1 The claimant is a subsidiary proprietor of a unit in a strata title residential development, of which the respondent is the management corporation (“MCST”). She commenced the present action on 6 March 2026 seeking $20,000 in damages on the basis that the respondent is liable in tort for damage to her property.

2 The essential facts are not in dispute and may be stated briefly. On 6 March 2024, the claimant’s unit was flooded as a result of backflow from a blocked sewer pipe. The blockage was caused by three stones lodged within the pipe.

3 The claimant was away on holiday in Seoul with her husband and son at the time, and so the flooding went undetected until a neighbour noticed water flowing out from the unit into the common corridor. By then, the damage was done. The flooding caused significant harm to the claimant’s property—including carpets, furniture, appliances, flooring, and other belongings—with losses quantified at $25,568.68.

4 The respondent subsequently submitted both a public liability claim and a fire policy claim to its insurers. Both were rejected. The public liability claim failed on the basis that the respondent does not exercise control over objects discharged into the pipe system, and therefore bore no liability for the flooding incident. The fire policy claim failed on the basis that coverage extended only to original fixtures and fittings provided by the developer, and did not reach items, fixtures, or fittings subsequently added by the subsidiary proprietor.

5 The present action is “a claim in tort relating to damage caused to any property”, one of the specified claims falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Tribunals: see s 5(1)(a) of the Small Claims Tribunals Act 1984 (2020 Rev Ed), read with para 1(b) of the Schedule.

6 That description, however, identifies a category of possible causes of action. A claim in tort relating to property damage might sound in, for example, trespass, negligence or breach of a statutory tort. These are conceptually distinct causes of action, each carrying its own legal and evidential requirements.

7 In the present case, the precise cause of action advanced by the claimant was not clearly identified in her claim form or supporting documents. Her case, as described in the claim form, is that “[t]he flooding caused extensive and irreversible damage to the marble and parquet floors, as well as to all items in contact with them, including carpets, rugs, curtains, wool rugs, etc. all of which had to be discarded”. She tendered photographic and videographic evidence of the aftermath of the flooding and the damage sustained. Her witness statement, and that of her son, detailed the circumstances of the flooding, their understanding of its cause, and the losses they had suffered. Nowhere in the claim documents or the evidence was there any clear articulation of the nature of the tortious wrongdoing alleged against the respondent—the legal wrong that would ground its liability to compensate for those losses.

8 Nonetheless, it appears to me that the causes of action she advances are in the tort of negligence and/or for breach of statutory duty.

9 An MCST owes a statutory duty to subsidiary proprietors to properly maintain and keep the common property in a state of good and serviceable repair under s 29(1)(b) of the Building (Strata Management) Act 2004 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “BMSMA”). In 2005, Parliament introduced a civil right of action for subsidiary proprietors under s 88(1)(b) to apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to recover damages for any loss or injury suffered arising out of a breach of such duty. The effect is the creation of a statutory tort: see Reed, Michael v Bellingham, Alex (Attorney-General, intervener) [2022] 2 SLR 1157 at [64].

10 Even before the introduction of that civil right of action in 2005, it was well recognised that an MCST owes a duty at common law to take reasonable care in maintaining the common property of the development, upon which an action in the tort of negligence may be founded: see e.g. Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 586 v Menezes Ignatius Augustine [1992] 1 SLR(R) 201; Keller Piano Co (Pte) Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 1298 [1994] 3 SLR(R) 965.

11 Although one cause of action has its source at common law and the other in statute, the General Division of the High Court held in Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 3602 v MacFadden, Declan Pearse [2022] 4 SLR 623 (at [38]) that the statutory duty to maintain common property under s 29(1)(b) of the BMSMA similarly requires the MCST to act with reasonable care; the statutory duty is not more onerous than the common law duty so as to impose strict liability. The upshot, in practical terms, is that the two duties are practically coextensive in scope and content.

12 This convergence has direct implications for the claimant’s case. Her son testified at the hearing to his belief that an MCST is liable for any losses suffered by a subsidiary proprietor arising from issues with common property, regardless of whether the MCST had exercised reasonable care. That understanding, as I explained, finds no support in law. It follows that, to succeed on either cause of action, the claimant must prove that the respondent breached the applicable standard of care, and that those breaches caused the damage to her property.

13 Yet the claimant submitted no evidence on these matters. Nor, for that matter, did the respondent. It appears that neither party appreciated what the determination of liability actually required of them. As will become apparent, the inquiry resolves itself into two issues, which I address in turn.

14 The first issue is whether the blocked sewer pipe formed part of the common property, such that it fell within the scope of the respondent’s duties.

15 Given that more than two years had elapsed since the flooding incident, one might have expected this question to have been settled long before the hearing. If the respondent had reason to believe that the blocked pipe did not constitute common property, it ought to have consulted the relevant experts—including its plumber—and placed that evidence before the tribunal. Had it done so, the matter might well have been disposed of at the threshold.

16 Instead, the respondent’s representative, a member of its council, expressed doubt and uncertainty only at the hearing, suggesting for the first time that the portion of the sewer pipe where the three stones were lodged might not form part of the common property. He attributed this uncertainty to the passage of time, noting that both the respondent’s managing agent and the members of its council had changed since the incident occurred in 2024.

17 The claimant, by contrast, said she was told that the blockage was in the sewer main stack pipe of the building. She said her own plumber advised her at that time that the flooding had nothing to do with the sewage pipes relating to her unit but was the result of a blocked common pipe.

18 On the evidence before me, I accept that the blocked sewer pipe formed part of the common property. The respondent submitted a copy of the plumber’s invoice dated 7 March 2024, which recorded: “supply labour with high pressure water jetting on sewage main stack pipe to clear the choke”. The reference to the “sewage main stack pipe” more likely than not denotes the primary vertical plumbing pipe that carries wastewater and sewage from multiple units in the development. This would constitute common property within the meaning of the BMSMA.

19 Greater difficulties arose in relation to the second issue: what the applicable standard of care should be with respect to the maintenance of the sewer pipes, and whether it was breached by the respondent.

20 On this question, no evidence was placed before me at all. It appears that neither party was alive to its significance. On the claimant’s part, this may have been because she assumed that the statutory duty under s 29(1)(b) of the BMSMA gave rise to strict liability. At the hearing, the only evidence offered on this point was the testimony of the claimant’s son, who expressed his belief that MCSTs of other strata title developments would carry out servicing and maintenance of sewer pipes at least once a year. He also noted that, although he had requested the respondent’s maintenance records from both the respondent and its previous managing agent, none had been provided.

21 The claimant’s son further testified to his belief that the stones which caused the blockage may have originated from a neighbouring unit undergoing renovation, with debris from hacking works being discarded by contractors into the pipe. He stated that when this possibility was raised with the respondent, no further information was forthcoming. While he acknowledged that it would be impossible for the respondent to ensure that contractors never disposed of debris in this manner, he maintained that the respondent ought at the very least to have monitored and supervised ongoing renovations within the development.

22 The respondent’s representative, for his part, submitted that the standard of care expected of an MCST with respect to sewer pipe maintenance was simply to respond to any obstruction within a reasonable time upon its occurrence—for instance, by engaging a plumber to rectify the problem—and that there was no obligation to regularly monitor or maintain the sewer pipes. He candidly acknowledged, however, that this submission was based on his own personal interpretation, and he too produced no evidence in support of it.

23 In determining the applicable standard of care, I draw guidance from the Canadian decision in John Campbell Law Corp v Strata Plan 1350 [2001] BCSC 1342 (“Campbell”), which was cited in MacFadden and bears factual similarities to the present case.

24 In Campbell, the plaintiff’s unit suffered damage when sewage effluent backed up into the unit as a result of a blocked sewer pipe. The blockage had been caused by a root from a tree on neighbouring property. The defendant strata corporation had not previously experienced any difficulty with its sewer line being blocked, had taken no specific measures to check that the sewer line was free from obstruction, and had no policy of regularly inspecting the sewer lines.

25 The British Columbia Supreme Court held that the defendant did not breach its duty to take reasonable care to keep the common property in a state of good and serviceable repair. The evidence in that case established that strata corporations “do not usually practice flushing sewer pipes unless a problem has first presented itself”, and that “sewer backups are rare occurrences that can only be responded to in an emergency fashion”; in particular, the invasion of tree roots into the sewer pipe “could not have been reasonably anticipated” (at [11]). There was also no evidence as to when the roots had entered the pipe, and so it could not be said at what point an inspection would have detected their presence and thereby averted the backflow. In those circumstances, it could not be said that any act or omission on the part of the defendant was unreasonable.

26 Returning to the present case, there is similarly no evidence as to whether the respondent maintained a schedule for the regular inspection of its sewer pipes. But I cannot say that the absence of such a schedule demonstrated in any way that the respondent fell below the applicable standard of care, for there is no evidence as to the industry standard generally observed by strata title developments in Singapore at the time of the incident. Without that benchmark, I have no basis upon which to conclude that the respondent fell short of what was reasonably expected of it.

27 Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the blockage of the sewer pipe—and the consequent backflow and flooding into a subsidiary proprietor’s unit—was a reasonably foreseeable event carrying a high likelihood of harm. The claimant’s son testified that a prior flooding incident had occurred before the 6 March 2024 event, though on that occasion the damage was mitigated because the family was present. However, no corroborating evidence was submitted, and no light was shed on the cause of that earlier incident. In those circumstances, I am unable to infer that such events were sufficiently foreseeable as to require the respondent to regularly monitor and maintain the sewer pipes, or that its failure to do so constituted a breach of the applicable standard of care.

28 But even if I were to assume, for the sake of argument, that the respondent owed a duty to service the sewer pipes once a year—or even more frequently, on a half-yearly or quarterly basis—the claimant’s case would still founder on the question of causation.

29 There is no evidence as to when the stones entered the sewer pipe. There are various, plausible explanations for how the stones came to be lodged there, such as the claimant’s suggestion that they were debris discarded by contractors carrying out renovation works in the development. Such an event may very well have occurred even if the sewer pipes had been regularly inspected and serviced, or even if the respondent had instructed all contractors not to dispose of debris into the pipes. It cannot be said that any inspection, servicing, or other precautionary measure taken by the respondent would have detected the presence of the stones, prevented their lodging in the pipe, or thereby averted the flooding.

30 Therefore, even if the claimant could establish the standard of care she contends for, and that this standard of care had been breached, she has not submitted any evidence that goes towards proving that any such breach caused her loss.

31 For the reasons given, I dismiss the claim.

32 I make no order as to costs. Although the case advanced by the claimant and her evidence were deficient in material respects, I find that this was likely because she may not have appreciated the legal requirements that she had to satisfy in order to succeed on either cause of action. To be sure, the respondent fared no better in its preparation. But the burden of proof rests on the claimant, and that burden she has not discharged.

33 As a concluding observation, it appears to me that both parties may have entered this dispute with firm convictions about the merits of their respective positions. The claimant’s evidence suggests an assumption that proof of flooding and damage would be sufficient to obtain compensation for what was, by any measure, a most unfortunate and distressing incident, and that may have been borne out from a mistaken belief that the respondent’s statutory duty gave rise to strict liability. The respondent, for its part, appears to have assumed that the rejection of its insurance claims settled the question of legal liability, and accordingly invested little effort in preparing its defence.

34 There is often far more than meets the eye in legal proceedings. The gradual expansion of the Small Claims Tribunals’ jurisdiction has made this forum more accessible to a wider range of disputes, but accessibility of process does not mean simplicity of substance. Indeed, small claims are not always simple claims. Questions of legal complexity often lurk beneath the surface, and a party who arrives at the hearing without having grappled with them may find that it is too late to remedy the deficiency.

35 The concern is that parties may take step after step in proceedings—filing claims, attending consultations, preparing evidence, proceeding all the way to a hearing for determination—without appreciating the legal issues that lie at the heart of their dispute. That seems to be what occurred here. Neither party arrived at the hearing with a clear understanding of what the law required them to establish, or what evidence was needed to do so. However, a party who proceeds to determination in ignorance of issues at stake, and the evidence that should be surfaced, may risk losing the opportunity to meaningfully ventilate the issues in dispute. Therefore, although parties in tribunal proceedings cannot be legally represented, it may be prudent to seek advice to obtain clarity about the legal issues at stake, the evidence that is material and relevant, and the merits of one’s position.