1 The claim of the plaintiff is for defamation arising out of seven Facebook posts made by the defendant between 30 April 2020 and 28 October 2020. I heard the bifurcated trial on liability in two tranches over four days at the conclusion of which parties filed written submissions. Two witnesses (including the plaintiff) testified for the plaintiff and three witnesses (including the defendant) testified for the defendant.

2 The claim was a hotly disputed one with very little common ground between parties as one would expect from an action of this nature emanating from a fall out between former friends and informal business partners. This is evident from the Statement of Agreed Issues and Disputed Facts dated 30 Aug 2024 where the parties identified seven issues of which there was only partial consensus on one i.e. that the statements in question were published or communicated to a third party on Facebook with parties disagreeing as to whether they were published on any other social media. The notices of objections filed by both sides to the Affidavits of Evidence in Chief (“AEIC”) of the other side is another indicator of the extent of the dispute. I will return to these points later in the judgment.

3 Having considered the totality of the court documents, the evidence, the closing submissions of the defendant (“DCS”) dated 18 February 2025, and the closing submissions of the plaintiff (“PCS”) dated 1 April 2025, I now set out my judgment.

4 The plaintiff is and was the owner of the “Profish” brand of kayaks which were rebranded to “Yak2Go” and director of SH Global Pte Ltd, whose primary business is in the wholesale trade. The defendant is and was a prominent and active member of the local and international kayak and kayak fishing community who has participated in international kayaking competitions.

5 As outlined in the defendant’s opening statement (“DOS”) dated 29 August 2024 the plaintiff and the defendant entered a partnership to import kayaks manufactured by a company in China (“Manufacturer”) and to sell them under the then new “Profish” brand that they coined. The partnership was an informal one with distinct responsibilities for each of them. These are summarised by the defendant as follows:

(a) the plaintiff and the defendant would, together, be a distributor in Singapore for the Manufacturer’s kayaks and sell them under the Profish brand;

(b) the plaintiff and defendant would share the costs and profits of the business on a 50-50 ratio;

(c) the plaintiff would be responsible for logistics, shipping and delivery of the Profish kayaks; and

(d) the defendant would be responsible for marketing the Profish kayaks and designing the brand logo. ¹

6 Unfortunately, due to circumstances that are disputed, the partnership came to an end on 29 April 2020. To date, there has yet to be any consensus on the terms of the cessation of the partnership. On 30 April 2020, after being informed by the Manufacturer that they would not work with him, the defendant uploaded the first of the seven posts that are the subject matter of the action. ²

7 The plaintiff’s case in essence is that as the sole proprietor of Yak2Go, he has suffered reputational and financial damage due to the false and defamatory Facebook posts; the defamatory statements include allegations of dishonest business practices which have no factual basis; the posts were widely shared leading to serious consequences including loss of business opportunities and distress. ³ The defendant’s defences of truth, justification and fair comment are unsustainable, and the defendant acted with malice. ⁴

8 The defendant’s position is that based on the pleadings, the fourth post of the defendant has not been alleged to be defamatory. As for the remaining six posts, they are not defamatory of the plaintiff, whether in their natural or ordinary meaning or by innuendo. Some of them do not even refer to the plaintiff. Further, the defendant also relied on the defence of justification and fair comment. ⁵

9 The law on defamation is well established. The general principles are succinctly summarised by Justice S Mohan in Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan [2023] SGHC 221 at [14]–[17] as follows:

10 As mentioned at [2] above, both sides objected to the AEICs of the other side. The plaintiff objected to the AEICs of all three witnesses for the defendant while the defendant objected to the AEIC of the plaintiff. This necessitated the filing of extensive responses by both sides to the objections to the AEICs ⁶ , which parties eventually agreed to leave to closing submissions. ⁷

11 The submissions of the defendant in this regard are found in the DCS at Part B on Evidence while the plaintiff, presumably content to rely on their initial objections, do not appear to have touched on this area in the PCS. Having considered the respective responses to the objections and the DCS, I am in broad agreement with the submissions of the defendant that the purpose of evidence is to provide factual support for a claim or argument to allow the decision maker to reach a conclusion and relevance is key. ⁸ In this regard, the guidance from the Court of Appeal in SIC College of Business and Technology Pte Ltd v Yeo Poh Siah and others [2016] 2 SLR 118 at [41] that “… it is usually prudent and just to err in favour of admission rather than exclusion. ” is instructive.

12 While mindful that the rules of evidence apply and I must not rely on any evidence that is inadmissible such as hearsay, I am of the view that the objections of both the plaintiff and the defendant to the AEICs of the other party are without substantive merit. Furthermore, given that the witnesses have given their evidence, there is no useful purpose for me to rule on every objection. In this regard, it would suffice for me to bear in mind the need to ensure that my subsequent findings are not premised on inadmissible or otherwise objectionable evidence.

13 As mentioned at [2] above, whether the seven defamatory posts have been published beyond Facebook is a matter of contention. In the DCS, defendant submitted at part C.1 that there is no evidence that the posts were published on other parts of the Internet aside from Facebook. This does not appear to be addressed in the PCS. However, given that the trial is a bifurcated one on liability, nothing turns on this and whether the posts were published elsewhere can be dealt with at assessment if liability is found. What is important for present purposes is that publication on Facebook is not disputed.

14 At part C2 of DCS, the defendant submitted that Yak2Go and the plaintiff are not one and the same. The plaintiff is an individual while Yak2Go is a business entity and the reputation of the individual is distinct from the reputation of the business. The defendant further contends that an individual cannot equate himself with a business/corporate entity, citing the High Court decision of Qingdao Bohai Construction Group Co, Ltd and others v Goh Teck Beng and another [2016] 4 SLR 977 at [50] for the proposition that while a corporate entity can be injured in its pocket as a result of having its business reputation damaged, it must first prove its reputation, unlike for individuals. With respect, I do not see how this supports the submission of the defendant given that the plaintiff is an individual and Yak2Go, being a partnership, is not a separate legal or corporate entity. In any event, the claim is also not one started by Profish or SH Global Pte Ltd. In essence, while I appreciate that the plaintiff and Yak2Go are not one and the same, statements defamatory of Yak2Go would invariably affect the reputation of the plaintiff given the close association.

15 After hearing the evidence of the five witnesses, directions were made for the sequential exchange of closing submissions. Sequential rather than concurrent exchange of submissions was ordered so that the submissions of the parties would engage on the issues in dispute. The defendant duly filed a comprehensive 128-page DCS with detailed submissions regarding each of the seven posts. The plaintiff then filed a relatively succinct 14-page submission in response that touched generally on their case without engaging the detailed submissions found in the DCS. Both parties thereafter elected not to file a final round of submissions as permitted by my directions. While it would have been preferable for the submissions of the parties to engage on the key issues in dispute, and for the PCS to have been more detailed to respond to the DCS, nothing turns on this given that it is my role as the trial judge to determine the case on the merits in accordance with the law. A role which I now turn to discharge by outlining the issues and examining each of the seven posts separately.

16 The broad issues for determination are as follows:

(1) Are each of the seven posts defamatory of the plaintiff in their natural and ordinary meaning and/or by innuendo?

(2) If yes, do any of the defences apply?

17 Based on the Statement of Claim (Amendment No 1) (“SOCA1”) dated 2 September 2024, the First Post and Revised First Post, with the alleged (a) defamatory words in bold, (b) natural and ordinary meaning, and (c) meaning by way of innuendo are as follows:

18 All things considered, I disagree with the plaintiff that the natural and ordinary meaning of the offending words is as pleaded by them. In this regard, I agree with the DCS at [46] that the First Post and Revised First Post essentially describe a breakup between business partners and the consequential arrangements. There is nothing sinister mentioned about the plaintiff’s character or reputation. The strongest words in the First Post regarding doubting the plaintiff’s “hidden agenda” were revised to doubting the “long-term prospects for the partnership”, which is innocuous. The original reference to “hidden agenda” while not flattering is also not defamatory.

19 I also disagree with the plaintiff that the words in the First Post and Revised First Post are defamatory of him by innuendo as pleaded. In my view, there is no basis to link the posts to the quality of Yak2Go kayaks that are undeserving of the defendant’s endorsement or any suggestion of poor business ethics. The withdrawal of the defendant’s validation of the plaintiff’s kayaks also adds nothing to the plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, while I do not agree fully with all the reasons put forth by the defendant at [55] – [70] of the DCS, I am in broad agreement with the conclusions that the innuendos alleged by the plaintiff are far-fetched and contrived.

20 Having regard to my finding that the First Post and Revised First Post are not defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning and/or by innuendo, there is no need to consider if any of the defences would apply. I would only observe that neither party appears to have made any attempt to secure the testimony of Ms Andy Hua, the representative of the Manufacturer whose evidence would be relevant to the defence of justification.

21 Based on the SOCA1, the Second Post, with the alleged (a) defamatory words in bold, (b) natural and ordinary meaning, and (c) meaning by way of innuendo are as follows:

22  All things considered, I am in broad agreement with the submissions of the defendant that there is no cause of action in the Second Post and the Comments thereto. As noted by the defendant, the post does not mention the plaintiff or even Profish. To assert that any reference to kayaks that are made or imported from China refers to the plaintiff is simply a stretch too far. To this end, I agree with the DCS at [105] that this is a general post about kayaks that is targeted at no one in particular. The post and comments are not defamatory of the plaintiff in their plain and ordinary meaning.

23 As submitted by the defendant at [139] of the DCS, they are also not defamatory by innuendo as the plaintiff has not pleaded any particulars to support the innuendo as required by case law and Order 78 Rule 3 (1) of the Singapore Rules of Court 2014.

24 Having regard to my finding that the Second Post and Comments are not defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning and/or by innuendo, there is no need to consider if any of the defences would apply.

25 Based on the SOCA1, the Third Post, with the alleged (a) defamatory words in bold, (b) natural and ordinary meaning, and (c) meaning by way of innuendo are as follows:

26 All things considered, I am of the view that this post is defamatory of the plaintiff in its plain and ordinary meaning. While the bulk of words in this post do not concern the plaintiff directly as submitted in the DCS at [147], they contribute to the overall narrative. The title of the post that a promise is a promise when juxtaposed against the content and references to the plaintiff clearly suggests that in contrast to the defendant who keeps his promises, the plaintiff does not and is untrustworthy.

27 With respect, while calling someone a “self-centred opportunist” may not be disparaging, references to questionable “intent” and “integrity” are. The reference to making the right decision about trusting gut feel over the plaintiff’s act of innocence is also defamatory when read in context. That said, the last parts of the post about time revealing the truth, the defendant being glad not to have shared his sweet fishing spots and trust being fragile that the plaintiff has placed in bold are innocuous and not defamatory. In short, I am of the view that parts of the post are defamatory of the plaintiff within the meaning of [29] (a), (b) and (d) of SOCA1.

28 As for whether the post is defamatory by innuendo, I agree with the submissions of the defendant at [156] to [158] of the DCS that the special facts for the innuendo must be particularised and pleaded. As this has not been done, like the Second Post at [23] above, the case based on innuendo fails.

29 Having established that the post is defamatory, I turn to consider the defences of justification and fair comment raised by the defendant at [160] to [187] of the DCS. The defendant contends that the sting of the post that the plaintiff lacks integrity is true based on the events surrounding the break-up of the partnership as the plaintiff was not honouring pre-existing commitments. In my view, the circumstances surrounding the break-up are not as clear as the defendant would like to portray. To this end, I do not see the insistence of the plaintiff in not separating the dispute over payments between the parties and honouring purchase orders from customers as unreasonable. The partnership ended abruptly in less-than-optimal circumstances with both sides having different views about the responsibility for the fall out. On balance, I am not satisfied based on the evidence adduced that the plaintiff acted with questionable intent and integrity. It is pertinent to note in this regard that Mr Alvin, whose evidence would presumably have supported the defence of justification, has not been called as a witness.

30 As for fair comment, I do not agree with the defendant’s characterisation at [183] to [184] of the DCS that any ordinary reasonable person would understand the post to be a reflection by the defendant on the importance of trust to him or reflections of a general nature about his dealings with former business partners. While I do not find the comments to be actuated by malice, but more a misguided notion of honour and sense that he was doing the right thing, the post clearly goes beyond fair comment on a matter of public interest. In any event, as the foundation of facts on which the comments are made have not been established, the defence necessarily fails.

31 Accordingly, I am of the view that parts of this post are defamatory and there are no applicable defences.

32 Based on the SOCA1, the Fourth Post is as follows:

33 In the DCS at [188] to [195], the defendant has submitted that there is no case of defamation to be considered as the plaintiff has not pleaded how the post is defamatory. This submission is not responded to in the PCS that was filed after the DCS.

34 All things considered, I agree with the DCS that since the plaintiff has not pleaded how the post is defamatory, there is no case to speak of. I also agree that read in context, there is no mention of the plaintiff or Profish in the post and yaks, which is a short form for kayak, is not a reference to the Yak2Go brand.

35 Based on the SOCA1, the Fifth Post, with the alleged (a) defamatory words in bold, (b) natural and ordinary meaning, and (c) meaning by way of innuendo are as follows:

36 All things considered, I agree with the submissions of the defendant that the post is not defamatory of the plaintiff. The post does not refer to the plaintiff, Profish or Yak2Go. The term “Yaks” is also not a reference to Yak2Go and no reasonable person reading the post would come to the conclusions that the plaintiff seeks to attribute to the words in their plain and ordinary meaning or by innuendo.

37 Having established that the post is not defamatory, there is no need for me to consider if any of the defences would apply. I would only add that if parties wanted to argue about the quality of the Chinese made kayaks in general and the Profish kayak in particular versus those made elsewhere, they should have relied on experts and scientific testing as opposed to witnesses of fact sharing personal experiences. The difference in price between the products is another factor that should be considered when discussing quality or the lack thereof. This was alluded to in the answer of DW1 Mr Phang Hup Huat to the questions from counsel for the plaintiff that it would not really be fair to compare kayaks from Hobie and Profish because of the price difference. ⁹

38 Based on the SOCA1, the Sixth Post, with the alleged (a) defamatory words, (b) natural and ordinary meaning, and (c) meaning by way of innuendo are as follows:

39 All things considered, I agree with the defendant that this post is not defamatory of the plaintiff. The plaintiff and Profish are not mentioned at all. To construe a reference to a single incidence of early rust in a rudder that is made in China as an attack on the plaintiff and his products is baseless. The innuendo meanings pleaded at [43] of the SOCA1 are farfetched and contrived. In my view, it is inconceivable for any reasonable person to construe it in these ways.

40 Having determined that the post is not defamatory, there is no need for me to consider if any of the defences would apply. I would only add that my observations about the evidence to establish the defences and the need to consider price rather than the country of manufacture at [37] above would similarly apply here.

41 Based on the SOCA1, the Seventh Post, with the alleged (a) defamatory words in bold, (b) natural and ordinary meaning, and (c) meaning by way of innuendo are as follows:

42 All things considered, while there is reference to Yak2Go, I agree with the defendant that there is nothing defamatory of the plaintiff in this post. As submitted by the defendant, none of the alleged meanings are injurious of the plaintiff. The strongest terms of being shameless and desperate, while not flattering, are also not defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning. The pleaded innuendos are also not particularised and far-fetched.

43 Having determined that the post is not defamatory, there is no need for me to consider if any of the defences would apply.

44 In view of all the above, I find that of the Seven Posts pleaded, only the Third Post is defamatory. As the trial is bifurcated, I enter interlocutory judgment for the plaintiff for damages arising from the Third Post to be assessed by me. Interest and costs will be reserved to the assessment.