1 The claimant, Ms C, brought this claim against her former tenant, Mr R, for unpaid rent and several other sums which she said arose from the early termination of their tenancy. I heard the parties on 23 October 2026 and allowed the claim in part, giving brief oral reasons.

2 Though the dispute was straightforward, I think it useful to give these fuller grounds of my decision principally to explain why I dismissed one of Ms C’s heads of claim: that is, for a daily charge of $30 which the parties’ tenancy agreement provided Mr R would incur each day “rent remains outstanding”. According to Ms C, it was her property agent who suggested including such a charge, but she could offer no explanation for how the $30 figure had been derived. Ms C’s property agent was not called as a witness. In any event, Ms C’s understanding was that the charge was intended to discourage non-payment. Given the widespread use of standard forms in preparing tenancy agreements in Singapore, the question of how such a charge should be assessed may have relevance beyond this dispute, and that is—as I said—the principal reason I give these fuller grounds.

3 The parties’ tenancy agreement was dated 18 June 2026 and provided for a term of one year, from 19 June 2026 to 18 June 2027. Rent was $2,900 per month and was payable in advance on the 19th of each month. Mr R paid the first month’s rent, as well as a security deposit of $2,900. However, he made no further rental payments after that.

4 The agreement also provided for the circumstances in which Ms C could bring the tenancy to an early end. In particular, cl 5(a) provided:

5 Clause 5(b) addressed non-payment more specifically. Apart from the daily charge mentioned above, it provided:

6 It was on the basis of those provisions that Ms C brought the tenancy to an early end. She had given written notice requiring Mr R to leave on 24 August. According to her, she called the police that day after attending the flat with two agents and receiving no answer at the door. Mr R was subsequently given until 26 August to leave, and he left on that date, returning both sets of keys issued to him. Some of his belongings remained in the flat until 1 September, when movers collected them. However, Mr R himself was not permitted to enter the flat after he had returned possession.

7 As to why he had left, Mr R said that a police officer had told him on 24 August that, if he refused to leave, he would be treated as trespassing and taken into lock-up. When I asked whether he meant that the officer had said he would be arrested, he confirmed that this was so. He also said that he had asked for a court document authorising his removal, but had been told by the police that this was unnecessary. Although, according to Mr R, his lawyer friends had advised him that this was a civil dispute, he said that he had left under pressure and out of concern for his mother. Before going any further, I should make clear that I make no finding as to whether the police had in fact told Mr R what he claimed, but I will return to this part of his account below.

8 Against that background, Ms C claimed $4,209 in rent through 1 September, $1,320 in late charges, $1,152 towards the agency commission, $134.35 for cleaning and $10.50 for a padlock, making $6,825.85 in all. After crediting Mr R with the $2,900 security deposit, the amount claimed stood at $3,925.85. She further reduced the late charges by $320, from $1,320 to $1,000, leaving a net claim of $3,605.85. Mr R did not dispute that rent had gone unpaid. He nevertheless resisted the late charges, and also relied on the circumstances of his departure to dispute the cleaning expense. As for the commission, his objection concerned alleged disturbances during the tenancy and the agent’s handling of his complaints. I will first address those other parts of the claim before returning to the late charges.

9 I begin with rent. Ms C’s reason for claiming rent through 1 September was that Mr R’s belongings had remained in the flat until then. However, she accepted that he had returned possession on 26 August: he had handed back the keys and was thereafter prohibited from entering the flat personally. His belongings had to be collected through movers. In those circumstances, I did not think that the continued presence of his belongings justified treating his liability for rent as continuing until 1 September. I therefore only allowed rent through 26 August, inclusive of that day. This comprised $2,900 for 19 July to 18 August and, using Ms C’s 31-day basis, $748.39 for the eight days from 19 to 26 August, making $3,648.39 in all.

10 Mr R nevertheless remained obliged to clear his belongings when he returned possession. That obligation applied upon early termination, and the agreement expressly contemplated termination on as little as 24 hours’ written notice once rent had remained unpaid for more than seven days. Ms C was therefore entitled to recover any loss proved to have resulted from his failure to clear the flat. The question was what loss she had suffered. There was, however, no evidence that the belongings had prevented her from letting the flat earlier, or that she would otherwise have been able to let it between 26 August and 1 September. Nor had any other loss from their continued presence been proved. In those circumstances, I awarded nominal damages of $93.55, representing one day’s rent, to recognise the breach without treating the tenancy as having continued until the belongings were collected.

11 Next, for her claim to reimbursement of the agency commission, Ms C relied on cl 5(c), which provided:

I accepted her evidence that she had paid $1,450.01 on 5 September under a deferred payment arrangement with the agency. Of that sum, she sought reimbursement of $1,152, which she had calculated by reference to the 290 days from 2 September 2026 to 18 June 2027 within the remaining unfulfilled term.

12 Mr R’s objection to this part of the claim arose from what he described as “debt-collection activity” at the flat. The incident for which he had a record occurred on 20 August. On his account, a man had knocked on the door, asked for the landlord and shown him a photograph of another man. Upon learning that Mr R was the tenant, the visitor left a letter for the landlord. Mr R later found another envelope under the door, but he had not seen who had delivered it. Mr R’s explanation was this: he believed that the man in the photograph was Ms C’s husband, though he accepted that he did not know whether she was married or, if so, what her husband looked like. The basis of his belief, instead, was that the visitor had mentioned a name, and that name matched the other name appearing alongside Ms C’s in the property registration. In any case, after the incident, Mr R sent a photograph of the visitor and the two letters to Ms C’s agent, who said that he would relay the matter. According to Mr R, however, he received no response thereafter.

13 Mr R regarded those events as a breach of his right to quiet enjoyment under the agreement. Taking his argument at its highest, I understood him to be saying that Ms C had herself breached the agreement before terminating it, and that she should therefore not be permitted to recover the commission from him. This argument was, however, misconceived. Even assuming that Ms C had breached the agreement, that would not, without more, have brought the tenancy to an end or released Mr R from his obligations under it. He did not contend that he had acted on any such breach to terminate the tenancy before Ms C did. Indeed, when asked whether the incidents entitled him to terminate the agreement or stop paying rent, he said that this was not his argument. Mr R also did not adduce proof of any loss suffered because of the incident which could support a deduction from the commission claimed. Thus, as it was his failure to pay rent that had led to the early termination, and cl 5(c) required him to reimburse Ms C for the commission she had paid in respect of the unfulfilled tenancy period, I accordingly allowed her claim for $1,152.

14 I turn next to the cleaning expense. Clause 2(z) provided:

Ms C’s claim was for cleaning after Mr R had left. And, in this regard, I accepted her evidence that the flat required cleaning and that she had paid $134.35 for that work on 8 October.

15 Mr R’s objection was that he had been required to leave and was therefore unable to clean the flat himself. I accepted that he could not do so after access had been withdrawn. However, Ms C was entitled under cll 5(a) and 5(b) to recover possession following the prolonged non-payment and written notice, and he had been given until 26 August to leave. Further, cl 2(z) expressly required him to return the flat in the stipulated condition upon “earlier termination”, so that obligation applied when he returned possession. In those circumstances, I did not think that his inability to clean the flat personally thereafter meant that Ms C had to bear the reasonable expense of doing so. I therefore allowed the $134.35 claimed.

16 Finally, Ms C claimed $10.50 for a padlock. This claim was premised on her explanation that Mr R’s mother had seemed reluctant to return the second set of keys, which led her to suspect that duplicates might have been made. It was accepted, however, that both sets of keys issued to Mr R at the beginning of the tenancy had been returned. The mere hesitation of Mr R’s mother which Ms C described was, in my view, plainly insufficient to establish that duplicates had been made. There was therefore not enough evidence to justify requiring Mr R to bear the cost of a padlock bought to address that concern. I accordingly dismissed this part of the claim.

17 Before turning to the late charges, I should return to what Mr R said the police had told him. I have already made clear that I make no finding as to whether his account was true (cf [7] above). Nevertheless, it raises a point which merits explanation. A clause permitting the landlord to re-enter does not, by itself, resolve every question about the tenant’s position. The exercise of that right may be subject to restrictions, and the tenant may, in appropriate circumstances, obtain relief preserving or restoring the tenancy.

18 Sections 18 and 18A of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1886 are the starting point. Where s 18 applies, the landlord must first serve a notice specifying the breach, requiring it to be remedied if it is capable of remedy, and requiring monetary compensation. The right of re-entry or forfeiture becomes enforceable only if the tenant fails, within a reasonable time thereafter, to remedy the breach where possible and make reasonable compensation (see s 18(1)). The tenant may also apply for relief, which the court may grant on appropriate terms after considering the parties’ conduct and all the circumstances (see ss 18(2)–18(4)). However, s 18(9) expressly preserves the separate law governing re-entry, forfeiture and relief for non-payment of rent. Section 18’s requirements therefore do not apply to forfeiture on that ground (see Protax Co-operative Society Ltd v Toh Teng Seng and another [2001] SGHC 84 (“Protax”) at [15]).

19 For non-payment of rent, s 18A applies where the landlord brings an action to enforce a right of re-entry or forfeiture. Broadly, where the action is confined to forfeiture for non-payment and recovery of the arrears, the tenant can preserve the tenancy and bring the action to an end by paying all the arrears and costs into court within the prescribed initial period. If the action proceeds to trial and the court finds the landlord entitled to possession on that ground, its order must allow at least four weeks from the date of the order for payment into court of the arrears and the costs directed. The court may extend that period before possession is recovered under the order (see ss 18A(1)–18A(6)). To be clear, however, these provisions operate within court proceedings. Nothing about s 18A imposes a general requirement that a landlord give four weeks’ notice before exercising a right of re-entry privately.

20 Indeed, court proceedings are only one means by which forfeiture may be effected. Where a landlord’s contractual right to forfeit for non-payment of rent has arisen and has not been waived, the landlord may exercise it by peaceably re-entering and taking back possession with the intention of ending the tenancy. In that situation, the re-entry itself effects forfeiture, and no prior court order is required (see Protax at [18]). Accordingly, the protections in s 18A do not apply. However, it is nevertheless important to note that a notice of termination alone does not achieve the result of forfeiture, as the Appellate Division explained in Campbell Hospitality Pte Ltd and others v Marchmont Pte Ltd and another appeal [2025] 1 SLR 816 (see [49] and [60]–[61]). Further, even after a landlord has lawfully forfeited the tenancy by peaceable re-entry, the court may still grant equitable relief and restore possession to the tenant on appropriate terms (see Protax at [16]).

21 All this is to say that a tenant faced with a demand to leave may therefore have several matters to consider: whether the landlord’s right to forfeit has arisen, whether that right has been validly exercised, and whether relief may be available. The existence of a re-entry clause does not, by itself, answer all those questions. Against that background, if the police told Mr R that he would be arrested for trespass unless he yielded to Ms C’s demand for re-entry—and I emphasise that this is an if—the suggestion that his refusal to leave would justify his arrest would require careful consideration of his legal position and the basis for exercising any police power. Of course, the possibility of obtaining relief does not itself entitle a tenant to remain in possession or establish that an arrest would be unlawful. Equally, the landlord’s reliance on a re-entry clause does not itself establish the contrary. I make no finding on those matters, or on whether Mr R would have obtained relief. My observation is simply that tenants facing such a demand should consider their position carefully and seek legal advice where necessary.

22 With that, I return then to the late charges, which the tenancy agreement addressed in the opening sentences of cl 5(b):

Ms C calculated $1,320 for the 44 days from 20 July to 1 September and, after the reduction mentioned earlier (cf [8] above), she sought $1,000. Ms C also said that, had Mr R approached her about his difficulties earlier, she might have negotiated with him and the late charges might not have arisen.

23 I could readily understand Ms C’s concern about receiving rent on time. She had financial commitments of her own, and the agreement plainly required punctual payment. However, the additional $30 became payable only because Mr R had failed to perform his obligation to pay rent. The charge was therefore subject to the rule against penalties. Under our law, the question is whether the stipulated payment was a genuine pre-estimate of likely loss when the contract was made. A payment which is extravagant and unconscionable compared with the greatest loss that could conceivably follow from the breach is unenforceable (see Denka Advantech Pte Ltd and another v Seraya Energy Pte Ltd and another and other appeals [2021] 1 SLR 631 (“Denka Advantech”) at [185(a)]–[185(b)], [254] and [305]). It was for Mr R to establish that the charge was penal (see Denka Advantech at [287]).

24 What that means, for present purposes, is that the charge must be capable of justification by reference to the loss which late payment might cause. Certainly, agreeing in advance to compensate a landlord for that loss may also encourage the tenant to pay punctually, but the landlord’s desire to secure punctual payment cannot itself justify whatever additional sum might be thought effective in doing so. Granted, the position differs in England, where wider interests in performance may be considered (see Snell’s Equity (Steven Elliott gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 35th Ed, 2025) (“Snell”) at para 13-015, n 135). However, our law provides that the relevant interest is compensation (see Denka Advantech at [185(b)]). I therefore had to consider whether the daily sum provided for by cl 5(b) could reasonably be explained by the loss which delayed payment might cause Ms C.

25 Here, the rental debt itself remained payable, as the award I have explained reflects. Any added losses from delay would, in my view, principally arise from being kept out of that money. A landlord who relies on rent to meet other financial commitments might, for example, have to obtain funds elsewhere, and incur a cost in doing so. There might also be reasonable expenses in pursuing payment. Those possibilities warrant consideration, particularly as Ms C gave evidence about her own financial difficulties. Further, the parties were entitled to allow for uncertainty when fixing compensation in advance. They did not have to predict the eventual loss precisely, and a clause does not become penal simply because it produces more than the loss ultimately suffered (see Snell at paras 13-017 and 13-020).

26 Under cl 5(b) of the parties’ tenancy agreement, however, a delay of 30 days attracted $900 in additional charges, or approximately 31% of the monthly rent of $2,900. Further, that daily charge remained the same even if a substantial part of the rent had been paid. Thus, for example, if the tenant had paid $1,900 and left only $1,000 outstanding, another 30 days’ delay would still attract $900. The landlord would then be kept out of a smaller sum of money, but the charge for being kept out of it would, on the face of cl 5(b), remain unchanged. There was therefore some difficulty explaining the charge by reference to the loss of use of the unpaid rent.

27 I recognised, of course, that the cost of pursuing payment might not vary with the amount outstanding. Sending a demand, for example, might cost much the same whether the tenant owed $1,000 or $2,900. That could explain why an allowance for recovery expenses would not diminish with the arrears. Even so, that would not, by itself, explain why the charge should increase by $30 with every further day of delay: an expense incurred once would not be incurred afresh simply because the debt remained unpaid. Certainly, further recovery efforts might generate additional expenses as the default continued, and the parties could estimate those expenses in advance without matching each daily charge to a particular expense incurred that day. Nevertheless, the question remained whether those anticipated expenses, considered together with the loss of use of the unpaid rent, could reasonably account for a charge accumulating at $900 every 30 days, for as long as any rent remained outstanding. It was the relationship between that accumulating liability and the anticipated loss as a whole which required examination.

28 I should emphasise that this examination depended on the particular agreement and the losses which the parties could reasonably have contemplated when they made it. In Zhang Jinxia and another v Zhu Yuhua [2026] SGHC(A) 3, the Appellate Division upheld a clause which provided for default interest of 0.5% per day, limited to 30 days, following a 12-month interest-free loan. The court considered the whole bargain, including the parties’ comparable bargaining position, and found that the challengers had not shown the charge to be extravagant compared with the greatest conceivable loss (see [23]–[25] and [27]). That decision is a useful illustration of why daily rates must be considered in the setting of the relevant agreement as a whole. In the present case, however, the charge was unlimited in duration and would remain unchanged even if the amount outstanding were reduced. Those features, together with the substantial sum produced by a month’s delay considered as a whole, gave me a materially different basis for assessing its relationship with anticipated loss.

29 There remained the question of the burden which, as I have said, rested on Mr R. Though he had to establish that the charge was penal, it did not follow that he had to produce further evidence regardless of what was already before the tribunal. In Ethoz Capital Ltd v Im8ex Pte Ltd and others [2023] 1 SLR 922, the Court of Appeal explained that sufficient evidence already before the court could require an answer from the party seeking to enforce the provision (see [69]–[77]). There, the substantial increase from the ordinary contractual rate to the default rate supplied sufficient evidence that the provision was prima facie penal. The court then considered the lender’s explanation of its anticipated losses and found that its bare assertion did not justify the increase (see [97]–[99]). Thus, the terms of the agreement themselves could supply the evidence which called for an explanation.

30 In this case, the substantial charge for a month’s delay, together with its continued application at the same rate to any remaining balance, was sufficient to call for an explanation by reference to anticipated loss. Ms C was expressly asked how the figure had been arrived at and how it related to the loss which late payment might cause. She explained why she wanted to encourage punctual payment, but could not explain how the amount chosen related to that loss. Granted, the absence of evidence that an estimate had actually been made did not, by itself, necessarily decide the matter (see Denka Advantech at [299]). Nevertheless, Ms C’s answer had to be considered alongside the amount of the charge and the way it continued to apply, without a ceiling and even if most of the rent had been paid. Taking those matters together, I was satisfied that Mr R had established that the charge was extravagant and unconscionable compared with the greatest loss that could conceivably follow from late payment under this tenancy. It was therefore an unenforceable penalty.

31 It made no difference to that conclusion that Ms C might have negotiated a concession, or that she had subsequently reduced her claim from $1,320 to $1,000. The provision had to be assessed as it stood when the parties agreed to it. Its enforceability did not depend on whether Ms C later chose to insist on the whole sum. Nor, once I had found the charge to be penal, could I simply reduce it to an amount which I considered acceptable; the parties were left to their ordinary remedies (see Snell at paras 13-020 and 13-023). I therefore dismissed the claim for late charges in its entirety.

32 That is also why I thought it useful to explain this part of my decision in fuller grounds. On Ms C’s account, she had accepted a figure suggested by her agent and understood it to deter non-payment, though she could not explain how that figure had been derived. The frequent use of standard form contracts by property agencies, including major agencies, gives that account some wider significance. This agreement was itself based on such a form. It seems to me, therefore, that there is a real possibility of provisions of similar structure and purpose being considered for other tenancies. That possibility makes it useful to explain what such a provision must satisfy if it is to be enforced.

33 I am, of course, not suggesting that this particular clause appears in other agreements, or that a late-payment charge is, by its nature, unenforceable. As I said, a charge may compensate for anticipated loss while also encouraging punctual payment. The question remains whether, considered in the setting of the particular agreement and at the time it was made, the charge was a genuine pre-estimate of loss. Thus, where a provision of similar structure and purpose is contemplated, those preparing or adopting it should consider what loss it is intended to compensate, and whether both the amount and the way the charge operates can reasonably be explained on that basis.

34 In conclusion, for the reasons given above, I allowed Ms C’s claim for $3,648.39 in rent, $93.55 in nominal damages, $1,152 for commission and $134.35 for cleaning, making a total of $5,028.29. After I credited the $2,900 security deposit, the balance payable was $2,128.29. I awarded a further $20 in disbursements and made no order as to costs. The total payable by Mr R to Ms C was therefore $2,148.29.

35 As to payment, Mr R requested to pay by instalments because he had no fixed income. He initially proposed 12 months and subsequently sought six monthly payments starting in January 2027. Ms C was willing to defer the start of payment until January, but sought payment over three months. I agreed with her that extending repayment over too long a period would be unfair, given the sum involved. Ultimately, after considering both parties’ positions, I ordered payment in four monthly instalments falling due on 1 January, 1 February, 1 March and 1 April 2027.