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Judgment:

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10 Plaintiffs' counsel says that a sale, in the eyes of the law, is an exchange of

property for money or in consideration of money. He submits that the alleged transactions,

if indeed they took place, were in the nature of an agreement to extinguish a debt in

exchange for the transfer of goods. That, he submits, is not a true sale. He cites the

case of Simpson v Connolly < 1953 > 2 All E R 474 and Robshaw Bros. Ltd v Mayer <

1957 > 1 Ch. D. 125.

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18 Disposition to defeat execution: the effect It has been established by a long line of

cases that a disposition of property for good consideration is not void merely because it

was made with the intention of defeating the expected execution of a judgment creditor. In

Wood v Dixie < 1845 > 7 Q B 892, the plaintiff had lent money to Phillips. In

October 1843, Phillips being unable to pay, executed a conveyance to the plaintiff of the

house and furniture at a price to be valued. The valuation was completed on 7 October, and

afterwards on the same day the sheriff sought to execute against the plaintiff on a writ

of fi. fa. It was contended by the defendant's counsel that the conveyance was fraudulent

as against the execution creditor. The judge told the jury that if there was no real

payment the whole transaction was colourable, and the defendant was entitled to succeed.

He also told the jury that even if there was a payment but if the intention of the

transaction was to defeat the execution creditor, the conveyance was void as against the

defendant, and in that case the defendant was also entitled to succeed. The jury returned

a verdict for the defendant.

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21 In Sutton v Bath < 1858 > 1 F & F 152, the headnote of the report reads as

follows:

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23 See also Hale v. Saloon Omnibus Co. < 1859 > 4 Drew 494; Darvill v. Terry <

1861 > 6 H & N 807.

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28 Burden of proof On the question of the burden of proof, the goods in question had been

the goods of Annho; in the case of the timber, subject of IP No. 3 and 4, it was held by

the timber yards on account of Annho. In the case of the office equipment, subject of IP

No. 2, it was on the premises of Annho themselves. In these circumstances, any person

seeking to show the coming into being of a contrary state of things must, in my view, bear

the burden of proving it; he who asserts must prove. This view is consistent with the

approach of Mohamed Azmi J in Sigma Air Conditioning Sdn Bhd v. World Wide Agencies (M)

Sdn Bhd < 1980 > 1 M L J 179. It is also consistent with the following statement by

the learned editor of Mallal's Supreme Court Practice 2nd ed. at p.173:

29 In a Sheriff's interpleader the claimant is as a general rule made the plaintiff, and

the burden of proof rests upon him where the goods seized were at the time of seizure in

the possession of the judgment debtor, possession being prima facie evidence of title.

Yorke v. Smith (1851), 21 L.J.Q.B. 53. If, however, the claimant was in possession at the

time of the seizure, the burden of proof may be upon the execution creditor, thus

reversing the ordinary rule, and the execution creditor may be made plaintiff; Gerhard v.

Montagu & Co (1889), 61 L.T. 564. See also De La Rue v. Hernu, Person & Stockwell

Ltd. < 1936 > 2 K.B. <164>; 2 All E.R. 411, C.A. where furniture was deposited

with a warehouseman.

30 I now proceed to consider the individual claims.

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