1 On 3 November 2025, the Wife applied for divorce (“Divorce Application”). This judgement concerns the Husband’s application to dismiss the Divorce Application (“Dismissal Application”) on the ground that it does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements in s 93(1) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (“Charter”).

2 At the time of this judgement, the Husband has not filed a properly affirmed affidavit to support the Dismissal Application. At the same time, I note that apart from asserting that she is a Singapore permanent resident ("PR"), the Wife has not provided any other information regarding why the Court has jurisdiction to hear the Divorce Application.

5 I have extended time for the Husband to file a properly affirmed affidavit. I have also directed the Wife to file an affidavit to address the jurisdictional issues. The Dismissal Application is adjourned.

6 The parties are citizens of the People's Republic of China ("China"). They married in China in 2019. The Husband resides there. The Wife and the parties' two children have been living in a rented apartment in Singapore since July 2024. ¹

7 The Wife relies on two facts to establish that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. First, that the Husband has behaved in such a way that she cannot reasonably be expected to live with him. Second, that the parties have lived apart for a continuous period of at least four years immediately preceding the Divorce Application. ² The application asserts that the Court has jurisdiction to grant the divorce under s 93 of the Charter because the Wife is a Singapore PR. ³ The application does not state which limb of s 93(1) is relied on.

8 The Husband contests the Divorce Application. ⁴ His lawyer, Ms Audrey Koo ("Ms Koo"), filed an affidavit exhibiting an unsigned and unaffirmed draft affidavit prepared for the Husband ("Unsigned Affidavit"). The Unsigned Affidavit asserts that neither party is domiciled in Singapore or has been habitually resident here for the three-year period required under s 93(1)(b). ⁵ Additionally, it alleges that –

(a) The Wife moved to Singapore only in July 2024; ⁶

(b) She had told the Husband that her principal reason for seeking a divorce in Singapore was to support applications for Singapore citizenship for herself and the children; and

(c) She did not intend to live in Singapore permanently.

9 The Unsigned Affidavit exhibits messages said to have been exchanged between the parties, with translations ("Messages"). On their face, the Messages appear to lend some support to the Husband’s allegations.

10 To be clear, the Unsigned Affidavit is not evidence. Under P 15, r 23 of the Family Justice (General) Rules 2024 ("Rules"), an affidavit must be signed and affirmed before a commissioner for oaths or other person authorised to administer oaths. These requirements are not mere technicalities. They ensure that the maker personally adopts the statements as true under the solemnity of an oath or affirmation, and that the maker may be held to account if the statements are false.

11 I make no finding on the assertions in the Unsigned Affidavit, on the authenticity of the Messages, or the accuracy of their translations. Given that the Husband resides in China, I have extended time for him to file a properly affirmed affidavit.

12 It bears emphasis that the absence of an admissible affidavit from the Husband does not resolve the jurisdictional issue in the Wife's favour. Her obligation to establish jurisdiction exists independently of it. Let me explain.

13 Section 93(1) of the Charter provides that –

Subject to subsection (2), the court has jurisdiction to hear proceedings for divorce, presumption of death and divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage only if either of the parties to the marriage is –

(a) domiciled in Singapore at the time of the commencement of the proceedings; or

(b) habitually resident in Singapore for a period of 3 years immediately preceding the commencement of the proceedings.

[emphasis added]

14 Three observations may be made about s 93(1).

(a) First, the words "only if" make clear that at least one of the two requirements in s 93(1) must be satisfied before the Court may hear a divorce application.

(b) Second, the party invoking the Court's jurisdiction bears the burden of proving the facts on which it depends, on a balance of probabilities. Here, that party is the Wife. The Husband bears no burden of disproving jurisdiction. If he asserts specific facts, he must prove them by admissible evidence. That said, his failure to do so does not discharge her burden of proof.

(c) Third, jurisdiction is assessed by reference to the date on which divorce proceedings commenced. In this case, that date is 3 November 2025. If the Wife relies on s 93(1)(a) to establish jurisdiction, the question is whether either spouse was domiciled in Singapore on 3 November 2025. If she relies on s 93(1)(b), the question is whether either spouse was habitually resident in Singapore throughout the three years immediately preceding that date.

15 Every person acquires a domicile of origin at birth. That domicile continues until displaced by a domicile of choice or dependence: Peters Roger May v Pinder Lillian Gek Lian [2009] 3 SLR(R) 765 ("Peters Roger May") at [15] to [17]; WKR v WKQ and another appeal [2023] SGHC(A) 35 at [51(a)]. A domicile of choice is acquired when a person resides in a country with the intention of making it his or her home permanently or indefinitely.

16 The party alleging a change of domicile bears the burden of proving it by sufficiently clear evidence. This is particularly important where the domicile sought to be displaced is one of origin: Peters Roger May at [26]; Algemene Bank Nederland NV v Loo Choon Yow [1989] SGHC 25 at [23] and [24].

17 In assessing whether a person has elected Singapore to be his or her domicile of choice, the central question is not how firmly that person has established a life here – but whether the person intends to make this country his or her home indefinitely. A person may live and work in Singapore for many years, own property, raise a family and develop substantial social and economic connections here, yet intend eventually to settle elsewhere. Equally, a person who has only recently arrived in Singapore may acquire a domicile of choice if he or she has formed the requisite intention. The duration of residence is therefore relevant principally as evidence of intention, not as conclusive proof of it: Peters Roger May at [19], [21] and [24].

18 The person's actual intention is to be determined from the totality of the evidence. Relevant indicators include (a) the reasons for residing in Singapore, (b) the location of his or her spouse, children and family home, (c) his or her employment, business and financial arrangements, (d) property ownership, (e) immigration status, (f) children's education, (g) social connections, (h) plans for retirement, and (i) continuing ties with other countries. No one indicator is conclusive. What matters is not the number of connections with a country, but what those connections reveal about the person's intention to remain there: Peters Roger May at [24]; Wong Phui Lun Joseph v Yeoh Loon Goit [1978] SGHC 7 (“Wong Phui Lun”) at [20] to [25].

19 Reason for being in Singapore. Particular attention should be paid to the person's intention when the circumstances that brought him or her to Singapore come to an end. For example, does the person intend to remain here when (a) the employment ends, (b) the children complete their education, or (c) he or she retires? A settled intention to leave Singapore upon a clearly foreseen and reasonably anticipated contingency may be inconsistent with an intention to reside here indefinitely. In contrast, the mere possibility that unforeseen circumstances may cause the person to leave does not necessarily negate the requisite intention. The distinction is between a person who has made his or her home in Singapore but may one day leave, and one who intends to remain only until a particular circumstance comes to an end: Peters Roger May at [20] to [23].

20 Significant commitments in Singapore. Care is also needed in assessing evidence commonly associated with permanence. Acquiring property, maintaining long-term investments, and enrolling children in local schools may indicate an intention to settle. However, these arrangements may equally be explained by practical, financial or other considerations. The absence of property ownership does not necessarily establish a lack of the requisite intention. The Court should thus examine the reasons for the relevant arrangements rather than draw conclusions from their mere (non-)existence: XSX v XSY [2025] SGFC 110 (“XSX”) at [28(a)], [41] and [42].

21 Ties with another country. If a person maintains ties with another country, the Court should examine the purpose and substance of these connections: Peters Roger May at [70] to [78] and [97] to [99]. For instance, retaining citizenship, family relationships, inherited property or financial assets abroad may simply reflect a person's history and continuing obligations. On the other hand, concrete arrangements to return and settle there, particularly upon retirement, may provide stronger evidence of an intention to leave Singapore.

22 Declaration of intention. A person's declarations of intention are relevant but must be approached with care. Greater weight may be attached to contemporaneous statements and conduct that predate the matrimonial proceedings and are consistent with the person's life arrangements. On the other hand, statements made for the purpose of contested proceedings may require closer scrutiny because of the possible incentive to present a particular intention. The Court must thus assess not only what the person says he or she intends to do, but also whether his or her conduct and arrangements support that assertion: Peters Roger May at [79] to [96].

23 Ultimately, the Court must distinguish between evidence that a person has established a life in Singapore and evidence that he or she has chosen to make this country his or her home indefinitely. The former may support the latter, but they are not synonymous. The key issue is whether the evidence, viewed as a whole, sufficiently establishes an intention to remain for an unlimited period, rather than merely for as long as a particular purpose or anticipated circumstance continues. 

24 Habitual residence differs from domicile in that it does not require an intention to remain in a country permanently or indefinitely. Two features are necessary to establish habitual residence. First, the residence must have been adopted voluntarily. Second, there must be a degree of settled purpose in residing in Singapore. That purpose may include employment, education or family life. The requirement for a settled purpose may be satisfied even if the person intends to reside in Singapore for only a limited period: Lee Mei-Chih v Chang Kuo-Yuan [2012] 4 SLR 1115 ("Lee Mei-Chih") at [5] to [8]; XEW v XEV [2025] SGHCF 5 ("XEW") at [2].

25 Two points bear highlighting.

(a) Section 93(1)(b) requires the habitual residence to be "for a period of 3 years immediately preceding the commencement of the proceedings".

(b) Temporary absences from Singapore do not necessarily interrupt habitual residence. A person may remain habitually resident here while travelling abroad. Whether an absence brings habitual residence to an end depends on its duration, purpose and surrounding circumstances: see e.g., Lee Mei-Chih at [8] and [9]; XEW at [2]. In XEW, the High Court concluded that the husband’s habitual residence in Singapore had not been broken after examining the reasons for his absences and the objective evidence of his continuing connection with the country: at [7] to [9].

(a) Permanent residency confers substantial practical advantages, including freedom to work without a work pass, access to CPF and healthcare benefits, eligibility for certain public housing, and more favourable stamp duty treatment when purchasing residential property. These advantages are expressly recognised in official publications of the Singapore Economic Development Board, ⁷ Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, ⁸ Housing and Development Board, ⁹ Ministry of Health ¹⁰ and Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore. ¹¹

(a) PR status indicates that the person has obtained permission from the Immigration and Checkpoint Authority (“ICA”) to reside in Singapore on a continuing basis. It does not prove that the person has in fact resided in the country habitually. This is because a person may retain Singapore PR status while residing predominantly overseas. Section 11 of the Immigration Act 1959 provides for the issuance of Re-Entry Permits ("REPs"), which enable persons to retain their PR status while abroad. ¹² See also s 12(3)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 which expressly contemplates that a Singapore PR may not even have a place of residence in Singapore.

(i) She holds a blue Singapore identity card bearing an issue date in 2007. ¹³ This suggests that she has a connection with Singapore extending well before July 2024. Given that the Husband has contested the Court’s jurisdiction, she should provide (1) evidence to clarify where she had lived between 2007 to 2024 and (2) other evidence, if any, to prove her case that she had intended to make Singapore her home.

(ii) According to the Divorce Application, the Wife has lived in Singapore since July 2024. ¹⁴ On this basis, she had resided here for about 16 months before proceedings began. This is well short of the three years required by s 93(1)(b).