1 On 3 February 2025, the claimant purchased a handbag-cleaning promotion voucher from the respondent company for $599.50, which entitled her to the cleaning of up to five handbags. The claimant purchased the voucher because she sought cleaning services for one Loewe handbag. She noticed that the inner lining appeared to be mouldy. Had she paid for that service alone without the voucher, the cost would have been $163.50. The voucher therefore represented potential cost savings compared with five separate à la carte cleanings.

2 According to the respondent’s representative (“RR”), the voucher was subject to terms and conditions: the five handbag cleanings had to be completed within three months, and the price paid was neither refundable nor exchangeable for cash. At the hearing, the claimant maintained that she had not been made aware of these terms at the time of purchase. The respondent accepted that although the terms and conditions were published on its social media pages, they were not printed on the in-store poster. Nonetheless, RR’s evidence was that the store attendant would have explained them to the claimant at the point of sale. The claimant said she could not recall the precise details of that conversation.

3 I find it more likely than not that the store attendant did verbally inform the claimant of the relevant terms when she purchased the voucher. I accept RR’s account for two reasons.

4 First, the contemporaneous evidence supports the respondent’s position. Shortly after the claimant purchased the voucher and submitted her Loewe bag for cleaning, the respondent sent her WhatsApp messages that same day confirming that one out of the five cleanings had been utilised. One of those messages stated that the voucher would expire on 3 May 2025. The claimant raised no objection or expression of surprise. If she had only learned of the validity period later when the dispute was referred to the Consumer Association of Singapore, as she claimed, it is reasonable to expect that she would have protested at that point. Her silence is more consistent with prior knowledge of the term.

5 Second, the claimant herself initiated the inquiry about the voucher because it offered cost savings compared with five à la carte cleanings. But such a discount is often balanced by conditions protecting the business—namely, payment in advance on a non-refundable basis and a limited redemption period. These are standard features of consumer promotions. I find it to be unlikely that the respondent would omit to communicate such conditions, or that the claimant would have believed she could secure the benefit of the discount without accepting any corresponding limitations. I therefore find it more probable that the terms were explained to the claimant at the time of purchase, even if she did not pay close attention to them.

6 The respondent’s staff proceeded with the cleaning of the handbag, including the removal of mould from its inner lining. After removal, the respondent discovered that the inner lining was disintegrating. On 5 February, the respondent advised the claimant via WhatsApp that the lining should be replaced because “[m]ost part of the inner leather already wear off n will not be able to use as it will keep on peeling”, and that “[c]leaning will not help”. The respondent offered to replace the lining at an additional gross charge of $350, not inclusive of goods and services tax.

7 Upon receipt of this advice, the claimant queried about the replacement material. The respondent replied that it could provide a similar leather lining, but not the original Loewe material. The claimant responded that she thought the lining was fabric; the respondent clarified that it “[i]s actually one kind of soft leather”. After this clarification, the claimant instructed: “pl just clean or remove it”. The respondent reiterated that “cleaning will not help inside” because “the remainder leather keep peeling”. The claimant then asked to collect the bag and requested to “cancel my subscription please”, implying that further cleaning was unnecessary. However, by that stage, the respondent had already completed the cleaning, and informed the claimant that the bag was ready for collection.

8 The claimant collected the bag later that afternoon. Shortly afterwards, she expressed disappointment and, the following day, requested a full refund of the voucher price. The respondent refused, citing the non-refundability of the voucher.

9 As the parties could not resolve their dispute, the claimant eventually filed the present claim. She clarified at the hearing that she was claiming for $440, representing four-fifths of the gross price of the voucher, recognising that she had already used one cleaning. The claimant relied on four grounds.

10 First, the claimant alleged breach of contract. She questioned whether the respondent had in fact performed any cleaning at all. She advanced two reasons. The first was that when she informed the respondent on 5 February that she wished to collect her bag and cancel her subscription, the respondent replied within a minute that the bag had already been cleaned. The claimant argued that cleaning could not have been completed so quickly and therefore inferred that the respondent had not performed the cleaning.

11 I cannot accept this. The bag had been with the respondent since 3 February. I accept RR’s evidence that the cleaning had been carried out by the time the respondent informed the claimant of the condition of the lining.

12 The second was that when the claimant later sent the bag to Loewe to replace the lining, Loewe apparently informed her that there was no mould. From this, the claimant suspected that the bag had never been mouldy, and that the respondent therefore had not performed any mould removal.

13 I reject this contention. Loewe only inspected the bag after it had been in the respondent’s care. If the respondent had removed the mould as contracted, it would be unsurprising that Loewe found none remaining. Moreover, the claimant herself believed that the bag was mouldy when she first delivered it on 3 February, as reflected in the comments on the respondent’s receipt issued that day.

14 The claimant also alleged breach of contract on the basis that the respondent’s service was sub-standard, asserting that the bag appeared worse off after the respondent’s handling.

15 I do not accept this. The claimant contracted with the respondent for cleaning services, in particular mould removal. It seems to me that the cleaning revealed—not caused—the true condition of the lining: namely, that the material was already structurally unsound and disintegrating. The deterioration was inherent to the bag’s lining, not a result of the respondent’s performance. Cleaning could not have corrected such structural degradation, which was a problem existing at the material level of the lining itself. What was required was replacement of the lining, as the respondent advised and as Loewe eventually carried out.

16 It is also relevant to note that the disintegrating lining would inevitably have affected the aesthetic appearance of the handbag in a material way. No amount of cleaning, however skilfully performed, could have concealed or remedied the obvious problems that arose once the lining began to peel and break apart. It is therefore possible that the claimant’s impression of a sub-standard service was coloured by the unavoidable visual impact of the bag’s condition rather than by any deficiency in the respondent’s workmanship. To that extent, her expectations of what cleaning could achieve in the circumstances may have been unrealistic.

17 Second, the claimant argued that she was entitled to cancel the contract under section 11 of the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act 2003 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPFTA”).

18 But the statutory right of cancellation applies only to regulated contracts prescribed in the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) (Cancellation of Contracts) Regulations 2009. The present contract does not fall within any of those classes, and the claimant therefore has no statutory right of cancellation under the CPFTA.

19 Third, the claimant argued that the respondent had engaged in an unfair practice under section 4 of the CPFTA by making representations that might reasonably deceive or mislead consumers. She said that the respondent’s advertising was “aggressive and misleading” because it gave the impression that the company could clean high-end handbags to a standard commensurate with the reputation of those brands.

20 I do not see why or how these advertisements were aggressive or misleading. There is no evidence that the respondent’s representations about its long history of servicing handbags across various brands, or its past work with luxury goods companies, were false.

21 Moreover, even if I accept that the advertisements could have reasonably led a consumer to expect a standard comparable to that of the brand itself, the claimant has not proven that the respondent failed to meet such a standard. As I explained earlier, the evidence shows instead that the handbag’s disintegrating lining was the main source of the obvious defects in its appearance, rather than the respondent’s failure to carry out the cleaning with the appropriate care and skill.

22 Finally, the claimant argued that she is entitled to recover four-fifths of the voucher price because the voucher was a “divisible contract”, with the implication that the respondent’s right to payment is conditional on the number of cleanings that had been performed under the voucher.

23 The claimant’s argument turns on a proper construction of the contract between the parties, which informs whether the respondent’s right to payment is conditional or absolute, as well as the basis for the respondent’s receipt of the payment: see generally Jack Beatson, “Discharge for Breach: The position of instalments, deposits and other payments due before completion (1981) 97 LQR 389, cited in PT Sandipala Arthaputra v STMicroelectronics Asia Pacific Pte Ltd and others [2017] SGHC 102 at [251]; see also TG Master Pte Ltd v Tung Kee Development (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2024] 1 SLR 690 at [81]–[85].

24 In my view, the claimant paid in exchange for a right to have up to five handbags cleaned by the respondent within three months. The voucher was, in substance, a short-term “subscription” capped at five uses. This is not only the natural interpretation of the terms of the contract but also borne out by context. Customers could either pay $163.50 for each à la carte cleaning, or purchase the voucher at $599.50 for five cleanings within three months. Although styled as a promotion, the voucher was not invariably a better bargain for customers. A customer had to pay more upfront and risk under-utilisation. If all five cleanings were used, the saving was $218. If not, the customer could pay more than she would have under the à la carte option.

25 None of this is to say that the voucher is a misleading or unfair bargain. It would undoubtedly be attractive to customers who could fully utilise it. Moreover, although the respondent would earn less in absolute terms from such customers than from selling five individual cleanings, the promotion was commercially advantageous because it secured immediate payment and locked in customer commitment.

26 With this context in mind, I am not persuaded that the respondent’s right to payment can be properly construed to be conditional on the claimant consuming all five cleanings. If what the claimant purchased was a right to have up to five handbags cleaned by the respondent over a period of three months, the claimant was under no obligation to exercise that entitlement to its fullest extent. She may allow any, or even all, of the five cleanings to lapse unused. Accordingly, as one party’s obligation under a contract is the correlative of the other’s right, the respondent’s obligation in the present case was simply to stand ready to provide the claimant with up to five handbag cleanings with no additional payment required for such service over the three-month period.

27 Therefore, the respondent’s right to payment of the voucher price accrued absolutely upon assuming that obligation at the point of purchase. All of this remains consistent with the express terms of the contract, which stipulate the non-refundability of the price paid.

28 Nor can the claimant succeed by alleging that the respondent has been unjustly enriched. It is well established that “the payee cannot be said to have been unjustly enriched if he was entitled to receive the sum paid to him”: Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln CC [1999] 2 AC 349 at 408. In this regard, the respondent’s receipt of the payment was pursuant to a valid and subsisting contract under which it undertook the obligation to provide up to five cleanings over three months in exchange for the price that parties agreed was non-refundable. There is, in other words, a legally effective basis for the respondent’s receipt.

29 Naturally, the existence of a legally effective basis means that no ground of restitution can be identified as an unjust factor. By claiming for four-fifths of the voucher price paid, the claimant’s case is premised on the ground that, as regards the four unused cleanings, the basis has totally failed. Yet, to apportion the basis in this manner requires re-casting the respondent’s obligation under the contract as one which guarantees the cleaning of five handbags, so that the benefits to be provided by the respondent can be considered divisible. But this is inconsistent with a proper construction of what parties agreed under contract, and “[u]njust enrichment mends no-one’s bargain”: see Barton v Morris [2023] AC 684 at [107].

30 As I explained earlier, the payment was made to the respondent in exchange for the claimant’s acquisition of a contractual right: namely, to have up to five handbags cleaned within three months. That right accrued immediately upon payment, and therefore the basis of the payment was fully furnished at the outset. The claimant did in fact exercise the right once, but her decision not to exercise it further does not alter the analysis. The contract did not guarantee that she would use all five cleanings, only that she was entitled to do so. It follows that there can be no suggestion of a total failure of consideration.

31 For the reasons given, I dismiss the claimant’s claim. The parties are to bear their own costs.

32 I would add this in conclusion. Much of this dispute appears to have been fuelled by misunderstandings and unfounded assumptions, which might have been entirely avoided through clearer communication between the parties and by affording one another the simple courtesy of the benefit of the doubt. It is unfortunate that a difference over the cleaning of a single branded handbag, which arose nearly eight months ago, had to be resolved only by way of formal proceedings before the Small Claims Tribunal. One cannot help but think that the time and energy expended by the parties over this period were disproportionate to the sums at stake. I hope that both parties will take this experience as a reminder, in any future dealings, to resolve differences pragmatically, charitably, and with forbearance.