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In the High Court of the Republic of Singapore
[1993] SGHC 4
Suit 5858/1986
Between
Great Pacific Finance Ltd |
… Plaintiff
And
Tan Hock Chan |
… Defendant
grounds of decision
This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports. |
Great Pacific Finance Ltd v Tan Hock Chan
[1993] SGHC 4
Suit 5858/1986
Lai Siu Chiu JC
04 January 1993
Lai Siu Chiu JC
04 January 1993
1
Judgment:
Judgment:
2 Coram: Lai Siu Chiu JC
3 GROUNDS OF DECISION
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16 C. The defendant's application
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25 D. I dismissed the defendant's application for the following reasons:
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30 E. The defendant's appeal The defendant's arguments
31 Counsel for the defendant contended
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34 (i) length of the delay
35 (ii) reasons for the delay
36 (iii) chances of success
37 (iv) the degree of prejudice.
38 Where proceedings have been going on for a long time the court held that reasons for
delay and the likelihood of success are factors which weigh heavily in the court's
consideration (Pearson v Chen Chien Wen Edwin < 1991 > 3 MLJ 208).
delay and the likelihood of success are factors which weigh heavily in the court's
consideration (Pearson v Chen Chien Wen Edwin < 1991 > 3 MLJ 208).
39 3. even if the House of Lords in Lonrho plc v Fayed < 1991 > 3 AER 303 did change
the law on conspiracy, the plaintiffs have not explained the period of delay from the date
of the decision (27 June 1991) to April 1992. Further the mere fact that a higher court in
a subsequent case has overruled an authority upon which a decision was based is not by
itself sufficient ground to grant leave to appeal out of time (see Re J Wigfull < 1919
> Ch 52 and in Re Berkeley < 1944 > Ch 1).
the law on conspiracy, the plaintiffs have not explained the period of delay from the date
of the decision (27 June 1991) to April 1992. Further the mere fact that a higher court in
a subsequent case has overruled an authority upon which a decision was based is not by
itself sufficient ground to grant leave to appeal out of time (see Re J Wigfull < 1919
> Ch 52 and in Re Berkeley < 1944 > Ch 1).
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42 F. The plaintiffs' arguments
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47 4. Even if the court feels that the plaintiffs' solicitors were at fault in detecting
the Lonrho decision late, he would urge the court to exercise discretion in the
plaintiffs' favour (see Gatti v Shoosmith < 1939 > 3 AER 916).
the Lonrho decision late, he would urge the court to exercise discretion in the
plaintiffs' favour (see Gatti v Shoosmith < 1939 > 3 AER 916).
48 G. I granted the plaintiffs leave to appeal out of time and consequently dismissed the
defendant's appeal in the exercise of my discretion which according to the Court of Appeal
in Gatti's case (supra) and Palata Investments Ltd v Burt Sinfield Ltd < 1985 > 2
AER 517 is unfettered and will be exercised flexibly with regard to the facts of the
particular case. I did not think and I was not informed by counsel for the defendant,
there would be any prejudice to the defendant in allowing the plaintiffs an extension of
time in which to file their appeal. I asked the same question as Chan Sek Keong JC (as he
then was) did in Hau Khee Wee v Chua Kian Tong < 1987 > 2 MLJ 146 -- 'Should the
appellants be deprived of their right of appeal because of the mistakes of their
solicitors?' The answer obviously must be 'no' if no prejudice is caused to the defendant
thereby.
defendant's appeal in the exercise of my discretion which according to the Court of Appeal
in Gatti's case (supra) and Palata Investments Ltd v Burt Sinfield Ltd < 1985 > 2
AER 517 is unfettered and will be exercised flexibly with regard to the facts of the
particular case. I did not think and I was not informed by counsel for the defendant,
there would be any prejudice to the defendant in allowing the plaintiffs an extension of
time in which to file their appeal. I asked the same question as Chan Sek Keong JC (as he
then was) did in Hau Khee Wee v Chua Kian Tong < 1987 > 2 MLJ 146 -- 'Should the
appellants be deprived of their right of appeal because of the mistakes of their
solicitors?' The answer obviously must be 'no' if no prejudice is caused to the defendant
thereby.
49 H. The plaintiffs' appeal The plaintiffs' arguments
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52 3. Counsel said that the court below dismissed the plaintiffs' application based
primarily on the authorities cited by counsel for the defendant which included Wing On
Bank Ltd v Wai Man Estates Ltd < 1990 > 1 HKLR 377. In the light of the House of
Lords decision in Lonrho's case, the previous authorities are no longer good law.
primarily on the authorities cited by counsel for the defendant which included Wing On
Bank Ltd v Wai Man Estates Ltd < 1990 > 1 HKLR 377. In the light of the House of
Lords decision in Lonrho's case, the previous authorities are no longer good law.
53 4. The law on the tort of conspiracy prior to Lonrho was that to succeed on such a
cause of action, the statement of claim must plead and allege that the predominant purpose
of the alleged conspiracy was to injure the plaintiffs (see Allied Arab Bank v Hajjar (No
2) < 1988 > 3 AER 103, Metall v Donaldson < 1989 > 3 AER 14 and Wing On Bank,
supra). By virtue of Lonrho it is now not an essential ingredient of the tort of
conspiracy that the defendant should have had the sole or predominant purpose of injuring
the plaintiffs, it is sufficient that the conspiracy can reasonably be foreseen to injure
the plaintiffs.
cause of action, the statement of claim must plead and allege that the predominant purpose
of the alleged conspiracy was to injure the plaintiffs (see Allied Arab Bank v Hajjar (No
2) < 1988 > 3 AER 103, Metall v Donaldson < 1989 > 3 AER 14 and Wing On Bank,
supra). By virtue of Lonrho it is now not an essential ingredient of the tort of
conspiracy that the defendant should have had the sole or predominant purpose of injuring
the plaintiffs, it is sufficient that the conspiracy can reasonably be foreseen to injure
the plaintiffs.
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56 I. The defendant's arguments
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60 J. The decision
61 I allowed the appeal for the following reasons:
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63 2. Counsel for the defendant argued that it was unlikely that the plaintiffs would
succeed in their proposed action for conspiracy on the ground that the proposed amendments
disclose no reasonable cause of action (see Jeyaretnam v Lee Kuan Yew < 1990 > 2 MLJ 65). I did not agree with counsel's contention that it is so plain and obvious that the
plaintiffs have no cause of action for conspiracy by the amendments proposed, adopting the
test of the Court of Appeal in Jeyaratnam's case that in a contested interlocutory
application for leave to amend pleadings, the principles to be applied are the same as if
the application before the court had been an application to strike out the amended
pleadings. It is noteworthy in this context that O 20 r 5(5) of the RSC clearly allows
pleadings to be amended notwithstanding that the effect would be to add a new cause of
action, which is the case here.
succeed in their proposed action for conspiracy on the ground that the proposed amendments
disclose no reasonable cause of action (see Jeyaretnam v Lee Kuan Yew < 1990 > 2 MLJ 65). I did not agree with counsel's contention that it is so plain and obvious that the
plaintiffs have no cause of action for conspiracy by the amendments proposed, adopting the
test of the Court of Appeal in Jeyaratnam's case that in a contested interlocutory
application for leave to amend pleadings, the principles to be applied are the same as if
the application before the court had been an application to strike out the amended
pleadings. It is noteworthy in this context that O 20 r 5(5) of the RSC clearly allows
pleadings to be amended notwithstanding that the effect would be to add a new cause of
action, which is the case here.
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Lai Siu Chiu JC |
Scott Thillagaratnam & Kenny Chooi (Khattar Wong & Partners) for the plaintiffs
Thio Ying Ying (Chor Pee & Co) for the defendant
Thio Ying Ying (Chor Pee & Co) for the defendant
This judgment text has undergone conversion so that it is mobile and web-friendly. This may have created formatting or alignment issues. Please refer to the PDF copy for a print-friendly version.
Version No 1: 11 Sep 2026 (01:05 hrs)