms Tang on 3 December 2024 whereby Ms Tang informed her that KTT would not offer her a refund, and KTT’s reply to her First Google Review posted on 3 December 2024 referring to “discrepancies” between the treatment rendered and the First Google Review. It was thus more likely than not that it was KTT’s refusal to refund her that triggered the Second Google Review.

159 I therefore find that the facts warrant an award of aggravated damages.

160 As for quantum, I considered the following case precedents cited by parties:

(a) In Foo Diana, the court applied an uplift of 25% to the award of general damages (which then amounted to $6,250 and $2,000 for 2 publications) to reflect the aggravation caused by the defendant’s malice, in lacking any genuine belief in the truth of her Google review, her unsuccessful plea of justification, her subjecting of the plaintiff to many accusations in cross-examination, and her failure to apologise;

(b) In Golden Season, $20,000 in aggravated damages was awarded to the plaintiff where the writer was found to have maliciously intended to cause him hurt, chose to bring up irrelevant matters during trial, and failed to extend an apology;

(c) In Lee Kok Choy v Leong Keng Woo [2022] SGHC 3, aggravated damages of $5,000 was awarded where the defendant had invented the defamatory allegations, refused to apologise, and maintained that he had proper sources of information for his allegations even though there was no evidence for the assertion;

(d) In Lai Chong Meng v Liew Leong Wan [2016] SGDC 252, $15,000 was awarded to the plaintiff as the defendant refused to retract his statements and apologise, and continued to maintain up to conclusion of the trial that the plaintiff had been responsible for circulating a viral email (which was untrue); and

(e) In the unreported decision of Liow Wang Wu v Pang Ah San [DC 2058/2013], $20,000 in aggravated damages (in addition to $50,000 in general damages) was awarded to a litigation lawyer in respect of allegations of sexual immorality, where the defendant refused to retract the libellous blogs or apologise, pleaded justification in circumstances that were bound to fail, and was motivated by spite or personal vendetta because he had lost the disciplinary proceedings which the plaintiff had been appointed to act as legal assessor in.

161 Applying a 25% uplift on the general damages award of $10,000, I award the claimant a further $2,500 in aggravated damages.

162 An injunction may be granted where there is a propensity or likelihood to repeat the defamatory statements: Golden Season at [147].

163 The claimant did not, in her closing submissions, address the injunction sought in the statement of claim. I therefore take it that she was not maintaining her claim for this relief. In any event, the claimant has not adduced any evidence to suggest that the defendant was likely to repeat the defamatory allegations.

164 I therefore decline to grant any injunction.

165 In the circumstances, I award $12,500 to the claimant, plus interest at 5.33% from the date of this Judgment to the date of payment.

166 Unless parties can agree on costs, they are to file brief costs submissions, limited to 10 pages, within 2 weeks of the date of this judgment.