1 This decision relates to two summonses taken out to stay three applications for payment out of the sale proceeds of vessels paid into court:

(a) In HC/SUM 2337/2025 (“SUM 2337”) filed in HC/ADM 92/2021 (“ADM 92”), Da Hui Shipping (Pte.) Ltd (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) (“Da Hui”) opposed the payment out applications filed by PetroChina International (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“PetroChina”) in HC/SUM 1804/2025 (“SUM 1804”) and by Societe Generale, Singapore Branch (“SocGen”) in HC/SUM 1987/2025 (“SUM 1987”).

(b) In HC/SUM 2338/2025 (“SUM 2338”) filed in HC/ADM 94/2021 (“ADM 94”), Da Hui opposed the payment out application filed by PetroChina in HC/SUM 2077/2023 (“SUM 2077”).

2 SUMs 2337 and 2338 will be referred to collectively as the “Stay Applications”, while SUMs 1804, 1987 and 2077 will be referred to collectively as the “Payment Out Applications”. Da Hui sought a temporary case management stay of the Payment Out Applications, pending the final resolution of HC/ADM 93/2025 (“ADM 93/2025”) and HC/ADM 94/2025 (“ADM 94/2025”) and the re-ordering of priorities in HC/ORC 4935/2023 and HC/ORC 4946/2023.

3 After hearing the parties on 3 September 2025, I dismissed the Stay Applications. These are the full grounds for my decision.

4 The Plaintiff in ADM 92 and ADM 94 is the Bank of America, N.A., Singapore Branch (“BofA”). BofA entered into a Facility Agreement with Da Hui and An Rong Shipping Pte Ltd (“An Rong”) as joint and several borrowers. The loan was secured by mortgages over vessels owned by each borrower. This included Da Hui’s vessel, the Sea Equatorial, and An Rong’s vessels, the Ocean Goby and the Ocean Jack (the latter two vessels, collectively, the “Vessels”). ¹ Da Hui and An Rong were both part of a group of vessel-owning subsidiaries related to Ocean Tankers (Pte.) Ltd. and Hin Leong Trading (Pte) Ltd. ²

5 Following a non-payment default by the co-borrowers, BofA issued an acceleration notice on 17 June 2020, declaring all outstanding amounts immediately due and payable. On 14 October 2020, the Sea Equatorial was sold by private treaty for US$21,447,121.86. After satisfying Tranche A of the Facility Agreement (which was structured into three tranches), a portion of the sale proceeds was applied towards Tranches B and C of the Facility Agreement, which were granted and/or utilised solely for the purpose of refinancing An Rong’s vessels. ³

6 In August 2021, BofA commenced ADM 92 and ADM 94, and arrested the Ocean Goby and the Ocean Jack. The Vessels were sold, with the proceeds paid into court.

7 PetroChina and SocGen intervened in ADM 92, asserting claims as cargo owners for mis-delivery. PetroChina also intervened in ADM 94, asserting its claim as cargo owner for mis-delivery.

8 On 20 April 2023, the court in ADM 94 determined the priority of claims against the sale proceeds of the Ocean Jack.

9 In April 2023, Da Hui filed HC/OA 418/2023 (“OA 418”) and intervened in ADM 92 and ADM 94. In OA 418, Da Hui sought a declaration that An Rong was indebted to Da Hui in the sum of US$12,460,161.55, being Da Hui’s claim in contribution against An Rong, and that Da Hui was entitled to be subrogated to any extinguished securities held by BofA under the Facility Agreement, including its mortgages over An Rong’s vessels, the Ocean Goby and Ocean Jack.

10 On 12 July 2023, PetroChina applied for payment out of court of the remaining sale proceeds of the Ocean Jack in ADM 94, pursuant to the priorities determined by the court on 20 April 2023. On 12 October 2023, Da Hui obtained an adjournment of PetroChina’s application pending determination of OA 418, on certain terms. The priority of claims for ADM 92 was determined on 16 October 2023.

11 On 28 June 2024, the General Division of the High Court (the “High Court”) dismissed OA 418; see Da Hui Shipping (Pte) Ltd (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) v An Rong Shipping Pte Ltd (in liquidation) (Societe Generale, Singapore Branch and another, non-parties) [2025] 4 SLR 816 (“Da Hui (HC)”). The court held that BofA’s interests as mortgagee in the vessels had either been extinguished by operation of law, or been merged into the admiralty in rem causes of action BofA possessed as mortgagee and the judgments BofA had obtained in its actions in rem; Da Hui (HC) at [63]. Moreover, upon full repayment of BofA’s outstanding debt from the Vessels’ sale proceeds, BofA fell out of the pool of in rem claimants; Da Hui (HC) at [65]. The court also held that Da Hui was attempting (very late in the day) to steal a march on the other lower-ranking in rem claimants and the remedy of subrogation could be refused on grounds of public policy; Da Hui (HC) at [66].

12 Da Hui appealed against the High Court’s decision in OA 418. On 23 June 2025, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal; see Da Hui Shipping (Pte) Ltd (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation v An Rong Shipping Pte Ltd (in liquidation) (Societe Generale, Singapore Branch and another, non-parties) [2025] 1 SLR 998 (“Da Hui (CA)”). The Court of Appeal held that an in personam action like OA 418 was the incorrect procedural mode for asserting what is fundamentally a proprietary claim against the sale proceeds of a vessel held in an admiralty action in rem: Da Hui (CA) at [78].

13 Thereafter, on 24 June 2025, PetroChina wrote in to court to seek a hearing date for SUM 2077. On 25 June 2025, PetroChina filed SUM 1804. On 16 July 2025, SocGen followed on to file SUM 1987.

14 In the meanwhile, Da Hui wrote in on 30 June 2025 (in relation to ADM 94) and 2 July 2025 (in relation to ADM 92) to inform the court that it was considering its next steps and required time to appoint new solicitors following the resolution of Da Hui (CA). On 8 August 2025, Da Hui commenced ADM 93/2025 and ADM 94/2025 against the sale proceeds of the Ocean Goby and the Ocean Jack respectively (the “Admiralty Actions”). Subsequently, Da Hui filed the Stay Applications on 19 August 2025 to stay the Payment Out Applications taken out by PetroChina and SocGen, pending the final resolution of the Admiralty Actions and the re-ordering of priorities.

15 First, Da Hui submitted that its application for a stay satisfies the factors set out in Rex International Holding Ltd and another v Gulf Hibiscus Ltd [2019] 2 SLR 682 (“Rex International”). ⁴ There was a complete overlap and dependency of issues with the Admiralty Actions. ⁵ The dismissal of its in personam application in OA 418 did not, as a matter of law, bar Da Hui from pursuing its in rem remedy in the Admiralty Actions. Da Hui has to obtain a judgment in rem in these actions before it can ask the court to redetermine the priorities established in ADM 92 and ADM 94. ⁶

16 Second, if the stay is not granted and the proceeds are paid out to PetroChina and SocGen before the Admiralty Actions are determined, the res will be dissipated. Any judgment Da Hui subsequently obtains in the Admiralty Actions would be rendered practically unenforceable against the fund. In contrast, the prejudice to PetroChina and SocGen was minimal and entirely compensable. ⁷

17 Third, the Court of Appeal in Da Hui (CA) had prescribed the procedural path for Da Hui to take. ⁸ It would be contrary to the interest of justice to foreclose the course of action which Da Hui had been directed to take. ⁹ Da Hui acted with expedition to commence the Admiralty Actions immediately after the conclusion of Da Hui (CA). The stay would be for a short, finite period. ¹⁰

18 Both PetroChina and SocGen opposed Da Hui’s application for a stay. While each filed its own written submissions, they made similar and overlapping arguments. I set them out jointly below.

19 First, Da Hui (HC) held at [67] that it is not possible for Da Hui to be subrogated to security already fully enforced and therefore spent in the hands of BofA. The High Court also disallowed Da Hui’s prayer 3 in OA 418 seeking a declaration that Da Hui be entitled to subrogation (see [30] below), for reasons of public policy, namely the unfair prejudice to other creditors in ADM 92 and ADM 94. ¹¹

20 Following the dismissal of Da Hui’s appeal in Da Hui (CA), Da Hui (HC) remains valid, and is final and conclusive on its merits. Da Hui sought to relitigate these issues through the Admiralty Actions, as seen from its Statements of Claim in the Admiralty Actions at paragraphs 20–21 and 24. The Court of Appeal did not reverse or overturn Da Hui (HC). The issues that Da Hui sought to relitigate were hence res judicata. ¹² The Court of Appeal also observed that Da Hui in OA 418 took the position that the remedy of subrogation to BofA’s extinguished rights could not be treated as “a mortgage or charge on a ship” under s 3(1)(c) of the High Court (Admiralty Jurisdiction) Act 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “HCAJA”); Da Hui (CA) at [73]–[74] and [76]. This is contrary to the position it now takes in the Admiralty Actions. ¹³

21 Second, the owner of the Vessels, An Rong, is in liquidation. The permission of the court to commence the Admiralty Actions, as required under s 133(1) of the Insolvency Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IRDA”), had not been obtained by Da Hui. Hence the Admiralty Actions cannot justify the granting of stay. ¹⁴

22 Third, Da Hui had not demonstrated that it would be entitled to reorder the determination of the priorities orders to justify the Stay Applications. ¹⁵ The Court of Appeal in Da Hui (CA) at [81] observed that a court will have to have regard to Da Hui’s consistent conduct since it intervened in ADM 92 and ADM 94, balanced against the rights of PetroChina and SocGen as in rem judgment creditors, before deciding whether or not to re-order the priorities. Da Hui provided no materials to demonstrate otherwise on this point.

23 Fourth, there would be prejudice to PetroChina and SocGen, who commenced their action timeously, if the Stay Applications were granted. ¹⁶ SocGen commenced admiralty in rem actions on 17 June 2020 and obtained default judgment on 5 May 2023. ¹⁷ PetroChina obtained its default judgments in HC/ADM 88/2020 and HC/ADM 89/2020 on 5 July 2023. ¹⁸ This prejudice point was observed in Da Hui (HC) at [66]. ¹⁹ To date, PetroChina and SocGen are the only interveners in ADM 92 and ADM 94 with judgment debts against the Vessels. They should not be deprived their fruits of litigation because Da Hui had failed to properly consider its position on the appropriate legal route to take for its claim against the sale proceeds. ²⁰

24 The applicable law is well established and not in dispute amongst parties. The grant of a stay on case management grounds is “part of the court’s exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to manage its own internal processes”; see BNP Paribas Wealth Management v Jacob Agam and another [2017] 3 SLR 27 (“BNP Paribas”) at [32]; Rex International at [16]; Lun Yaodong Clarence v Dentons Rodyk & Davidson LLP [2025] 1 SLR 849 (“Clarence Lun”) at [41].

25 In determining whether a case management stay ought to be granted, the court should engage in a balancing exercise of various factors. In BNP Paribas, the Court of Appeal outlined at [34] the following non-exhaustive factors:

26 The Court of Appeal in BNP Paribas concluded at [35] by noting that:

27 I started by considering whether there are overlapping issues. In Clarence Lun, the Court of Appeal reiterated at [44] its earlier observation in Rex International that “in order for case management concerns to be relevant at all, there must first be the existence or at least the imminence of separate legal proceedings giving rise to a real risk of overlapping issues”.

28 At the hearing, parties submitted at length as to whether leave is required to commence the Admiralty Actions pursuant to s 133 of the IRDA. I did not find it necessary to come to a view on this issue because even if Da Hui was indeed required to seek leave to commence the Admiralty Actions, it would have been open to Da Hui to retrospectively seek leave to validate its actions. Further even if I were to accept that there are in existence or the imminence of separate legal proceedings, the key question arises as to whether the separate proceedings give rise to a “real risk of overlapping issues”.

29 Da Hui claimed in the Admiralty Actions that it “is entitled, by the principles of equity and pursuant to Section 2 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856, to be subrogated to the rights and remedies held by BofA”. ²¹ However, the High Court in Da Hui (HC) had held that there was no such entitlement.

30 In OA 418, Da Hui sought among other things, the following prayer, which will be referred to as “Prayer 3”; see Da Hui (HC) at [3(c)]:

31 In Da Hui (HC), the High Court did not grant Prayer 3, holding:

32 Da Hui appealed against this decision. The Court of Appeal dismissed Da Hui’s appeal in Da Hui (CA). Da Hui contended during the hearing that the High Court in OA 418 had no power to decide these issues. ²² I did not accept this contention as there was no indication at all in Da Hui (CA) that the Court of Appeal had overturned or set aside in some other way the High Court’s decision in Da Hui (HC). The appeal was dismissed. Even though the Court of Appeal dismissed it on procedural grounds, this still means that the Court of Appeal left the High Court’s decision in Da Hui (HC) standing. Da Hui has exhausted its avenues of appeal with respect to the holdings made in Da Hui (HC).

33 PetroChina and SocGen submitted that as the High Court’s decision in OA 418 is now final and binding, the issue relating to whether Da Hui can be subrogated is now res judicata. It is not necessary for me to make a finding on the issue of res judicata, for the purposes of Da Hui’s Stay Applications. For a case management stay to be granted, Da Hui had to satisfy the court that the Admiralty Actions gave rise to “a real risk of overlapping issues” vis-à-vis the Payment Out Applications; see Clarence Lun at [44]. In light of Da Hui (HC)’s standing decision as set out above, which had decided on the premise of the Admiralty Actions, I found it difficult to say that there is a “real risk” of overlapping issues.

34 At the hearing, counsel for Da Hui accepted that the nature of the claims is fundamentally similar and the premise of the claims in OA 418 and the Admiralty Actions is the same. ²³ However, it was submitted that there is still a difference because OA 418 pursued an in personam action against An Rong, whereas the claims in the Admiralty Actions are against the res in the Admiralty court. Be that as it may, these differences that Da Hui referred to arose from how Da Hui chose to litigate in OA 418, which the Court of Appeal in Da Hui (CA) pointed out was wrong. It did not change the fact that these are fundamentally similar claims based on the same premise. The premise had been ruled on by the High Court in Da Hui (HC), and the Court of Appeal left this decision standing in its ruling in Da Hui (CA).

35 In light of this, in my assessment, it could not be said that there is a “real risk” of overlapping issues. On this basis alone, I found sufficient grounds to decline to grant a case management stay.

36 Da Hui sought to bolster their case by citing the Court of Appeal’s observations in Da Hui (CA) at [81]. I was unable to agree with Da Hui that the Court of Appeal had prescribed the procedural path for Da Hui. In my view, the court in Da Hui (CA) was emphasising throughout the judgment, that Da Hui would have had to advance its case in an action in rem before it could have recourse to the res. The Court of Appeal was not saying what Da Hui should be doing, but instead, was pointing out what Da Hui should have done. This is apparent when the court’s observations are read in full, instead of the selected dicta which Da Hui cited from [81]. The portions which Da Hui left out are in bold:

37 It also appeared to me that even the portion that Da Hui chose to selectively cite, is more a remonstration of Da Hui’s conduct and the difficulties it would face if re-ordering of priorities was considered, rather than a sanction of the steps that Da Hui has now taken in the Admiralty Actions or to justify a stay of the Payment Out Applications. Da Hui’s “conduct consistently maintained since it intervened in ADM 92 and ADM 94”, which the court observed at [81], included Da Hui’s decision not to safeguard its position at the vital moment. It also included the position taken by Da Hui’s former solicitors that the remedy of subrogation to BofA’s extinguished rights could not be treated as “a mortgage or charge on a ship” under s 3(1)(c) of the HCAJA. The approach taken by Da Hui in OA 418 was “obviously adopted to work around the position held by [Da Hui’s solicitors] which was that Da Hui’s claim for subrogation would not fall under s 3(1)(c) of the HCAJA”; Da Hui (CA) at [76]. Far from justifying a stay, it appeared to me that these very factors cited by the Court of Appeal worked against Da Hui’s case for a stay.

38 For completeness, even if I had found a real risk of overlapping issues, I would have declined to grant a case management stay, having due regard to the circumstances of the case. In BNP Paribas at [34], the following were identified as relevant factors, amongst others: (a) which proceedings were commenced first; (b) the public interest; (c) how far advanced the proceedings are in each court; (d) generally balancing the advantages and disadvantages to each party.

39 I first considered the advantages and disadvantages, or in other words, the relative prejudice to the parties. Da Hui submitted that it would be more prejudiced if the stay is not granted, since the res would be dissipated. In contrast, PetroChina and SocGen could be compensated monetarily for being kept out of the sale proceeds pending the determination of the Admiralty Actions.

40 I took Da Hui’s point that the res might be dissipated if a stay is not granted and that conversely, monetary compensation was available for PetroChina and SocGen. It had been on that basis that I earlier ordered an adjournment of ADM 94 on 12 October 2023, with a proviso that Da Hui would pay the interests on the sums due to PetroChina running as of 12 October 2023 and costs thrown away if Da Hui fails on OA 418. But I found that the weight of prejudice has shifted considerably since. Any prejudice or disadvantage that may be occasioned to Da Hui was a result of the course of action that it had chosen to undertake.

41 Notably, Da Hui had already obtained a stay of the payment out of the sale proceeds in ADM 94, for it to pursue its claim on OA 418. It was for Da Hui to decide how it would pursue its claim there. It was no fault of PetroChina or SocGen that the Court of Appeal found Da Hui to have taken the wrong approach and dismissed its appeal against the High Court’s decision in OA 418.

42 Indeed, it is also pertinent that in hearing OA 418, the High Court regarded such prejudice to PetroChina and SocGen as a basis for refusing Da Hui’s remedy of subrogation on the ground of public policy, holding at [66]:

43 While Da Hui claimed that the Admiralty Actions would be resolved in a matter of months, I agreed with PetroChina that such a contention was speculative and probably overly optimistic. ²⁴ By way of reference, OA 418 was commenced on 24 April 2023 and was finally resolved some two years later by Da Hui (CA) on 23 June 2025. PetroChina had filed for permission to intervene in the Admiralty Actions and in that light, the default judgment applications taken out by Da Hui would likely be contested. One might reasonably expect the Admiralty Actions to take a comparable amount of time to resolve.

44 Therefore, although Da Hui may be disadvantaged if the Stay Applications were not granted, I assessed that whatever prejudice or disadvantage that Da Hui may suffer would be entirely self-inflicted. Such prejudice would also not outweigh the prejudice suffered by PetroChina and SocGen occasioned by yet another delay to their fruits of litigation.

45 I would add that the higher order concerns cited by the Court of Appeal in Tomolugen Holdings Ltd and another v Silica Investors Ltd and other appeals [2016] 1 SLR 373 (“Tomolugen”) weighed against Da Hui. At [188], the court stated:

Even though these higher order concerns were articulated in the context of a stay application in favour of arbitration, two of the higher order concerns, viz, a plaintiff’s right to choose and the court’s objective to ensure efficient and the fair resolution of disputes, are of general relevance in assessing whether to grant a case management stay.

46 In this case, Da Hui had a right to choose who, how and where it wanted to sue. It did so in OA 418. It has already had that opportunity to make that choice. There is nothing in Tomolugen that says that a plaintiff has a right to choose again a second time, if it got the first time wrong.

47 In addition, the court, in assessing a stay application, also has to ensure “the efficient and fair resolution of disputes”. This is the second higher order concern flagged in Tomolugen. It was undisputed that both PetroChina and SocGen were timeous in their intervention and Da Hui was very late in the day. This was observed by both the High Court in Da Hui (HC) (at [66]) and the Court of Appeal in Da Hui (CA) (at [81]).

48 Relating back to the factors articulated in BNP Paribas (see [38] above), it was undisputed that the Payment Out Applications were commenced first and, in so far as the Payment Out Applications represent the final step of PetroChina and SocGen’s in rem claims against the Vessels, are at a far more advanced stage than the Admiralty Actions, which Da Hui had just commenced.

49 In the circumstances, I found that it would be grossly unfair to PetroChina and SocGen to deny them finality and the fruits of their litigation, due to mistakes which they did not make, after having already waited for Da Hui for over two years to determine OA 418.

50 Therefore, even if there had been a real risk of overlapping issues, I would have declined to exercise my discretion to grant the Stay Applications.

51 Having found no real risk of overlapping issues, I dismissed SUMs 2337 and 2338. In any event, I would have declined to grant the Stay Applications, taking into account the circumstances of the case. As it stood, both considerations fortified my decision to decline the Stay Applications.