1 
Judgment:

2 Coram: Lai Kew Chai J

3 ORAL JUDGMENT

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 I turn first to the question whether there was an expressed contract of bailment which

was entered into by G K Express on the express authority of the plaintiffs. There is

absolutely no evidence from either Ms Sundari or Mr Gopal which begin to establish that Ms

Sundari on behalf of the plaintiffs had clothed Mr Gopal trading as G K Express with the

express authority to enter into any contract of bailment for and on behalf of the

plaintiffs. Mr Suresh on behalf of the plaintiffs stressed that he relies on the doctrine

of undisclosed principal between the plaintiffs and the defendants. Now, he is saying that

a court could in certain circumstances infer by an agent's disclosure of the existence of

the principal to the other party which would result in the formation of a contract which

was in truth and in substance entered into between the other party and the undisclosed

principal. Nominally, the contract was apparently formed between the agent (though not

mentioned as such) and the other party. If a person is an undisclosed principal in

connection with a contract, it is of course the law that that undisclosed principal can

sue the other party to the agreement simply because the underlying principle is that the

other party had known or ought to have known that he was contracting with the undisclosed

principal. This common law development of the doctrine was in recognition of the growing

multiplicity of parties involved in transactions, particularly like the middleman,

referred to by Lord Lindley in Keighley, Maxsted & Co v Durant < 1901 > AC 240

at 261. But as rightly pointed out by Mr Jeyaretnam that case does not help the plaintiffs

at all because it was a case that principally dealt with the question of ratification.

Each case must turn on its own facts. There is nothing here on the evidence given by the

plaintiffs to suggest that what they have said about ownership was enough to impute on Mr

Karuppiah the knowledge and therefore his agreement and consent that he was entering into

the contract with the plaintiffs as owners of the Konica films. Now, I need not say much

about Stockton v Morton < 1979 > RTR 130 which was relied by Mr Suresh. Again, I am

in agreement with Mr Jeyaretnam when he said that that case dealt with the ambit of the

authority of the insurance broker who was clearly the agent of the insurance company and

where, in a particular situation, that insurance broker could and would bind his

principal. We are concerned with the question of who was the contracting party rather than

with the ambit of an agent's authority.

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 Their claims are accordingly dismissed with costs.