1 Parliament passed the Debt Collection Act 2022 on 13 September 2022 to regulate debt collection activities in Singapore by introducing a licensing regime for debt collection companies. In so doing, Parliament recognised that debt collection is “a legitimate activity that facilitates the fulfilment of financial obligations” ¹ , but also one that must be properly regulated to prevent abuse. Beyond the licensing framework, licensed debt collectors are subject to the general laws including the Protection from Harassment Act 2014 (“POHA”) which governs the way they conduct their debt collection activities. This case concerned whether the conduct of a licensed debt collection company crossed the boundaries set by the POHA.

2 The first respondent, [JHX], is a licensed debt collection company. The second, third, fourth and fifth respondents, [JHY], [JHZ], [JIB] and [JIC] were its employees. The first respondent was engaged to recover a debt allegedly owed by the claimant and her husband, [CW], to its clients. Pursuant to this engagement, the respondent’s employees visited the claimant’s home and [CW’s] office on several occasions. The claimant then applied for a protection order under s 12 of the POHA against all five respondents. She subsequently withdrew her claim against the second to fifth respondents. The trial related to her claim against the first respondent, who I will refer to as the respondent in these grounds. On 28 October 2025, I delivered brief reasons granting the protection order in the claimant’s favour. I now set out the full grounds of my decision, including observations on the types of conduct during debt collection activities that may contravene the POHA.

3 The following facts were undisputed:

(a) On 5 December 2023, the claimant and [CW] engaged two renovation contractors (the “contractors”) to renovate their home at [XX]. Disputes subsequently arose regarding the provision of renovation services.

(b) On 25 November 2024, the contractors engaged the respondent to recover a debt of $102,937.16 allegedly owed by the claimant and [CW]. The respondent issued a letter of demand to the couple, stating that its “debt enforcement team” would personally call on them “to demand payment and proceed with a house visit” if the couple failed to pay within seven days. ²

(c) On 1 December 2024, the claimant and [CW] sent a written response to the respondent, disputing liability for the debt. ³ The reasons for the dispute were immaterial to the present proceedings.

(d) Subsequently, two of the respondent’s employees, [JHY] and [JHZ], visited the claimant’s home on 3, 11, 19, 24 December 2024, and 8 January 2025 to recover the debt. They also visited [CW’s] office on 5 and 19 December 2024, leaving a red debtor’s notice with office staff on both occasions as [CW] was absent.

(e) The claimant filed the claim for a protection order on 4 January 2025. On 8 January 2025, she applied for an expedited protection order. On 22 January 2025, the claimant and [CW] sought assistance from the Consumers Association of Singapore (“CASE”) to resolve their dispute with the contractors. However, the contractors did not respond to CASE’s requests to participate in mediation. ⁴

4  The claimant and [CW] testified as witnesses at trial. The claimant’s case was that the respondent’s employees had contravened ss 3, 4 and/or 5 of the POHA during the visits to the claimant’s home and [CW’s] office to collect the debt: ⁵

(a) On 3 December 2024, at around 2.10 pm, the respondent’s employees, [JHY] and [JHZ], arrived at the main gate to [XX]. They began ringing the doorbell and shouting the claimant’s and [CW’s] names. The claimant, who was indoors, immediately called the police and checked the intercom. She noticed [JHY] through the intercom. When she spoke to him, [JHY] rudely demanded that she pay the contractors. [JHY] also hit the railing outside the main gate several times while shouting. The claimant exited her home and attempted to explain why she was not paying the contractors, to no avail. Both [JHY] and [JHZ] repeatedly interrupted her. The claimant returned indoors. As she left, the respondent’s employees continued to shout. [JHY] also threatened to visit [CW’s] office and shouted at the claimant “CEO also no money ah, ai yah CEO ah, talk cock CEO”, which was a reference to [CW], a Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”). The respondent’s employees subsequently pasted a red notice on the main gate before leaving. This was an A4 size paper containing the names of the claimant and [CW], the amount allegedly owed, the claimant’s address, and the creditor’s name.

(b) On 5 December 2024, a separate team visited [CW’s] office and left a red notice similar to the one pasted at the claimant’s main gate. The claimant and [CW] were not present during this visit.

(c) On 11 December 2024, at around 7.10 pm, [JHY] and [JHZ] visited the claimant’s home again. [JHY] started shouting for the claimant and [CW] to “come out and talk”. [JHY] also shouted that [CW] should not hide behind his wife and that [CW], as CEO, had cheated the contractors. The claimant called the police and remained inside the house. [JHY] also threatened to visit the home again if no payment was made. Both employees made hand gestures towards the claimant’s two young children who were watching from the second floor of the house, with [JHZ] shouting “your children on top watching, not very nice leh”. [JHY] and [JHZ] subsequently passed another red notice before leaving.

(d) On 19, 24 December 2024, and 8 January 2025, [JHY] and [JHZ] visited the claimant’s home again. The claimant, [CW], and their children were absent. Only the claimant’s domestic helper was present. According to the claimant, her helper informed her that [JHY] and [JHZ] had allegedly shouted outside the claimant’s home before threatening to return to the home unless payment was made. The two of them left after pasting a red notice at the main gate.

(e) On 19 December 2024, the respondent’s employees visited [CW’s] office and left a red notice with [CW’s] staff. Neither [CW] nor the claimant were present during this visit.

5 The respondent was represented by its general manager, [JHY], who was its sole witness. The respondent did not dispute the claimant’s account of what transpired during the visits to the claimant’s home and [CW’s] office. The respondent’s defence was that no harassment occurred during these visits and that all actions taken by its employees were within the bounds of professional obligations as licensed debt collectors. ⁶

6 To successfully obtain a protection order under s 12(1) of the POHA, the claimant must satisfy s 12(2) which states that:

7 Based on s 12(2) of the POHA and the claim form, the issues were:

(a) whether the respondent had contravened ss 3, 4 or 5 of the POHA;

(b) if so, whether the respondent is likely to continue that contravention or commit another contravention of the POHA; and

(c) whether it would be just and equitable in all the circumstances to grant a protection order to the claimant.

8 I began with ss 3 and 4 of the POHA. To establish a contravention of ss 3 and 4, the claimant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that:

(a) For s 3(1)(a), the respondent, with intent to cause harassment, alarm or distress to her, used threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, and that such words, or behaviour caused harassment, alarm or distress to her or any other person. Under s 3(3), it is a defence for the respondent to prove that its conduct was reasonable.

(b) For s 4(1)(a), the respondent used threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour which were heard, seen or otherwise perceived by any person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress. The respondent may rely on two defences: first, that it had no reason to believe that the words or behaviour would be heard, seen or otherwise perceived by the victim; or second, that its conduct was reasonable.

9 In this regard, in Benber Dayao Yu v Jacter Singh [2017] 5 SLR 316 (“Benber”), See Kee Oon J (as he then was) (“See J”) adopted (at [27]) a two-stage approach when deciding whether to grant a protection order:

(a) The first stage is to establish whether the respondent had contravened ss 3 and 4 of the POHA by examining the nature of the words and behaviour in question. In this connection, the terms “abusive”, “insulting”, “threatening”, “harassment”, “alarm” and “distress” found in ss 3 and 4 ought to be accorded their common-sense meaning (Benber at [31]).

(b) If the conduct complained of falls within ss 3 or 4, the court proceeds to the second stage to consider whether any defence can apply. What amounts to reasonable conduct is fact-specific and requires the court to consider, among other factors, the nature of the conduct, the context in which the conduct took place and the effect of the conduct on the victim (Benber at [43]).

10 With these legal principles in mind, I examined the respondent’s conduct during the visits to the claimant’s home and [CW’s] office.

11 Both parties recorded and tendered in evidence videos of the visit from different perspectives. Based on the videos, I found that the respondent had breached, at the very least, s 4 of the POHA.

12 As regards the first stage of the Benber inquiry, the video recordings showed three distinct breaches:

(a) First, [JHY] was captured hitting the railing outside the claimant’s home multiple times and demanding payment in a loud voice. In my assessment, the respondent’s conduct must be examined with regard to the environment in which it occurred. From the videos, the claimant’s neighbourhood was quiet and relatively peaceful. Given the environment, I found that the respondent’s conduct amounted to threatening behaviour.

(b) Second, the videos captured [JHY] using the phrase “talk cock CEO” in reference to [CW] when shouting at the claimant. ⁷ This plainly constituted abusive or insulting language.

(c) Third, the videos captured [JHY] shouting “[y]ou called the police right, never mind, next we will go to your husband’s office” when the claimant informed [JHY] and [JHZ] that she had called the police. [JHY] subsequently stated “since you don’t want to pay, I will go to your husband’s office”. ⁸ These statements, objectively construed, contained threats to visit [CW’s] office.

13 In this connection, I was satisfied that all three actions were likely to cause alarm or distress to the claimant. The first involved threatening behaviour the claimant directly perceived during her interaction with the respondent. The latter two comments directed at the claimant involved threats and insults in respect of her husband. Any reasonable person, in my judgment, would be alarmed or distressed by these actions.

14 In this regard, s 4 of the POHA does not require proof that the respondent intended to cause harassment, alarm or distress. Be that as it may, there was ample evidence that the respondent intended to cause harassment, alarm or distress. The words and conduct of the respondent’s employees were, in all likelihood, deliberate and calculated to compel the claimant to settle the debt with the contractors. Consequently, I found that the respondent’s conduct breached s 3 of the POHA as well.

15 I turn to the second stage of the inquiry, namely whether the respondent had established any defence. The respondent argued that its conduct was reasonable because the claimant refused to communicate with the respondent, the respondent’s employees shouted only in response to the claimant’s shouting, and its employees had to shout to reach the claimant, who was initially inside her home.

16 With respect, I was unable to accept the respondent’s arguments:

(a) First, it was not accurate to say that the claimant was unwilling to engage the respondent. It was undisputed that the claimant had sent a written response to the respondent’s letter of demand. Indeed, the respondent’s reply to the claimant during the visit suggested that it was not prepared to accept written correspondence as a proper mode of engagement, stating that it was “not up to [the claimant] to decide how to correspond”. ⁹

(b) Second, the videos showed that the claimant was shouting at the respondent’s employees in response to the latter’s shouting.

(c) Third, there was no reason for the respondent’s employees to shout. There was no dispute that the intercom of the claimant’s home was working at the material time and the respondent’s employees could have communicated through the intercom without shouting.

17 All considered, I found that the respondent had breached ss 3 and 4 of the POHA.

18 That said, I did not consider the pasting of the red notice (referred to at [4(a)] above), at the main gate, in and of itself, to be a contravention of ss 3 or 4 of the POHA. A licensed debt collector is entitled to collect debts by lawful means. The notice simply informed the debtor of an alleged outstanding debt.

19 The claimant and [CW] were not present during this visit. Evidence of this visit came from the respondent, who submitted a video recording of its employees visiting [CW’s] office and leaving with the counter staff a red notice.

20 I accepted the respondent’s argument that the handover of the red notice was peaceful and without incident. Even then, I found that the respondent’s visit to [CW’s] office constituted a breach of ss 3 and 4 of the POHA.

21 As regards the first stage of the inquiry, the respondent’s visit was an implied threat to embarrass [CW] for not paying the debt. The debt purportedly owed by the claimant and [CW] was a private one for renovation works. It had nothing to do with [CW’s] work. There was thus no reason for the respondent’s employees to visit [CW’s] office, thereby informing [CW’s] staff of [CW’s] private matter. In fact, in this visit, the respondent was plainly making good on its threats to the claimant made during the visit to the claimant’s home on 3 December 2024.

22 Considering this visit together with the first visit to the claimant’s home, I concluded that the office visit was deliberately designed to exert pressure on [CW] by embarrassing him before his staff. I was also satisfied that the respondent’s actions were targeted at the claimant by exerting pressure through [CW]. To be clear, a threat made to one spouse does not necessarily amount to a threat made to the other. Whether it does is context specific. In this case, I found that the threat to [CW] constituted a threat to the claimant. Both the claimant and [CW] were parties to the agreement with the contractors and were involved in the dispute. Accordingly, when the respondent carried out its earlier threat to visit [CW’s] office, that visit would have caused, at the very least, alarm or distress to the claimant.

23 Turning to the second stage of the inquiry, I found that the respondent’s conduct was not reasonable. As stated above, it was not necessary to visit [CW’s] office in respect of a private debt that had nothing to do with his work.

24 All considered, I found that the first visit to [CW’s] office constituted a breach of ss 3 and 4 of the POHA.

25 Similar to the first visit to the claimant’s home, both parties submitted their own videos of the incident. Having reviewed the video recordings, I found that the respondent had breached ss 3 and 4 of the POHA.

26 As regards the first stage of the inquiry, the video recordings disclosed at least four instances of threatening, abusive and/or insulting conduct:

(a) First, [JHY] was captured shouting the claimant’s and [CW’s] names, asking them to “come out and talk” about repayment. ¹⁰ Similar to the first visit, the videos depicted the neighbourhood as a quiet one. Given this context, [JHY’s] shouting amounted to threatening behaviour. Indeed, one of the claimant’s neighbours could be heard in the video commenting about the noise made by the respondent’s employee. In my judgment, this is further proof that the respondent’s conduct disrupted the peace of the neighbourhood and crossed the line concerning what is permissible.

(b) Second, [JHY] shouted that [CW] had “cheated” the contractors and as CEO earned money by “cheating a lot of customers”. ¹¹ These words were plainly insulting to [CW] and the claimant. They implied that [CW] was engaged in dishonest conduct.

(c) Third, [JHZ] could be heard shouting “your children on top watching, not very nice leh”. ¹² This statement is insulting as it implies that the claimant and [CW] had behaved shamefully.

(d) Fourth, the claimant’s video showed [JHZ] pointing to his eyes before pointing two fingers in a particular direction. I found, on the balance of probabilities, that [JHZ] was gesturing towards one of the claimant’s children, who could be seen observing [JHY] and [JHZ] from the second floor of the claimant’s home. In the circumstances, there was no other plausible explanation for the gesture. I agreed with the claimant that the gesture, in that context, was threatening.

27 In this regard, I found that the respondent’s conduct, described above, had caused alarm or distress to the claimant. The respondent’s conduct thus fell within s 4 of the POHA, as the conduct was clearly perceived by the claimant to be threatening and insulting.

28 Moreover, examining the respondent’s conduct in totality, I concluded that the respondent intended to insult and threaten the claimant and [CW]. The words used and the way in which they were communicated were designed to shame the claimant and [CW] into paying the alleged debt. [JHZ’s] hand gesture, which was directed at the claimant’s child, was also calculated to achieve this goal. Accordingly, I found that s 3 of the POHA was contravened as well.

29 At the second stage of the analysis, I disagreed that the respondent’s conduct was reasonable. The video showed that the respondent was plainly dismissive of the fact that the claimant had already sent a written response explaining why she disputed the debt. [JHY’s] reply “your response via email no use, you must respond now”, showed that the respondent was prepared to engage only on its own terms. Such conduct was hardly reasonable.

30 From the respondent’s video, it appeared that its employees had set out to insult and mock the claimant and [CW]. At the start of the video, [JHZ] was captured singing before [JHY] began shouting for the claimant and [CW]. Subsequently, [JHZ] was heard imitating a police call by saying, “Hello police ya, this is [XX] renovate the house and don’t want to pay, hello police ya”. ¹³ Viewed together, these events suggested that the respondent was mocking the claimant and [CW] rather than making a reasonable attempt to resolve the dispute.

31 I therefore found that the second visit to the claimant’s home constituted a contravention of ss 3 and 4 of the POHA.

32 Similar to the first visit to [CW’s] office, the claimant and [CW] were not present when the respondent’s employees visited the office and handed the red notice to [CW’s] staff. Like before, this visit was briefly captured in a video recorded by the respondent’s employee.

33 The analysis of the respondent’s first visit to [CW’s] office applied equally to this visit. While the visit was peaceful, I found that the respondent’s act of visiting constituted an implied threat to embarrass and pressure [CW] and, by extension, the claimant, into paying the debt to the contractors. Moreover, there was no reason why the respondent had to visit [CW’s] office for a private matter. The respondent’s decision, in my judgment, was a deliberate one. All considered, I found that the second visit constituted a breach of ss 3 and 4 of the POHA.

34 As stated above, the claimant and her family were not at home when the respondent’s employees visited on 19, 24 December 2024 and 8 January 2025. Neither party submitted any videos of these visits.

35 I found that there was insufficient evidence of any contravention of ss 3 and 4 of the POHA in respect of these visits. The claimant’s domestic worker, who was present during the visits on 19 and 24 December 2024, was not called as a witness. There was therefore no direct evidence of what transpired on 19 and 24 December 2024. Similarly, there was no witness who gave direct evidence of what happened on 8 January 2025.

36 Further, as stated above, I did not consider the pasting of the red notice to be a contravention of ss 3 and 4 of the POHA. Notifying someone of an outstanding debt does not cross the line of what is permissible as regards debt collection.

37 In view of the foregoing, I found that the claimant had established that the respondent had breached ss 3 and 4 of the POHA in respect of the respondent’s visits to her home on 3 and 11 December 2024, as well as the visits to [CW’s] office on 5 and 19 December 2024. Given this finding, it was unnecessary to decide whether s 5 of the POHA was also contravened.

38 In any event, s 5 requires the claimant to show that the respondent intended to cause her to believe that unlawful violence would be used against her, or to provoke the use of unlawful violence by her or another person against any other person. The respondent’s conduct, while deplorable, did not support the inference that it intended to use unlawful violence.

39 Having found that the respondent had breached ss 3 and 4 of the POHA, I next considered whether the respondent was likely to continue those contraventions or commit further contraventions. The alleged debt remained outstanding. There was therefore a substantial likelihood that the respondent would continue visiting the claimant’s home and [CW’s] office. The respondent’s repeated visits to both locations before the application for a protection order demonstrated persistence. Although I did not find POHA contraventions in respect of the visits on 19 and 24 December 2024 and 8 January 2025, those visits nevertheless reinforced my conclusion that further contraventions were likely if no order was made.

40 See J (as he then was) in Benber identified (at [54]) the following factors relevant to whether it is just and equitable to grant a protection order:

(a) the nature and seriousness of the harassing conduct;

(b) the purpose and motive behind the conduct in question;

(c) the impact of the conduct on the victim and the degree of adverse emotional or psychological harm suffered;

(d) the degree to which the harassing conduct had been made known to the public;

(e) whether the victim had the means to mitigate or avoid the harassing conduct;

(f) whether the person behind the conduct had made genuine efforts to ensure that the conduct would not be construed or misunderstood; and

(g) the ordinary instances of daily living that may be expected to be tolerated by reasonable persons.

41 Considering the factors in the present case, I was satisfied that it was just and equitable to make a protection order for the following reasons:

(a) I accepted the claimant’s submission that the respondent’s conduct caused distress and alarm. Given the persistence of the visits, and in particular, the respondent’s conduct during the two visits to the claimant’s home, any reasonable person would have been distressed.

(b) The respondent’s conduct at the claimant’s home could not be regarded as an ordinary incident of daily life that reasonable persons are expected to tolerate. Having people turn up uninvited at one’s doorstep and shout to gain one’s attention is plainly not such an incident.

(c) The purpose and motive behind the respondent’s conduct was to pressure the claimant and [CW] into paying the alleged debt. The respondent also made little attempt to ensure that its conduct would not be construed as threatening, abusive or insulting.

(d) The respondent’s conduct was made known to others. During the second visit to the claimant’s home, the noise caused a neighbour to leave her home to find out what was happening. During the office visits, [CW’s] staff were made aware of [CW’s] private matter.

42 That said, I considered that the protection order should be confined in scope. Licensed debt collection companies such as the respondent may engage in debt collection activities, provided their employees act within the boundaries of the law. In these circumstances, I ordered that the respondent and/or its agents or servants be prohibited from doing the following:

(a) by any means, using or making any threatening, abusive or insulting words, behaviour or communication with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to the claimant and/or her family members, including but not limited to knocking the railing outside the claimant’s residence or shouting outside the claimant’s residence;

(b) by any means, using any threatening, abusive or insulting words, behaviour or communication which is heard, seen or otherwise perceived by the claimant and/or her family members and which is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress, including but not limited to knocking the railing outside the claimant’s residence or shouting outside the claimant’s residence; and

(c) visiting the claimant’s husband’s workplace for the purpose of collecting the debt allegedly owed by the claimant and/or her husband to [the contractors].

43 Apart from granting the order, I awarded the claimant $130.00 disbursements ($30 for filing the claim and $100 for the hearing fee for the second day of trial).

44 I conclude with two observations. First, as stated in my brief reasons, at the time of the verdict, the claimant and [CW] had not resolved their dispute with the contractors. The contractors were not parties to these proceedings. While it was unnecessary for me to make findings on the alleged debt, it was clear that these proceedings arose from that debt. I therefore advised the claimant to seek legal advice on resolving the underlying dispute with the contractors.

45 Second, when drafting the protection order, I was mindful that there was nothing inherently wrong with debt collection. At the same time, a licence to engage in debt collection activities does not give a debt collector carte blanche to contravene laws such as the POHA. While it is neither necessary nor possible to develop a comprehensive list of prohibited debt collection conduct, certain boundaries are clear. As a general rule, turning up at the alleged debtor’s home and shouting insults or abuse is impermissible. So is visiting the alleged debtor’s workplace to collect a private debt that has nothing to do with his or her work. Licensed debt collectors must take heed of the legal boundaries as set out in the POHA and other applicable laws. Those who fail to do so run the risk of having to defend against applications for protection orders and bearing the attendant costs of court proceedings.