IN THE GENERAL DIVISION OF
THE HIGH COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

[2026] SGHC 244

Originating Application No 45 of 2026 and Summonses Nos 392, 1529, 2118 and 2159 of 2026

Between

(1) Dave Nitin Harivadan
(2) 9 Gems Energees Consultants Pte Ltd

… *Applicants*

And

Law Society of Singapore

… *Respondent*

GROUNDS OF DECISION

[Administrative Law — Judicial review]
[Administrative Law — Remedies — Mandatory order]
[Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Amendment]

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Dave Nitin Harivadan and another
v
Law Society of Singapore and other matters

[2026] SGHC 244

General Division of the High Court — Originating Application No 45 of 2026 and Summonses Nos 392, 1529, 2118 and 2159 of 2026
See Kee Oon JAD
5 October 2026

25 November 2026

See Kee Oon JAD:

Introduction

1 The applicants in the present case sought permission to apply for mandatory orders compelling the Law Society of Singapore (referred to herein as "Law Society" or "Respondent") to investigate claims of professional misconduct against two lawyers. After hearing the parties, I dismissed the application and gave brief oral reasons for my decision. These are my detailed grounds of decision.

Background

2 On 15 March 2024, Mr Dave Nitin Harivadan ("Mr Harivadan") submitted a complaint dated 13 March 2024 ("Complaint") to the Law Society alleging, among others, fraud and misconduct on the part of Justice Philip

Jeyaretnam (in his capacity as a then-practising lawyer) and Mr Chu Hua Yi ("Mr Chu").[1] As the Complaint referred to Jeyaretnam J in his capacity as a practising lawyer, I refer to him in this decision as "Mr Jeyaretnam".

3 The Complaint was brought by Mr Harivadan on behalf of 9Gems Energees Consultants Pte Ltd ("9Gems"), a company which had been voluntarily struck off the Register of Companies around September 2022.[2] The alleged fraud and misconduct identified in the Complaint pertained to the conduct of HC/S 610/2016 ("S 610"), wherein Mr Jeyaretnam and Mr Chu acted for 9Gems, the plaintiff.[3] By way of background, in June 2016, 9Gems commenced the action in S 610 against one KVK Energy and Infrastructure Pte Ltd, seeking damages for breach of contract.[4] On 28 March 2018, the second day of trial in S 610, 9Gems agreed to withdraw the suit with costs of $30,000 payable to the defendant.[5] At all material times, Mr Harivadan was the sole director of 9Gems.[6]

4 Following Mr Harivadan's filing of the Complaint on 15 March 2024, Mr Harivadan and the Law Society exchanged further correspondence regarding the Complaint, lasting nearly two years.[7] I set out the pertinent exchanges below:

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1 Respondent's Bundle of Documents (Vol 2) ("RBOD-2") at p 8: 2nd Affidavit of Lam Yi Wen Rachel dated 29 April 2026 ("2-LYWR") at para 10.

2 RBOD-2 at p 331: 2nd Affidavit of Dave Nithin Harivadan dated 28 January 2026 ("2-DNH") at paras 6–7.

3 RBOD-2 at pp 23–27: 2-LYWR, Exhibit 2 (Complaint dated 13 March 2024).

4 RBOD-2 at pp 51–69: 2-LYWR, Exhibit 2 (Statement of Claim dated 6 January 2017).

5 RBOD-2 at p 26: 2-LYWR, Exhibit 2 (Complaint dated 13 March 2024).

6 RBOD-2 at p 338: 2-DNH, Exhibit (ACRA Business Profile of 9Gems).

7 RBOD-2 at pp 9–11: 2-LYWR at paras 11–17.

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(a) Between 26 March 2024 and 19 April 2024, Mr Harivadan sent numerous emails to the Law Society, submitting additional information and documents which he claimed to be in support of the Complaint.[8] During this time, Mr Harivadan also forwarded and/or copied the Law Society in various emails sent to the Judiciary, wherein he made a complaint and request for investigation against Mr Jeyaretnam and Belinda Ang J (as she then was), the Judge who presided over the trial of S 610 in March 2018.[9]

(b) On 26 April 2024, the Law Society wrote to Mr Harivadan to inform him that he should not "forward information and documents to the Law Society in a piecemeal fashion". The Law Society also stated that part of the Complaint was out of the prescribed timeline under s 85(4A) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) ("LPA"), and that if Mr Harivadan wished to proceed with his entire complaint, he was required to state his reasons for delay in making the Complaint, so that the Council of the Law Society ("Council") could consider whether to seek the necessary leave from court for the Complaint to be processed in its entirety.[10]

(c) On 28 April 2024, Mr Harivadan wrote to the Law Society that because the date of the "main incident of Deceit" was a court hearing which took place on 28 March 2018, the six-year period under s 85(4A) of the LPA only expired on 29 March 2024.[11]

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8 RBOD-2 at pp 103–123: 2-LYWR, Exhibit 3.

9 RBOD-2 at pp 108–123: 2-LYWR, Exhibit 3.

10 RBOD-2 at pp 9 and 124–127: 2-LYWR at para 11, Exhibit 3.

11 RBOD-2 at pp 136–143: 2-LYWR, Exhibit 4.

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(d) Between 28 April 2024 and 9 May 2024, Mr Harivadan sent further emails to the Law Society, submitting further information and documents in support of the Complaint.[12]

(e) On 27 May 2024, Mr Harivadan sent an email to the Law Society that he was "in the process of securing documents to prove the clear link between the Registrar, Plaintiff's solicitor, Judge and Defendant's solicitors to backstab the Plaintiff using a systematic pre planned process involving forgery of information and evidence", and that he would provide an update "soon".[13]

(f) The Law Society did not hear from Mr Harivadan until 21 April 2025, when he sent an email to the Law Society informing them that he would be "adding a new folder in the DROPBOX with the files as shown below".[14] Between 29 April 2025 and 3 June 2025, Mr Harivadan sent further emails to the Law Society, as well as the courts (with the Law Society in copy), submitting further information and documents.[15]

(g) On 24 September 2025, the Law Society wrote to Mr Harivadan to ask that he confirm that "any documents and/or events referred to in [his] complaint which had occurred prior to 15 March 2018 … [were] meant only as background information to [his] complaint".[16]

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12 RBOD-2 at pp 129–170: 2-LYWR, Exhibit 4.

13 RBOD-2 at p 172: 2-LYWR, Exhibit 5.

14 RBOD-2 at pp 183–184: 2-LYWR, Exhibit 6.

15 RBOD-2 at pp 183–222: 2-LYWR, Exhibit 6.

16 RBOD-2 at pp 224–226: 2-LYWR, Exhibit 7.

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(h) On 21 November 2025, Mr Harivadan wrote to the Law Society stating that "[a]dditional clarifications cannot be avoided in any complaint/case". Mr Harivadan further stated: "While the correspondence or evidence or court documents etc. may be dated post 28 March 2018 or 15 March 2024, all the Misconducts, Negligence, Fraud of the accused have occurred prior to this date. All the documents refers [*sic*] to events before March 2018."[17]

(i) On 1 December 2025, Mr Harivadan wrote to the Law Society attaching a statutory declaration and "complaint addendum" dated 1 December 2025, which he said he was duly authorised by 9Gems to make.[18] For context, 9Gems (which had been voluntarily struck off the Register of Companies in 2022; see [3] above) was restored to the Register of Companies at Mr Harivadan's application, on 28 March 2025.[19]

(j) Between 4 December 2025 and 30 December 2025, Mr Harivadan and the Law Society engaged in further correspondence regarding the details of the Complaint.[20]

OA 45

5 On 13 January 2026, Mr Harivadan and 9Gems (together, the "Applicants") filed the present application in HC/OA 45/2026 ("OA 45"), seeking a mandatory order compelling the Law Society to "act and promptly

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17 RBOD-2 at pp 228–237: 2-LYWR, Exhibit 8.

18 RBOD-2 at pp 239–284: 2-LYWR, Exhibit 9.

19 RBOD-2 at p 332: 2-DNH at para 8.

20 RBOD-2 at pp 285–310: 2-LYWR, Exhibit 9.

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perform its legal obligation" ("Mandatory Order").[21] The prayer in OA 45 was subsequently amended by consent as a prayer for *permission* to apply for a mandatory order in the same terms, on 14 April 2026:[22]

> … Judicial review requesting a court mandatory order forcing respondent to act and promptly perform its legal obligation due to respondent's following failures:
>
> a. failure to act or perform it's [*sic*] statutory duty with efficiency
>
> b. did not initiate review and inquiry panel for more than 21 months with an agenda to do undue favours to Philip Antony Jeyaretnam and Chu Hua Yi regarding complaint dated 15 Mar 2024.
>
> c. delibrate [*sic*] violation of Section 85(1A) i.e. failure to form review panel and activate the inquiry panel promptly
>
> d. intentionally ignoring Section 85(4A) for hidden agenda
>
> e. refusing to use all available evidence so that respondent can cover up the fraud of Philip Antony Jeyaretnam and Chu Hua Yi
>
> f. recycling issues for intentional timewasting tactics and harassing complainant
>
> g. relying on fraud to coverup fraud
>
> h. doing undue favours to Philip Antony Jeyaretnam in view of the conflicts because the respondent is an ex-president of the Law Society; a sitting judge at the High Court and The President of the Singapore International Commercial Court
>
> i. investigate influence of Philip Antony Jeyaretnam on the respondent's illegal coverup and desperate moves to protect Philip Antony Jeyaretnam and Chu Hua Yi

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21 Respondent's Bundle of Documents (Vol 1) ("RBOD-1") at pp 245–246: Originating Application dated 13 January 2026.

22 RBOD-1 at pp 249–250: Originating Application (Amendment No 1) dated 14 April 2026.

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Events subsequent to the filing of OA 45

Filing of SUM 392 on 30 January 2026

6 On 30 January 2026, Mr Harivadan sought the court's permission to represent the second applicant 9Gems in OA 45, in HC/SUM 392/2026 ("SUM 392"). The Law Society did not contest SUM 392.[23]

Law Society's letters dated 30 and 31 March 2026

7 On 30 March 2026, the Law Society informed Mr Harivadan that the Council would refer the Complaint, insofar as it related to alleged acts of misconduct occurring *after* 13 March 2018 (*ie*, six years prior to the filing of the Complaint), to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel ("Inquiry Panel"). The Chairman would appoint a review committee to review the Complaint ("RC") and if necessary, an inquiry committee to inquire into the Complaint ("IC"). The Law Society also informed Mr Harivadan that after careful consideration, the Council determined that it would not seek the leave of court to refer the alleged acts of misconduct occurring *prior* to 13 March 2018 to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel; the Council was also unable to refer the allegation of fraud to the Chairman.[24]

8 On 31 March 2026, the Law Society informed Mr Harivadan that as the Complaint was pending before the Chairman, it would not correspond further with him on the Complaint until after the reports of the RC and/or the IC were received and considered by the Council.[25]

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23 Respondent's Written Submissions dated 10 September 2026 ("RWS") at fn 2.

24 RBOD-2 at pp 12–13: 2-LYWR at paras 19–20.

25 RBOD-2 at p 13: 2-LYWR at para 22.

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Filing of SUM 1529 on 18 May 2026

9 On 18 May 2026, the Applicants filed HC/SUM 1529/2026 ("SUM 1529"), seeking the following prohibitory and mandatory injunctions:[26]

> 1. PROHIBITORY INJUNCTIONS:
>
> > i. Respondent should NOT randomly remove the FRAUD aspect from the Complaint filed by the Applicants / Complainants.
> >
> > ii. Respondent should NOT ignoring [sic] section 85(4B) (b) of the LPA 1966.
> >
> > iii. Respondent should NOT falsify the dates of misconduct by PHILIP ANTONY JEYARETNAM & CHU HUA YI
> >
> > iv. Respondent should NOT tamper, manipulate, delete or ignore any documents referred in the three Statutory Declarations dated 13 March 2024, 01 December 2025 and 5 December 2025.
> >
> > v. Just because PHILIP ANTONY JEYARETNAM is an Ex-President of the Respondent; sitting High Court Judge; President of the Singapore International Commercial court does not mean Respondent can do undue favours to him and protect him by openly violating law.
> >
> > vi. Respondent to be fair, professional and ethical with integrity in its investigation of the instant case.
>
> 2. MANDATORY INJUNCTIONS:
>
> > i. Inquiry Panel Chairman to HOLD the investigation until the full set of documents are shared by the Respondent
> >
> > ii. Respondent to provide Copy of the incomplete set of documents which has already been used to refer the Complaint to the Inquiry Panel Chairman.
> >
> > > 1. This is required for establishing the magnitude of the forgery / tampering / manipulation by the Respondent

[26] RBOD-2 at pp 345–346: SUM 1529 filed on 18 May 2026.

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> iii. Respondent to immediately pull-back the trimmed, manipulated and incomplete Complaint from the Inquiry Panel Chairman
>
> iv. Respondent to re-submit the entire Complaint to the Inquiry Panel, which includes all the documents shared by the Complainants / Applicants, including but not limited to the relevant attachments identified in Para 11.d above.

RC Report dated 22 May 2026

10 On 26 May 2026, the RC submitted its report to the Council ("RC Report").[27] The RC found that the allegations made by the Applicants were "bare, misconceived, lacking in substance and […] not supported by documentary evidence", and in some cases contradicted by the documentary evidence.[28] However, on the evidence before the RC, it was unable to determine whether the Applicants' claim of misrepresentation against Mr Chu was misconceived or lacking in substance.[29] The RC ultimately reached the following conclusions:

> (a) In respect of Mr Jeyaretnam, the RC took the view that the Complaint (as defined in the RC Report) was "misconceived and lacking in substance". Accordingly, the RC directed the Council to dismiss the Complaint against Mr Jeyaretnam.[30]

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27 See RBOD-2 at pp 395, 405–416: 3rd Affidavit of Lam Yi Wen Rachel ("3-LYWR"), Exhibit 12 (RC Report dated 22 May 2026).

28 RBOD-2 at p 411: 3-LYWR, Exhibit 12 (RC Report dated 22 May 2026 at para 11).

29 RBOD-2 at p 416: 3-LYWR, Exhibit 12 (RC Report dated 22 May 2026 at para 17).

30 RBOD-2 at p 416: 3-LYWR, Exhibit 12 (RC Report dated 22 May 2026 at para 18(1)).

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(b) In respect of Mr Chu, the RC took the view that the Complaint concerning the alleged misrepresentation should be referred back to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel for further investigation.[31]

Filing of SUM 2159 on 10 June 2026

11 On 10 June 2026, the Applicants filed HC/SUM 2159/2026 ("SUM 2159"), seeking relief in the form of the following orders:[32]

> 1. Seeking Approval To Add Review Committee Report For Judicial Review.
>
> 2. Add Inquiry Panel, Review Committee and Inquiry Committee As Respondents.
>
> 3. Urgent & Immediate Hearing of HC/SUM 1529/2026.

12 The third prayer in SUM 2159 for an expedited hearing was withdrawn by the Applicants, with leave of the court, during the hearing before me on 5 October 2026.

Filing of SUM 2118 on 19 June 2026

13 On 19 June 2026, the Applicants filed HC/SUM 2118/2026 ("SUM 2118") seeking an order that OA 45 and all associated summonses be sealed ("Sealing Order").[33]

Hearing of OA 45 and the Summonses

14 OA 45 was heard together with SUM 392, SUM 1529, SUM 2159 and SUM 2118 ("Summonses") on 5 October 2026. After hearing parties, I granted

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[31] RBOD-2 at p 416: 3-LYWR, Exhibit 12 (RC Report dated 22 May 2026 at para 18(2)).

[32] RBOD-2 at p 421: SUM 2159 filed on 10 June 2026.

[33] RBOD-2 at p 506: SUM 2118 filed on 19 June 2026.

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an order in terms of SUM 392, which was uncontested. I dismissed OA 45 and the remainder of the Summonses.

Decision

Overview

15 I note at the outset that the Applicants' written submissions dealt substantially with the Complaint and contained numerous allegations against both the Law Society and the Judiciary.[34] I agreed with the Law Society that these allegations were wholly irrelevant to the application in OA 45, which concerned an application for permission to apply for a mandatory order.[35] As such, in the following sections, I address the Applicants' submissions only insofar as they were relevant for the purposes of determining OA 45 (and the contested Summonses).

16 I deal first with the contested Summonses (*ie*, SUM 1529, SUM 2159, and SUM 2118), before addressing the merits of the application in OA 45.

SUM 1529: Application for injunctions

17 In my view, the injunctions sought by the Applicants in SUM 1529 (see [9] above) essentially sought to challenge the Council's decision not to refer matters which it considered to be time-barred (*ie*, matters occurring prior to 13 March 2018) to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel.

18 The Council's decision was conveyed to Mr Harivadan on 30 March 2026. Crucially, the Council's decision *post-dated the filing of*

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[34] See Applicants' Written Submissions dated 9 September 2026 ("AWS") at paras 11, 14–15, 29 for example.

[35] RWS at para 10.

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OA 45, which took place on 13 January 2026. Allowing the Applicants to, in effect, amend OA 45 to include a prayer for judicial review of the Council's decision, would have offended the rule against amendments to pleadings that introduce a cause of action non-existent at the time of filing of the original pleading (*ie*, the "Relation Back Rule"): see *The "Jeil Crystal"* [2022] 2 SLR 1385 at [37]; *Juniper Biologics Pte Ltd v Ramandeep Singh* [2026] SGHCR 24 at [44].

19 The present case also did not involve a challenge against a public law decision substituted by a further subsequent decision *having the same legal effect*. The Court of Appeal in *Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General* [2012] 4 SLR 476 ("*Tan Eng Hong*"), endorsing the decision in *R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Turgut* [2001] 1 All ER 719, accepted that in such cases, it would be possible for the first decision to be substituted by the second in judicial review proceedings (*Tan Eng Hong* at [168]).

20 While I recognised the Applicants' concern about the potential waste of time and resources in commencing separate judicial review proceedings, I considered this to be a direct consequence of the Applicants' decision to commence and pursue OA 45 *alongside* the statutory disciplinary process prescribed in the LPA. It would have been an abuse of the court process and the judicial review mechanism if the Applicants were allowed to amend OA 45 *as and when* the statutory process produced results that they were dissatisfied with.

21 For the above reasons, I agreed with the Law Society that the Applicants had to separately apply for permission to commence judicial review proceedings in respect of the said decision if they were dissatisfied with the decision. Accordingly, I dismissed SUM 1529.

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SUM 2159: Application for further relief

22 Turning to the first prayer of SUM 2159 (see [11] above), it appeared that the Applicants were seeking in effect to amend OA 45 to include a prayer for judicial review of the RC Report. For the same reasons stated above in respect of SUM 1529, I agreed with the Law Society that a fresh application for permission to commence judicial review proceedings would have to be commenced in respect of the RC's decision, if the Applicants wished to do so.

23 It followed that there was no basis to grant the second prayer, which sought to join the Inquiry Panel, RC and IC as respondents in OA 45. In any event, the Applicants had not explained why there was a necessity to join the additional parties as respondents in OA 45.

24 Accordingly, prayers 1 and 2 of SUM 2159 were dismissed.

SUM 2118: Application for sealing order

25 I turn to address the Applicants' application for the Sealing Order. By way of background, on 31 March 2026, the Attorney-General's Chambers ("AGC") informed the court that Mr Harivadan's affidavit filed in support of OA 45 contained allegations against the Judiciary and drew the Applicants' attention to s 3 of the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (2020 Rev Ed) ("AJPA").[36] Mr Harivadan subsequently informed the court on 13 and 18 June 2026 that he had been interviewed by the police in connection with the use of the term "collusion" in said affidavit.[37]

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[36] See RWS at para 61.

[37] RBOD-2 at pp 501 and 503: Mr Harivadan's letters to court dated 13 and 18 June 2026.

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26 The Applicants subsequently filed SUM 2118, claiming that the AGC had "raised concerns about the issues raised by [the] Applicants" and that the police were "also investigating about [*sic*] potential contempt of court issues".[38] They sought a Sealing Order on the basis that OA 45 was "highly sensitive" and that sealing was "necessary in the interest of justice".[39] Mr Harivadan asserted that it was essential for the Applicants to "be allowed to freely express all the events and details so [that the court] can get the true and full picture", and that "[h]iding facts would lead to upfront injustice".[40]

27 Under s 8(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed), the court has the power to hear any matter in private "if the court is satisfied that it is expedient in the interests of justice", among other situations. However, sealing orders must not be lightly made as they represent a departure from the principle of open justice (*Anurag Avula v MatchMove Pay Pte Ltd* [2026] SGHC 123 ("*Anurag*") at [16]). The court requires "sufficiently compelling countervailing reasons to outweigh the court's strong desire to conduct its proceedings openly and transparently, with the full benefit of public scrutiny" (*Anurag* at [17]).

28 In this case, the Applicants were evidently concerned that the submissions and/or allegations made in OA 45 might have led them to be found in contempt of court. Indeed, the Applicants had made numerous allegations against the Judiciary both in the Complaint and in OA 45, which may have engaged s 3(1)(*a*) of the AJPA. Section 3(1)(*a*) of the AJPA provides:

> **Contempt by scandalising court, interfering with administration of justice, etc.**

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38 RBOD-2 at p 511: 5th Affidavit of Dave Nithin Harivadan at paras 6–7.

39 RBOD-2 at p 511: 5th Affidavit of Dave Nithin Harivadan at para 8.

40 RBOD-2 at p 511: 5th Affidavit of Dave Nithin Harivadan at para 10.

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> 3.—(1) Any person who —
>
> (a) scandalises the court by intentionally publishing any matter or doing any act that —
>
> (i) imputes improper motives to or impugns the integrity, propriety or impartiality of any court; and
>
> (ii) poses a risk that public confidence in the administration of justice would be undermined;
>
> […]
>
> commits a contempt of court.

29 However, the Applicants' concern clearly did not rise to the level of a "sufficiently compelling countervailing reason" (see above at [27]) that outweighed the interest in open justice. I agreed with the Law Society's observation that the Applicants' apparent motivation for obtaining the Sealing Order was the ability to continue making allegations against the Judiciary "with impunity and cover".[41]

30 The threat of contempt did not, and should not have, prejudiced the Applicants' case before the court. The Applicants were *in fact* free to refer to and "express all the events and details" (see above at [26]) necessary to make their case in OA 45, provided that they did so fairly, accurately, and in good faith. In this regard, I highlight that the AJPA provides for the following defences to contempt, among others:

> **Fair and accurate report of court proceeding not contempt**
>
> 14.—(1) Subject to this section, a person is not guilty of contempt of court under section 3(1)(a) or (b) for publishing in good faith a fair and accurate report of a court proceeding or any stage of the proceeding held in public, that was published contemporaneously with, or within a reasonable time after, that proceeding.
>
> […]

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41 RWS at paras 72–73.

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> **Report in good faith made to Chief Justice, police, etc., not contempt**
>
> 16.—(1) To avoid doubt, a person is not guilty of contempt of court under section 3(1)(*a*) by reason that he or she has made a report to the Chief Justice, the police, a law enforcement agency or any other public authority alleging misconduct or corruption on the part of a judge, being a report —
>
> (a) which is made in good faith; and
>
> (b) which discloses grounds which, if unrebutted, would provide a sufficient basis for the investigation of the allegation of misconduct or corruption.
>
> (2) In this section, "law enforcement agency" has the meaning given by the Criminal Procedure Code 2010.

31 In view of the above, I saw no compelling reason to depart from the principle of open justice and accordingly dismissed SUM 2118.

OA 45: Application for permission to apply for the Mandatory Order

Applicable principles

32 In order for permission to commence judicial review proceedings to be granted, the applicant must establish three threshold requirements: (a) the subject matter of the complaint must be susceptible to judicial review; (b) the applicant must have sufficient interest in the matter; and (c) the material before the court must disclose an arguable or *prima facie* case of reasonable suspicion in favour of granting the remedies sought by the applicant (*Qureshi Mohamed Aslam v Majlis Ugama Islam, Singapura* [2026] 1 SLR 411 at [38], citing *Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Attorney-General* [2021] 1 SLR 809 at [9]).

No arguable case

33 I agreed with the Law Society that the Applicants' case failed to satisfy the third threshold requirement of an arguable case in favour of granting the remedies sought (*ie*, the Mandatory Order).

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34 The Applicants sought a mandatory order "forcing [the] respondent to act and promptly perform its legal obligation" (see [5] above). In their submissions, they asked that the court compel the Law Society to "abide by LPA 1966 and its legal, ethical, moral and professional obligations with integrity".[42] However, they did not point to any *specific* legal obligation on the part of the Law Society, which the Law Society had yet to fulfil as at the time of the hearing on 5 October 2026. The only apparent obligation on the part of the Law Society was the obligation to refer qualifying complaints against regulated legal practitioners to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel. In this respect, s 85 of the LPA provides:

> **Complaints against regulated legal practitioners**
>
> 85.—(1) Any complaint of the conduct of a regulated legal practitioner —
>
> (a) must be made to the Society in writing;
>
> (b) must include a statement by the complainant —
>
> (i) as to whether, to the complainant's knowledge, any other complaint has been made to the Society against the regulated legal practitioner, by the complainant or by any other person, which arises from the same facts as the complainant's complaint; and
>
> (ii) if so, setting out such particulars of each such complaint as the Council may require and the complainant is able to provide; and
>
> (c) must be supported by such statutory declaration as the Council may require, except that no statutory declaration is required if the complaint is made by any public officer or any officer of the Institute.
>
> (1A) Subject to subsection (4A), *the Council must refer every complaint which satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) to the Chairperson of the Inquiry Panel.*
>
> […]
>
> [emphasis added]

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42 AWS at para 40.

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35 I agreed with the Law Society that the present case was analogous to that of *Manjit Singh s/o Kirpal Singh v Attorney-General* [2013] 2 SLR 1108 ("*Manjit Singh*"), wherein the court held that there was no purpose in seeking a mandatory order to compel a person to do a particular act, if that act has already been done by the time the court considers the matter (*Manjit Singh* at [133]).[43] As there was no purpose in the mandatory order sought, the intended application did not meet the requirement of an arguable case (*Manjit Singh* at [150]).

36 In the present case, since the Law Society had already referred the Complaint (insofar as it was not time-barred) to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel, there was no purpose in the Mandatory Order sought. The Applicants' case failed to satisfy the third threshold requirement of an arguable case, and the application for permission to commence judicial review proceedings was accordingly dismissed.

Conclusion

37 For the above reasons, I dismissed OA 45 and the contested Summonses and granted an order in terms of SUM 392. The Applicants were ordered to pay costs of $22,000 to the Respondent, in respect of OA 45 and the contested Summonses.

See Kee Oon
Judge of the Appellate Division

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[43] RWS at paras 17–20.

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The applicants in person;
Jaikanth Shankar, Tan Ruo Yu, Manish Chamiraj and Nikhil Sheyan Rakesh (Davinder Singh Chambers LLC) for the respondent;
Sarah Siaw and Grace Morgan (Attorney-General's Chambers) for the non-party (watching brief).

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