1 This is an application by the accused, Iris Koh Hsiao Pei (“Ms Koh”), for disclosure of four broad categories of material sought from the prosecution at trial.

2 Ms Koh claimed trial to seven charges of criminal conspiracy under section 120B of the Penal Code 1971 (2020 Rev Ed) (“PC”) with Dr Jipson Quah (“Dr Quah”), his assistant, Chua Cheng Soon, Thomas (“Mr Chua”), and/or his patients to dishonestly make false representations under section 424A(3) PC to the Health Promotion Board that the patients had received the coronavirus disease (“COVID-19”) vaccinations so that they could be reflected as receiving such vaccinations in the National Immunisation Registry (“NIR”). Six of these charges alleged a criminal conspiracy with Dr Quah and the patients, ¹ one of whom was Gary Tho Kong Chong (“Mr Tho”), ² whereas the remaining charge alleged such conspiracy with Dr Quah, Mr Chua and a patient. ³

3  I heard parties on Mr Koh’s application on 10 September 2026. Ms Koh applied for disclosure of four broad categories of material ⁴ from the prosecution and corresponding orders ⁵ in relation to:

(a) Mr Tho’s mobile phone, his Telegram communications with her and the photograph he took of the vial during his second vaccination with Dr Quah (“Category 1 material”);

(b) Ms Geno Ong Kay Yong (“Ms Ong”) and the origin of the investigation against Ms Koh (“Category 2 material”);

(c) the determination of vaccination status in the NIR (“Category 3 material”); and

(d) her remand (“Category 4 material”).

4 The prosecution urged me to dismiss Ms Koh’s application in its entirety ⁶ because she either failed to displace the presumption that the prosecution had complied with its disclosure obligations, or such obligations do not arise because the requested material does not exist, it does not reside within the prosecution’s possession or knowledge, or it is not relevant to the charges faced by Ms Koh. ⁷

5 Upon my invitation to respond to Ms Koh’s application, counsel for Dr Quah, Mr Adrian Wee, indicated to me that he had none. ⁸ Likewise for Mr Chua, except that he supported Ms Koh’s application. ⁹

6 Having reserved my judgment to give due consideration to Ms Koh’s application as well as the parties’ written and oral submissions, I now dismiss the application. I explain why in relation to each category of material sought by Ms Koh in turn.

7 I preface my explanation with an outline of the approach for deciding Ms Koh’s application.

8 The prosecution’s disclosure obligations in relation to any “unused material” and any statement of any “material witness” are set out in section 221B read with section 221A of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”). As the High Court observed in Lee Siew Boon Winston v PP [2015] 4 SLR 1184 (“Winston Lee”) at [167], the Office of the Attorney-General as the Public Prosecutor is a high constitutional office and in this regard there is a presumption of legality or regularity. A similar presumption of legality or regularity applies in relation to the prosecution’s duty of disclosure and the court proceeds on the assumption that the prosecution has fulfilled and complied with its disclosure obligation when trial begins: Winston Lee at [168]. Such a presumption of compliance rests on the trust reposed in the prosecutor as “ministers of justice” when conducting a trial: Winston Lee at [169]. There is nothing to suggest otherwise of the prosecution in this case from the even-handed interactions I had observed that Mr Timotheus Koh (and previously Mr Kelvin Chong) and his team has had with the parties thus far.

9 The approach to be taken is therefore not to look to the prosecution to show its compliance unless there are sufficient reasons to do so: Winston Lee at [170], when there is some reasonable grounds for belief based on some reasonable (as opposed to merely fanciful) doubt, dispute or uncertainty that the prosecution has failed in such compliance: Winston Lee at [171] and [172]. Bare assertions of possibilities cannot constitute such grounds: Winston Lee at [189]. In short, the test as endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Lee Siew Boon Winston v PP [2015] SGCA 67 at [10] is that:

10 It would not be helpful for the defence to make a blanket assertion that the prosecution has failed in its compliance without reference to specific categories of undisclosed documents which the defence believes to be exculpatory: Soh Guan Cheow Anthony v PP [2017] 3 SLR 147 (“Anthony Soh”) at [98]. When the defence has shown reasonable grounds that the prosecution has in its possession certain disclosable material, a clear indication from the prosecution that it does not have possession of those documents because the materials are non-existent or not available anymore would usually suffice unless there is strong evidence to the contrary: Winston Lee at [182].

11 Ms Koh’s request for Category 1 material relates to Mr Tho’s phone, the Telegram communications between them, and the photograph of the vial he took during his second vaccination with Dr Quah.

12 Ms Koh has asked for a full forensic extraction report for Mr Tho’s phone and records/information related to how the phone was handled. ¹⁰

13 She has not shown that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the prosecution has in its possession a complete record of the Telegram communications between Mr Tho and herself, which differs from the record that she had already adduced. ¹¹ Neither she nor Mr Tho suggested that her record was deficient or lacking in any material aspect or otherwise incomplete. ¹² Indeed, Ms Koh had already established with Mr Tho on her record what she says would exculpate her, that is, that she had asked him to undergo the D-Dimer and baseline health tests before his vaccination with Dr Quah. ¹³

14 Ms Koh was prepared not to pursue the requested material if the prosecution were to accept her record as complete and accurate. ¹⁴ Suffice it to say that the prosecution had not objected to the admission of that record. ¹⁵ The prosecution also indicated that it does not have any material showing that Ms Koh’s record is incomplete. ¹⁶ Specifically, it does not possess a full forensic extraction report for Mr Tho’s phone, only a readable copy of the extracted data. There is no such report to disclose as such. As I intimated at the last mention, I do not have the power to order a forensic examination, ¹⁷ even if I were to find that Ms Koh has displaced the presumption of compliance.

15 As for the photograph Mr Tho took of the vial during his second vaccination with Dr Quah sought by Ms Koh, ¹⁸ it is evidently clear that Ms Koh has not shown that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the prosecution has it. Mr Tho already clarified in court that he had used another phone to take the photograph, not the phone that was seized by the police and he had not been able to locate the photograph. ¹⁹ The photograph is therefore not in the prosecution’s possession and there is nothing to disclose as such.

16 Ms Koh also sought disclosure of whether and if so how the contents of Mr Tho’s phone was used during investigations leading up to the charging decision against her. ²⁰ Suffice it to say that the prosecution has no general obligation to disclose its reasons for its prosecutorial decisions. This has been affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 at [74]. Given the nature and width of its constitutional prosecutorial discretion and the manifold factors that it is entitled to take into account in making a prosecutorial decision, it would be wholly unrealistic for the court to proceed on the basis that the prosecution would be unable to point to any relevant consideration to explain its prosecutorial decision: Ramalingam Ravinthran at [77] and [78].

17 Ms Koh’s request for Category 2 material relates to Ms Ong ²¹ and the genesis of investigations against Ms Koh. ²²

18 Ms Koh has not established reasonable grounds to believe that the prosecution has in its possession the requested material relating to Ms Ong that ought to be disclosed. In any event, the prosecution has plainly stated that it does not have any material suggesting that Ms Ong was an informant or that she was involved in the genesis of investigations. ²³ I also fail to see how the requested material is relevant to Ms Koh’s guilt or innocence. None of the evidence adduced at the trial thus far is remotely connected with or related to Ms Ong. Ms Koh has attempted to draw that connection or relation by Ms Ong’s social media posts insinuating insider information about someone getting in trouble a week before Dr Quah and Mr Chua were asked to attend at the Ministry of Health (MOH)’s office. ²⁴ This was tantamount to a mere assertion that that a member of public could possibly have provided information to the authorities, which cannot constitute reasonable belief to displace the presumption of compliance: Winston Lee at [189]. This was also neither admissible nor prima facie credible or would provide a real chance of pursuing a relevant line of inquiry: compare Muhammad bin Kadar v PP [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [116(a)].

19 Indeed, the prosecution’s case is premised on the first information report ²⁵ and the identity of the informant has already been ascertained during trial. ²⁶ The prosecution does not have any material shedding light on why the maker of the report lodged the report on his behalf and was reflected as the informant. ²⁷ It is also not privy to any discussions pertaining to the lodging of the report. ²⁸

20 The requested material concerning any prior investigative steps does not fall within the ambit of the prosecution’s duty of disclosure. The prosecution does not have a duty to review all material gathered by the police and law enforcement agencies in the course of investigations and evaluate that material for the purposes of disclosure. Knowledge of the police and law enforcement agencies cannot be attributed to the prosecution. Also, how investigations came about and was organised neither goes to Ms Koh’s guilt or innocence nor to the criminal conspiracies she has been charged for.

21 As for Ms Koh’s request ²⁹ for material relating to the process of recording Dr Quah’s MOH statement, ³⁰ where there was a pause in the statement recording for Deputy Director-General of Health Dr Raymond Chua (“Dr Chua”) to engage Dr Quah, Ms Koh also did not show that the prosecution was in possession of such material and did not disclose them. Nevertheless, the prosecution has plainly stated that no statement was recorded from Dr Chua; ³¹ the statement recorder also testified that the engagement between Dr Chua and Dr Quah was not recorded in the statement. ³² Neither did he take any notes of the engagement. ³³ In any event, this should not have been canvassed in Ms Koh’s application when it could have been properly ventilated during the ancillary hearing. Indeed, no allegation of impropriety was made about the engagement during the ancillary hearing; Mr Wee did not pursue the nature of the interactions DDMS had with Dr Quah in this regard. ³⁴ The statement recorder testified that there was none. ³⁵ There is therefore no basis for disclosure on the suggestion that the ensuing engagement affected the admissibility or reliability of Dr Quah’s statement that could be used against Ms Koh.

22 Ms Koh’s request for Category 3 material relates to the determination of vaccination status in the NIR. ³⁶

23 Likewise, Ms Koh has not shown that the prosecution is in possession of such material and has not disclosed them. The prosecution has plainly stated that no statement was recorded from Director-General of Health Dr Kenneth Mak. ³⁷ It also does not possess any of the requested materials related to MOH’s internal decisions on vaccination status changes. ³⁸ There is therefore no material to disclose pursuant to the prosecution’s obligations. I also fail to see how such material is disclosable when they do not go to Ms Koh’s guilt or innocence that either tends to undermine the prosecution’s case or support her defence. The prosecution is not relying on the accuracy of the NIR records to prove criminal conspiracy as part of its case; ³⁹ Ms Koh has also pointed out that all the patients in her charges are still reflected as vaccinated on the NIR record. ⁴⁰

24 Finally, Ms Koh’s request for Category 4 material relates to her remand. ⁴¹

25 Again, Ms Koh has not shown that the prosecution possesses such material and has not disclosed them. The prosecution would not have been involved with the arrangement of Ms Koh’s assessment at the Institute of Mental Health or police investigations into her complaints against them. ⁴² Nevertheless, the prosecution has plainly stated that it does not possess the requested material, except for the custody and hospital footages that were not available anymore as they had since been overridden as a matter of course. ⁴³

26 The fact that Ms Koh complained about her remand does not make the circumstances of her remand relevant to her charges, which have no bearing on the criminal conspiracies for which she is charged, ⁴⁴ and is untethered from any specific aspect of the prosecution’s case and her defence. ⁴⁵

27 A ruling from the court should be seen as a measure of last resort in contested applications where the defence seeks disclosure but the prosecution bona fide believes that disclosure is not required: Winston Lee at [181]. Ms Koh has not shown that the prosecution is in possession of the requested material and has not disclosed them. As such, she has not displaced the presumption of compliance. Be that as it may, the prosecution has plainly stated for the most part that they are also not in such possession. Ms Koh has contended that this was the prosecution’s own foul and has attributed the knowledge of the police and investigative agencies to the prosecution. That cannot be right. The prosecution’s disclosure obligations does not frame any duty in relation to the work of investigators and how they ought to interact with the prosecution: Muhammad bin Kadar v PP [2011] 4 SLR 791 (“Kadar (II)”) at [13]. The prosecution is only duty-bound to disclose a limited amount of unused material that is exculpatory in nature. Ms Koh has not shown that the requested material tends to undermine the prosecution’s case or strengthen her defence.

28 It is neither the prosecution’s duty to assist the defence in making out a case nor is it appropriate to allow a fishing or trawling expedition by the defence of unused material in the speculative hope of finding a defence, while placing the burden on the court to decide on the relevance or credibility of these materials: Anthony Soh at [106]. The prosecution’s duty of disclosure also does not require it to search for additional material and does not extend to material outside the prosecution’s knowledge; it applies continuously only to undisclosed material in its possession within its knowledge as opposed to material outside their initial knowledge that they had to search for: Kadar (II) at [14]. The presumption of compliance means the prosecution is entitled to conduct its own internal assessment and evaluation as to its possession and knowledge of undisclosed material. When it plainly and unequivocally states it is not in such possession, I am entitled to take the prosecution’s word for it, unless there is strong evidence to the contrary. No such evidence is presented in this application.

29 I am therefore constrained to dismiss Ms Koh’s application in its entirety. Though I am ultimately unable to agree with them, Ms Koh’s application and papers have been decently prepared; so too were the prosecution’s cogent written submissions. I have derived much assistance from the parties’ efforts in this regard, which I duly acknowledge.