1 A marriage of convenience erodes the institution of marriage. It violates the sanctity of marriage. Its insidious nature renders detection challenging. With the enactment of s 57C of the Immigration Act 1959 (“the Act”), Parliament recognised the specific need to target such offences with a punishment regime that serves as a strong deterrent. ¹ The integrity of public systems is further undermined by the conduct of bad actors involved in transacting a marriage of convenience to procure an immigration advantage.

2 The accused, Yap Yeong Keen, a male 51-year old Singaporean, claimed trial to the following charge for an offence of assisting in arranging a marriage of convenience under s 57C(2) of the Immigration Act 1959:

You…are charged that you, between 11.06.2022 and 09.07.2022, in Singapore, did assist in arranging a marriage of convenience between Chen Weiyu (D.O.B.: 30.11.1985), a male Singapore citizen and Cao Rongrong (D.O.B.: 03.11.1992), a female People’s Republic of China national on 09.07.2022 in Singapore, to wit:

1. you booked and paid for the venue for the solemnisation and reception on the said date,

2. you paid for their wedding rings and you provided a red packet containing $108 in cash to the solemniser via Chen Weiyu on the said date,

3. you coached Chen Weiyu on how to argue with the authorities for extension of Cao Rongrong’s stay in Singapore until the solemnisation date, and

4. you acted as a witness for the solemnisation between Chen Weiyu and Cao Rongrong on the said date,

with the intention of assisting the said Cao Rongrong to obtain an immigration advantage to extend her stay in Singapore, in the form of a Visit Pass, and you have thereby committed an offence punishable under s 57C(2) of the Immigration Act 1959.

3 On the fourth day of the trial during the prosecution’s case, the accused pleaded guilty to and was convicted of the same offence under an amended charge under s 57C(2) of the Immigration Act 1959. The amendment involved the removal of some particulars in the original charge, namely, the reference to three acts of assistance. The amended charge contains a single act of assistance, namely,

You … are charged that you, between 11 June 2022 and 9 July 2022, in Singapore, did assist in arranging a marriage of convenience between Chen Weiyu, a male Singapore citizen and Cao Rongrong, a female People’s Republic of China national, on 9 July 2022 in Singapore, to wit, by acting as a witness for the solemnization between Chen Weiyu and Cao Rongrong, with the intention of assisting the said Cao Rongrong to obtain an immigration advantage to extend her stay in Singapore, in the form of a Visit Pass, and you have thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 57C(2) of the Immigration Act 1959.

4 I impose a sentence of 15 weeks’ imprisonment and set out my reasons.

5 An offence involving assisting in arranging a marriage between two other persons, with the intention of assisting one of the parties to the marriage to obtain an immigration advantage under section 57C(2) of the Immigration Act 1959 may be punished with a maximum fine of $10,000, or with an imprisonment which may extend to 10 years, or with both.

6 Section 57C(6) of the Act defines an immigration advantage to mean the grant or extension of the validity of any visa, pass, permit or re-entry permit under the Act or the regulations or any order made under the Act for a party to the marriage or for a child or parent of that party.

7 The accused has no antecedents. ²

8 The Statement of Facts sets out the relevant facts to which the accused pleaded guilty unreservedly. ⁴

9 The accused, a married man, was involved in a romantic relationship with Cao Rongrong (“Cao”) in March 2022.

10 Sometime in May 2022, Cao, a work permit holder, wanted to extend her stay in Singapore and conveyed her intention to marry a Singaporean for this purpose to Ngiam Kee Chai, Jankin (“Ngiam”). Ngiam in turn approached Chen Weiyu (“Chen”) to ascertain his interest in entering a marriage of convenience with Cao for the purpose of enabling her to obtain the requisite passes to remain in Singapore for a monthly payment of $1000. Ngiam also offered to negotiate with Cao on Chen’s monthly fee if the latter agreed to the arrangement. Chen agreed to enter the marriage of convenience.

11 Pursuant to the arrangement and on behalf of Chen, Ngiam applied to the Ministry of Manpower (“MOM”) for approval to marry Cao.

12 As Cao’s work permit was due to be cancelled by her employer, Ngiam and Chen discussed various options to enable her to remain in Singapore before the marriage. Upon Ngiam’s suggestion, Chen made enquiries with the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (“ICA”) and was advised to seek approval from MOM to marry Cao. Ngiam told Chen to visit the ICA with Cao to enquire about extending the latter’s stay in Singapore before the marriage upon the cancellation of her work permit. Chen was told by Ngiam to make up a credible story for Cao’s extension of stay before the marriage in Singapore and to allay any suspicion surrounding his relationship with Cao by being equipped with the information on the circumstances in which they met and Cao’s workplace.

13 After visiting ICA, Chen apprised Ngiam of the plan for Cao to leave Singapore, while he applied for her to enter Singapore again after obtaining the approval from MOM.

14 On 9 June 2022, Chen informed Ngiam that he had obtained the approval form MOM to marry Cao. Cao remained in Singapore before the marriage. The solemnisation of the marriage was scheduled to take place on 23 August 2022. Ngiam agreed to Chen’s request to be a witness to the solemnisation. Ngiam also told Chen that he could help to raise his monthly payment to $1500 and $500 drink credits.

15 Sometime between 11 June 2022 and 9 July 2022, Cao asked the accused to act as a witness to the solemnisation of her marriage with Chen. At the material time, the accused knew that Cao’s marriage with Chen was not genuine. He knew that the purpose of the marriage was to enable Cao to obtain an immigration advantage, namely, an extension of her stay in Singapore. The accused agreed to Cao’s request to assist her to obtain an immigration advantage.

16 As Cao’s work permit was due to be cancelled, Chen brought forward the date of the solemnisation. The accused booked a restaurant at the Singapore Indoor Stadium as the solemnisation venue. The wedding rings for the solemnisation were purchased by Cao with the accused’s credit card.

17 On 9 July 2022, the solemnisation of the marriage between Chen and Cao took place at the restaurant in the presence of the accused and Ngiam as witnesses. The accused gave a red packet with cash of $108 to the solemniser upon Cao’s request.

18 Chen and Cao agreed that Chen would be paid a monthly amount of $1500 after the solemnisation. The accused assisted Cao to pay Chen $1500 monthly for entering the marriage of convenience. Over the course of four months between July and October 2022, the accused made a total payment of $6000 to Chen. Cao subsequently paid the accused in cash.

19 Pursuant to the agreement, Chen sponsored multiple applications for visit passes for Cao in July 2022 and August 2022. These included two applications for Short Term Visit and one for Long Term Visit Pass. The applications were approved.

20 The prosecution submits that the custodial threshold is crossed and sought a custodial sentence, the length of which to be determined by the court. ⁵ According to the prosecution, there are no reported cases where the courts have imposed a sentence of a fine for offences of such a genre. ⁶

21 The prosecution highlights that the accused played a critical role by acting as a witness to the marriage solemnisation. ⁷ By so doing, the accused had contributed to the deception of the relevant authorities and undermined the solemnisation process. According to the prosecution, the accused further took steps to facilitate the perpetuation of the marriage of convenience. These included booking the solemnisation venue and allowing the use of his credit card for the purchase of the wedding rings, as well as providing a red packet to the solemniser at the end of the ceremony.

22 The prosecution further states the accused is entitled to a maximum discount of 5% at Stage 4 of the guidelines on reduction in sentences for guilty pleas issued by the Sentencing Advisory Panel (“the SAP sentencing guidelines”). ⁸

23 The defence seeks a maximum fine of $10,000. According to the defence, the custodial threshold is not crossed as the accused played a limited role by serving as witness to the solemnisation. ⁹

24 The defence submits that where a custodial sentence is imposed by the court, the accused should be entitled to the maximum 30% sentencing discount pursuant to the SAP guidelines. ¹⁰

25 The defence highlights that a custodial sentence would be severely detrimental to the longstanding career of the accused as he stands at risk of losing his professional licence as a financial services advisory representative. ¹¹ The defence further submits that the accused’s elderly parents and children would suffer financial hardship and emotional distress if a custodial sentence were imposed. ¹²

26 In finding the issue to be answered in the affirmative, I have taken account of the following considerations.

27 Deterrence is the predominant sentencing consideration in the present case. The following relevant factors, among other non-exhaustive factors, as identified in PP v Law Aik Meng [2007] 2 SLR (R) 814 (“ Law Aik Meng ”) at [24] - [25], would attract the sentencing principle of general deterrence:

(a) Offences against or relating to public institutions;

(b) Group/syndicate offences;

(c) Offences affecting public safety, public security, public health or public services;

(d) Offences leading to public disquiet; and

(e) Difficulty of detection

These factors were demonstrably present. The present offence was committed against multiple public institutions, namely, the Ministry of Social and Family Development, ICA and MOM. In subverting the process underpinning the issuance of visit passes, the offence involved deception on the authorities and threatened to undermine the immigration system. The organised nature of the group offence in which the accused was involved rendered detection of such crime difficult. The protection of public interest warrants deterrence in sentencing.

28 The need for deterrence in sentencing offences involving marriage of convenience was also recognised by the High Court in Mehra Radhika v Public Prosecutor [2015] 1 SLR 96 (“ Mehra Radhika ”) at [34] - [35]. In that case, Menon CJ identified six aggravating sentencing factors that are relevant to the offence of arranging or assisting in the arrangement of a marriage of convenience (at [58]). The presence of any of the aggravating factors will generally be sufficient to cross the custodial threshold. These non-exhaustive factors are, namely:

(a) Active steps were taken to conceal the offence;

(b) The offender played a major role in the commission of the offence as opposed to a minor or merely ancillary role;

(c) The offence part of a commercial enterprise active in the commission of such crimes as opposed to being a one-off incident;

(d) The offender was motivated by profit. A fine should additionally be imposed where there was profit motivation.

(e) The offender recruited other persons, apart from the ‘spouse’, in the course of committing the offence; and

(f) There was exploitation or pressure applied to any of the participants involved in the commission of the offence.

29 Applying the sentencing considerations in Mehra Radhika, the prosecution submitted that two of the six factors applied to the present case, namely, (a) the role of the accused in the commission of the offence and (b) the active steps taken to avoid detection of the offence. ¹³

30 The prosecution acknowledges that the accused was neither the mastermind of the scheme nor played a purely ancillary role. According to the prosecution, the accused’s involvement in the offence falls at the midpoint of the polar ends of the spectrum. ¹⁴ The prosecution submits that the accused had assisted to conceal the crime by assisting in organising the wedding reception. ¹⁵ However, the prosecution concedes that this factor applies to a limited degree as the accused’s acts of assistance were done at “ the behest of Chen and Cao ” and did not “provocatively initiate” the hosting of a wedding reception. ¹⁶

31 The defence argues that none of the factors are present in the case. According to the defence, the accused played a purely ancillary role, given that his involvement is confined to acting as a witness and should be regarded as de minimis. ¹⁷ The defence highlights that while steps were taken to conceal the offence, the accused did not initiate these and his acts of assistance were “spur of the moment” responses to Cao’s requests. ¹⁸ It is the defence submission that the custodial threshold is not automatically crossed due to the mere presence of one factor in prominence and a substantial fine is still appropriate where one or two factors are engaged in a limited sense. ¹⁹

32 Notably, the defence acknowledges that the courts have not imposed a fine in cases involving offences concerning a marriage of convenience. ²⁰ Similarly, the prosecution agrees that there are no reported precedents where a sentence of a fine was imposed for such offences. ²¹

33 I broadly agree with the prosecution that two factors are present and address these below.

i) Role of the accused

34 The accused played a significant role in the perpetration of the offence. While the accused was not the mastermind of a wider illicit commercial enterprise, he neither played an ancillary role nor acted under extreme pressure or coercion (see Mehra Radhika at [47]).

35 Contrary to the defence submissions, the accused was not a mere conduit of information between Chen and Cao. In reality, the accused was actively involved in the discussions with Chen and Cao regarding the arrangement of the marriage of convenience. It emerged from the text messages between the accused and Chen that meticulous details were discussed with a view to creating a veneer of legitimacy. ²² The accused provided monetary payments towards creating and maintaining the façade of a genuine marriage between Chen and Cao. According to PW2, Checkpoint Inspector Neo Chin Chuan (“Insp Neo”), the accused and Cao discussed the amount of payment to be made to Chen. ²³ It was the accused who subsequently proposed to Chen in a text message of 15 July 2022, the monthly payment of $1500 for the purpose of maintaining the façade of a genuine marriage. ²⁴ Investigations revealed that the accused paid Chen the sum of $1500. ²⁵ Notably, the accused went to considerable length of accounting for an increment in the monthly payment to Chen in planning the subsequent purchase of a property intended to provide the semblance of a matrimonial home as part of the agreement. ²⁶ It is patent that the accused’s assistance extended beyond acting as a witness to the solemnisation.

36 It was the evidence of PW2, Insp Neo that Chen provided information and updates to both the accused and Cao at the same time. ²⁷ PW2, Insp Neo categorically maintained during cross-examination that it was the accused who actively enquired from Chen the status of the pre-marriage long term visit pass assessment and instructed Chen on how to enable Cao to have an extension of stay in Singapore. ²⁸ The accused told Chen to paint a “sob story” to the authorities of how Cao had made plans to travel overseas and that her return to Singapore was fraught with uncertainty due to strict quarantine rules. ²⁹ This can be gleaned from the testimony of PW2, Insp Neo pertaining to the Whatsapp text messages ³⁰ between the accused and Chen, the relevant extract of which is reproduced below:

The accused was equally complicit in helping Chen print out the MOM documents relating to Cao’s application to extend her special pass. ³¹

37 I disagree with the defence characterisation of the accused’s role as de minimis. ³² This is misplaced and erroneous in law.

38 Section 95 of the Penal Code 1871 (“ the Penal Code”) defines what constitutes an act that is de minimis. This is set out as follows:

Pursuant to s 95 of the Penal Code, the present charge would not have been made out if the act of the accused did not constitute an offence. By the defence submission, the accused’s conduct would have been rendered nugatory and his plea of guilt otiose.

39 In my view, it is wholly artificial to view the accused’s role in isolation. The level of his culpability in the entire scheme must be juxtaposed against the circumstances leading to the commission of the offence and assessed holistically. It is pertinent to note that the accused went beyond the mere act of witnessing the solemnisation. He actively monitored the status of Cao’s visit pass applications. He was involved in various aspects of the preparatory work including giving specific instructions to Chen that culminated in the soleminsation of the marriage. These ran the gamut from assisting to book the solemnisation venue to providing his credit card for the purchase of the wedding rings. ³³ According to PW2, Insp Neo, the accused told Chen to change the solemnisation time to suit the opening of the venue, the Thai Village Restaurant. The relevant extract is set out below:

ii) Active steps taken to conceal the offence

40 As observed by the court in Mehra Radhika at [37]-[38], an offence committed in circumstances which were designed to prevent detection is an aggravating factor. This is particularly significant in the context of s 57C(2) of the Act. The deliberate legislative intention behind the enactment of this specific provision in the Act is to address the issue concerning marriages of convenience. Where active steps were taken by the arranger or in the present case, the person assisting to arrange the marriage of convenience, to prevent the detection of the offence or to deceive others into believing that the marriage is legitimate, this is an aggravating factor that warrants a more severe sentence. Similarly in Public Prosecutor v Lim Yung Keng Adam [2023] SLR(StC) 416 at [63], the court recognised the following acts as steps taken by the offender to conceal the crime: (a) constructing a false relationship history between the parties to the marriage of convenience, (b) organising a wedding reception to give the impression of a genuine marriage and (c) maintain the façade of a genuine marriage after solemnisation. ³⁴

41 In the present case, I find that the accused took steps to conceal the offence. These were not limited to the act of organising a wedding reception by booking the solemnisation venue. Rather, it is the confluence of his various acts involving the booking of the solemnisation venue and the provision of his credit card for the purchase of the wedding rings prior to the solemnisation, and serving as a witness to the marriage solemnisation. Coupled with the provision of monetary payments after the solemnisation to Chen on behalf of Cao for maintaining the façade of a genuine marriage, these pointed to a sustained pattern of criminal conduct. ³⁵ Contrary to the prosecution’s submission, it cannot be said that this factor applied only to “a limited degree”. The accused’s acts, taken collectively were calculated to evade the detection of the offence by the authorities and to mislead others into believing that the marriage between Chen and Cao was legitimate. Regardless of whether the acts of assistance were requested by Chen and Cao, the accused knew that it was not a genuine marriage and took conscious and deliberate steps to ensure that it was not detected.

42 Equally aggravating is the fact that the accused had instructed Chen to delete his chat messages with him when Cao was investigated by ICA, as borne out by the evidence of PW2, Insp Neo. ³⁶ It is evident that the accused was fully cognisant of his wrongful actions and sought to conceal his involvement in the offence.

43 It is the defence submission that the court should place little or no weight on other acts of the accused, save for the fact that he was a witness to the solemnisation. ³⁷ The specific facts are : the booking of the solemnisation venue, providing a red packet of $108 for the solemniser and Cao’s purchase of the wedding rings using the accused’s credit card. ³⁸ The defence objects to the prosecution relying on these facts in the Statement of Facts as aggravating sentencing factors, when these were the very particulars removed from the original charge. The defence argues that the prosecution “cannot have it both ways”. While the defence acknowledges that the court cannot disregard the facts entirely, it urges the court to place no weight on these facts that warrant an uplift in the sentence to be imposed. According to the defence, the prosecution has conceded that these factors should only apply to “a limited degree”. ³⁹

44 In support of its submissions, the defence relies on the cases of Vasentha d/o Joseph v Public Prosecutor [2015] 5 SLR 122 and Public Prosecutor v Tan Thian Earn [2016] 3 SLR 269 for the proposition that an offender cannot be punished for conduct which has not formed the subject of the charges brought against him. ⁴⁰

45 However, in Public Prosecutor v Bong Sim Swan Suzanna [2020] 2 SLR 1001 (“ Suzanna Bong ”), the Court of Appeal affirming the principles set out in Chua Siew Peng v Public Prosecutor & anor [2017] 4 SLR 1247 at [81]-[85], stated at [65]-[66] that while a sentencing court generally could not take into account uncharged offences, it was entitled to and in fact should consider the aggravating circumstances in which the offence was committed, even where those circumstances could technically constitute separate offences. The Court of Appeal observed that conduct that was so closely intertwined to constitute a sufficient nexus to the commission of the offence could be considered at the sentencing stage, regardless of whether that fact could also constitute a separate offence for which the offender was not charged. Where the fact is relevant and proved, it ought to be considered by the sentencing court.

46 I have made the same observation over the course of the proceedings, namely, that the principles in Suzanna Bong apply to the specific facts which formed part of the Statement of Facts that the accused had accepted and these facts would have a bearing on the sentence to be imposed, even though they may not form the subject of the charge. ⁴¹ I find the accused person’s various acts involving the booking of the solemnisation venue, providing his credit card for the purchase of the wedding rings and providing the red packet with cash to the solemniser constitute facts in the immediate circumstances of the charged offence. In this regard, I agree with the prosecution that these facts have sufficient nexus to the commission of the offence and should be considered in sentencing. ⁴²

47 In my view, the defence contention is a non-issue. It is the prerogative of the prosecution to amend the charge that it intends to proceed with. The amendment of the charge involving the removal of particulars from the original charge is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The factors which the prosecution took into account in amending the charge, or specifically, in removing the particulars form the charge, are not relevant considerations to the court in sentencing (see Public Prosecutor v Gaiyathiri d/o Murugayan [2022] 4 SLR 560 at [57]). ⁴³ Pertinently, the defence accepted the amended charge and the Statement of Facts containing these particulars. The accused admitted to the amended charge and the Statement of Facts unequivocally. He had benefit of legal advice at the material time. The accused accepted the specific facts which were set out in the Statement of Facts unreservedly, as confirmed by learned counsel. Notably, the defence acknowledges that the court is entitled to consider the facts set out in the Statement of Facts for the purpose of sentencing. ⁴⁴

48 Even if the other acts of assistance in contention were sequestered and disregarded, the singular act of the accused in the execution of his role as a witness to the formal solemnisation of the marriage lends itself to a significant level of culpability. The act of witnessing the solemnisation of a marriage bears serious legal implications. The solemnisation of the marriage is a process governed by the Women’s Charter 1961 (“the Women’s Charter”). The act of solemnisation is defined in section 2 of the Women’s Charter to include “the contracting of a marriage or effecting a marriage in accordance with the law, religion, custom or usage of the parties or any of the parties thereto”.

49 Pursuant to section 23(1)(c) of the Charter, the legal process requires the presence of at least two credible witnesses. Integral to the solemnisation is the presence of these witnesses who attest to the validity of the marriage. In this regard, the accused played an instrumental role in legitimising the sham marriage, thereby perpetrating the fraud and deception on the public institutions. He was not a mere cog in the arrangement of the marriage of convenience. As a witness to the solemisation, the accused was in essence attesting to the validity of the marriage and thus misleading the authorities into the false belief that the parties were contracting a lawful union. Even if the other forms of assistance were discounted, this singular act of witnessing the solemnisation of a marriage by the accused was especially critical, given its significant legal ramifications. It is also noteworthy that the act of perpetrating fraud and deception on the public institution that is given oversight of the registration of marriages, namely, the Ministry of Social and Family Development, would have constituted a separate and distinct offence.

50 In Mehra Radhika, the offender pleaded guilty to arranging a marriage of convenience between a foreign national, her brother’s friend and a Singapore national. The purpose of the marriage of convenience was to enable the foreign national to find a job in Singapore. Pursuant to the plan, the offender enlisted the assistance of a friend, one Peer Ali, to procure a Singaporean female as a “spouse”. The offender paid Peer Ali a sum of $6300 for his assistance. The foreign national and the Singaporean spouse were charged and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment each for the offence of entering into a marriage of convenience under s 57C(1) of the Act. Both the offender and Peer Ali were each charged under s 57C(2) of the Act for arranging a marriage of convenience. Peer Ali was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment, while the offender was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment in addition to a month that she had already served in remand. The offender’s effective sentence was nine months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the offender’s sentence was reduced to six months’ imprisonment. The appellate court found the presence of aggravating factors that were sufficient to cross the custodial threshold. The offender initiated the idea of securing a marriage of convenience and suggested to the foreign national to enter into such an arrangement. She also recruited Peer Ali and paid him to involve another person, namely, the “spouse”, who would be paid for her involvement. She discussed the proposed terms of the marriage of convenience with Peer Ali. The offender also brought the foreign national to the community club where the marriage was solemnised. In allowing the appeal against the sentence, the court considered that it was a one-off incident which she committed to assist her brother’s friend. The court further noted that the offender was not motivated by monetary gain, unlike her friend, Peer Ali.

51 The prosecution cites several precedents involving offences under s 57C (2) of the Act that applied the Mehra Radhika sentencing framework. ⁴⁵ Of note are the following cases: Public Prosecutor v Huang Liping [2015] SGDC 70 and Public Prosecutor v Huang Liping [2015] SGDC 147 (“Huang Liping”), Public Prosecutor v Zhao Mingyue [2017] SGDC 98 (“ Zhao Mingyue”) and Public Prosecutor v Qin Fuxing and another [2021] SGDC 154 (“Qin Fuxing”):

a. Huang Liping involved an offender who claimed trial to a charge of arranging a marriage of convenience with the intention of assisting her female employee, a foreigner, obtain an immigration advantage in the form of a visit pass for herself. In sentencing her to eight months’ imprisonment, the court found that the offender played a major role in the commission of the offence. The offender initiated the proposal and approached a male friend, who was also her employee at her lounge, to marry the foreigner. The male employee first rejected the offender’s proposal and only agreed when she approached him again. She applied pressure on him to marry the foreigner to prolong her stay in Singapore by sponsoring her long term pass application. To facilitate the marriage solemnisation process, the offender loaned her private apartment and lent a pair of rings to the male employee, which were subsequently returned to her. She also acted as a witness to the solemnisation and enlisted the help of a customer at her lounge to be the other witness. After the solemnisation, the offender discussed with her male employee on renting a room to stay with the foreign bride to avoid the suspicion of the authorities. She paid her male employee a sum of $15,000 in three monthly instalments after the marriage. After the solemnisation, the male employee sponsored the visit pass of the foreigner, which was extended on three occasions. While there was no evidence of payment made to the offender, the court found that the offender was motivated by financial gain of having the foreigner work and generate business at her lounges. She knew it was a sham marriage between her employees. The offence was a one-off incident and no active steps were taken by the offender to conceal it.

b. In Zhao Mingyue, the offender claimed trial and was convicted to an offence of arranging a marriage of convenience between her co-worker and her brother with the intention of assisting her brother to obtain an immigration advantage. In sentencing the offender to eight months’ imprisonment, the court found that she played the major role in getting and convincing her co-worker to marry her brother. In return, the offender promised to pay her co-worker a sum $2000-$3000 after the marriage and help her find accommodation. The offender further informed her co-worker that her brother would be able to help support her financially. Upon securing her co-worker’s agreement, the offender actively arranged the marriage. She booked the appointment with the Registry of Marriages, arranged for a Justice of Peace she knew to solemnise the marriage, procured her friends to be witnesses to the solemnisation and allowed the marriage solemnisation to take place in her mother-in-law’s home. ⁴⁶ There was no evidence of exploitation of other parties as the offender had concealed the fact of the sham marriage from her friends whom she approached to be witnesses to the marriage. The court noted that the offender’s culpability was higher than that of the offender in Mehra Radhika.

c. Qin Fuxing concerned the offender, Pang Beng Lee (“Pang”) and his co-offender, Qin Fuxing (“Qin”). Pang claimed trial to a charge of arranging a marriage of convenience between Qin and his elder brother with the intention of assisting Qin to obtain a visit pass for herself. Pang and Qin were in a romantic relationship. Pang was a married man. In order to carry on their relationship, he suggested to Qin to enter a sham marriage with his elder brother in order to obtain a visit pass to stay in Singapore. Pang undertook all the arrangements for the marriage. The marriage was solemnised at the Registry of Marriages. After the marriage, Pang accompanied the couple to ICA to apply for Qin’s visit passes and filled in all the entries in the application forms. Qin was granted an extension of her stay on two occasions. In sentencing Pang to 10 months’ imprisonment, the court noted that he had played the main role in the offences. He persuaded his elder brother to enter the marriage so that the latter could apply for a subsidised HDB flat. Pang made all the arrangements for the marriage solemnisation at the Registry of Marriages and acted as one of the witnesses to the marriage. The offender also took steps to conceal the offences by registering a Malaysian address as the co-offender’s residence to prevent ICA from performing checks on the addresses he falsely declared in the forms, which formed the subject of two false statements charges. He was present at ICA with Qin and his elder brother for every application for visit pass and its extension and filled up all the application forms. The offender also worked towards obtaining a permanent resident status for Qin to help his elder brother in his application for a HDB flat.

52 Notably, these cases involved offenders who were convicted after trial on the charge of arranging a marriage of convenience, as opposed to assisting to arrange a marriage of convenience, which is the subject of the present charge. It is apparent from the facts of these cases that the conduct of the offenders extended to acts of assistance as well. These included the provision of the solemnisation venue, wedding rings and witnessing the solemnisation process, which bear striking similarities with the present case. The sentences imposed on the offenders who had claimed trial ranged from seven months to 10 months’ imprisonment.

53 Like the offenders in the precedents, the accused knew at the material time that it was a not a genuine marital relationship between Chen and Cao. However, he continued to facilitate the perpetuation of the sham marriage.

54 I recognise that the accused’s culpability is lesser that of the offender in Mehra Radhika, who pleaded guilty to her charge. For her role in arranging the marriage of convenience, the offender in Mehra Radhika effectively served a sentence of seven months’ imprisonment.

55  According to the SAP sentencing guidelines, the reduction in sentence to be considered at Stage 4 of the proceedings on or after the first day of the trial is up to a maximum of 5%.

56 It bears emphasis that the SAP sentencing guidelines serve to provide guidance in sentencing and are non-binding on the courts. The recommended reductions in the guidelines are not writ in stone and may be displaced by appropriate circumstances through the public interest exception to the guidelines, particularly where the evidence presented is clear and the circumstances are egregious, hence warranting a heavy and harsh sentence: PP v Yoong Kok Kai [2026] SGHC 247 (“Yoong Kok Kai”) at [15]-[18], citing Ng En You Jeremiah Ng v PP [2025] 4 SLR 395. While the amount of reduction is intended to promote certainty and encourage early resolution of criminal cases, the High Court in Yoong Kok Kai reiterated that the 30% recommendation reduction for an early guilty plea at Stage 1 of the SAP guidelines is not appropriate and should not be applied mechanically where the evidence is clear and the circumstances are egregious (Yoong Kok Kai at [16]).

57 According to the prosecution, the accused person’s plea of guilt would be accorded the maximum discount of 5% as he elected to plead guilty midway through trial and after witnesses had testified. This would bring the case within Stage 4 of the SAP sentencing guidelines. ⁴⁷

58 The defence asserts the accused should be entitled to the maximum 30% sentencing discount, given the substantial amendments to the particulars of the charge. ⁴⁸ In support of this contention, the defence relies on the SAP sentencing guidelines at [12], which states that the court may exercise its discretion to award an appropriate reduction in sentence irrespective of the recommended stipulated reductions, subject to a maximum reduction of 30%, where the accused person pleads guilty following an amendment to the charge, which amendment has a material bearing on the sentence. This includes an amendment of a charge to a different offence or involves a substantial amendment to the particulars of the charge.

59 The defence further canvasses the case of Public Prosecutor v S Iswaran [2025] 3 SLR 403 (“S Iswaran”) for a sentencing discount of up to 30% on account of the significantly amended charge to which the accused pleaded guilty. ⁴⁹

60 In S Iswaran at [139], the High Court held that it was appropriate to confer a discount of up to 30% to a plea of guilt to an amended charge, where the amendment was substantive. Notably, the original charge pertained to the offence of corrupt receipt of gratification under section 6(a) read with section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1960 with a prescribed punishment of a fine of up to $100,000 or imprisonment of up to seven years or both. This was far more serious than the amended charge under section 165 of the Penal Code 1871 involving the offence of obtaining a valuable thing without consideration by a public servant, for which the prescribed punishment is a fine or imprisonment of up to two years or both.

61 By contrast, the amendments to the charge in the present case did not substantially alter the nature and consequences of a plea of guilty to the amended charge. Unlike S Iswaran, there are no substantive amendments to the statutory provision, as well as the prescribed punishment. The offence remains in essence the same, namely, one of assisting in arranging a marriage of convenience, for which the prescribed punishment is a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or to both. In my view, the amendment to the charge involving the removal of specific acts of assistance is not substantive. This is especially so where the Statement of Facts alluded to these specific acts, the legal implications of which I have elaborated earlier. ⁵⁰

62 I accord due credit to the accused’s plea of guilt. As a relevant sentencing consideration, this accounts for the tiered approach in the reduction in sentence recommended by the SAP sentencing guidelines. ⁵¹ However, the accused originally claimed trial to the charge. Considerable public resources were expended by multiple stakeholders including the law enforcement agency, prosecution and judiciary, in the preparation of and during the trial. Over the course of the trial, two prosecution witnesses, namely, ICA officers, PW1, Checkpoint Inspector Ng Chun Cheun and PW2, Insp Neo testified and were cross-examined extensively by the defence. The accused only elected to plead guilty on the fourth day of the trial. The utilitarian effect of the accused’s plea of guilt is blunted in the present case. The accused cannot now avail himself of the benefit of a full 30% sentencing discount that is accorded to an early plea of guilt. It is noted that the accused’s plea of guilt came amid overwhelming evidence. In the face of incriminating evidence, it is Hobson’s choice for the accused to plead guilty. Accordingly, his guilty plea is attenuated in its mitigating value.

63 While the accused does not have antecedents, he cannot be described as a first offender. His involvement in the circumstances leading to and resulting in the fruition of the sham marriage is material. It was not an isolated incident of acting as a witness to the marriage solemnisation. Rather, the accused had displayed a sustained pattern of offending conduct that is relevant in sentencing. It is abundantly clear from the evidence of PW2, Insp Neo, as well as the exchange of Whatsapp text messages between the accused and the co-offenders, that the degree of his involvement was by no means minor. While his various acts would have constituted separate and distinct offences, these were not subject of any additional charges brought against the accused. By his transgressions, the accused has demonstrated wilful disregard of the law.

(ii) Harm

65 I find the case of Koh Yong Chiah v Public Prosecutor [2017] 3 SLR 447 (“Koh Yong Chiah”) to be equally instructive in determining whether the custodial threshold is crossed. The High Court observed at [50] that:

In our view, whether the custodial threshold is crossed should essentially be determined based on the degree of harm caused or likely to be caused by the s 182 offence… Specifically, if appreciable harm may be caused by the s 182 offence, the courts should, as a starting point, impose a custodial term.        

[emphasis added]

66 While Koh Yong Chiah involved an offence of providing false information to a public servant under section 182 of the Penal Code 1871, the sentencing principle is equally applicable in the present case, where deception and fraud were perpetrated on public institutions. In determining the degree of harm that occasioned from the accused’s role, I consider both actual and potential harm (see Koh Yong Chiah at [51]). Appreciable harm did materialise in the present case as Cao obtained an immigration advantage on three occasions when her stay in Singapore was extended upon the approval of her applications for visit passes under the cloak of legitimacy afforded by the marriage of convenience with Chen. ⁵² The erosion of the trust and confidence in public institutions translates to the harm done to public interest. The offence also creates the potential for harm as genuine marriages involving Singaporean citizens and foreigners are subjected to heightened scrutiny informed by more stringent checks conducted by the authorities in the processing of such applications (see Qin Fuxing at [68]). Genuine applicants are also disadvantaged, being deprived of a legitimate chance at securing permanent residency or citizenship, particularly when the process is subverted by a perpetrator of a sham marriage. This will inevitably lead to public disquiet.

67 The group nature of the offence is equally aggravating as a sentencing factor. The accused and his co-offenders each played a significant role in perpetrating the fraud and deceit on the authorities, thereby enlarging the extent of harm: Law Aik Meng at [25]. While I note that the accused was not part of a wider illicit commercial enterprise, he was clearly involved in a meticulously planned and well-orchestrated scheme. Such group dynamics generally occasion greater harm or damage.

68 The role of the offender is relevant to his culpability. As observed in Mehra Radhika at [48], where the role of the arranger is more important and intensive, and the scale of the enterprise greater, the more severe the punishment should be. This applies equally to the role of an offender who assisted in arranging the marriage of convenience. The accused played a pivotal role in assisting the wider illicit commercial enterprise achieve its criminal objectives.

69 It bears noting that the legislature does not draw a distinction between the act of arranging and the act of assisting to arrange. Both acts attract the same statutory prescribed punishment. Section 57C(2) of the IA provides as follows:

        [emphasis added]

70 I next consider the role of the accused vis-à-vis that of his co-offenders, namely, Chen, Cao and Ngiam.

71 Consistency in sentencing is relevant. The principle of parity applies when two of more offenders who were party to the same offence were sentenced, the sentences passed should be similar, unless there was a relevant difference in their responsibility or in their personal circumstances: Public Prosecutor v Ramlee [1998] 3 SLR(R) 95 and affirmed by the High Court in Public Prosecutor v Ng Sae Kiat and other appeals [2015] 5 SLR 167. In Chong Han Rui v Public Prosecutor [2016] SGHC 25 at [1], the High Court reiterated that the application of the parity principle to the sentences meted out to co-offenders who were party to a common criminal enterprise should not be unduly disparate from each other, namely, those of similar culpability should receive similar sentences, while those of greater culpability should generally be more severely punished. It was further emphasised by the court at [52]:

“…however that the parity principle is not to be applied in a rigid and inflexible manner. Rather, it is an important aid to the sentencing court to ensure that sentencing of co-offenders is done in a manner that is broadly consistent and fair. But ultimately, what is consistent and fair depends on the facts of the case at hand…”

[emphasis added]

72 The table below sets out the status of the co-offenders: ⁵³

73 While the accused was a party to the same transaction as Ngiam, Chen and Cao, I am mindful that the principle of parity of sentencing ought not to be applied blindly, without regard to the degree of culpability of each individual offender in committing the offending acts. This was similarly emphasised in Mehra Radhika at [71].

74 Chen and Cao were each charged for a separate and distinct offence under s 57C(1) of the Act, to which they pleaded guilty and consented to three charges under s 57(1)(k) of the Act to be taken into consideration. As the accused was charged for a different offence under s 57C(2) of the Act, the parity principle does not apply. However, the need for consistency in sentencing remains relevant, given the accused’s involvement in the criminal endeavour with Chen and Cao.

75 The prosecution submits that the level of the accused’s culpability differs significantly from the co-offenders. ⁵⁴ According to the prosecution, Chen and Cao were motivated to enter the marriage of convenience for benefit, while the accused did not obtain any financial gain. Both Chen and Cao further consented to three other charges under s 57(1)(k) to be taken into consideration. These charges related to the offence of providing false information to the authorities in the applications for visit passes.

76 The prosecution further contends that the accused’s culpability is lower than Ngiam’s. Like the accused, Ngiam acted as a witness to the solemnisation of the marriage. It is the prosecution’s submission that Ngiam’s case is directly relevant as he was charged for arranging the marriage of convenience between Chen and Cao. ⁵⁵ The prosecution concedes that Ngiam played a “greater role” than the accused by proposing the idea of the marriage of convenience to Chen and introducing Cao to him. Ngiam was involved in the negotiation of the financial terms and actively coached Chen on how to apply for the requisite passes to extend Cao’s stay in Singapore. Ngiam also assisted Chen with the relevant applications to enter the marriage of convenience. On account of these factors, the prosecution argues that the accused should not be sentenced to an imprisonment term exceeding that of six months imposed on Ngiam.

77 The defence argues that the accused’s role was minimal, in contrast to Ngiam’s. ⁵⁶

78 To a limited extent, I agree with the prosecution that the absence of profit distinguished the accused’s case from Chen’s. Relative to the accused’s motivation, Chen’s participation in the criminal enterprise was driven solely by monetary gain and reflected a greater degree of culpability. A harsher sentence is warranted where the offence is motivated by any form of financial gain or benefit (see Mehra Radhika at [51] and [72]). Similarly, Cao had obtained an immigration advantage on account of the marriage of convenience. She was allowed to extend her stay in Singapore lawfully on multiple occasions. ⁵⁷

79 However, I do not accept that the accused did not procure any form of benefit from his involvement. While the accused did not gain financially, there was personal motivation on his part to legitimise and extend Cao’s stay in Singapore to continue his relationship with her. It would have been myopic to view his participation as purely altruistic. The reality is that the accused, a married man, was involved in an affair with Cao. He had a vested interest in ensuring the success of the marriage of convenience. Given his marital status, the accused was unable to extend her stay in Singapore legitimately. In this regard, the accused did derive intangible benefits from the marriage of convenience. It enabled him to carry on his relationship with Cao.

80 The degree of planning and premeditation was demonstrably high. The sequence of the events as captured in the text messages between the accused and Chen pointed to the nature and extent of their collaboration to perpetrate fraud on the authorities. The existence of a considered intention to perpetrate the offence on the authorities justifies a harsher sentence than one which resulted from a “ spur of the moment ” (see Mehra Radhika at [41]).

81 I agree with the prosecution that Ngiam’s sentence is relevant. It is not disputed that Ngiam’s level of culpability is higher than the accused’s. This is amplified by Ngiam’s prior attempts to arrange two marriages of convenience with Chen involving foreign female Chinese nationals. ⁵⁸ Given that Ngiam’s sentence was six months’ imprisonment, his claim-trial sentence would have been in the range of nine months to nine and half months before a sentencing discount of 30% (maximum) was applied to his early plea of guilt. As observed earlier, Ngiam cannot be described as a first offender, given his prior involvement in similar incidents of arranging marriage of convenience. These would have had the effect of enhancing his overall criminality and warranted an uplift of up to two months’ imprisonment in his sentence.

82 I recognise that Ngiam’s role in the criminal endeavour was more intensive than the accused’s and was motivated primarily by financial gain. However, these considerations fail to bring the accused’s case below the custodial threshold. The threshold warranting a custodial sentence is invariably crossed in the present case. While I agree with the prosecution that the sentence should not exceed the imprisonment term of six months meted out to Ngiam, the accused’s conduct must be met with opprobrium. Having taken one final look at all the circumstances presented, I am of the view that an appropriate sentence where the accused has claimed trial would be one of 16 weeks’ imprisonment. Applying the maximum sentencing discount of 5% at Stage 4 of the proceedings for his plea of guilt, this would translate to an imprisonment term of 15.2 weeks, which is rounded down to 15 weeks’ imprisonment.

83 For these reasons, I am fortified in my view that 15 weeks’ imprisonment is a sentence commensurate with the accused’s overall criminality.

84 On a final note, I thank the parties for their helpful submissions in this matter.