1 KARTHIGESU JA

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3  Introduction

4 At the centre of the dispute between the parties was a property known as No 40A Crane Road which straddled parts of three lots of land, namely, Lot 28-6 Mukim 26, Lot 28-27 Mukim 26 and Lot 28-7 Mukim 26. Lot 28-7 is State land and was not part of Teo`s claim in Suit No 1265/95. His claim was only concerned with those parts of Lot 28-6 and Lot 28-27 on which No 40A Crane Road stood. The land areas concerned amounted to approximately 44.8 sq m of Lot 28-6 and approximately 26.4 sq m of Lot 28-27. In these written grounds we shall refer to these land areas collectively as `the disputed land`.

5  The facts

6 The events leading to the commencement of Suit No 1265/95 were as follows. Teo and his family first came to live on the disputed land in mid-1957, when Teo`s father accepted the invitation of one Chng Tang Huat to occupy the disputed land. Teo`s father built the house which later became known as No 40A Crane Road. Chng Tang Huat himself lived nearby with his family, in a house later to be known as No 56 Carpmael Road.

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17  The appellants` case

18 We have already stated that the claim in Suit No 1265/95 concerned those parts of Lot 28-6 and Lot 28-27 occupied by the house No 40A Crane Road. Not surprisingly, the appellants did not seriously dispute that Sin had, throughout the period 1 August 1978 to 31 July 1990, exercised the necessary degree of physical control over the disputed land. What they disputed was the existence of that other essential component of her claim of adverse possession: the mental element commonly referred to as the ` animus possidendi ` or, as Lindley MR put it in Littledale v Liverpool College [1900] Ch 19, `the intention of excluding the owner as well as other people` from the disputed land. In the submission of the appellants` counsel, the evidence failed to support a finding that Sin had manifested the necessary animus possidendi during the relevant 12-year period.

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20  The element of animus possidendi

21 In so far as the issue of animus possidendi was concerned, counsel for the appellants argued that the following acts by Sin negatived the existence of any intention to exclude others from the disputed land: (a). the tender of rent by Sin to Chng, by way of the letter of 16 September 1978;

22  (b). Sin`s property tax return of 18 April 1979. This return was filed in response to an enquiry from the Property Tax Division regarding No 40A Crane Road. In this return, Sin gave Chng`s name in reply to a question which asked her for the name and address of the `Owner, Landlord, or other person` to whom she paid rent. She did not claim `owner-occupation` of No 40A Crane Road. She also attached a letter to her return, in which she informed the Property Tax Division that she had paid Chng rent until 1 August 1978, when he refused to accept rent;

23  (c). Sin`s second property tax return of 29 October 1980. In this return, she again identified Chng as the person to whom rent had been paid in respect of No 40A Crane Road.

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28  animus possidendi on Sin`s part. It must be recalled what is actually required to prove animus possidendi . It is the intention to exclude the paper owner and everyone else from possession of the disputed land. As counsel for Teo pointed out, this is distinct from a belief that one owns the land or an intention to acquire ownership of the land. Thus Slade J in Powell v McFarlane [1979] 38 P & CR 452 noted at p 471 of his judgment that the concept of animus possidendi was:

29 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623, a case cited to us by Teo`s counsel. The defendant in this case claimed adverse possession of a plot of land adjoining his property, Dolphin Place. The conveyance of Dolphin Place to the defendant stated that it was being conveyed `together with all such rights estate title and interests as the vendors may have in or over the plot`. The defendant also procured from the vendors a statutory declaration setting out their acts of cultivation and use of the plot in the five to six years before the conveyance. He continued to cultivate the plot himself. He also fenced it off and added a lock and key. In fact, the plot belonged to the local council which had planned to use it at some unspecified time in the future for a proposed road diversion. The council, having eventually become aware of the defendant`s use of the plot, brought proceedings to recover possession of it. The defendant contended that he had acquired title to the plot by adverse possession. Evidence adduced during the proceedings showed clearly that the defendant had, in the course of the 12-year period relied upon, acknowledged that he would be obliged to leave the plot if in the future the council required it for the construction of the proposed road diversion. Indeed, there was even a letter written by him expressly acknowledging this state of affairs. The English Court of Appeal held, however, that such acknowledgments did not negate the defendant`s animus possidendi . Slade LJ, who delivered the leading judgment of the court, stated:

30  Lodge v Wakefield Metropolitan City Council [1995] 2 EGLR 124. In counsel`s submission, this case established that even if an alleged adverse possessor believed mistakenly that he was obliged to pay rent to some other party, such a belief did not negative the existence of the animus possidendi necessary to prove adverse possession. In Lodge `s case the plaintiff was given an oral tenancy in 1969 of some 11.9 acres of land by the defendant`s predecessor in title. After some five years on the land, the plaintiff stopped paying rent, whereupon Sch 1 para 5 of the UK Limitation Act 1980 came into operation. These provisions are in pari materia with ss 13(2) and (3) of our Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Ed): the effect of these provisions was that the plaintiff ceased to be regarded as a tenant once the period covered by his last payment of rent had expired. The plaintiff eventually brought proceedings for a declaration that he had acquired title to the land by adverse possession. In giving evidence, the plaintiff acknowledged that until 1981 and perhaps later, when it came to his attention that he was not paying any rent, he still believed he was in the position of tenant to the defendant landlord. In spite of this express acknowledgment, the English Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff had established adverse possession of the land for the relevant period. Balcombe LJ, who delivered the judgment of the court, stated:

31  Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran , he submitted that the case was distinguishable on the facts: the Court of Appeal in that case, he said, had placed emphasis on the defendant`s acts in fencing off the disputed plot of land and also in adding a lock and key. These acts, counsel submitted, were not present in Sin`s case. As for Lodge v Wakefield Metropolitan City Council , counsel contended that the operation of Sch 1 para 5 of the UK Limitation Act 1980 made all the difference in that case: he pointed out that in Jubilee Electronics Pte Ltd & Ors v Tai Wah Garments & Knitting Factory Pte Ltd [1996] 2 SLR 39 , this court had held, in connection with the case of a periodic tenancy under s 13(2) of our Limitation Act, that `mere continuation of possession by the tenant without paying rent` sufficed to establish animus possidendi .

32  Moran `s case and Lodge `s case inapplicable. The disputed land in Sin`s case might not have been fenced off but it was certainly enclosed within the four walls of her house, No 40A Crane Road: we could see no material difference between this manner of enclosure and the enclosure constituted by the erection of fencing in Moran `s case. As for Lodge `s case, we could not see how the operation of Sch 1 para 5 of the UK Limitation Act 1980 detracted from the relevance of the court`s reasoning. The issue at stake before the court in that case was not whether ` mere continuation by the tenant without paying rent ` sufficed to establish animus possidendi : the issue was whether the tenant`s belief in his continuing obligation to pay rent negated the existence of animus possidendi ; and on that score, the court`s firm answer was that it did not.

33  Moran `s case and Lodge `s case supported his client`s position. In the present case, the acts enumerated at (a) to (c) of para 16 above might be said to show - at least arguably - that Sin believed Chng had in law a superior title to the disputed land; and that she believed he might at some point demand the return of the land. Yet, adopting the reasoning seen in Moran `s case and in Lodge `s case, such a belief did not in itself preclude the existence of an intention to exclude all others, including Chng, from the land so far as was reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law would allow. The evidence showed that Sin had such an intention; furthermore, that this intention was exhibited openly. As at 1 August 1978, Chng had already revoked the `permission` originally given to Sin and her family to stay on the land. So far as Sin was aware, therefore, as at 1 August 1978, she and her family had become trespassers on the land: Chng no longer tolerated their presence on the land; and so far as Sin was aware, he could at any time call upon the processes of the law to evict them. Chng reinforced his revocation of `permission` by refusing to accept the rent she tendered in September 1978. Yet, throughout the period beginning with Chng`s revocation of `permission` on 1 August 1978, Sin refused to give up possession of the land. She remained in residence at No 40A Crane Road. As we have noted, the disputed land was effectively enclosed within the four walls of this house: accordingly, Sin`s continued residence in the house barred access by everyone else - including Chng - to the disputed land.

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43  animus possidendi at least in the period between 1 August and 16 September 1978. The same suggestion was also made by counsel during his closing submissions in the trial below.

44  since 1 August 1978 `. No application was ever made to delete this phrase from the pleadings or to amend it in some way. From the notes of evidence, it was plain that the appellants and their counsel always understood the period of 1 August 1978 to 31 July 1990 to be the relevant period of adverse possession claimed. This understanding was never refuted by Teo and his counsel in the course of the trial, save for the brief suggestion made by counsel in his closing submissions. In the circumstances, we did not think it right for counsel to suggest that we consider the possibility of Sin`s adverse possession having commenced on some date other than 1 August 1978.

45  The effect of the 1982 conveyance of Lot 28-27

46 The appellants next contended that in respect of Lot 28-27, any adverse possession by Sin must have been terminated or at least interrupted by a conveyance of the legal title in the land on 8 December 1992, from the then paper owners of the lot to Koh Keng Wah Pte Ltd. Counsel for Teo objected. He said that such a proposition surely ran contrary to the provisions of s 9(1) of the Limitation Act, which provisions read as follows:

47  Powell v McFarlane :

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49  Powell v McFarlane involved a situation where the plaintiff, Mr Powell, was claiming adverse possession of a field which had been left vacant by its paper owner for a period of time beginning from 1956. Mr Powell`s case was that he had entered into possession of the field in the summer of 1956 and that he had remained in possession thereafter with the animus possidendi required of an adverse possessor. On behalf of the paper owner, it was argued that the acts relied on by Mr Powell to show animus possidendi were equivocal at best. The question with which Slade J was mainly concerned, therefore, was whether Mr Powell had discharged the burden of proving animus possidendi . The remark relied on by the appellants` counsel above was made by Slade J in the course of a passage comparing the differing burdens of proof required, on the one hand, of a paper owner seeking to negative discontinuance of possession, and on the other hand, of a trespasser seeking to show adverse possession. In the interests of clarity, we reproduce below the relevant passage in its entirety:

50  Powell v McFarlane supported in any way the proposition that the 1982 conveyance of Lot 28-27 was enough - without more - to end Sin`s adverse possession of the said lot. As stated, we agreed with Teo`s counsel that this proposition ran contrary to the terms of s 9(1) of the Limitation Act.

51  Conclusion

52 In our judgment, therefore, prior to her death in 1994, Sin was in open, uninterrupted factual possession of the disputed land throughout the period from 1 August 1978 to 31 July 1990; and this was accompanied by the intention to exclude all others from the land so far as this was reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law allowed. We were satisfied that she had acquired title to the disputed land by virtue of her adverse possession; further, that such title had passed to Teo in his capacity as the representative of her estate. For these reasons, we dismissed the appeal with costs.