1 This is an appeal by the second defendant against the judgment of the learned district judge wherein he allowed recovery of possession against both the first and second defendants. The first defendant has not appealed.

2 The history of the case is as follows: The plaintiffs became owners of 327 Beach Road (the premises), subject matter of the action, sometime in 1972. Prior to that date Messrs Alkaff & Co either the owners or the managers of the property, had rented the premises sometime in 1966 to the first defendant at a rental of $67 per mensem. The premises are rent controlled and the case proceeded on the basis that there was no provision against sub-letting. The first defendant then furnished the empty premises with six writing tables, one steel cabinet, two weighing machines for weighing rubber, ten chairs and a shelf for putting letters (p 52 of Record) and carried on a rubber business there under the firm or style of Buan Guan Heng. It would appear that with the consent of Messrs Alkaff & Co, the first defendant sub-let the premises in 1970 to the firm of Seng Bee Rubber Co, the partners of which at that time were the second defendant and Tay Bok Choon.

3 The plaintiffs purchased the property sometime in 1972 and soon after that they served a notice to quit dated 26 October 1972 (AB2) on the first defendant. As a result thereof the first defendant became a statutory tenant of the plaintiffs as from 1 December 1972. By a further notice to quit dated 6 September 1979 (AB7) and served on the first defendant at the premises the plaintiffs required him to `quit and deliver up possession of the house and premises known as 327 Beach Road, Singapore held by you as tenant` on 31 October 1979 (or on the expiration of the month of his tenancy which will expire next after the end of one calendar month from the time of the service of the notice). The plaintiffs then took out a district court summons on 7 November 1979 against the first and second defendants whereby they sought to recover possession of the premises against the first defendant on the ground that he was not a statutory tenant under s 27(a) of the Control of Rent Act (Cap 266) (the Act) and against the second defendant on the ground that he was in unlawful occupation of the premises.

4 During the course of the trial, more exactly when the first defendant was being cross-examined, the statement of claim was amended as follows:

5 This resulted in amendments to the defences of both the first and second defendants (pp 69 and 70 of the record). So that the claim against the first defendant then proceeded on the basis that he, having become a statutory tenant at the end of the first notice to quit (AB2), was not in possession of the premises when the second notice to quit (AB7) was served on him or alternatively, that at the time of the second notice to quit (AB7) the first defendant had sub-let the premises to the second defendant and was receiving from him in respect of the sub-letting rents in excess of 110% of the recoverable rent in contravention of the provisions of s 15(1)(g) of the Act.

6 Some of the difficulties of the learned trial judge arose from his being under a misconception that the letting of premises in the name of a partnership could not in law create a tenancy. There is clear law that when there is such a letting then all the partners at the time of the letting become joint tenants and the tenancy continues until such time as the last of the joint tenants disappears from the scene. Counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents does not contest this proposition of the law.

7 In the event the learned trial judge found against the first defendant on the alternative ground but made no finding on the original ground of whether the first defendant had ceased at any time to be in possession of the premises after he became a statutory tenant and so had lost the protection of the Act. On the basis of the finding of the learned trial judge, that is to say that the first defendant had offended against the provisions of s 15(1)(g) of the Act it must follow that on the evidence before him he was satisfied that the first defendant was in possession of the premises when the second notice to quit was served and being in possession of the premises had sublet it to the second defendant in contravention of s 15(1)(g) of the Act and made an order for possession against the first defendant. This order operates under s 26 of the Act to protect the second defendant and to make him, on the particular facts of our case, the statutory tenant of the plaintiffs under the section.

8 Plaintiffs` counsel says that by virtue of the three agreements dated 1 October 1973, 1 October 1974 and 1 October 1976 between the first defendant and Seng Bee Rubber Co, new contracts had been entered into whereby new sub-tenancies had been created as between the first defendant, who was a statutory tenant as from the 1 December 1972 and the second defendant and Tay Bok Choon. From here he goes on to say that as the first defendant was not in occupation of the premises he could not create a sub-tenancy in favour of the second defendant and/or Tay Bok Choon and that from this it follows that the second defendant is in unlawful occupation of the premises. However, it is contended on behalf of the second defendant/appellant that the last three agreements were merely extensions of the first agreement dated the 1 September 1970 (exh DIC) for furnished premises which had been entered into previously and that at the time when the second, third and fourth agreements were signed the first defendant was in possession of the premises, as indeed he had always been as from when he first became tenant of the premises from 1966. So that in this case when the first notice to quit was served, and so terminating the contractual tenancy and creating thereafter a statutory tenancy, the sub-tenants of the premises were the second defendant and Tay Bok Choon. It would be noted that all the four so-called agreements are between the first defendant and the firm of Seng Bee Rubber Co. Counsel for the respondent argues that the second, third and fourth agreements operated both as surrenders of tenancies and as creating new tenancies. I do not agree with this contention. On a proper construction of all four documents, I am of the view that the second, third and fourth agreements merely extended from time to time the protected furnished letting under the first agreement (exh DIC) dated 1 September 1970.

9 The crux of this case, in my opinion, is whether at the date of the second notice to quit, the first defendant was in possession of the premises within the meaning of s 27 of the Act. In my view, he was so in possession for the following reasons:

10 In my judgment the learned trial judge, having found for the plaintiffs against the first defendant under s 15(1)(g) of the Act should, as a necessary consequence thereof, have held that the second defendant, by virtue of s 26 of the Act, did become and is now a statutory tenant of the plaintiffs. There will therefore be an order accordingly. Costs of the appeal and of those incurred in the district court to the appellant (second defendant).

11 Appeal allowed.