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Judgment:

2 Coram: Chao Hick Tin J

3 GROUNDS OF DECISION

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13 Second variation of tenancy The next significant milestone in the relationship between

the parties occurred on 1 January 1978 when the rent paid by the plaintiff to the

defendant was raised to $2,000 per month. Here again, there was a dispute as to the reason

for the increase. Quek said that as the defendant returned the use of the back portion of

the ground floor to the plaintiff, the defendant demanded that the plaintiff pay an

increased rent of $2,000. Quek claimed the defendant threatened him that if he did not

agree to the increase, the defendant would let out the entire premises to others. He was,

therefore, compelled into accepting this unreasonable demand. On the other hand, Yeo said

that the increased rent to $2,000 had nothing to do with the return of the rear portion of

the ground floor to the plaintiff. The increase was due to the fact that the plaintiff

requested for the use of the second floor. Only about 10% of the space of the second

storey was being used by the defendant to store some of their junks and the remaining 90%

of the space was for the use of the plaintiff. The relevant receipts did not refer to the

second storey, just "76 Amoy Street" or "storage rental". There was no

consistency in the receipts issued. It was not in dispute that there was an internal

staircase leading from the ground floor to the second floor which could be closed by way

of a trap-door. Yeo said that the trap-door was never locked. Quek denied that he had ever

used the second floor for storing his goods. He claimed that the trap-door was locked and

he had no access to the second floor. This question of fact whether the $2,000 was paid

for not only the use of the ground floor but also of the second floor, was crucial to this

action. The plaintiff contended that, by virtue of the written agreement in Chinese, the

standard rent for the entire ground floor was $900 and it was illegal for the defendant to

have received rent in excess of $900. Accordingly, the defendant should refund the excess

to the plaintiff pursuant to s.3(4) of the Control of Rent Act. I accepted Yeo's evidence

that the original understanding to rent out the premises, and the subsequent variations,

were all concluded by him and Quek orally. I accepted that Yeo was frequently away on

business. I found it hard to believe Quek when he claimed that Yeo had unreasonably

demanded that he pay $2,000 rent per month for the use of the ground floor only. If Yeo

had been such an unreasonable person, I could not understand why Quek kept sending gifts

to Yeo at every Chinese New Year from 1972 to 1991 without fail. This annual gesture could

only signify one thing: that Quek was grateful to Yeo. Quek himself admitted that they

were good friends. This conduct of Quek was inconsistent with his claim that Yeo had not

been reasonable or was an unscrupulous person. I could only conclude that the plaintiff

had agreed to the increase because of the additional space being used by him. The rent

increase was not insignificant. Such an increase could only be explained on the ground

that the plaintiff had obtained some additional benefits. And if Yeo had indeed been such

an unreasonable person, why did he agree to reduce the rent by $200 to $1,800 per month

with effect from February 1981. Yeo said that he agreed to this reduction because Quek

requested for it due to poor business. That remained the rent paid by the plaintiff to the

defendant until 1991, when the owner of the building discovered the sub-letting and sought

to re-possess the premises. This did not appear to me to be the behaviour of an

unreasonable landlord. All these were entirely consistent with Yeo's version as to the

reason for the increase in rent to $2,000. In addition, there was one other factor which I

thought was significant. This was the evidence of the solicitor for the owner of the

building, Mr Ho Nee Min. In answer to a question in re-examination, following a question

put by the court, he said that on 16 October 1991 he went to inspect the premises with his

client. Both the ground and the second floors had been completely vacated. He went up to

the second floor which was dark. The windows were all closed and boarded up. He noted the

smell of some dry foodstuff. He said that the onion smell on the second storey was very

strong. In his submission counsel for the plaintiff tried to explain that it was probable

that the smell came "from the ground floor via the openings, in particular the air

well and was trapped within the second storeyed premises." At best this was

speculative. There was no evidence to indicate when the windows of the second storey were

boarded up; and if the windows were in fact so closed and boarded up for sometime and if

the trap-door leading from the ground floor to the second storey was always closed and

locked as claimed by Quek, how was it that the second storey could have such a strong

smell of onions. There was evidence before me that the plaintiff used fans in order to

ventilate the store- room and prevent the foodstuff from deteriorating. The foodstuff had

to be kept dry. In the words of Yeo "otherwise shoots would come out" of the

onions. I found that in all likelihood the second floor had been used for so many years

for storing and drying onions and other foodstuff, so much so that anyone who went up to

that level could not avoid being overwhelmed by the very strong smell as Mr Ho had

encountered. This evidence of Mr Ho clearly corroborated the evidence of Yeo when he said

that the plaintiff had been using the second storey to store and ventilate garlics and

onions. It was not in dispute that the defendant never traded in such foodstuff. In the

result I held that the plaintiff did request for and was allowed the use of 90% of the

space of the second storey for its business. In coming to this decision I have disregarded

whatever hearsay evidence that might have come out of the mouths of witnesses. I also held

that the $2,000 rental (subsequently reduced to $1,800) was paid for the use of both the

ground and the second floors (up to 90% thereof). As the $2,000 rental was for the

combined use of whole of the ground floor and approximately 90% of the second floor as one

entity, that was a separate letting and the $2,000 per month was the standard rent for the

totality of the aforesaid areas: see Lim Tai Tin v Services Ltd < 1965 > 1 MLJ 91

and Hin Seng & Co v SEAC Co < 1963 >29 MLJ 109

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16 Judgment