1 Singapore’s warm and humid tropical climate makes air-conditioning less of a luxury and more of a necessity for many of the island’s inhabitants – nowhere more so than when it comes to getting comfortable sleep. It is therefore unsurprising that room rental agreements in Singapore commonly provide for air-conditioning (“AC”) usage. That said, the standard arrangement typically confines it to the night, on the logic that tenants use it when they sleep. There is, however, nothing to stop landlords and tenants from negotiating a different arrangement to suit their circumstances – and that was precisely what the Claimant did. A nurse who worked nightshifts, she rented a room from the Respondent and negotiated to be able to use the AC at any time of the day, so long as she kept within her daily quota. It was a practical arrangement that made good sense for someone who needed to sleep during the day after a nightshift. However, [YCF], the Respondent’s daughter who lived in the same flat, saw things differently. Her grievances over the arrangement escalated into a harassment campaign that compelled the Claimant to end the lease before it expired. The Respondent then forfeited her security deposit of $800, prompting the Claimant to file SCT/11553/2025 in the Small Claims Tribunals (“SCT”) to recover it. However, a complication arose that became the central focus of this Grounds of Decision: the Respondent’s repeated failure to attend trial.

2 The trial was scheduled for 25 August 2025. The Claimant and her witness duly appeared, but the Respondent did not. Although I was not satisfied that the Respondent had a reasonable excuse for her absence, I nonetheless exercised my discretion to adjourn the trial to 30 September 2025 to afford her an opportunity to appear and be heard. She did not appear on that occasion either. Satisfied that she again had no reasonable excuse for her absence, I proceeded to hear the claim on the merits and entered a default judgment against the Respondent for $1,536.47 (the “Default Judgment”) pursuant to s 29(b) of the Small Claims Tribunals Act 1984 (the “SCTA”). On 7 October 2025, the Respondent applied to set aside the Default Judgment (SCT/APPL/122990/2025) pursuant to s 41(1) of the SCTA (the “Set Aside Application”). I heard the Set Aside Application on 21 October 2025 and, after careful consideration, dismissed it. Accordingly, the Default Judgment stood. This was a consequence that flowed directly from the Respondent’s airy disregard for the trial dates scheduled before the tribunal – a disregard that, as will become apparent, carried implications that extended beyond the parties to this case. I set out my reasons in this Grounds of Decision.

3 The Claimant was a Malaysian lady who worked in one of the public hospitals in Singapore and was a former tenant of the Respondent.

4 The Respondent was an elderly Singaporean lady who spoke exclusively in Mandarin with Hokkien interspersed. The Respondent owned a five-room Housing Development Board flat at [address redacted] (the “Flat”). However, she did not reside there herself because she allowed her daughter, [YCF], and [YCF]’s husband to occupy the master bedroom. The remaining two furnished common bedrooms and the study room were rented out to tenants.

5 It is apposite to introduce [JCY] at the outset, as she featured prominently in the present dispute. Like the Claimant, [JCY] was a Malaysian lady who worked as a nurse in the same hospital, albeit in a different department. The two were friends who wished to live together, and so they approached the Respondent around the same time to rent the two vacant common rooms in the Flat. They subsequently entered into separate tenancy agreements dated 3 August 2024 on largely similar terms.

6 The tenancy agreements proffered to the Claimant and [JCY] by the Respondent through her agent were rather brief, being based on a two-page room rental template from ERA Realty Network Pte Ltd. ¹ Nevertheless, they contained the bare essentials for the creation of a lease – viz, the premises to be leased, the identity of the parties, the commencement date and duration of the term, and the rent payable (see Soup Restaurant Singapore Pte Ltd (formerly known as Soup Restaurant (Causeway Point) Pte Ltd) v Y.E.S. F&B Group Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 246 at [11]).

7 The essential terms of the Claimant’s tenancy agreement (the “TA”) that were also present in [JCY]’s counterpart and relevant to the present dispute are summarised below:

(a) The lease was for one year starting from 1 September 2024 (see clause 5 of the TA).

(b) The monthly rent was $800, which included, inter alia, utility bills for water and electricity, as well as the cost for servicing and repairing the AC unit in the Room (see clauses 6 and 7 of the TA).

(c) The Claimant paid $800 to the Respondent as a security deposit, which had to be “[r]efunded free of interest at the end of this tenancy, subject to any deductions by the [Respondent] as may be necessary” (see clause 6.2 of the TA).

(d) Under the header “OTHER TERMS & CONDITIONS”, the Respondent’s property agent handwrote the words “AIRCON USAGE 8HRS PER DAY” (the “Additional Term”) (see clause 9 of the TA).

8 With respect to the Additional Term, it was specifically negotiated by the Claimant and [JCY] because they both worked nightshifts and thus had to sleep with the AC turned on during the day on several days each week. The essence of what they bargained for was simple: they did not want to be restricted as to when they could use the AC, so long as they kept within their daily eight-hour quota. Hence, unlike the standard form room rental tenancy agreements commonly used in Singapore, the pair were not confined to using the AC only in the evenings.

9  The leases for both the Claimant and [JCY] started rather uneventfully. However, not long after moving in, significant friction developed between the pair on one hand, and [YCF] on the other hand. For the purposes of the present dispute, it is unnecessary for me to enumerate all of [YCF]’s grievances. It suffices for me to say that there were two main annoyances for her:

(a) Firstly, the Claimant and [JCY] brought their respective boyfriends back to their rooms on various occasions without furnishing their personal particulars to, or obtaining prior authorisation from, the Respondent.

(b) Secondly, despite the pair keeping within their respective daily eight-hour quotas, their AC usage caused the Flat’s electricity bills to increase. This was a particular source of grievance for [YCF] because she, rather than the Respondent, bore the cost of the Flat’s utility bills. The crux of [YCF]’s complaint was that the pair worked different nightshift schedules. Consequently, there were occasions where one slept during the day after a nightshift whilst the other slept in the evening after a regular shift, resulting in the AC condenser running for up to 16 hours a day instead of eight. This was twice what it would have been had their shifts been aligned.

10 As a result of the foregoing, [YCF] frequently harassed the Claimant and [JCY] by, inter alia, shouting at them in the common areas and disrupting their sleep by switching off the AC condenser through the central power switch in the service yard. The latter was particularly disruptive on days when the pair had to sleep during the day after a nightshift, as their rooms would grow warm and uncomfortable without the AC.

11 Things came to a head on 1 November 2024 during a heated discussion between [YCF] and the Claimant and [JCY] in the Respondent’s absence. In total disregard for the Additional Term, [YCF] gave the pair three options:

(a) firstly, they could increase their monthly rent from $800 to $1,000, in which case they would be allowed to use the AC in their respective rooms for up to eight hours at any time of the day;

(b) secondly, they could choose to maintain their existing rent at $800, but they would be allowed to use the AC in their respective rooms only at night between 11 pm and 7 am, regardless of whether they worked nightshifts and needed to sleep during the day; or

(c) thirdly, they could move out if neither option was acceptable. If they failed to decide, [YCF] threatened to harass them daily until they did,

(collectively, the “Three Options”).

12 Faced with the Three Options, the Claimant and [JCY] jointly informed the Respondent on 2 November 2024 and again on 3 November 2024 that they would vacate the Flat on 30 November 2024. They duly did so, whereupon the Respondent withheld both of their security deposits. This prompted [JCY] and the Claimant to file their respective claims in the SCT against the Respondent on 21 and 24 February 2025 to recover the same (i.e., SCT/11456/2025 and SCT/11553/2025).

13 After [JCY] filed SCT/11456/2025, the Respondent filed a counterclaim (i.e., SCT/CC/1134/2025) seeking $299 in damages on top of the $800 security deposit she had withheld, as compensation for a bedframe that [JCY] allegedly broke. The Respondent’s case was that the bedframe cracked because [JCY] was, in her words, “very big and heavy and plump” and she must have weighed approximately 150 kg in her estimation.

14 The trial of SCT/11456/2025 and SCT/CC/1134/2025 was conducted physically at the State Courts Towers on 11 and 12 August 2025. After hearing the parties, I allowed [JCY]’s claim in full along with disbursements, dismissed the Respondent’s counterclaim and ordered the Respondent to pay costs for her egregious conduct during the trial. On the counterclaim, it suffices to say that the Respondent’s characterisation of [JCY]’s physique and her estimation of [JCY]’s weight were grossly inaccurate, and I was far from satisfied that [JCY] could have broken the bedframe on that basis.

15 The Respondent’s egregious conduct on 11 and 12 August 2025 was relevant to the present dispute and the Set Aside Application. I summarise the key incidents below:

(a) Firstly, the Respondent arrived approximately 30 minutes late on 11 August 2025 because she had forgotten about the trial. She also came empty-handed, without her own documents. This necessitated further delays so that she could get access to her documents filed in the Community Justice and Tribunals System (the “CJTS”).

(b) Secondly, the Respondent was exceedingly disruptive throughout the trial on both days. Despite understanding the questions posed to her through the Mandarin and Hokkien Court Interpreter (“CI”), she routinely: (i) responded with a question instead of an answer; (ii) meandered onto unrelated issues; (iii) deliberately misrepresented the CI’s interpretation of questions directed at her; or (iv) otherwise refused to give a direct answer. As a result, even simple questions had to be repeated multiple times to get a clear answer. She also interrupted the CI mid-translation and spoke over witnesses as they testified whenever she disagreed with them. This conduct needlessly prolonged the trial, as considerable time had to be spent managing her behaviour.

(c) Thirdly, just as I was about to deliver my verdict on 12 August 2025, the Respondent approached the bench without leave and attempted to tender hardcopies of new evidence. After that attempt was rejected, she proceeded to interrupt the CI and me nine times during the delivery of the verdict and brief reasons to express her dissatisfaction and relitigate issues already decided. Even after the matter had concluded, she raised her voice to declare that she would not pay [JCY] anything, lingered in the tribunal hearing room to re-argue aspects of her case and had to be ushered out by the CI.

16 The foregoing paints a vivid picture of the Respondent’s attitude towards proceedings before the SCT: it was one marked by a conspicuous lack of respect for the judicial process. That attitude, as will become apparent, did not abate when the trial of SCT/11553/2025 came around.

17 Returning to the present dispute, I set out the events that transpired between 25 August 2025 and 30 September 2025 in chronological order, as they form an important backdrop to the Set Aside Application.

18 The trial of SCT/11553/2025 was scheduled for an in-person hearing at the State Courts Towers on 25 August 2025. On that day, the Claimant attended with [JCY] as her witness. However, the Respondent was absent.

19 On the cusp of the trial, at 12.24 am on 25 August 2025, the Respondent filed an application to change court date (SCT/APPL/113864/2025) (the “25 August CCD Application”), claiming that she “fell down in public and broke [her] leg bones”. The sole supporting document was a medical certificate (“MC”) from the National University Hospital (“NUH”) dated 23 August 2025, covering the period of 23 to 31 August 2025 (the “23 August MC”). ² The 23 August MC failed to comply with paras 14(2)(e) and 14(2)(f) of the State Courts Practice Directions 2021 (“SCPD”) in that it neither stipulated a diagnosis nor excused the Respondent from judicial proceedings (the “MC Requirements”). It bears emphasising that the MC Requirements were not unknown to the Respondent by this point. During the earlier trial of SCT/11456/2025 and SCT/CC/1134/2025 on 11 August 2025, the Respondent had indicated that she felt unwell, prompting me to offer her an adjournment on two separate occasions. On each occasion, I also informed her of the MC Requirements. The Respondent nonetheless confirmed twice that she was fit to continue, and the trial proceeded accordingly. Against that backdrop, I rejected the 23 August MC for its blatant non-compliance with the MC Requirements.

20 The 25 August CCD Application was also deficient in another respect. It indicated that the Respondent had obtained the Claimant’s consent to postpone the trial, as required under paras 46(6) and 46(7) of the SCPD. Not only did the Respondent fail to provide any proof of such consent, but the assertion turned out to be entirely false — the Claimant had never been approached. The Respondent therefore failed to satisfy this requirement as well.

21 In view of the foregoing, I rejected the 25 August CCD Application and replied to it in the CJTS with the above reasons. Nevertheless, I exercised my discretion to adjourn the trial to my next available hearing date of 30 September 2025 to afford the Respondent an opportunity to appear, and indicated the new trial date in the same reply.

22 Separately, in addition to seeking a postponement, the Respondent also requested in the 25 August CCD Application that the trial be conducted by video-conference (“VC”) on the basis that she had difficulty travelling to court. As I have explained elsewhere, there are requirements to be satisfied before a party may attend a trial before the SCT by VC, and it is a convenience extended to self-represented persons (“SRPs”) rather than an entitlement (see JFP v JFQ [2026] SGSCT 4 at [25]–[27] and [29]–[30]). Importantly, the tribunal retains an overriding discretion to conduct the trial physically even where the relevant requirements are met (see Section D of the Schedule of Registrar’s Circular No. 5 of 2020 and para 57(5) of the SCPD). In this case, notwithstanding that both parties had indicated their consent to attending by VC in the CJTS, I exercised that overriding discretion to conduct the trial physically for two reasons.

23 The first and most important reason was that the Respondent’s past behaviour made it untenable for a trial to be conducted by VC without severe disruptions and unnecessary delays. I explain.

(a) The platform used for VC, Zoom, operates by capturing a speaker’s audio and transmitting it to all attendees. This works best when participants speak in turn. If multiple persons speak simultaneously, the audio becomes garbled, making it difficult to follow what is being said. Given the Respondent’s established habit of speaking over others and out of turn, this would have made it very difficult – if not altogether impossible – for the CI to translate and for me to take my notes of evidence.

(b) While the tribunal, as host of the Zoom session, has the option to mute a persistently disruptive participant, this is far from an effective solution. A determined individual can simply unmute herself and resume her disruptions at will, reducing the tribunal to playing an endless game of cat and mouse over the mute button rather than focusing on the proceedings before it. That is plainly unsatisfactory.

(c) As seen at [15(b)] above, the Respondent had already demonstrated that she was capable of being exceedingly disruptive during the earlier trial of SCT/11456/2025 and SCT/CC/1134/2025 on 11 and 12 August 2025. Nor was that an isolated incident: the Assistant Registrars (“ARs”) who presided over the pre-trial case management sessions known as “consultations” for both SCT/11456/2025 and SCT/CC/1134/2025 and SCT/11553/2025 encountered similar behaviour, and it was for that reason that they conducted their sessions in person. I therefore rejected the Respondent’s request to attend by VC, so as to better manage her conduct and avoid the disruptions that her behaviour over VC would inevitably have caused.

24 The second reason was that the trial was inherently document-intensive. For what was a relatively simple tenancy dispute, the parties collectively tendered over 100 pages of evidence, comprising, inter alia, the TA, text messages, transcripts and photographs. The Claimant also submitted several audio recordings of heated exchanges between the Claimant and [JCY] on one hand, and the Respondent and/or [YCF] on the other. As the Respondent spoke exclusively in Mandarin with Hokkien interspersed, the CI was required to translate both the documentary evidence and the oral testimonies. A physical hearing was plainly more conducive to working through this volume of material efficiently – the audio recordings could be played over the tribunal’s speakers for all to hear, and the CI could translate simultaneously as evidence was discussed or as witnesses spoke, neither of which would have been practicable over VC.

25 On 26 August 2025, the Respondent applied to the District Court (“DC”) for leave to appeal against my decision in SCT/11456/2025 (SCTDJ/8021/2025) (the “LTA Application”) to the General Division of the High Court (the “HC”).

26 On 1 September 2025, the tribunal’s registry sent an e-Correspondence to the Respondent in the CJTS (the “1 September e-Correspondence”) to reiterate the new trial date of 30 September 2025, stress that any MC that failed to comply with para 14 of the SCPD would be rejected, and highlight that it was open to the Respondent to file an application for a representative under s 23(2)(j) of the SCTA – along with supporting evidence – if she was unable to present her defence by reason of any infirmity of the mind or body, by no later than 29 September 2025.

27 The Respondent clearly saw the 1 September e-Correspondence, as she filed an application for representative (SCT/APPL/115830/2025) the very next day on 2 September 2025 (the “Application for Representative”), seeking to have [YCF] represent her at the trial on the basis that she was illiterate and could not read. I rejected the Application for Representative as that claim was patently untrue. The Respondent had exhibited no signs of illiteracy at the earlier trial of SCT/11456/2025 and SCT/CC/1134/2025 on 11 and 12 August 2025, and had previously communicated with the Claimant and [JCY] via text messages in Mandarin.

28 On 15 September 2025, the first case conference for the LTA Application was scheduled for a physical hearing at 11 am before the Deputy Registrar (“DR”) in the DC, of which the parties had been notified via e-Correspondence in SCT/11456/2025 on 2 September 2025. However, on 14 September 2025, the Respondent replied to request for a postponement on the basis that she was covered by an MC. Then, at or around 10 am on the day of the case conference, [YCF] called the State Courts hotline on the Respondent’s behalf to enquire whether it was absolutely necessary for her to attend in person, and if so, to request more time to travel to the State Courts Towers. The call centre promptly notified the tribunal’s registry, and the DR decided to conduct the case conference by VC instead. The Respondent attended from her home and had no difficulty participating.

29 Also on 15 September 2025, the Respondent filed another application to change court date (SCT/APPL/118200/2025) in SCT/11553/2025, seeking to postpone the trial from 30 September 2025 to 31 October 2025 (the “15 September CCD Application”). The stated reason was: “Respondent fracture her bones attached mc [sic] and x-ray report and [R]espondent need to go back to specialist clinic for follow up check up”. In this regard, the Respondent filed three supporting documents:

(a) Firstly, the 23 August MC. ³

(b) Secondly, an MC dated 11 September 2025 from My Family Clinic (TH) Pte Ltd (the “11 September MC”) stating that the Respondent was “[u]nfit for [w]ork / [s]chool” from 11 to 30 September 2025. ⁴ This MC indicated that the Respondent had a “[f]racture of right foot” and “[f]racture of right 5th rib”, but expressly stated that she was not excused from judicial proceedings. ⁵

(c) Thirdly, a police report dated 11 September 2025 (the “Police Report”), in which the Respondent stated that she had been injured on 13 August 2025 when the gantry doors near the control station at Woodlands South MRT Station closed in on her, striking her chest and abdomen. ⁶ She subsequently felt unwell and had difficulty breathing, and sought medical attention at a clinic on 18 and 19 August 2025. ⁷ An X-ray of her chest was taken, and the report dated 19 August 2025 (the “X-Ray Report”) indicated a “suspected non-displaced fracture of the right 6th rib anterolaterally”. ⁸ According to the Police Report, the Respondent again felt unwell on 23 August 2025, prompting her to visit the emergency department of NUH, which resulted in the 23 August MC being issued.

30 Having sighted the 11 September MC, X-Ray Report and Police Report for the first time, I was not unsympathetic to the Respondent’s situation. I did not doubt that she had sustained injuries and would have experienced some degree of physical discomfort. That said, I was constrained to reject the 15 September CCD Application for four reasons:

(a) Firstly, the 11 September MC covered the Respondent only until 30 September 2025 – the very date of the trial. It did not support her preferred postponement date of 31 October 2025.

(b) Secondly, by this point the Respondent had been informed of the MC Requirements on four separate occasions: twice in person at the trial of SCT/11456/2025 and SCT/CC/1134/2025 on 11 August 2025, and once each in the reply to the 25 August CCD Application and the 1 September e-Correspondence. Despite this, the 11 September MC expressly stated that the Respondent was not excused from judicial proceedings, and thus failed to comply with the MC Requirements once again.

(c) Thirdly, notwithstanding her injuries and the 11 September MC, the Respondent had attended and participated in the case conference for the LTA Application on 15 September 2025 – the very same day she filed the 15 September CCD Application. This was telling. It indicated that her condition, whilst no doubt uncomfortable, did not render her unable to participate in court proceedings. I will return to this point at [51] below.

(d) Lastly, despite having been informed of the requirements under paras 46(6) and 46(7) of the SCPD in the reply to the 25 August CCD Application, the Respondent again failed to obtain the Claimant’s consent to postpone or provide an explanation as to why it could not have been obtained.

31 Nevertheless, mindful of the Respondent’s injuries, I included in my reply to the 15 September CCD Application an invitation to her to file a fresh application for representative under s 23(2)(j) of the SCTA – should she remain unable to present her defence by reason of any infirmity of the mind or body – by no later than 29 September 2025. No such application was ever filed.

32 On 30 September 2025, the Respondent was once again absent for the trial. As I was satisfied that she had no reasonable excuse for her absence, I proceeded to hear and determine the claim pursuant to s 29(b) of the SCTA.

33 The Respondent’s entitlement to retain any part of the Claimant’s security deposit was determined entirely by the terms of their lease. Clause 6.2 of the TA provided that the security deposit was to be “[r]efunded free of interest at the end of this tenancy, subject to any deductions by the [Respondent] as may be necessary”, meaning that the Respondent was obliged to refund the deposit in full unless a deduction was necessary. What constituted a necessary deduction was a question of contractual interpretation that fell within the exclusive purview of the courts, and was not a matter to be determined based on the whims and fancies of the landlord. I will return to this point at [63(e)] below. For now, it suffices to note that I proceeded to assess the Respondent’s entitlement to retain the security deposit under clause 6.2 of the TA based on the justifications set out in her witness statement dated 15 May 2025. ⁹

34 Unfortunately, the Respondent adopted a blunderbuss approach and raised multiple justifications for forfeiting the Claimant’s security deposit, several of which concerned [JCY]’s earlier claim in SCT/11456/2025 and had no bearing on the Claimant. After sifting through them, three reasons emerged as being relevant to the Claimant’s case:

(a) Firstly, the Respondent alleged that the Claimant had repeatedly brought her boyfriend to the Room without furnishing his personal particulars or seeking the Respondent’s permission, and had committed immoral acts therein “by engaging in private activities, e,g. [sic] sexual intimacy, behind closed doors with an [sic] young male visitor”, in breach of clauses 8.6 and 8.7 of the TA, which respectively prohibited the Claimant from using the Room for “any unlawful or immoral purposes” and from assigning or subletting it without the Respondent’s consent (the “First Reason”). ¹⁰

(b) Secondly, the Respondent alleged that the Claimant exceeded her daily eight-hour quota for AC usage on 21 November 2024, resulting in an increase in the Flat’s utility bills (the “Second Reason”). ¹¹

(c) Thirdly, the Respondent alleged premature termination of the TA when the Claimant informed the Respondent on 2 and 3 November 2024 that she would move out at the end of the month. This was a breach of the TA because it was to run until 31 August 2025 (the “Third Reason”). ¹²

35 For completeness, the Respondent had indicated to the AR at the consultation on 23 April 2025 that she wished to counterclaim for financial losses allegedly suffered as a result of the premature termination, though she was unsure of her basis for doing so. The AR directed her to consider seeking independent legal advice before filing a counterclaim if she wished to pursue one. Despite this, and notwithstanding her references to alleged financial losses in her witness statement, no counterclaim was ever filed, and I accordingly proceeded on 30 September 2025 to determine only the matter before me.

36 After taking evidence at the trial and evaluating the Respondent’s three justifications, I issued the Default Judgment against the Respondent for $1,536.47, comprising $800 for the Claimant’s claim, $501.29 as costs thrown away, and $235.18 for disbursements.

37 Subsequently, as stated at the outset, the Respondent filed the Set Aside Application on 7 October 2025, a week after the Default Judgment was issued.

38 With the factual backdrop established, I turn to the applicable legal principles governing the Set Aside Application. The starting point for the analysis is to distinguish whether the Default Judgment issued on 30 September 2025 was procedurally regular or irregular. This distinction matters because a procedurally regular default judgment carries with it a presumption that the successful party should not be lightly deprived of the fruits of her success (see Mercurine Pte Ltd v Canberra Development Pte Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 907 at [43]).

39 In this case, the Default Judgment was procedurally regular because the requirement of service under s 19(1)(b) of the SCTA had been complied with when the tribunal generated the notice of hearing for trial and served it on both parties on 25 August 2025 through the CJTS pursuant to r 12A(1)(c) of the Small Claims Tribunals Rules. Thus, the foregoing presumption applied.

40 Where setting aside concerns a judgment entered after trial in the Respondnet’s absence, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) in Su Sh-Hsyu v Wee Yue Chew [2007] 3 SLR 673 (“Su Sh-Hsyu”) at [44] identified seven factors relevant to the assessment of whether such an application ought to be allowed.

(a) First, the reason for the Respondent’s absence. The CA stressed that this was to be the predominant consideration in the setting aside assessment.

(b) Second, whether allowing the setting aside would result in the Claimant suffering prejudice that could not be remedied through a costs order.

(c) Third, whether there was any undue delay in the Respondent filing the Set Aside Application, and in particular whether the Claimant had acted on the Default Judgment or third parties had acquired rights by reference to it.

(d) Fourth, whether allowing the setting aside would entail a retrial on matters of fact already investigated by the tribunal.

(e) Fifth, whether the Respondent enjoyed a real prospect of success at trial.

(f) Sixth, whether the public interest in the finality of litigation would be compromised if the setting aside were allowed.

(g) Seventh, and as the overriding consideration, whether there was a likelihood that a real miscarriage of justice would occur if the setting aside were not allowed.

41 Turning to the facts of this case, two of the seven factors from Su Sh-Hsyu could be said to favour the Respondent: the second, because any prejudice suffered by the Claimant if the Set Aside Application were allowed could be adequately remedied through a costs order, and the Claimant had not yet acted on the Default Judgment to enforce it; and the third, because there was no undue delay on her part given that the Set Aside Application was filed within a week of the Default Judgment being issued. However, these two factors were decisively outweighed by the first, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh factors, each of which pointed firmly towards dismissing the Set Aside Application. I will address each in turn.

42 I begin by addressing the first and predominant factor of the analysis: the reason for the Respondent’s absence on 30 September 2025. In the Set Aside Application, the Respondent provided the following justification:

i broke my bones, thus doctor given me mc to rest to recuperate. i have issue walking, i can not attend the physical court session. i have try asking for zoom session but my request was turn down

[typographical errors in original]

43 The Respondent also filed the following supporting documents for the Set Aside Application: (a) the 23 August MC; (b) the 11 September MC; and (c) a new MC dated 29 September 2025 from NUH, covering the period from 29 September to 7 October 2025 (the “29 September MC”). ¹³ Like its predecessors, the 29 September MC did not excuse the Respondent from judicial proceedings – and unlike the 11 September MC, it did not even indicate a diagnosis.

44 As stated at [30] above, I did not doubt that the Respondent had sustained injuries and was experiencing some degree of physical discomfort at the material time. That said, in my judgment, her absence on 30 September 2025 was deliberate, and neither her MCs nor her physical state excused it. I say this for four reasons: (a) the Respondent was well aware of the trial date; (b) she knew of the MC Requirements and yet failed to comply with them; (c) it was more likely than not that she was physically able to attend the trial at the State Courts Towers but chose not to; and (d) she did not file a fresh change of court date application (“CCD Application”) after receiving the 29 September MC, had no good reason for failing to do so, and did not even furnish that MC to the tribunal until she filed the Set Aside Application. I will elaborate on each of these points in turn.

45 I begin with the first reason. At the hearing of the Set Aside Application, the Respondent’s evidence was a study in contradiction – on the one hand she confirmed that she knew about the trial on 30 September 2025, and on the other she claimed ignorance of it. In my judgment, however, she had actual knowledge of the trial date for two reasons.

(a) First, beyond the notice of hearing itself, the Respondent was notified of the trial date on three separate occasions in writing: (i) in the tribunal’s reply to the 25 August CCD Application; (ii) in the 1 September e-Correspondence; and (iii) in the tribunal’s reply to the Application for Representative.

(b) Second, as mentioned at [26]–[27] above, the 1 September e-Correspondence informed the Respondent that she could file an application for representative to have [YCF] represent her at the trial on 30 September 2025 if she qualified under s 23(2)(j) of the SCTA. The Respondent filed the Application for Representative the very next day, and subsequently filed the 15 September CCD Application. Taken together, these acts leave little doubt that she was well aware of the trial date.

46 I turn next to the second reason. None of the MCs excuse the Respondent’s absence on 30 September 2025 because she failed to comply with the MC Requirements (as set out at para [19] above).

47 I am mindful that the Respondent was a self-represented person, but this did not diminish the importance of compliance with the MC Requirements. By the time of the trial on 30 September 2025, she had been informed of those requirements no fewer than six times – four times in writing (viz, in the reply to the 25 August CCD Application, the 1 September e-Correspondence, and the replies to the Application for Representative and the 15 September CCD Application), and twice verbally at the trial of SCT/11456/2025 and SCT/CC/1134/2025 on 11 August 2025. Against that backdrop, her non-compliance was, in my judgment, not a mere procedural lapse – it was, at best, wilful blindness, and at worst, deliberate.

48 When asked at the hearing of the Set Aside Application why she had not procured an MC that excused her from judicial proceedings, the Respondent said:

“R: Every time I do not know how to tell the doctor this. It is just a MC issued by a doctor and I don’t know how to say that I was unable to walk. I don’t know how to tell the doctor that I was required to attend court proceedings. I don’t know everything.”

49 This explanation rings hollow, and is in fact self-contradictory: at the hearing, the Respondent was able to tell the tribunal precisely what she claims she did not know how to convey to her doctor – that she was unable to walk and that she was required to attend court proceedings. If she could articulate those very things before the tribunal, there was no reason why she could not have said the same to her doctor. Accordingly, I rejected her explanation and the MCs pursuant to para 14(5) of the SCPD, and found that they did not excuse her absence on 30 September 2025.

50 I turn now to the third reason. I found that it was more likely than not that the Respondent was physically able to attend the trial on 30 September 2025 at the State Courts Towers, but chose not to. I will explain.

51 As mentioned at [28] above, the first case conference for the LTA Application in the DC was scheduled on 15 September 2025. At or around 10 am on that day, [YCF] called the State Courts hotline on the Respondent’s behalf to enquire if attendance in person was absolutely necessary, and if so, indicated that the Respondent needed more time to travel to the State Courts Towers. Significantly, as noted at [30(c)] above, the Respondent did ultimately attend and participate in that case conference (albeit by VC), notwithstanding her injuries and the 11 September MC. This was telling on three counts:

(a) first, if she was genuinely unable to make the journey, she would not have indicated through [YCF] that she could still travel down but simply needed more time;

(b) second, her ability to attend and participate in the case conference showed that her condition, whilst no doubt uncomfortable, did not render her unable to take part in court proceedings; and

(c) third, her proactive engagement with the case conference – viz, calling ahead to enquire about attendance arrangements, and ultimately attending and participating by VC – demonstrated that she was perfectly capable of engaging with judicial proceedings when she chose to do so.

52 In any event, there was no evidence that the Respondent was physically unable to travel down on 30 September 2025, and if she truly was, it was incumbent on her to obtain an MC excusing her from judicial proceedings, which she did not despite being well aware of the MC Requirements.

53 Therefore, the irresistible inference was that the Respondent was selective in her attendance of judicial proceedings – present when it suited her, and absent when it did not. Such conduct could not be countenanced, and I accordingly did not accept her reason for her absence at trial.

54 I turn to the final reason. The Respondent did not file a fresh CCD Application after receiving the 29 September MC, had no good reason for failing to do so, and did not even furnish that MC to the tribunal until she filed the Set Aside Application.

55 At the hearing of the Set Aside Application, the Respondent explained that she did not file a fresh CCD Application because she did not know how to do so. This could not be correct. As seen at [19] and [29] above, by the time of the trial on 30 September 2025, the Respondent had already filed the 25 August CCD Application and the 15 September CCD Application, both of which had been rejected. She therefore knew full well how to file such an application.

56 Further, the Respondent made no effort to notify the tribunal of her absence. This stood in stark contrast to her conduct in respect of the case conference for the LTA Application on 15 September 2025, where [YCF] had proactively called the registry to enquire about attendance arrangements on the Respondent’s behalf. When it came to the trial of SCT/11553/2025, however, no such call was made – it was the registry that had to call the three mobile phone numbers associated with the Respondent in the CJTS twice between 9.15 am and 9.25 am before [YCF] finally answered to say that she would not be attending, even though the 29 September MC did not excuse her from judicial proceedings. The contrast in her conduct spoke for itself. This only reinforced the conclusion at [51]–[53] above that the Respondent had made a calculated choice about which proceedings to engage with.

57 Drawing the strands together, I was satisfied that the Respondent’s absence at the trial on 30 September 2025 was deliberate and calculated, and that neither her MCs nor her physical state excused it. I turn now to consider how the first factor bears on the Set Aside Application.

58 The CA in Su Sh-Hsyu explained that the reasons given by a party for her absence are to be evaluated on a spectrum of considerations (see [47] of Su Sh-Hsyu). At one end of the spectrum, the reason is wholly innocent – the party was absent through no fault of her own (see [48] and [57] of Su Sh-Hsyu). At the other end, the absence was the result of a deliberate decision not to attend (see [49]–[52] of Su Sh-Hsyu). In between are cases where the absence can be attributed to some inadvertent mistake, oversight, or unavoidable accident (see [53]–[56] of Su Sh-Hsyu).

59 For the reasons stated at [44]–[57] above, the Respondent’s absence could not be characterised as wholly innocent, nor could it be attributed to inadvertent mistake or oversight. To be sure, the Respondent was dealing with some degree of physical discomfort at the material time, and I do not minimise that. However, the evidence showed that she was not incapacitated to the point of being unable to participate in proceedings – and knowing of the trial, she chose to absent herself without taking any of the steps available to her to seek an adjournment or notify the tribunal. That the Respondent faced personal difficulties did not preclude the tribunal from concluding that her absence was nonetheless deliberate (see Ching Chew Weng Paul, deceased, and others v Ching Pui Sim and others [2011] 3 SLR 869 at [14]). For cases at this end of the spectrum, the CA in Su Sh-Hsyu said at [57] that “the court will be most reluctant to set aside the judgment even though there may be other countervailing factors in favour of setting aside”, and “the reasons for non-attendance will be most severely viewed”. Therefore, I accorded significant weight to this first factor, and found that it militated heavily against allowing the Set Aside Application.

60 I turn next to the fifth factor – whether the Respondent enjoyed a real prospect of success at trial.

61 As summarised at [34] above, the Respondent proffered three reasons for withholding the Claimant’s security deposit, and confirmed at the hearing of the Set Aside Application that she had no other justification beyond them. After careful consideration, I found that none of the three reasons justified withholding the deposit, and that the Respondent therefore had no real prospect of success at trial. I will address each reason in turn.

62 The First Reason (see [34(a)] above) did not justify withholding the deposit for the following reasons.

(a) First, the Respondent failed to prove that the Claimant had repeatedly brought her boyfriend to the Room. This was a bare assertion. At trial, the Claimant testified that she had brought her boyfriend to the Room on only one occasion – viz, 4 October 2024, during the daytime – and had notified the Respondent beforehand. ¹⁴ More fundamentally, the TA imposed no restriction on the Claimant’s right to bring visitors to the Room, nor did it require her to furnish their personal particulars or seek the Respondent’s consent. Since it was the Respondent who proffered the TA through her property agent, the burden was on her to have included any such restriction. Having omitted to do so, the Respondent had no contractual basis to insist that the Claimant furnish her visitor’s personal particulars or seek her consent beforehand.

(b) Second, the Claimant did not breach clause 8.6 of the TA, which prohibited use of the Room for “any unlawful or immoral purposes”. There was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, of any unlawful or immoral conduct in the Room — this too was a bare assertion. Critically, the Respondent was not even present in the Flat on 4 October 2024, the one occasion on which the Claimant brought her boyfriend to the Room. She was therefore in no position to testify on whether the Claimant had engaged in “private activities, e,g. [sic] sexual intimacy, behind closed doors with an [sic] young male visitor”, ¹⁵ and I accorded no weight to that assertion.

(c) Third, there was no breach of clause 8.7 of the TA, which prohibited the Claimant from assigning or subletting the Room. There was simply no evidence to even suggest that the Claimant had assigned her rights under the TA or subleased the Room to her boyfriend.

63 Next, the Second Reason (see [34(b)] above) was also not a valid justification. I will explain.

(a) The only evidence the Respondent tendered in support were four utility bills, ¹⁶ the breakdown of which is as follows:

(b) The four utility bills did not even clear the threshold of relevance because the alleged breach on 21 November 2024 fell outside the billing cycle of the fourth bill. ¹⁷ In any event, the bills were equivocal at best: while they showed an increase in the Flat’s electricity usage, there was simply no basis to attribute that increase to any specific person or activity with any degree of certainty, bearing in mind that the Flat was occupied by multiple individuals. They therefore did not take the Respondent’s case very far.

(c) More fundamentally, the Second Reason failed on the terms of the TA itself. Putting aside the fact that it was [YCF] who paid for the Flat’s utility bills in practice (see [9(b)] above), clause 7.2 made clear that the Respondent bore the risk of any fluctuation in the bills as part of the fixed monthly rent of $800. That was the bargain she struck — and it cut both ways. If electricity usage or prices fell and the bills decreased, the Respondent would have been the beneficiary. She could not therefore look to the security deposit when the arrangement did not suit her. A bad bargain is not a basis for forfeiture.

64 Finally, the Third Reason (see [34(c)] above) was similarly not a valid justification for withholding the security deposit. I will explain.

(a) As canvassed at [9]–[12] above, matters came to a head on 1 November 2024 when [YCF] presented the Three Options to the Claimant and [JCY], prompting them to inform the Respondent on 2 and 3 November 2024 that they would vacate at the end of the month. I found, however, that [YCF]’s conduct could not be attributed to the Respondent. To their credit, the Claimant and [JCY] acknowledged at trial that the Respondent had attempted to restrain [YCF], though her efforts proved fruitless. [YCF] therefore acted entirely of her own accord. While the pair may have had other legal recourse against [YCF] for harassment, terminating their leases was not among them — however objectionable [YCF]’s conduct was, it could not justify that consequence.

(b) That said, the Third Reason nonetheless failed as a basis for forfeiture for two reasons.

(c) First, the TA contained no term expressly entitling the Respondent to forfeit the security deposit in the event of early termination. The TA was her document, proffered through her property agent – if she wanted such a right, it was incumbent on her to provide for it. Since she did not, she had no contractual basis to forfeit the deposit.

(d) Second, the Respondent could not plug this gap by relying on clause 6.2 of the TA. As highlighted at [33] above, clause 6.2 provided that the deposit was to be refunded at the end of the tenancy “subject to any deductions by the [Respondent] as may be necessary.” The word “necessary” is significant. It imports a requirement that any deduction must be genuinely needed – it cannot be arbitrary or made at the Respondent’s whim. To read it otherwise would render the word “necessary” superfluous, contrary to the well-established canon of construction that parties are presumed to have intended every word in their agreement and that superfluous words are to be eschewed (see Ishan Anoop Sakraney v Ameet Nalin Parikh and another matter [2021] SGHC(A) 12 at [12]). It is equally trite that contractual terms are interpreted contextually to give effect to the objective, and not subjective, intention of the parties at the time of contracting (see Yap Son On v Ding Pei Zhen [2017] 1 SLR 219 at [30]). The question then becomes: what did the parties objectively intend to be a necessary deduction?

(e) To answer that, one must have regard to the nature and purpose of a security deposit in the context of residential leases. As explained by Tribunal Magistrate Jared Kang Chern Wey in JHK v JHL and another [2026] SGSCT 16 at [37], a security deposit serves as security for a tenant’s performance of the tenancy agreement. It gives a landlord a readily accessible pool of funds to rectify a tenant’s defaults without having to resort to litigation, and is most commonly drawn upon to offset losses arising from damage to the property or the need to reinstate it at the end of the tenancy. Critically, a security deposit is not paid to a landlord absolutely. This is why a landlord is typically obliged to return the security deposit by the deadline stipulated in a tenancy agreement. Ultimately, a landlord’s entitlement to draw on a security deposit is governed by the terms of the tenancy, and it is those terms – interpreted in their proper context – that define the scope of any permissible deduction.

(f) In some cases, the terms of a tenancy agreement may expressly provide for deductions in specific situations. For instance, it may provide that upon early termination, the tenant is liable to compensate the landlord for the prorated agent’s commission for the balance duration of the lease. In other cases, the terms may go further and provide for the complete forfeiture of the security deposit, such as where a tenant terminates early or allows illegal immigrants to reside in the property. But the point is the same in either case: the tenancy agreement itself must provide for those specific situations. Without such express provision, a landlord has no right to draw on or forfeit the security deposit.

(g) Turning to the TA, it was a bare two-page room rental template that was silent on when a deduction under clause 6.2 would be regarded as necessary. Given the nature and purpose of a security deposit as described above, a necessary deduction under clause 6.2 must, in my view, be interpreted as referring to deductions needed to rectify damage caused by the Claimant to the Room. The TA contained no express provision entitling the Respondent to forfeit the deposit upon early termination, and if she wanted such a right, it was incumbent on her to have provided for it expressly. Having failed to do so, she cannot rely on the early termination as a basis for forfeiture. As the Respondent adduced no evidence that the Room was left in a state of disrepair such that reinstatement works were needed, she had no basis under clause 6.2 to withhold the security deposit.

65 To conclude on the fifth factor, the Respondent had no real prospect of success at trial on any of the three reasons she advanced for withholding the security deposit. This factor therefore weighed significantly in favour of dismissing the Set Aside Application.

66 I turn finally to address the fourth, sixth and seventh factors together, as there is some degree of interplay between them. These concern, respectively, whether allowing the Set Aside Application would entail a retrial on matters of fact already investigated by the tribunal, whether the public interest in finality in litigation would be compromised, and whether there was a likelihood of a real miscarriage of justice occurring if the Set Aside Application were not allowed.

67 I begin with the fourth factor. At the trial on 30 September 2025, I had already heard the oral testimonies of the Claimant and her witness, [JCY], and made findings of fact in the Respondent’s absence. Allowing the Set Aside Application would therefore necessitate a complete retrial – requiring the Claimant and [JCY] to attend before the tribunal again, be re-examined, and relive a process they had already been put through once. While a costs order could in principle compensate the Claimant for this, I did not think that was a satisfactory answer. The claim concerned a relatively modest sum of $800, and the need for a retrial would have arisen solely because of the Respondent’s deliberate absence. To put the Claimant and her witness through further time, effort and expense in those circumstances would, in my judgment, be plainly unfair. The fourth factor therefore weighed against the Respondent.

68 The fourth factor does not operate in isolation, however. As observed in Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green (No 3) [1979] Ch 496 at 505, where setting aside a judgment would require a complete retrial on matters of fact already investigated by the court, an applicant would need to present overwhelmingly strong reasons before the court could be persuaded to reopen the matter and put the successful party once more at risk in a way that could scarcely be compensated in costs. In other words, the prospect of a retrial serves to amplify the weight to be given to the sixth factor – viz, the public interest in finality in litigation. It is for this reason that the two factors are considered together.

69 That public interest in finality is particularly strong in the context of SCT proceedings, as is evident from the narrow appellate framework under the SCTA. Since its inception, s 38(1) has permitted appeals to the HC against the tribunal’s order only on a question of law, or on the basis that the claim fell outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction. In my view, this reflects the principle of proportionality – viz, that the time and cost of pursuing a claim in the SCT should not outstrip the value of the claim itself. This sentiment was echoed by the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Law, Prof S Jayakumar, during the second reading of the Small Claims Tribunals (Amendment) Bill (Bill 29 of 2005) – a Bill that further tightened the appellate framework by requiring a party to first obtain leave from the DC before appealing to the HC. He observed that “[t]he scope for an appeal is deliberately narrow, to promote finality, and to avoid high costs in appealing that may exceed… the sum in dispute” (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (21 November 2005) vol 80 at col 1829).

70 This strong public interest in finality in litigation is further underscored by two other features of the SCTA. First, even where leave to appeal to the HC is granted, s 39(2) bars the HC from reversing or varying any finding of fact made by the tribunal or receiving further evidence. A party dissatisfied with the tribunal’s factual findings therefore cannot take a second bite of the cherry on appeal, since the HC is barred from reversing or varying those findings. Second, s 40 provides that orders made by the tribunal outside of s 35(1) – such as an order to dismiss a set aside application under s 41(1) – are final and not appealable.

71 Against that backdrop, I saw no good reason to compromise this strong public interest in finality in litigation. As mentioned earlier, the amount in dispute was relatively modest, the Respondent’s absence at trial was deliberate and unexcused, and she had no real prospect of success on the merits. The sixth factor therefore weighed firmly against the Respondent.

72 As for the seventh factor, I was satisfied that there was no likelihood of a real miscarriage of justice if the Set Aside Application were not allowed. As I noted at [30] and [44] above, I did not doubt that the Respondent had sustained injuries and was experiencing some degree of physical discomfort at the material time, and I was not unsympathetic to her situation. However, as I explained at [51]–[53] and [56] above, the irresistible inference from her conduct was that she had made a calculated choice about which proceedings to participate in – present when it suited her, and absent when it did not. Critically, this was not a case where the Respondent had been prematurely shut out from defending herself – she had been afforded not one but two opportunities to attend trial and defend herself, and chose not to do so on both occasions. The Default Judgment was therefore the direct consequence of her own deliberate and inexcusable absence. Moreover, as I concluded at [65] above, she had no real prospect of success on the merits in any event. In those circumstances, it could not therefore be said that declining to set aside the Default Judgment would give rise to any real miscarriage of justice, and the seventh factor accordingly also weighed against the Respondent.

73  To sum up, having weighed the factors from Su Sh-Hsyu, I was satisfied that the balance fell decisively in favour of dismissing the Set Aside Application. Whilst the second and third factors favoured the Respondent, they were decisively outweighed by the first, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh. I therefore dismissed the Set Aside Application pursuant to s 41(1) of the SCTA and ordered that the Default Judgment stand.

74 I turn now to set out my reasons below for awarding costs and disbursements in the Default Judgment.

75 I start with costs. As I have explained in JFP v JFQ [2026] SGSCT 4 at [127]–[132], the tribunal’s power to award costs was initially limited to frivolous or vexatious claims that were dismissed. That changed with the introduction of s 35(1)(f) of the SCTA through the Small Claims Tribunals (Amendment) Act 2018, which conferred a much broader power to award costs. As explained by Edwin Tong Chun Fai, the then Senior Minister of State for Law during the second reading of the Small Claims Tribunals (Amendment) Bill (Bill No 23 of 2018), this was intended to address cases where a litigant was “unusually disruptive, uncooperative or contemptuous” such as to cause the proceedings to “be unreasonably stretched out” (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (9 July 2018) vol 94).

76 The present case was precisely one where the proceedings were unreasonably stretched out by the Respondent’s conduct. The first day of trial on 25 August 2025 was wholly wasted by reason of her absence, and I accordingly ordered her to pay the Claimant $501.29 as costs thrown away. I was satisfied that this was warranted notwithstanding that the Respondent had filed the 25 August CCD Application and produced the 23 August MC, for two reasons.

(a) First, the 25 August CCD Application was filed far too late. Para 46(5) of the SCPD required such applications to be filed at the earliest possible juncture. On the Respondent’s own account in the Police Report, she was injured on 13 August 2025, sought medical attention on 18 and 19 August 2025 due to difficulty breathing, and received the X-Ray Report dated 19 August 2025, which indicated a suspected rib fracture (see [29(c)] above). The basis for a CCD Application therefore existed by 18 August 2025 at the earliest, or 19 August 2025 at the latest. Instead, the Respondent waited until 12.24 am on the morning of the trial itself to file it. I did not doubt that she was in some discomfort during this period, but that did not explain the delay – if anything, her condition as early as 18 or 19 August 2025 was precisely the reason why she should have acted promptly. Had she done so with the relevant supporting evidence, and had I allowed the application, the tribunal’s registry would have had the opportunity to notify the Claimant of the adjournment in advance, sparing her and [JCY] from taking leave from work and attending on 25 August 2025, only to find that the trial could not proceed.

(b) Second, and in any event, the 25 August CCD Application was substantively deficient. The 23 August MC – its sole supporting document – failed to comply with the MC Requirements even though the Respondent had been informed of them verbally twice on 11 August 2025 (see [19] above). I accordingly rejected it and declined to excuse the Respondent’s absence pursuant to para 14(5) of the SCPD. Critically, the evidence that actually shed light on the Respondent’s physical condition – i.e., the 11 September MC, the Police Report, and the X-Ray Report – were only placed before the tribunal for the first time as supporting documents for the 15 September CCD Application, and were not before me on 25 August 2025. Whatever the true extent of her injuries, the 23 August MC as filed gave me no proper basis to excuse her absence. Compounding matters, as stated at [20] above, the Respondent falsely declared in the 25 August CCD Application that she had obtained the Claimant’s consent to the postponement, when in truth she had never approached the Claimant at all, in breach of paras 46(6) and 46(7) of the SCPD.

77 To conclude on costs, I make one observation. A CCD Application is not granted as of right. Unless approved, the default position is that a trial proceeds as scheduled. The fact that I did not enter default judgment against the Respondent on 25 August 2025 did not mean I regarded her absence as excusable. Having regard to the expense and inconvenience visited upon the Claimant, it was only fair and reasonable that she be compensated for costs thrown away, fixed at $501.29. This amount represented the aggregate value of one day of annual leave consumed by both the Claimant and [JCY], and the shift allowance they would have earned as nurses had they not taken leave that day.

78 Turning to disbursements, I allowed the Claimant’s claim in full and ordered the Respondent to pay $235.18, as I was satisfied that all the expenses had been reasonably incurred in prosecuting her claim. The expenses comprised: (a) $142 for transportation to attend consultations and the trial at the State Courts Towers; (b) $75.50 for professional transcription and translation services of audio recordings; (c) $1 for purchasing CDs to submit her audio evidence; (d) $10 for filing her claim in the SCT; and (e) $6.68 for serving her claim by registered post.

79 To close, I will make one observation. The CA in Su Sh-Hsyu at [39] spoke of the strict judicial policy of adhering to hearing dates and times religiously and issued a strong caution against parties who viewed them airily. I can do no better than to reproduce the CA’s caution in full:

The present judicial policy in relation to the religious and punctilious observance of hearing dates and minimal tolerance for unmeritorious adjournments has not and will not be modified. This strict judicial policy remains a vital cornerstone that ensures the systematic administration of justice and maximises the optimisation of judicial resources to most advantageously serve the public interest. Court hearing days and time, being scarce and expensive resources, should not be wasted… It follows that strong compelling grounds must prevail before the court will consider the exercise of its discretion to vacate trial dates… where the court had fixed dates, it would require “cogent reasons” before such dates were vacated. The Singapore standard of “strong compelling grounds” is a higher threshold that requires demonstrably convincing reasons to move a court to exercise its discretion. In this regard, we should also add that the court’s sympathies will certainly not lie with litigants and/or solicitors who exhibit a callous disregard for adherence to trial or hearing dates that have been fixed. Parties and/or solicitors who airily view court schedules and hearing dates as being flexible or elastic will have to accept the usually irreversible consequences if their misplaced assumptions turn out to be incorrect.

[emphasis added in bold and underline]

80 The strict judicial policy articulated by the CA applies with equal force to proceedings before the SCT. Consultation and trial slots are a finite public resource that must be shared across the thousands of litigants who come before the tribunal each year. To illustrate the scale of demand: between 2021 and 2024, some 40,452 claims were filed in the SCT, yielding a yearly average of approximately 10,113 claims (see Small Claims Tribunals in Singapore: Accessible • Affordable • Empowering (Thian Yee Sze and Sandra Looi Ai Lin eds) (Academy Publishing, 2025) at p ix). When a litigant deliberately chooses not to attend a consultation or trial that has been scheduled, that slot is not merely wasted – it is taken away from another litigant who could have availed herself of it to have her matter moved along or adjudicated. Every wasted slot means someone else is made to wait longer, and this must be minimised as far as possible. As the old adage goes, justice delayed is justice denied.

81 Ultimately, however, the need for expeditious adjudication is not an end in itself – it is grounded in two broader imperatives.

(a) The first is one of the core tenets of the rule of law: in the context of civil disputes, a state must provide means for their adjudication without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay (see Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin Books, 2011) at p 85). The importance of the rule of law is not merely an academic point – it has very real and tangible consequences, as Singapore’s own history attests. As Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon observed in an extra-judicial context, Singapore began its independent existence in 1965 as a small and vulnerable nation, bereft of natural resources, a natural hinterland, or a common market. In those trying circumstances, economic growth was the only viable path to survival, and it was the unwavering commitment to the rule of law as the bedrock of society that undergirded Singapore’s remarkable economic transformation (see Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, Supreme Court of Singapore, “Reimagining the Rule of Law: A Renewed Conception”, speech at Conversations With the Community (20 September 2024) at paras 16–18). The rule of law is therefore not an abstraction to be taken lightly – it is a principle that has played, and will continue to play, a foundational role in Singapore’s development and prosperity.

(b) The second imperative is the need to ensure that the time and resources spent pursuing a claim are proportionate to its value – a consideration that is especially acute in the SCT, where the sums in dispute are relatively modest in the broader context of civil litigation. The SCT was established to provide accessible and affordable justice, and that promise rings hollow if the process of obtaining it becomes unduly protracted.

82 Both imperatives point in the same direction: consultation and trial slots in the SCT must be treated with the same seriousness and rigour as those in any other court. A litigant who airily views them as flexible or elastic does a disservice not only to the tribunal, but to every other litigant waiting in line. One who deliberately absents herself without strong compelling reasons should not expect the tribunal’s indulgence. That is all the more so where the absence is not the product of genuine incapacity, but of a calculated choice about which judicial proceedings to engage with.