1 The claimant agreed to carry out renovation works at the first and second respondents’ flat, with most of the price payable by monthly instalments. He now seeks payment of instalments which have fallen due. The respondents, in turn, say that parts of the work were defective and seek the cost of putting them right. There is also a dispute about the third respondent’s position. He signed the written agreement but says that he did so as a guarantor for the other two respondents. The case therefore requires me to determine the obligation he assumed, the amount presently payable under the agreement, and the allowance which the evidence supports for defective work.

2 The written agreement is dated 24 December 2024. It provided for an initial payment of $1,220 and a further $17,200 payable by 36 instalments. The first instalment was $1,450 for December 2024. The remaining 35 instalments were $450 each, payable monthly from January 2025 to November 2027, on the 18th of each month. The agreement also provided that subsequent instalments would remain payable despite incomplete work or outstanding touch-ups, and contained a provision for accelerated payment of the unpaid balance upon default. The parties separately agreed on two additional sink doors for $160 and work on the doorway to the service-balcony for $80. Those additional works fell outside the original written agreement.

3 The claimant, whom I shall call Mr C, carries on a renovation business as a sole proprietor. The first and second respondents, Mr R1 and Ms R2, are the homeowners. The third respondent, Mr R3, is Ms R2’s father. The agreed works included kitchen cabinetry, construction of a sink support and installation of the kitchen sink. Mr C was also to remove an L-shaped wall between the hall and kitchen, carry out specified tile touch-ups, and remove the doorframe of the common toilet and make good the surrounding area. There is no dispute that other contractors also worked at the flat: one installed the replacement toilet door, and another later laid vinyl flooring over the existing floor. The homeowners additionally arranged some work directly with workers involved in Mr C’s renovation. I heard evidence from Mr C and all three respondents on 25 September 2026. No other witnesses were called.

4 Mr C seeks payment under the written agreement. He accepts that the respondents have paid him $6,960 in total and that this includes the $160 and $80 mentioned at [2] above for the additional sink doors and service-balcony work. Mr C’s original demand was for the remaining $11,700 under the written agreement. At the hearing, however, he confined the relief sought to instalments which had fallen due and expressly stated that he no longer sought accelerated payment of the rest in these proceedings. He maintains that all three respondents signed the agreement and remain bound by its payment terms.

5 The respondents say that the defective work should be put right before Mr C requires further payment. They also challenge the copies of the agreement which he produced. Their own copy bears Mr R1’s and Ms R2’s signatures, while the spaces for Mr C and Mr R3 are blank. Mr C produced two further copies bearing all three respondents’ signatures, with different signatures for his business. Mr R1 and Ms R2 say that they signed only once and did not separately sign those copies. Mr R1 therefore alleged that their signatures had been forged. Mr R3, for his part, acknowledged the signature shown to him, but said that he understood the paper presented by the secretary to be a guarantee and signed without reading it thoroughly. Mr R1 likewise said that the staff had spoken of a separate guarantee. The respondents also rely on messages from the business referring to a guarantor. Their objection thus concerns both how the signatures came to appear on Mr C’s copies and whether Mr R3 undertook the same payment obligation as the homeowners.

6 The respondents’ counterclaim originally sought $12,550 for six categories of work: $2,830 for the sink cabinet, including its internal panels and access opening; $2,800 for the toilet doorway and proposed work to its frame; $610 for electrical work; $2,350 for uneven flooring where the L-shaped wall had been removed; $2,430 for holes left in the cabinets and damage to their surfaces; and $1,530 for misaligned cabinet doors and unsatisfactory fittings. They rely on photographs, messages and a report setting out proposed repairs and prices. Mr R1 attributed the report to a contractor he had found online, but its maker did not give evidence. At the hearing, however, Mr R1 withdrew the claim for electrical work after Ms R2 confirmed that the work had been arranged privately with a worker, and not Mr C. Further, Ms R2 also complained about the appearance of a glass panel and frame installed between the kitchen and service yard, but Mr R1 confirmed that the frame was outside the counterclaim, and no sum was being sought for that complaint.

7 Mr C disputes his responsibility for several of the matters in the counterclaim. In particular, he says that the cabinet within the sink support was privately arranged between the homeowners and his carpenter, who supplied it without charge. As to the toilet doorway, he says that he removed the old frame and touched up the area, while another contractor installed the replacement door. He also distinguishes his work on the tiled floor from the later installation of vinyl. His account is that removing the L-shaped wall revealed a difference between the levels of the existing hall and kitchen floors. He filled the strip exposed by the wall with matching tiles, but says that the homeowners declined the additional expense of hacking and retiling the kitchen to bring both floors to one level.

8 As to the cabinetry, Mr C says that fittings were repositioned during installation, including at the homeowners’ request, and that the holes were touched up. He considers the workmanship satisfactory and says that any misalignment could be corrected by adjusting the hinge screws. He also explains that he replaced the hydraulic supports for the overhead kitchen cabinet doors without charge after the homeowners asked for fittings which would hold the doors open. More generally, he disputes the need for the substantial replacement works proposed in the report adduced by the respondents.

9 The respondents, however, maintain that the cabinets were supplied with poor finishes and misaligned doors, and that the floor was already uneven before the vinyl was laid. They also say that the dish rack was installed too high for Ms R2 to use practically. They seek money to engage another contractor to put right the defects for which Mr C is responsible.

10 Against that backdrop, three issues arise. First, what follows from the respondents’ objections to the copies of the agreement, and what obligation did Mr R3 assume? His position also requires consideration of the Small Claims Tribunals’ (“SCT”) jurisdiction over the claim against him. Second, how much is presently payable after taking account of the payments already made and Mr C’s decision to seek only accrued instalments? Third, which defects have the respondents proved, and what sum should be allowed to put them right? I will address the issues in that order.

11 I begin with the objection concerning the signatures. Mr R1 and Ms R2 accept that they signed the copy which they retained. Their concern is that the same signatures appear on the further copies produced by Mr C, although they did not sign those copies separately. Mr C explained that his secretary signed for the sole proprietorship first and that he later signed a copy himself. That explains how there are different signatures on behalf of the business. As to how Mr R1 and Ms R2’s signatures appear on different copies, it seems to me likely that the page bearing their signatures was photocopied before the other signatures were added to the resulting copies. That would explain why Mr R1’s and Ms R2’s signatures are identical in both shape and position across the copies. That said, it is unnecessary to reconstruct that process to determine the homeowners’ obligations. Their retained copy records the terms which they accepted, and Mr R1 ultimately confirmed that the terms in the other copies were the same. The respondents’ continuing concern about the reproduction of the signatures therefore supplies no basis for finding that a different bargain was imposed on the homeowners.

12 Mr R3’s position needs to be dealt with separately because his signature is absent from the homeowners’ retained copy. His name, however, is already printed on that copy, both among the persons to whom the agreement is addressed and beneath a space provided for his signature. When shown the signature against his name on Mr C’s copy, he accepted that it was his. He also confirmed that he attended the office and signed one document. His evidence was that he understood that document to be a guarantee, although he candidly admitted that he had not read it thoroughly. That, however, still leaves the question of the obligation recorded by his signature.

13 The nature of that obligation depends on the agreement read in its context. Contractual interpretation is an objective exercise: the starting point is the language used, considered with the relevant circumstances which were clear, obvious and known to the parties, and the meaning adopted must be one which that language can reasonably bear (see, eg, CIFG Special Assets Capital I Ltd (formerly known as Diamond Kendall Ltd) v Ong Puay Koon and others and another appeal [2018] 1 SLR 170 at [19]). Here, all three respondents are named in the agreement and sign beneath the same words, “Agreed by”. Those features give Mr C’s position some force. Nevertheless, the payment provisions state the amounts and dates for payment without expressly identifying each signatory as a principal debtor. The circumstances in which Mr R3’s signature was sought therefore matter.

14 In this regard, the business’s own messages provide a clear explanation. The respondents adduced messages from the business. One of those messages was titled “In-house loan requirements”, and it distinguishes the documents required from the owners from those required from a guarantor, and says that both are to attend to sign the agreement. A further message asks for the guarantor’s name and particulars so that the business can prepare the revised agreement. The reply supplies photographs of Mr R3’s identity card. ¹ These messages, in my view, quite clearly connect Mr R3 with the role for which the business sought another person’s participation. They also explain why a guarantor would be named in, and asked to sign, the same document as the homeowners. His inclusion in that document is therefore consistent with the arrangement described by the business.

15 Mr R3’s evidence at the hearing fits that arrangement. He said that Mr R1 brought him to the office to sign as a guarantor and that the secretary presented the paper as a guarantee. Granted, he could not recall her exact words and accepted that he had not read the document thoroughly. His account of the substance of what she conveyed was nevertheless clear, and the business’s written messages support it. In his witness statement, Mr R1 likewise described the staff telling him that Mr R3 would sign a separate guarantee. ² I therefore accept that Mr R3 was asked to sign in that capacity. To be clear though, I must emphasise that this conclusion rests on the communications surrounding his signature, considered together. Had Mr R3 merely asserted his understanding of the document that he signed—but admittedly did not read—I would not have found that sufficient to reach the same conclusion.

16 Read in that context, Mr R3’s assent to the payment terms is most naturally understood as an undertaking to answer for the homeowners’ failure to pay according to those terms. I therefore find that Mr R3 signed as a guarantor and did not assume the homeowners’ primary obligation to pay the renovation price. In my view, that finding is not inconsistent with his signature appearing in the same instrument, seeing as how the instrument does not specify his particular obligation, and a reasonable person reading it in the context of the business’s own messages would understand him to have undertaken the role of guarantor.

17 A guarantor’s liability is collateral to, and depends upon, the principal debtor’s liability and default (see Low Kee Yang, The Law of Guarantees in Singapore and Malaysia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd Ed, 2003) at p 52, cited by the Court of Appeal in PT Jaya Sumpiles Indonesia and another v Kristle Trading Ltd and another appeal [2009] 3 SLR(R) 689 at [50]). That being Mr R3’s position as I have found, a question then arises as to whether the SCT has jurisdiction over Mr C’s claim against him. Section 5(1)(a) of the Small Claims Tribunals Act 1984 (“SCTA”) confines the SCT’s subject-matter jurisdiction to specified claims. The relevant category, in para 1(a) of the Schedule, is “a claim relating to a contract for the sale of goods or the provision of services”. Mr C’s claims against the Mr R1 and Ms R2 fall within that category because he seeks the price payable under their renovation contract. The claim against Mr R3, by contrast, rests on his collateral undertaking to answer for their default. I must thus consider whether the statutory category extends to the enforcement of that undertaking.

18 I recognise that the guarantee supports payment for the renovation services and is recorded in the same instrument. The words “relating to” could, read broadly, encompass that connection. Those words must, however, be read with the contractual categories which Parliament has specified. The Schedule defines a limited subject-matter jurisdiction, within which a claim must fall before the tribunal may determine it (see JFO v JFN [2026] SGSCT 3 at [13]–[18]). In my view, the category concerning goods and services requires attention to the contractual undertaking which supplies the right asserted against the particular respondent. Extending it to a distinct undertaking to secure another person’s debt would bring an entirely different kind of contractual claim within the SCT’s jurisdiction merely because the secured debt arose from a qualifying transaction.

19 I took a similar approach in JJA v JJB [2026] SGSCT 21. There, I explained that, had a proposed settlement of a tenancy dispute been concluded, any right to payment under it would have arisen from the settlement itself. Its connection with the tenancy would therefore have been insufficient to bring a claim under it within the SCT’s jurisdiction over residential leases (see [45]–[46]). Of course, the present case concerns a guarantee which supports the homeowners’ continuing obligations, and that is an entirely different kind of contract from a compromise. Nevertheless, Mr C’s right to payment from Mr R3 would arise from Mr R3’s promise to answer for their default. It is that separate promise which Mr C would have to enforce. In my view, the fact that the debt guaranteed is payment for renovation works does not bring the claim against Mr R3 within the statutory category concerning contracts for the provision of services.

20 Accordingly, I conclude that the claim against Mr R3 falls outside para 1(a) of the Schedule and discontinue it under s 5(5) of the SCTA. As this conclusion disposes of that claim on jurisdictional grounds, I make no determination of the guarantee’s enforceability, its extent, or the amount, if any, recoverable under it. Those matters remain open should Mr C pursue the claim before a court of competent jurisdiction. The claims between Mr C and the homeowners can, however, proceed, and I turn next to the amount payable for the renovation works before considering the homeowners’ complaints about their condition.

21 With the parties’ respective positions established, I turn to the payments. Mr C produced a handwritten record setting out the agreed charges, the payments received and the instalments to which they were applied. The respondents also produced records of transfers and the corresponding receipts. ³ At the hearing, there was initially some disagreement as to the amount actually paid to Mr C. However, this was because Mr R1 had counted some receipts as further payments in addition to the transfers which they recorded. Once all the transfer records and receipts were reconciled, Mr R1 accepted that $6,880 had been paid, apart from the separate $80 charge. This gives a total of $6,960. Of that, $240 paid for the additional works identified at [2] above, leaving $6,720 towards the original contract price of $18,420. Mr C’s record applies that $6,720 to the initial $1,220, the first instalment of $1,450 and nine further instalments of $450.

22 The unpaid balance under the original agreement is therefore $11,700. However, as mentioned at [4] above, Mr C now seeks only the part of that balance which has fallen due. As at today, 14 October 2026, 12 further instalments have fallen due, from October 2025 to September 2026 inclusive. At $450 each, they amount to $5,400. The remaining 14 instalments, from October 2026 to November 2027, total $6,300. I therefore take $5,400 as the accrued debt, subject to the counterclaim which I now consider.

23 The instalment provision mentioned at [2] means that incomplete work or outstanding touch-ups do not, by themselves, postpone the agreed payment dates. It also leaves Mr C responsible for carrying out the works properly. A person who undertakes to supply skilled services for payment ordinarily owes an implied contractual obligation to exercise reasonable skill and care (see, eg, Go Dante Yap v Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG [2011] 4 SLR 559 at [24]). The service of home renovation is plainly one requiring skill. Mr C was accordingly required to exercise that care in performing the renovation works which he undertook. The respondents may consequently recover compensation for a failure to do so. For each complaint, however, Mr R1 and Ms R2 must be able to identify the agreed work, prove that Mr C’s performance fell short, and establish the losses that followed.

24 Where defective work is proved, the reasonable cost of putting it right may provide the appropriate measure of damages, even if the respondents have yet to pay for the repairs. The proposed work and its cost must, however, be reasonable and proportionate to the benefit of obtaining proper performance (see Terrenus Energy SL2 Pte Ltd v Attika Interior + MEP Pte Ltd and another appeal [2025] 1 SLR 306 at [39]–[45] and [53]–[60]). The report adduced by the respondents (cf [6] above) proposes a mix of repairs as well as substantial replacement. That being the case, it should be noted that a defect which can be adequately repaired does not, without more, justify replacing the whole item. Equally, however, the fact that a defect can notionally be repaired does not mean that the cost of replacement cannot be recovered where repair would leave the item short of the condition promised and replacement would be reasonable and proportionate.

25 With all that in mind, I turn to the respondent’s report. Headed “Defect Inspection Report”, it contains photographs, descriptions of the alleged defects, proposed repairs and prices. ⁴ Mr R1 attributed it at the hearing to an “Emilio’s Solutions”, a contractor he had found on Carousell. The report is, however, unsigned and undated, and its maker was also not called by the respondents as a witness to explain it and be subject to questioning. Section 28(1) of the SCTA permits me to consider it without being bound by the ordinary rules of evidence. However, its weight naturally requires calibration.

26 The way the report has been adduced certainly reduces the weight I may place on it given that the respondents must prove both their loss and its amount. That being said, the law “does not demand that the plaintiff prove with complete certainty the exact amount of damage that he has suffered” (see Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd and another [2008] 2 SLR(R) 623 at [27]–[31]), and I accept that the respondents have put in the evidence reasonably available to them even if it is not the best evidence.

27 Therefore, in assessing the report, I begin by considering its estimates alongside the photographs, the videos tendered by the respondents, as well as the parties’ oral evidence. Nevertheless, as the report is not especially detailed, and its maker was absent, the weight I can give it—as I mentioned—is limited, especially as regards proposals in need of elaboration. My analysis will thus proceed through each head of the counterclaim; for each, I will assess the defect proved in Mr C’s performance (if any), and will only allow those sums which I find sufficiently supported by the evidence.

28 I begin with the cabinet beneath the kitchen sink. Items 8, 17 and 19 of the parties’ agreement provided for construction of the sink support, installation of laminate kitchen cabinetry, and installation of the sink and its pipes. Mr C accepts that his carpenter supplied the internal panels, but says that this was a private favour for the homeowners, who wanted to keep a bin there. Granted, the homeowners made private arrangements with workers elsewhere, and the separate charge for the sink doors shows that some work in this area fell outside the original agreement. The question remains whether these particular panels formed part of Mr C’s agreed work.

29 On this point, the respondents adduced a WhatsApp exchange in which Mr R1 sent Mr C a photograph of the cabinet and asked why it had no backboard. Mr C replied that the back had been left open for future repairs and offered to attend and check the works. ⁵ In his witness statement, he also described the sink support as protecting the wood beneath the sink and the cabinet door as concealing the pipes while preserving access and ventilation. ⁶ Those statements do not expressly admit responsibility for every internal panel. However, read with the agreed cabinet work and the photographs, they persuade me that the panels formed part of his undertaking. I therefore prefer the homeowners’ account to his explanation of a private arrangement with the carpenter.

30 As to the cabinet’s condition, the report includes a photograph showing rough finishing around the opening in its base panel. It prices refinishing the panel at $180 and sealant and edge finishing at $120. Those operations address the condition shown, and I accept $300 as a reasonable repair cost. The evidence does not, however, establish that a backboard was promised, that access to the plumbing was inadequate, or that demolition and replacement were necessary. Further, the earlier photograph accompanying the backboard complaint shows a substantially cleaner surface than the later photograph in the report. I therefore cannot attribute all the later dirt and residue to Mr C’s work, and make no further allowance under this head.

31 Item 5 of the parties’ agreement required Mr C to demolish the common toilet doorframe and touch up the white wall tiles. He accepts that he removed the frame and touched up the area. Mr R1 nevertheless says that the finish was left rough, and the respondents’ photographs support that complaint. One shows the affected side without the replacement aluminium frame; others show rough patching around the fitted frame. ⁷ Although undated, those photographs, considered with the agreed work and the parties’ evidence, persuade me that Mr C inadequately made good the area affected by his work. Another contractor’s installation of the replacement door does not account for the whole of the condition shown.

32 The report prices cosmetic wall repair at $800. This covers plaster repair, patching and repainting, and I accept it as a reasonable estimate for remedying the poor finish. The further $1,800 sought in the counterclaim as the sum needed to remove and reinstall the frame depends on whether it was incorrectly positioned. The report recommends checking its position first. The need for that work therefore remains unproved; moreover, the respondents accept that it was another contractor that installed the frame. I therefore do not allow this sum. Finally, the remaining $200 for labour is not apportioned between the wall repair and the proposed work on the frame. I therefore allow only $800 under this head, with no additional sum for labour.

33 The respondents’ complaint concerns the tiled floor beneath the vinyl, which another contractor installed. Both sides agree that removing the L-shaped wall exposed a narrow strip which Mr C filled with matching tiles, while the existing tiles on either side were retained. Mr C estimated that strip at about 13 to 14 centimetres wide. Item 10 of the parties’ agreement also required tile touch-ups in that area. Those works had to be performed with reasonable care. Although the agreement did not expressly require Mr C to relay the hall and kitchen floors throughout, that limitation would not excuse a poorly formed join between them. The question is therefore whether the unevenness establishes defective performance of the work which he undertook.

34 I accept that the slope was present before the vinyl was installed. On 13 March 2025, Mr R1 sent Mr C a photograph of the tiles and asked why there was a slope. ⁸ Mr C himself acknowledged in his witness statement that there was a slight slope where the new tiles had been laid. His explanation was that the existing hall and kitchen floors differed in level, and that the homeowners had declined the additional work of hacking and retiling the kitchen. ⁹ At the hearing, he estimated that difference at about one centimetre. His account thus provides an explanation for the slope which must be considered alongside the respondents’ complaint. The fact that the new tiles sloped does not, by itself, establish that they were improperly laid where the work involved joining retained floors of different levels.

35 The photographs and report do not adequately resolve that question. The respondents’ photographs of a spirit level on the vinyl show unevenness, but do not enable me to determine how the tiled strip compares with the retained floors on either side. ¹⁰ The report likewise describes a localised hump in the vinyl, identifies an uneven underlying floor and improper vinyl installation as possible causes, and recommends inspecting the underlying floor before applying levelling compound if required. ¹¹ It therefore leaves the cause unresolved. In particular, it does not explain whether the new strip introduced an additional hump or whether the condition shown reflects the difference between the retained floors described by Mr C.

36 There is nevertheless evidence that another method of dealing with the difference in level may have been available. Ms R2 said that Mr C knew of the intended vinyl installation and referred to another contractor’s view that the area could have been levelled before tiling. Mr C also accepted that a small difference in level could be accommodated by preparing the surface beneath the vinyl. I therefore do not proceed on the basis that hacking and retiling were necessarily the only means of achieving a level finish. However, the other contractor did not give evidence explaining the condition inspected, the work required or how Mr C’s tiled join was deficient. The possibility of further preparation for the vinyl does not itself establish that the agreed tiling was performed without reasonable care.

37 Finally, Mr R1 said that Mr C had agreed to remind his workers to rectify the slope. ¹² That assurance lends support to the respondents’ case and requires consideration. Mr R1 places the conversation during the hacking works, however, and his account does not explain whether the unevenness then discussed concerned work still in progress or the difference between the retained floors. Nor does it establish that Mr C undertook, as part of the agreed price, to bring those floors to a common level. I have weighed that assurance and the early complaint against Mr C’s explanation, the agreed retention of the surrounding tiles, and the limitations of the photographs and report. Taken together, the evidence does not persuade me, on the balance of probabilities, that the completed strip or touch-ups were defective, or that Mr C failed to perform a further undertaking to level the floors. I therefore dismiss the claim for $2,350.

38 Turning to the cabinet surfaces, the respondents’ photographs show conspicuous patches inside the cabinets and doors where hinges and other fittings had been moved. ¹³ Mr C says that adjustments were necessary and that some were requested by the homeowners. Even so, the resulting surfaces required a proper finish. His view that the cabinets looked satisfactory from the outside does not answer the condition of their internal surfaces. Further, in a WhatsApp exchange dated 14 March 2025, Mr R1 sent photographs of the marks and complained about the holes. ¹⁴ That contradicts Mr C’s suggestion that the homeowners had not raised the matter while making their instalment payments. I find that the finishing was defective.

39 Mr C also recounted the carpenter’s explanation that the homeowners accepted the holes because he had done other work for them without charge. The carpenter did not give evidence, and the homeowners’ complaint and continued objections weigh against that account. I am therefore not satisfied that they agreed to accept the deficient finish. As to the remedy, the report proposes filling, sanding and refinishing as an alternative to replacing the affected door. It prices “Fill, sand & touch-up finish” at $130. The photographs support the need for that repair, and I accept the estimate.

40 I therefore allow $130 under this head. The report’s further $250 entry for “Laminate cabinet” does not explain whether this is an alternative repair or additional work. Since the $130 item already includes finishing, I cannot allow both. The need to replace the doors, hinges, dish rack or glass, or to reconstruct the cabinet, has likewise not been established. Nor does the report explain what labour or debris charges are required beyond the accepted repair. Those sums are therefore disallowed. Ms R2’s complaint about the dish rack’s height does not justify a further award either. Even accepting her difficulty in using it, the report does not assess that complaint, and the evidence does not establish the work needed to address it or its cost.

41 The report also contains photographs of adjoining cabinet doors with uneven gaps. Its maker describes contact and abrasion when the doors are opened and closed, and recommends adjusting the hinges. ¹⁵ Mr R1’s evidence that several doors were misaligned supports that account. I am satisfied that adjustment is required, and Mr C himself says that any misalignment can be corrected by adjusting the screws. I therefore allow the report’s estimate of $180. The further $250 for realignment appears to cover the same work, with no evidence justifying both charges. Replacement hinges or doors have not been shown to be necessary, while laminate replacement is proposed only for abrasion which cannot otherwise be remedied. That need has not been established, and I allow no further sum for those items or labour.

42 The remaining complaint concerns the hydraulic supports for the overhead kitchen cabinet doors. Among the WhatsApp messages adduced by Mr C is a complaint dated 11 August 2025 that a door could not open fully. His witness statement says that he replaced the supports in response. ¹⁶ At the hearing, he explained that the original fittings allowed the doors to close slowly but required them to be held open. He replaced them without charge with stronger supports which held the doors open, although they then had to be closed by hand. The agreement required soft-closing hinges. Nevertheless, the evidence does not sufficiently identify a continuing defect after the replacement or establish why another replacement was needed. I therefore make no further award for the fittings.

43 The counterclaim therefore succeeds in favour of Mr R1 and Ms R2 for $1,410: $300 for finishing the sink panel and its opening, $800 for repairing the wall around the toilet doorway, $130 for repairing the cabinet surfaces, and $180 for adjusting the cabinet doors. The claim in respect of electrical works was withdrawn, and the remaining sums claimed have not been proved. Further, as stated at [6], no relief was sought concerning the glass and frame between the kitchen and service yard, so I make no determination of that complaint. Mr R3 is also named as a counterclaimant. However, no separate entitlement to the cost of repairing the homeowners’ flat has been established in his favour, and I make no monetary award to him.

44 Deducting the counterclaim award of $1,410 from the accrued instalments of $5,400 leaves $3,990. I therefore order Mr R1 and Ms R2 jointly to pay Mr C that sum by 28 October 2026. This is one sum payable by them together; payment by either reduces the amount outstanding for both. It accounts for the unpaid instalments through September 2026 and the counterclaim, which cannot be deducted again from later instalments. The claim against Mr R3 is discontinued for the reasons given at [20] above.

45 Given Mr C’s express position that he seeks the missed instalments and continuation of the later payments, the contract remains on foot. The next instalment of $450 falls due on 18 October 2026, after today’s judgment but before the deadline of 28 October for paying the judgment sum. That instalment remains separately payable on 18 October, in addition to the $3,990 ordered above. Subsequent instalments remain payable on the 18th of each month through November 2027. Mr C himself stated that he no longer sought accelerated payment of the entire balance in these proceedings, and the order accordingly covers only the accrued instalments after allowing the counterclaim. I make no order as to costs or disbursements.