1 The accused, Mr Poovalai Thevar Kathiravannethi, claimed trial to the following charge:

2 It was undisputed that as a result of the accident, the victim suffered traumatic brain injuries, spinal fractures, a left rib fracture with pneumothorax, a left brachial plexus nerve injury and lacerations and abrasions over his face and limbs. He was hospitalised for 16 days and granted 493 days of hospitalisation leave. He suffered 75% permanent disability, permanent weakness in his left upper limb, and was unable to use his left upper limb for any work. He could not return to his pre-accident job as a delivery rider.

3 After carefully considering the evidence adduced during the three-day trial and the submissions of both parties, I found that the Prosecution had proven the charge against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and convicted the accused of the charge accordingly.

4 Upon hearing parties’ submissions on sentence, I imposed a sentence of five months’ imprisonment based on an application of the governing High Court framework in Chen Song v Public Prosecutor and other appeals [2025] 3 SLR 509 (“Chen Song”), and a disqualification from all classes of driving licences (“DQAC”) for a period of five years with effect from the date of his release from prison. This was the mandatory minimum DQAC pursuant to s 65(6)(d) of the RTA, as there were no special reasons to order otherwise.

5 The accused appealed against both conviction and sentence. The Defence applied for, and I granted, a stay of execution on the accused’s imprisonment term.

6 When I delivered the verdict and sentence, I had provided my oral grounds. These are the full reasons for my decision.

7 The trial took place over three days. The Prosecution called five witnesses:

(a) The motorcyclist and victim, Mr Puang Bin Idris;

(b) The incident management team officer from the Land Transport Authority who attended the scene, Corporal Abdul Qayyum Quim Surani (“Cpl Qayyum”);

(c) The first responding Traffic Police patrol officer at the scene, Senior Staff Sergeant Rafael Tan Soon Peng (“SSSgt Tan”);

(d) The first investigation officer (“IO”), IO Tan Jun Yan (“IO Tan”); and

(e) The second investigation officer who took over the case, IO Yan Mingsheng Daniel (“IO Yan”).

8 The Prosecution also tendered two conditioned statements (Exhibits P17 and P18) from the passenger of the Car, Ms Chua Ting Fang (“Chua”), and the informant, Ms Charlene Ang Wei Lin (“Ang”).

9 The accused did not make any no case to answer submissions. He elected to testify in his defence as the sole defence witness.

10 The relevant provisions of the RTA as at the time of the offence provided as follows:

11 The elements of the charge against the accused are as follows:

(a) The accused drove a motor vehicle on a road;

(b) The accused did so without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road; and

(c) By such driving, he caused grievous hurt to another person.

12 At the beginning of the trial, the parties tendered a Statement of Agreed Facts pursuant to s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (“CPC”). The following facts were therefore undisputed.

13 The accused is a 54-year-old male Indian national and Singapore Permanent Resident. At the material time, the accused drove the Car, a silver Toyota, and possessed a valid Class 3 driving licence (issued on 16 August 2001). The accused worked as a private-hire driver for Gojek.

14 The victim is Puang bin Idris, a then 68-year-old male Singaporean. At the material time, the victim was working as a delivery rider and rode the Motorcycle. He possessed a valid Class 2B driving licence (issued on 30 September 1980).

15 On 16 February 2023, at about 11.36am, the accused picked up Chua, a Gojek passenger, from her residence. The accused then drove Chua in the Car towards her office located at Robinson Road.

16 At about 12.27pm, the accused was driving the Car along a slip road exiting onto the Ayer Rajah Expressway (“AYE”) towards the Marina Coastal Expressway. Chua was seated directly behind the accused in the passenger seat. At around the same time, the victim was riding the Motorcycle along the AYE. The accused's front-facing in-car camera captured the following:

(a) At 12:27:30, the accused was travelling in the left-most lane of the four-lane AYE. The victim was riding ahead of the accused, on the third right-most lane. The weather was clear, the road surface was dry, and the traffic volume was light.

(b) At 12:27:34, a sound resembling a collision was heard. At this point, the victim and the Motorcycle were no longer visible in the footage.

(c) At 12:27:41, the accused stopped the Car in the third right-most lane.

17 Following the collision between the Car and the Motorcycle, the victim's Motorcycle fell onto its left side, skidded and came to a stop at around the second right-most lane marking. Ang, who was driving a van along the AYE, behind the Car and the Motorcycle, stopped her vehicle and noticed the victim lying on the ground. At about 12.30pm, she alerted the Police about the accident. Her first information report was admitted and marked by consent as Exhibit P2.

18 At about 12.54pm, Cpl Qayyum, a traffic marshal, arrived at the scene. At about 12.56pm, SSSgt Tan, a Traffic Police patrol officer, arrived at the scene. At about 1.00pm, the paramedics arrived at the scene and subsequently conveyed the victim to National University Hospital (“NUH”) for emergency medical attention.

19 There were no known mechanical issues to the Car or Motorcycle at the material time.

20 Cpl Qayyum prepared a sketch plan of the accident scene (Exhibit P4). The sketch plan was not drawn to scale. The items depicted and the measurements reflected therein were accurately recorded.

21 The footage referred to above at [16] was stored on the SD card of the accused's in-car camera. On 16 February 2023, at about 1.15pm, at the accident scene, SSSgt Rafael Tan retrieved the SD card from the accused. At about 2.44pm, at the Traffic Police Headquarters, the SD card was handed over to the first IO, IO Tan. IO Tan thereafter extracted the relevant footage from the SD card. No alteration was made to the extracted footage. The footage was admitted and marked by consent as Exhibit P14. The SD card containing the footage was admitted and marked by consent as Exhibit P16.

22 Dr Pravin Lingam, a consultant at the Department of General Surgery, Trauma Division of the NUH, prepared a report in respect of the victim dated 26 June 2023 (Exhibit P11), stating that the victim sustained multiple injuries, some of which necessitated surgeries, as follows:

(a) an acute subarachnoid haemorrhage and an acute subdural haemorrhage, which were conservatively managed by neurosurgery;

(b) left cervical spine fractures, which were conservatively managed by the spine surgeons;

(c) a left rib fracture with pneumothorax, which was managed with a chest drain insertion that was subsequently removed;

(d) an upper lip laceration, which was treated by the plastic surgeons by way of toilet and suture;

(e) a left cheek laceration, which was conservatively managed by the plastic surgeons;

(f) multiple abrasions over his face and limbs, which were conservatively managed;

(g) a left brachial plexus injury, which was managed by the hand and reconstructive surgeons.

23 Dr Sarah Joy Huan Khian Wan, a senior resident at the Department of Hand and Reconstructive Surgery at NUH, prepared a report in respect of the victim dated 6 April 2025 (Exhibit P12), stating that on 10 May 2023, the victim underwent a left brachial plexus exploration, intercostal nerves 3, 4, 5 to musculocutaneous nerve transfer, spinal accessory to suprascapular nerve transfer, and C6 nerve root to radial nerve with ipsilateral ulnar nerve graft. The victim was warded for a total of 16 days, from 16 to 25 February 2023, and from 10 to 15 May 2023. He was granted a total of 493 days of hospitalisation leave from 16 February 2023 to 22 June 2024.

24 Dr Heng Shu Yun, a senior resident at the Department of Hand and Reconstructive Surgery at NUH, prepared a report in respect of the victim dated 21 November 2025 (Exhibit P13), confirming that the victim had a 75% permanent disability, he would have permanent weakness in his left upper limb, and he would be unable to use his left upper limb for any work.

25 The victim suffered the above injuries as a result of the collision between the Car and the Motorcycle.

26 As a result of the collision, the Motorcycle sustained the following damage:

(a) The left side mirror was missing.

(b) The left side of the trunk, as well as various other parts on the left side of the Motorcycle, were scratched and/or dented.

27 As a result of the collision, the Car sustained scratches to its right front side and right rear passenger door.

28 The damages sustained to the Car and the Motorcycle were reflected in their respective vehicle damage reports (Exhibits P5 and P6), as well as in the photographs taken at the scene by SSSgt Rafael Tan (Exhibits P7-P9).

29 On 13 March 2025, at about 4.05pm, the accused was arrested for his involvement in this incident and released on bail on the same day at about 7.39pm. The accused was thereafter charged in court on 19 March 2025.

30 In light of the foregoing, it was undisputed at trial that the accused drove the Car on a road. It was also undisputed that there was a collision between the Car and the Motorcycle, and the victim suffered grievous hurt as a result.

31 I will thus focus on the sole element in dispute, which was whether the accused drove without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road by failing to keep a proper lookout when executing a lane change, thus colliding into the Motorcycle.

32 The Prosecution’s case was that the accused failed to keep a proper lookout when changing from the left-most lane (lane 4) to the third right-most lane (lane 3). At 12:27:30 of Exhibit P14, the Motorcycle was already travelling ahead of the Car in lane 3 before the accused changed lanes. The accused therefore had every opportunity to observe the victim prior to making the lane change. However, the accused proceeded to make the lane change without slowing down or attempting to avoid the victim. Instead, it was clear from the trajectory of the Car between 12:27:31 and 12:27:33 of Exhibit P14 that the Car was heading diagonally towards the right side of lane 3, where the Motorcycle was travelling, such that contact between the Car and the Motorcycle was inevitable. ¹

33 The victim did not lose control of the Motorcycle, thus he could not have been responsible for the collision. The victim testified that he was in control of the Motorcycle at all times, which was consistent with the objective evidence in the footage which showed the Motorcycle in an upright and stable position even after the victim raised his left hand towards his visor. This was corroborated by IO Tan’s and IO Yan’s testimony, based on their own experience as long-term motorcycle riders, that lifting one hand off the handlebar did not inevitably cause a motorcycle to lose control. The accused also admitted that he did not personally observe the victim losing control of the Motorcycle at any point and the footage did not show the victim losing control of the Motorcycle. Hence, his allegation that the victim had lost control of the Motorcycle was nothing more than mere speculation which should be disregarded. ²

34 The accused’s own account of the incident at trial, which was that he had done all the requisite checks, had noticed the Motorcycle in lane 3, but considered that lane 3 was sufficiently wide for both the Car and the Motorcycle to be travelling side by side, was incredible and differed significantly from his police report lodged on the day of the accident (Exhibit P20) and his statement recorded by IO Tan pursuant to s 22 of the CPC (Exhibit P19). ³ The accused’s belated claim that he did not lodge the police report, and that his statement was not accurately recorded, should be rejected. ⁴

35 The Defence’s case was that the Prosecution failed to prove the charge because:

(a) The accused had taken all precautions before making the lane change. He spotted the Motorcycle in lane 3 as he changed lanes. ⁵ However, he considered that there was enough space in lane 3 for both the Car and the Motorcycle to travel side-by-side at the same time, which was why the accused made the lane change. ⁶

(i) In this regard, he did not recall the part of his statement where he indicated that he did not see the Motorcycle at all when making the lane change. He was in a state of anxiety and had requested for interpreter which was not provided to him. This cast doubt on the accuracy of the statement. ⁷

(ii) He did not recall making the police report. ⁸

(iii) Even though the footage from his in-car camera appeared to show that the Car was going towards the Motorcycle as he made the lane change, the position of his in-car camera was not straight and was instead tilted towards the right side. ⁹

(b) Second, the victim could have been the one who collided into the Car (instead of vice versa) as the victim could be seen in the footage to have taken his hand off the left handle of his motorcycle to adjust his visor. The Motorcycle could thus have become unsteady, and the victim could have lost control of the motorcycle. ¹⁰

36 I found that based on the totality of the evidence, the Prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had driven without reasonable consideration for other road users when executing the lane change, and this caused the Car to collide into the Motorcycle.

37 I begin with the in-car camera footage (Exhibit P14), which clearly showed that the Motorcycle was already in lane 3 and visible in front of the brown lorry before the accused executed a lane change from lane 4 to lane 3 (12:27:28 of Exhibit P14). Despite this, the accused changed lanes at 12:27:31, very close behind the Motorcycle, with a trajectory towards the Motorcycle at the right side of lane 3, just before the sound of a collision was heard. ¹¹ The Car was also seen to be accelerating when making the lane change. I illustrate this with screenshots from the in-car camera footage below:

38 No reasonable driver would have proceeded to make a lane change in the manner that the accused did, ie, in the direction of the Motorcycle at the right side of lane 3, while accelerating, if he had seen the motorcycle before making the lane change. Such an act would in all probability result in a collision by the Car into the back of the Motorcycle – which was precisely what happened in the present case. The irresistible inference was that the accused did not keep a proper lookout when executing the lane change, and must not have seen the Motorcycle before he made the lane change.

39 The objective footage was further bolstered by the accused’s own admissions in his statement that he was “sure there was no vehicle on [his] right” and he “[did] not know where the motorcycle came from”. ¹² In fact, when he was explicitly asked:

He answered clearly and unequivocally:

40 Furthermore, in the police report (Exhibit P20), the accused did not mention that he saw the Motorcycle when he made the lane change. Instead, he reported that the Motorcycle “cut into [his] lane” [emphasis added]. Again, if he had seen the Motorcycle ahead of him on lane 3, before he changed lanes, he would not have said that the Motorcycle “cut” into his lane.

41 I turn to consider the accused’s defences.

42 The accused contended that when his statement was recorded, he was in a “state of anxiety”, ¹⁴ was not fluent in English, ¹⁵ and had asked for an interpreter but was not given one. ¹⁶ As such, he did not recall providing the response “I did not see the motorcycle at all” as the answer to IO Tan’s question. ¹⁷ This affected the accuracy of the statement.

43 I found this assertion to be an afterthought which was calculated to conveniently dissociate the accused from an incriminating portion of his statement. IO Tan’s evidence in this regard was that the accused chose to speak English, he understood English, he was well at the time the statement was recorded and he was neither nervous nor traumatised. ¹⁸ The accused also did not request for an interpreter. ¹⁹ The statement was read back to him and he was invited to make amendments but he declined to do so. ²⁰ IO Tan’s evidence remained unshaken under cross-examination, and I accordingly accepted his evidence. I also noted that the question was a simple one which did not require a sophisticated grasp of the English language.

44 I also did not believe the accused’s attempts to distance himself from the police report lodged in his name (Exhibit P20). In this regard, I noted that his claims at trial were inconsistent. The accused initially admitted that he had lodged his own police report with its contents as recorded. ²¹ He also accepted that he did not point out anything related to the Motorcycle in the report. ²² After being confronted during cross-examination about the inconsistencies between his police report and his defence at trial, he then stated that he could not confirm if he had lodged the police report and that someone else might have assisted him to do so. ²³ I found this to be a belated attempt to circumvent the inference to be drawn from his failure to mention important planks of his defence in the police report. I also noted that the report was lodged via the Singapore Police Force website and had to be authenticated by his own SingPass, which made it difficult to fathom that someone else could have done it on his behalf.

45 As explained at [37] above, the accused’s in-car camera footage of the accident (Exhibit P14) provided important objective evidence in the present case, most notably that the Car was heading directly into the path of the Motorcycle as the accused changed lanes. Notwithstanding this, the accused mounted a wholly unmeritorious defence, contending that his in-car camera was “not straight”, and thus it “appeared to show” that the Car was moving to the right, towards the Motorcycle. In fact, the accused insisted, the camera was “tilted to the right side” so that “the right side of the Car was more visible”. ²⁴ This was, in my view, a patent attempt to circumvent the unfavourable evidence captured in the footage. It was abundantly clear to me that the perspective of the in-car camera was straight, showing equal widths on both sides of the windscreen, thereby demonstrating conclusively that the accused was heading directly towards the Motorcycle at the point when he changed lanes.

46 Finally, I found the accused's defence that he had intended to travel alongside the Motorcycle in lane 3 because the lane was wide enough for both vehicles to travel side-by-side to be untenable. Fundamentally, it had no bearing on whether he kept a proper lookout when executing the lane change, which I had already found that he had not. Second, if the accused had truly intended to travel alongside the Motorcycle, he would not have positioned himself so close to the right side of the lane, just behind the Motorcycle.

47 Overall, I rejected all of the accused’s proffered defences.

48 The Defence further argued that it was the Motorcycle that had collided into the Car, rather than the converse. This was because the victim “could have” lost control of the Motorcycle and collided with the Car when the victim took his hand off the handlebar to adjust his visor. ²⁵

49 I found that there was no evidence that the victim lost control of the Motorcycle, and collided into the Car. Instead, it was the Car that collided into the Motorcycle from behind.

50 First, the footage did not show any signs that the victim lost control. Instead, it showed that the victim was riding stably even when he took his left hand off the handlebar (12:27:31 to 12:27:35 of Exhibit P14).

51 Second, the victim testified during examination-in-chief that he did not lose control of the Motorcycle. ²⁶ His testimony remained unshaken despite repeated questioning on this issue during cross-examination, an excerpt of which I have reproduced below: ²⁷

52 In this regard, I note that even the accused accepted during cross-examination that he did not personally observe the victim losing control of his Motorcycle at any point, and that the footage did not show the rider losing control of the motorcycle. ²⁸ He conceded that he had only observed the rider removing his hands from the handlebar when he viewed his in-car camera footage after the event. This candid admission only served to expose this defence as a belated contrivance, wholly inconsistent with both the objective evidence and the victim’s testimony, and plainly aimed at unjustifiably shifting the blame onto the victim.

53 To some extent, the Defence must have recognised the weakness of its own contention. The tenor of the Defence’s closing submissions used tentative language such as the victim “could have” lost control of the Motorcycle, for example because he was an “elderly man” with “advanced age”. ²⁹ The use of such equivocal language, wholly unsupported by any evidence, merely highlighted the speculative nature of this defence.

54 Instead, the footage clearly showed that the Car was accelerating towards the Motorcycle from behind, leading to a collision of the Car into the Motorcycle from behind (12:27:33-12:27:39 of Exhibit P14), during which the sound of a collision was heard. Contrary to the accused’s testimony at trial, ³⁰ the accused did not keep a safe distance between the Car and the Motorcycle when executing the lane change.

55 In light of the foregoing, I found that:

(a) The accused drove without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road by failing to keep a proper lookout when executing a lane change, leading to him failing to see the Motorcycle travelling at the right side of lane 3 before he made the lane change. As a result, he executed the lane change directly towards the path of the Motorcycle.

(b) The accused’s Car then collided into the victim’s Motorcycle from behind, causing the victim the undisputed injuries which constituted grievous hurt.

56 I therefore concluded that the Prosecution had proven the charge against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and convicted the accused accordingly.

57  The High Court decision in Chen Song sets out the governing framework for careless driving causing grievous hurt offences punishable under s 65(3)(a) of the RTA. The High Court modified the “sentencing bands” approach in Tang Ling Lee v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 813 and set out a four-stage sentencing framework that considered the harm suffered by the victim and the culpability of the offender.

58 First, the court is to identify the number of offence-specific factors under the broad categories of “harm” and “culpability” (at [123]).

59 In terms of primary harm, which relates to bodily injury suffered by the victim(s), three broad factors should be considered (at [127]):

(a) Nature and location of the injury: This factor focuses on the precise nature and the location of the injury. This requires a consideration of:

(i) the nature and severity of injury (eg, simple or complex and extent of injury, etc);

(ii) the number of injuries;

(iii) whether surgical intervention was necessary (or whether the injuries were treated conservatively);

(iv) the disposition of the victim post-surgery (eg, general ward, high dependency or intensive care unit); and

(v) the location of the injury (eg, vulnerable location).

(b) Degree of permanence: This factor considers whether the injury or injuries caused to the victim are permanent or transient. Permanent injuries include loss of a limb or permanent privation of the sight of either eye or the hearing of either ear, etc.

(c) Impact of injury: This factor contemplates the impact of the injury on the victim’s quality of life. This includes considerations of:

(i) the duration of stay in the hospital/rehabilitation centre;

(ii) the duration of any hospitalisation/medical leave;

(iii) the victim’s ability to carry out daily tasks and maintain livelihood; and

(iv) the duration of rehabilitation (if any).

60 Secondary harm factors should also be considered. These are not related to physical injury suffered by the victim(s) but which nonetheless go towards the extent of harm caused in a particular case. These factors include (at [125]):

(a) potential harm; and

(b) property damage.

61 As for culpability, the High Court set out a non-exhaustive list of factors, each of which constitute one offence-specific factor going towards culpability:

(a) Any form of dangerous driving behaviour. For instance:

(i) speeding;

(ii) driving against traffic;

(iii) driving when not fit to drive;

(iv) driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs;

(v) sleepy driving;

(vi) driving while using a mobile phone;

(vii) swerving in and out of lanes;

(viii) using a vehicle in a dangerous fashion; and

(ix) street racing.

(b) Flouting of traffic rules and regulations. For instance:

(i) failing to stop at a stop line;

(ii) failing to conform to traffic signal;

(iii) not forming up correctly to execute a turn;

(iv) changing lanes across a set of double white lines/chevron markings; and

(v) making an illegal U-turn/right turn.

(c) High degree of carelessness: This is demonstrated where there was a prolonged or sustained period of inattention (as opposed to a momentary lapse of attention), and where the offender was deliberately cavalier about certain mitigatable risks. It would also be relevant to consider the extent to which the offender’s distraction was avoidable and the extent to which the offender’s misjudgment was reasonable. Something more than the usual manifestation of the basic elements of careless driving is required to establish a high degree of carelessness. A mere failure to keep a safe distance from the vehicle in front or failing to take proper care when changing lanes or executing a discretionary right turn merely reflected the very essence of a careless driving charge. Without more, the offender could not be said to have exhibited a higher degree of carelessness (at [132]).

62 Second, the court is to determine whether the harm caused is “lesser harm” or “greater harm” and whether the offender’s culpability is “lower culpability” or “higher culpability”, based on the number of offence-specific factors present. “Lesser harm” is caused, and the offender’s culpability is deemed as “lower culpability” where there is one or no harm or culpability factor. “Greater harm” would be caused and the offender’s culpability deemed as “higher culpability” where there are two or more harm and culpability factors. This was a general guideline which was not to be applied mechanistically in every case, but should be assessed holistically.: Chen Song at [123] and [134(b)]. The court should thereafter arrive at the sentencing band the offence falls within:

63 Third, after determining the indicative sentence band that the offence falls within, the court should identify an indicative starting point sentence within that range, taking into account: (a) all the primary harm factors and the culpability factors identified; and (b) the secondary harm factors.

64 Fourth, the court is to make adjustments to the starting point to take into account the usual gamut of offender-specific aggravating and mitigating factors.

65 The Prosecution sought a sentence of between six and eight months’ imprisonment and five years’ DQAC. Applying the High Court sentencing framework in Chen Song, the Prosecution argued that the present case fell within Band 2, involving greater harm and lower culpability. ³¹

66 In terms of harm, all three harm factors in Chen Song were heavily engaged in this case. First, the victim suffered multiple and complex injuries (outlined at [22] above), some of which were inflicted at vulnerable locations of his body, such as his head and spine. There was significant surgical intervention, such as a left brachial exploration and nerve transfers and nerve grafts.

67 Second, the injuries caused to the victim were permanent. The victim had a 75% permanent disability, permanent weakness in his left upper limb and was unable to use his left upper limb for any work.

68 Third, the impact of the accused’s injuries persisted until today. The victim was warded for a total of 16 days and given 493 days of hospitalisation leave. He suffered from residual pain in his left arm and was unable to perform simple tasks such as dressing, showering and housework. ³²

69 As for the accused’s culpability, the Prosecution accepted that the case fell within “lower culpability” as his failure to keep a proper lookout when executing a lane change was a manifestation of the basic element of the careless driving offence. ³³

70 The case therefore fell within Band 2 of the Chen Song framework, with the sentencing range of between six months’ and one year’s imprisonment. ³⁴

71 The indicative starting point should be six to eight months’ imprisonment and five years’ DQAC. There were no offender-specific aggravating or mitigating factors warranting any adjustments to the sentencing position. ³⁵ This sentence was also in line with the recent precedent of Habeeb Zaleena d/o Pallivilakam Kader Habeeb Mohamed v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGHC 99 (“Habeeb Zaleena”), in which the High Court also held in a greater harm, lower culpability case that the starting point was six to eight months’ imprisonment. ³⁶

72 The Defence submitted that the court should impose a fine and a DQAC “so that [the accused] would not lose his driving licence” ie, less than 12 months. This was despite the statutory mandatory minimum DQAC being five years in the absence of special reasons, pursuant to s 65(6)(d) of the RTA. It relied on the case of Public Prosecutor v Hue An Li [2014] 4 SLR 661, and pointed out that in Exhibit P12, the doctor considered that “there [might] still be some further recovery after the nerve transfer surgery”.

73 In oral submissions, defence counsel stated that he “[would] not be making any comments” about the appropriate period of DQAC. ³⁷ When specifically queried during oral submissions about his response to the Prosecution’s application of the Chen Song framework, defence counsel merely stated that he had been instructed to request for a fine rather than a term of imprisonment, would not be making any submission on the length of the sentence and left the sentence to the court. He urged the court to be lenient to the accused. ³⁸

74 In considering the appropriate sentence, I applied the High Court framework in Chen Song. At the first stage, I considered the degree of harm caused and the accused’s culpability.

75 In terms of harm, I first considered the nature and location of the injuries. In the present case, the victim suffered multiple injuries to various parts of his body, including injuries to vulnerable parts such as:

(a) Traumatic brain injuries: acute sub-arachnoid haemorrhage and acute subdural haemorrhage;

(b) Spinal injuries: left cervical spine fractures;

(c) Rib and lung injuries: a left rib fracture with pneumothorax; and

(d) Nerve injury: a left brachial plexus injury.

76 He also suffered an upper lip laceration, a left cheek laceration, and multiple abrasions over his face and limbs.

77 The victim had to undergo multiple surgical interventions. He had a chest tube inserted for his left pneumothorax, toilet and suture of his upper lip laceration, left brachial plexus exploration, intercostal nerves 3,4,5 to musculocutaneous nerve transfer, spinal accessory to suprascapular nerve transfer, C6 nerve root to radial nerve with ipsilateral ulnar nerve graft. The rest of his injuries were managed conservatively.

78 Second, these injuries led to permanent disabilities. The latest medical report (Exhibit P13) dated 21 November 2025 indicated that the victim had a 75% permanent disability and permanent weakness in his left upper limb. The victim also testified that he still experienced trauma and pain until today. His hand continued to ache and he had to massage his hand every day. He required help for everyday activities such as taking a shower, dressing and housework. ³⁹

79 Third, the injuries impacted the victim’s quality of life. In this regard, the victim was hospitalised for 16 days from 16 to 25 February 2023 and 10 to 15 May 2023, and granted 493 days of hospitalisation leave from 16 February 2023 to 22 June 2024. He was no longer able to ride a motorcycle or maintain his livelihood as a delivery rider, an occupation he held for 30 years prior to the accident. ⁴⁰ He could not use his left upper limb to do any work at all. ⁴¹

80 In terms of secondary harm, the Motorcycle sustained property damage. The left side mirror was missing and the left side of the trunk, as well as various other parts on the left side of the Motorcycle, were scratched and/or dented.

81 Considering the above factors, I agreed with the Prosecution that the harm caused to the victim constituted “greater harm”.

82 As there were no culpability-enhancing factors beyond the accused’s failure to keep a proper lookout, I agreed that the accused was of lower culpability.

83 As such, the present case fell within Band 2 of the Chen Song framework.

84 At Stage 3, I considered that the indicative starting sentence based on a holistic consideration of the harm and culpability factors was slightly lower than the lowest end of Band 2 of Chen Song, at 5 months’ imprisonment. In this regard, I examined the High Court precedent cited by the Prosecution, Habeeb Zaleena. In that case, the appellant executed a discretionary right turn and her car collided with the right side of the victim’s motorcycle, throwing the latter onto the pavement and causing him grievous hurt in the form of a right foot degloving injury with a fifth toe proximal phalanx fracture and cuboid fracture, a left tibial plateau fracture, a right knee superficial abrasion and an abdominal abrasion. He was hospitalised in various tranches totalling 119 days, and given hospitalisation leave for eight months post-discharge. He underwent multiple surgeries as a result of complications arising from his injuries and plastic surgery to reconstruct the flap in the heel of his right foot. The injury to his right foot was permanent requiring him to wear modified footwear.

85  In considering the harm caused in the present case, I was cognisant of the High Court’s guidance in Chen Song at [127] that grievous hurt was by its nature serious, but the breadth of the category allowed for it to encompass a wide range of injuries of differing levels of severity. Without downplaying the severity of the victim’s injuries, I considered that while the nature and location of the injuries suffered was to vulnerable parts of the body, the permanent disability caused was ultimately to the left upper limb. As such, the case should be calibrated as being at the lower end of “greater harm”. Compared to Habeeb Zaleena, the victim in this case was warded for a shorter period of time, but was granted a longer period of hospitalisation leave.

86 At the same time, in my assessment, the culpability of the accused was lower than the appellant in Habeeb Zaleena. The High Court considered the fact that the appellant in Habeeb Zaleena had executed a swift discretionary right turn without reducing speed and/or stopping within the right turning pocket to check for oncoming traffic, which flouted traffic rules and regulations (at [45]-[46]). This amounted to one culpability-enhancing factor. The High Court thus agreed with the District Judge that the starting point was six to eight months’ imprisonment. In the present case, there were no culpability enhancing factors. Given that there was lower culpability in the present case, and a similar level of harm, I calibrated the starting point at five months’ imprisonment.

87 At Stage 4, I declined to make any adjustments based on any offender-specific aggravating and mitigating factors. As the accused had claimed trial, he was not entitled to any discount accorded to those who pleaded guilty.

88 Under s 65(6)(d) of the RTA, for an offender convicted of driving without reasonable consideration causing grievous hurt, the court must impose a DQAC of not less than five years in the absence of special reasons. No special reasons existed in the present case.

89 Thus, I imposed a sentence of five months’ imprisonment and a DQAC of five years with effect from the date of release.

90 In conclusion, I assessed that the Prosecution had proven the charge against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. There was only one area of dispute – in this regard, the objective evidence in the form of the in-car camera footage and the accused’s own statement clearly demonstrated that the accused did drive without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road. None of the accused’s belated and contrived defences stood up to scrutiny. The imprisonment term of five months, in light of the harm caused to the victim and the accused’s culpability, was, in my view, fair and appropriate. The five-year period of DQAC was the mandatory minimum pursuant to s 65(6)(d) of the RTA in the absence of special reasons, for which there were none.

91 The accused is presently on bail pending appeal.