1 The appellant, Mr Tan Kai Yuan, pleaded guilty to one charge under s 65(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“RTA”) for driving without reasonable consideration. As his act caused a collision where grievous hurt was suffered by another motorist, the applicable punishment provision was s 65(3)(a) (which provides for the imposition of a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or both), read with s 65(6)(d) of the RTA (which stipulates a minimum disqualification period of five years). The District Judge below (“DJ”) sentenced the appellant to five days’ imprisonment and disqualified the appellant from holding or obtaining all classes of driving licences (“DQ Period”) for a period of five years with effect from the date of his release (Public Prosecutor v Tan Kai Yuan [2026] SGDC 36 (“GD”) at [3]).

2 The appellant appealed against the imprisonment term, submitting that a fine should be imposed. The appellant did not appeal against the DQ Period. After considering the parties’ arguments, I allowed the appeal and substituted the appellant’s sentence of five days’ imprisonment with a sentence of one day’s imprisonment. The DQ Period of five years remained undisturbed.

3 The Statement of Facts (“SOF”) to which the appellant pleaded guilty without qualification is set out in the GD at [7]–[21]. The facts are evidenced by the footages captured by the front and back dashcams of the appellant’s car, which were annexed to the SOF. ¹ I outline only the facts material to this appeal.

4 On 4 March 2025 at about 12 p.m., the appellant was driving along the 4th lane (the left-most lane) on the Ayer Rajah Expressway (“AYE”), a 4-lane road. He approached a split in the road – the 3rd and 4th lanes of the AYE led to Keppel Road while the 1st and 2nd lanes entered a flyover and led towards the Central Expressway-Seletar Expressway (“CTE-SLE”). White chevron markings separated the 2nd and 3rd lanes. ²

5 The appellant intended to drive towards the CTE-SLE but had not formed up in the correct lane. He braked abruptly such that his car almost came to a complete stop, engaged his turning indicator and filtered into the 3rd lane, with the intention of crossing the white chevron markings to enter the 2nd lane. The appellant allowed one car (according to the SOF) or two cars (according to the dashcam footage) travelling in the 3rd lane to pass him before he started filtering into the 3rd lane. ³

6 The victim was riding his motorcycle in the 4th lane behind the appellant. The victim was unable to take evasive action to avoid the appellant’s car and his motorcycle collided with the rear left portion of the appellant’s car. ⁴

7 There was no suggestion that any other factors or conditions caused or contributed to the collision. At the time of the incident, the weather was fine, the road surface was dry, traffic flow was moderate and visibility was good. There was no mechanical fault with the appellant’s vehicle. ⁵

8 The appellant stopped his car and rendered assistance to the victim, who was conveyed to Singapore General Hospital (“SGH”). He sustained multiple right hand/wrist fractures and underwent surgery, and was discharged on 6 March 2025. He was assessed to have suffered no permanent disability and was given hospitalisation leave for a period of 99 days. ⁶

9 As a result of the collision, the front headlamp portion of the victim’s motorcycle was ripped off and cracked with scratches. There were also scratches on the right side of his motorcycle. ⁷

10 It was common ground that the applicable sentencing framework for careless driving offences causing grievous hurt punishable under s 65(3)(a) of the RTA was that as set out in Chen Song v Public Prosecutor [2025] 3 SLR 509 (“Chen Song”). In sum, the framework provides as follows (see Chen Song at [134]):

(a) First, the court identifies the number of offence-specific factors under the broad categories of “harm” and “culpability”.

(b) Second, based on the number of offence-specific factors present, the court determines whether the harm caused is “lesser” or “greater” and whether the offender’s culpability is “lower”, or “higher”. “Lesser harm” is caused, and the offender’s culpability is deemed as “lower culpability”, where there is one or no harm or culpability factor respectively. “Greater harm” is caused, and the offender’s culpability is deemed as “higher culpability” where there are two or more harm or culpability factors respectively. However, this is only a general guideline that should not be applied mechanistically (Chen Song at [123]). For instance, where two or more primary harm factors apply but present themselves only to a limited degree, the court may nonetheless consider that “lesser harm” has been caused on a holistic assessment (Chen Song at [127]).

(c)  Third, the court determines the indicative sentencing band that the offence falls within and an indicative starting point sentence within that range, taking into account the primary harm factors and culpability factors identified and the secondary harm factors.

(d) Finally, the court adjusts the starting point to take into account offender-specific aggravating and mitigating factors.

11 The parties' sentencing positions were almost identical – the Prosecution sought a fine of $3,000 to $5,000, ⁸ while the appellant sought a fine of not more than $3,000. Both parties agreed that the appropriate DQ Period was five years. ⁹

12 The DJ did not agree that only a fine should be imposed. The DJ reasoned that:

(a) two primary harm factors were engaged – the nature and location of the victim’s injury and the impact of the injury. However, the harm factors presented themselves to a limited degree and thus, on a holistic assessment, there was lesser harm (GD at [63]–[70]);

(b) there were two culpability factors. First, the appellant “flouted traffic rules by changing lanes across chevron markings” (GD at [72]). Second, there was a high degree of carelessness because filtering across the 3rd lane on an expressway with moderate traffic showed a “sustained period of inattention” and the appellant was “deliberately cavalier about certain mitigable risks” (GD at [73]–[76]). The appellant’s actions in filtering sharply across the 3rd lane and in driving across the white chevron markings were separate culpability factors as neither action was the inevitable corollary of the other (GD at [77]);

(c) on a holistic assessment, lesser harm was caused and the appellant was of lower culpability. The present case was therefore situated in Band 1 of the Chen Song framework, and this was aligned with the positions of the parties; and

(d) the custodial threshold was crossed and the starting point for the sentence was about one week’s imprisonment. After factoring in the mitigating factors and a plead guilty discount (“PG discount”) of 30%, the DJ sentenced the appellant to five days’ imprisonment and a DQ Period of five years (GD at [95]).

13 The appellant contended first, that the DJ erred in finding that two harm factors were engaged because the nature and severity of the injuries and the impact of the injuries on the victim’s quality of life were limited. ¹⁰ Second, the DJ erred in his assessment of culpability by finding that there was a high degree of carelessness and that two culpability factors were made out on the appellant’s actions. ¹¹ Third, the sentence of five days’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive as the DJ erred in finding that the custodial threshold had been crossed and the DJ failed to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors. ¹² Alternatively, the appellant submitted that if the court was satisfied that the custodial threshold had been crossed, the sentence should be substituted with one day’s imprisonment.

14 The Prosecution maintained its position below that a high fine (up to the maximum of $5,000) would have been appropriate. The Prosecution took the view that the case only involved one harm factor (the impact of the injury), which was partially engaged, and one culpability factor (intention to flout traffic rules). Nonetheless, the Prosecution submitted that the threshold for appellate intervention had not been crossed because the DJ did not make any errors of law or principle, nor was the sentence manifestly excessive. ¹³ The Prosecution considered that this was a “borderline case” falling around the fringes of the custodial threshold. ¹⁴

15 It is well established that the appellate court will not ordinarily disturb the sentence imposed by a first instance court unless it is satisfied that the grounds for appellate intervention are made out. These are as set out in Public Prosecutor v UI [2008] 4 SLR(R) 500 (“UI”) at [12]:

(a) the trial judge erred with respect to the proper factual basis for sentencing;

(b) the trial judge failed to appreciate the materials placed before him;

(c) the sentence was wrong in principle; or

(d) the sentence was manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate. A manifestly inadequate or manifestly excessive sentence is “unjustly lenient or severe, as the case may be, and requires substantial alterations rather than minute corrections to remedy the injustice” (UI at [13], citing Public Prosecutor v Siew Boon Loong [2005] 1 SLR 611 at [22]).

16 It was common ground between the parties that this case fell at the lower end of Band 1 of the Chen Song framework. Indeed, that was also what the DJ found. However, the prescribed punishment for Band 1 is wide – it ranges from a fine to imprisonment of 6 months (see [10(c)] above). The main issue on appeal was whether there was any basis for appellate intervention in relation to the DJ’s assessment that the custodial threshold had been crossed.

17 I first consider the relevant harm and culpability factors.

18 I agreed with the DJ that the case should be pegged as involving lesser harm, even though the DJ may have overstated the relevant harm factors.

19  First, the DJ took into consideration the harm factor of “the nature and location of injury”. This involves consideration of (a) the nature and severity of injury; (b) the number of injuries; (c) whether surgical intervention was necessary; (d) the disposition of the victim post-surgery; and (e) the location of the injury (Chen Song at [127(a)]). The DJ noted that the victim suffered multiple right hand and wrist fractures and underwent immediate surgical intervention (GD at [63]–[64]). The appellant contended that, viewed holistically across the five indicia, the “nature and location of injury” was not made out as a harm factor because the injuries were simple and limited only to hand/wrist fractures, the number of injuries was limited and did not extend to a vulnerable part of the body, surgery was done under local anaesthetic and limited to cleaning the wound and realigning a little finger, and there was no indication that the victim had been warded in a high dependency or intensive care unit. ¹⁵

20 Second, the DJ assessed as relevant the harm factor of “the impact of injury” on the victim’s quality of life. The court is to consider relevantly (a) the duration of the stay in the hospital/rehabilitation centre; (b) the duration of any hospitalisation/medical leave; (c) the victim’s ability to carry out daily tasks and maintain livelihood; and (d) the duration of rehabilitation (Chen Song at [127(c)]). The DJ considered the fact that the victim was warded in a hospital for two days, and his hospitalisation leave was for 99 days (GD at [65]). The appellant contended that the impact of the injury on the victim’s quality of life was limited as the duration of hospital stay was just two days, there was no evidence that the victim required rehabilitation and the hospitalisation leave of 99 days did not, without more, explain the impact the injuries had on the victim’s quality of life.

21 At the outset, I observe that there may be some degree of artificiality in treating the relevant harm factors as a binary issue when they are inherently qualitative. The court in Chen Song emphasised that the foremost inquiry is to assess holistically whether the totality of the harm suffered by the victim is classified as “greater harm” or “lesser harm” (Chen Song at [123]), and that each category broadly encompasses a wide range of injuries of differing levels of severity (Chen Song at [127]). However, it remains for the court to assess whether a harm factor is engaged (Chen Song at [140]). This binary question suggests the existence of a tipping point beyond which a harm factor applies, and below which it does not. This, in my respectful view, may not be the most intuitive manner of assessing the harm factors, which are better evaluated on a continuum. In this regard, I agree with the Prosecution that in making a holistic assessment, the court should have regard to the intensity of the relevant factors, as opposed to simply determining the binary question of whether the factor is engaged and adding them mechanically. This explains the approach taken by some of the sentencing courts in finding that the harm factors were engaged but only to a limited degree, which is a scenario expressly contemplated in Chen Song at [127] (see, eg, Public Prosecutor v Lau Shiao-Li Alexis (Liu Xiaoli) [2025] SGDC 25 (“Alexis Lau”) at [31]–[34]; Public Prosecutor v Ang Choon Kang [2026] SGDC 165 at [30]), or focusing the analysis on a holistic assessment of harm without expressly considering whether each harm factor is engaged (see, eg, Public Prosecutor v Tan Bee Sen Bernard [2025] SGDC 243 at [42]).

22 In my view, the DJ, in identifying two harm factors to be engaged, may have overstated the harm, even though the DJ had apparently considered the factors to be engaged to a limited degree (GD at [69]). In particular, the DJ erred in finding that “the nature and location of injury” was engaged as a harm factor, given that the injuries were relatively limited in number and scope, were treated conservatively, and were not situated at any vulnerable part of the body. Even though the DJ stated the specific surgical procedure performed on the victim (GD at [63]–[64]), it was not apparent from the GD that the DJ had evaluated the injuries accordingly.

23 However, I agreed with the DJ that the “impact of injury” was a relevant harm factor and that it was engaged to a limited degree. The DJ considered the absence of a permanent disability (GD at [66]). Further, the DJ’s reference to the length of hospitalisation leave as a relevant proxy to measure the impact on the victim’s quality of life was justified, given that the hospitalisation leave reflected a medical opinion that significant rest and recuperation was required. However, I accepted that the weight placed on the length of hospitalisation leave ought to be circumscribed because there was no information in the SOF to properly give texture to the impact of this period on the victim, for instance, whether his quality of life was seriously impacted.

24 That said, the DJ, in my view correctly, engaged in a holistic assessment of the harm, looking beyond the notional engagement of the harm factors, and assessed the case to involve lesser harm. This assessment of lesser harm was consistent with the positions of both the appellant and the Prosecution.

25 The appellant’s principal arguments were against the DJ’s assessment of his culpability. In my view, even though the DJ properly assessed the case to holistically involve lesser culpability, the DJ ought to have found only one culpability factor to be made out.

26 First, it was not disputed that a relevant culpability factor was the appellant’s intention to flout traffic rules and regulations (see Chen Song at [131]). The appellant pointed out that based on the dashcam footage, the collision occurred when the appellant had slowed down in the 4th lane of the AYE. The appellant’s actions, in filtering across to the 3rd lane and onto the white chevron markings at which point he came to a stop, were after the collision. However, the DJ found that the appellant had “flouted traffic rules by changing lanes across chevron markings” (GD at [72], citing Chen Song at [131(b)(iv)]).

27 I did not accept the appellant’s argument that his act of filtering was not relevant to the collision. The rear dashcam footage showed that the victim was riding close to the dividing line between the 3rd and 4th lanes when he rear-ended the appellant’s vehicle. This suggested that the collision may have been caused, in part, by the appellant’s attempt to change lanes. This was further underscored by the fact that the victim’s motorcycle collided with the rear left portion of the appellant’s car.

28 However, I accepted the appellant’s submission that to the extent that the DJ had suggested that the appellant had in fact changed lanes across chevron markings, this was incorrect. ¹⁶ Instead, his conduct should more properly be construed as embarking on a course of conduct with the intention of flouting traffic rules and regulations by changing lanes across a set of chevron markings. Be that as it may, an intention to flout traffic rules and regulations would still properly constitute a culpability factor. The appellant did not contend otherwise and properly accepted at the hearing that there was at least one culpability factor in the intention to flout traffic rules.

29 Second, the DJ found that a second culpability factor was engaged as the appellant had acted with a high degree of carelessness. The DJ was satisfied that the appellant’s actions, in filtering sharply across the 3rd lane on an expressway with moderate traffic and, among other things, allowing a car travelling in the 3rd lane to pass him before filtering sharply, showed a “sustained period of inattention” and that the appellant was “deliberately cavalier about certain mitigable risks” (per Chen Song at [131(c)]) (GD at [74]).

30 The appellant disputed the DJ’s finding that he acted with a high degree of carelessness, submitting that the DJ placed undue weight on the description of his lane change as “sharp”. The appellant relied on the dashcam footage to argue that he was cautious and considerate in attempting the lane change, by first signalling and not cutting into the 3rd lane without first allowing vehicles on his right to pass. ¹⁷ His manoeuvre was not sudden or unheralded.

31 The appellant also submitted that the DJ erred in considering the two culpability factors independently when the underlying actions were inseparable and overlapping parts of the single continuous act constituting the offence. The Prosecution, quite fairly, maintained its position below that the appellant’s act of filtering was intricately connected to his intention of driving across the chevron markings.

32 In my view, the DJ ought not to have considered the appellant’s specific act in filtering into the 3rd lane as a separate culpability factor. I agreed with the appellant that his manoeuvre into the 3rd lane and his intended progression onto the chevrons were components of a single driving manoeuvre with one purpose – to enter the CTE-SLE. ¹⁸ In the circumstances, it seemed to me that the DJ might have been overly critical in dissecting the driving manoeuvre into its constituent parts, which, as the appellant correctly pointed out, may allow a court to locate multiple culpability factors on the basis of what would otherwise be a single act.

33 On a holistic assessment, I did not find that a separate culpability factor of a high degree of carelessness was made out. The appellant had signalled and kept a lookout for vehicles in the 3rd lane and allowed two cars to pass him (see [30] above). This mitigated to some degree the carelessness of the appellant’s conduct. Nonetheless, there were other aspects of the appellant’s conduct which were relevant to his culpability and which were relevant to determining the sentence against him – see [38] below.

34 The DJ was satisfied that given the lesser harm and lower culpability, the case fell within Band 1 of the Chen Song sentencing framework (GD at [82]; see [10(c)] above). Both the Prosecution and the appellant agreed with this assessment, which I also found was consistent with the evidence. The main issue was whether the custodial threshold was crossed. The DJ found that it had been as there were two harm factors and two culpability factors (GD at [83]–[84]).

35 The appellant first submitted that the DJ erred in finding that the custodial threshold was crossed as there was at most only one operative culpability factor and the harm should properly be classified as no more than lesser harm. ¹⁹ The appellant, more broadly, submitted that whatever the precise number of offence-specific factors present, the custodial threshold was not crossed on a holistic assessment of their substance and interplay. ²⁰ As noted above, the Prosecution, while agreeing that the custodial threshold had not been crossed, described this as a “borderline” case, such that a short custodial sentence was within a reasonable range of sentences that the DJ was entitled to give, and there was therefore no basis for appellate intervention.

36 I did not entirely agree with the DJ’s approach. The DJ had referred to Chen Song at [137] for the proposition that the custodial threshold would typically be crossed where there are two or more offence-specific harm and/or culpability factors present. As explained above, I did not entirely agree with the DJ in his assessment of the relevant factors. More importantly, in my view, in determining whether a custodial sentence is warranted, the court should make a holistic assessment of the harm suffered by the victim and the culpability of the offender. This is consistent with the emphasis in Chen Song at [122] that the classification of harm and culpability should proceed in totality.

37 I agreed with the Prosecution’s submission that this was a borderline case falling around the fringes of the custodial threshold. Taking a step back and assessing the circumstances holistically, I was unable to find that the DJ had erred in his conclusion that the custodial threshold had been crossed.

38 In my judgment, on top of the relevant factors identified in my analysis above, the circumstances of the incident justified some uplift to the sentence. The appellant’s actions were deliberate. He realised that he was in the wrong lane and decided to brake abruptly. While he did engage his turn signal and looked out for oncoming vehicles in the 3rd lane, there is nothing in the SOF or his mitigation plea to indicate that he had checked his rear-view mirror for vehicles behind him. He was aware that he would be violating traffic rules by crossing the white chevron markings but proceeded to do so anyway. More importantly, this manoeuvre was carried out on a moderately busy expressway where vehicles were travelling at relatively high speeds. The appellant’s actions were purely for his convenience as he could have taken a longer route to enter the CTE-SLE. In this regard, I echo the observation of Kannan Ramesh JAD in Ling Zhao Bin v Public Prosecutor [2026] 3 SLR 1383 that there is a meaningful distinction between a considered decision resulting in an accident and a decision taken on the spur of the moment (at [54(c)]) – on the appellant’s own case, the present circumstance appeared to be more in the vein of the former.

39 I also disagreed with the appellant’s submission that his conduct was no more than a manifestation of the basic elements of the careless driving offence, which the court in Chen Song cautioned against predicating a finding of a high degree of carelessness on. In Chen Song, the court explained that where an offender failed to keep a safe distance from the vehicle in front or failed to take proper care in changing lanes or executing a discretionary right turn, something more would be needed to establish greater culpability of the offender (at [132]). The basic elements of the careless driving offence in this case related to abruptly slowing down without regard for motorists behind him. The appellant’s deliberate choice to execute the manoeuvre on an expressway as described above plainly went much further.

40 The appellant submitted that a custodial sentence was excessive compared to sentences imposed in several other cases. I did not find it particularly meaningful to engage in such a comparison as the facts and circumstances in different cases are rarely similar. Nonetheless, there is nothing in the cases referred to which suggested that a custodial sentence in this case was wrong or manifestly excessive.

41 In Public Prosecutor v Johnson Tan Wee Kiat [2026] SGHC 59 (“Johnson Tan”), the respondent failed to conform to a red-light signal when turning right at a cross junction, and his vehicle collided into a motorcyclist travelling straight from the respondent’s right with the right of way. The main injury caused was a mildly displaced fracture to the second right rib, engaging the harm factor of “the nature and location of the injuries” (at [11(a)]). Tan J found at least one culpability factor, being the flouting of traffic rules, to be engaged. A second culpability factor of “a high degree of carelessness” was arguably triggered since the respondent had failed to notice that the traffic light had turned red for five seconds (Johnson Tan at [16]). However, Tan J exercised his discretion against treating the case as involving two discrete culpability factors warranting elevating to the next sentencing band because they were closely intertwined (Johnson Tan at [17]).

42 Tan J assessed the case to involve lesser harm and lower culpability and pegged the indicative starting imprisonment term at one month, finding the district judge’s starting point of 10 days’ imprisonment to be too low (Johnson Tan at [21]–[22]). After balancing the respondent’s previous compounded offence of failing to comply with a red traffic light as against his mitigating post-accident conduct, Tan J did not make any adjustments to the indicative starting imprisonment term, applied a 30% reduction for the respondent’s plea of guilt, and imposed an imprisonment term of three weeks.

43 I was satisfied that the present case could fairly be assessed as less serious than that in Johnson Tan, considering the lower degree of harm here. However, it did not appear that the respondent in Johnson Tan had deliberately sought to flout traffic rules, as the judge’s finding was that there had been a long period of inattention and that the respondent had failed to register that the traffic light had turned red (at [16]). This was in contrast to the present case, where the appellant’s conduct, properly construed, was deliberate. Even on the premise of the Prosecution’s submission that beating the red light was qualitatively a more serious infraction than an intention to cross the white chevrons, the deliberateness of the appellant’s conduct was still troubling. Further, while counsel for the appellant, Mr Abraham Vergis SC, suggested that the appellant had made a “split-second decision”, this did not detract from the fact that the appellant had consciously decided to embark on a risky course of action.

44 In Erh Zhi Huang Alvan v Public Prosecutor (this being one of the five appeals decided in Chen Song), the car in front of Erh braked and came to a stop on an expressway due to heavy traffic. Erh switched lanes to avoid the car but failed to keep a proper lookout, thus colliding with a motorcyclist. The victim suffered a permanent loss of his little finger and a right-sided clavicle fracture, and was given 58 days of hospitalisation leave (Chen Song at [165]). He was discharged the day after the accident (Public Prosecutor v Erh Zhi Huang, Alvan [2022] SGDC 251 (“Alvan Erh”) at [7]). Taking into consideration also the damage caused to the victim’s motorcycle and the potential harm arising from Erh’s abrupt lane-change on the expressway during peak hour, the court placed the harm caused at the higher end of the “low” category (Chen Song at [165]). Erh was assessed to be of low culpability (Chen Song at [166]). The court was of the view that the ten weeks’ imprisonment term imposed by the district judge below was manifestly excessive and imposed instead a fine of $4,000 (Chen Song at [169]). While the court applied the sentencing framework set out in Sue Chang v Public Prosecutor [2023] 3 SLR 440 instead of the Chen Song sentencing framework (Chen Song at [165]), the court observed that the application of the frameworks would likely result in the same or similar outcomes (Chen Song at [120]).

45 The DJ distinguished Erh’s case on the basis that, among other things, the victim in the present case required surgical intervention and was given hospitalisation leave of 99 days while in Erh’s case, it was not apparent that any surgical intervention was required for the fracture and the motorcyclist was given only 58 days of hospitalisation leave (GD at [107(b)]–[107(c)]). I disagreed with the DJ’s assessment and accepted that the harm caused in Erh’s case was comparable or even greater than that in the present case. For one, as the appellant correctly pointed out, the DJ did not appear to consider that surgery was required for the amputation of the motorcyclist’s little finger (Alvan Erh at [17]). Furthermore, the permanent loss of a finger was, in my view, of a greater significance than the injuries in the present case. There were also considerations of potential harm and the damage caused to the motorcycle germane in Erh’s case which were absent in the present case.

46 However, this did not take the appellant very far because in assessing whether the custodial threshold is met, the court is also to consider the accused’s culpability. The DJ assessed that the appellant’s culpability was higher than Erh’s, because Erh’s lane change was a reactive, split-second response to avoid colliding with the car in front which had braked and stopped due to heavy traffic. This was, in the DJ’s view, different from the appellant’s actions where he consciously chose to prioritise his own convenience over the road safety of others and in so doing, created a hazard to others (GD at [107(a)]). I agreed with the DJ. Viewed holistically, the present case was more serious than Erh’s case.

47 In Alexis Lau, the offender failed to give way to a motorcyclist at an unsignalised T-junction whilst turning right, resulting in a collision with the motorcyclist. The motorcyclist suffered a left tibia and fibula fracture for which he underwent two surgeries and received 102 days of hospitalisation leave. Two harm factors were engaged albeit to a limited degree such that the custodial threshold was not crossed (Alexis Lau at [31]–[34]). No culpability factors were engaged – there was no evidence contradicting the defence’s assertion that the offender had stopped her car before the right turn and was not travelling at a fast speed, and the offender’s line of sight could have been partially obstructed by the green barriers along the road the victim was travelling from (Alexis Lau at [35]–[37]). The district judge assessed that the case straddled between a maximum fine and a short custodial sentence under Band 1 of the Chen Song framework (Alexis Lau at [39]), but after considering the relevant mitigating factors, namely, voluntary compensation to the victim for damage to the motorcycle, an early plea of guilt and the offender’s clean driving record prior to the accident for the past 26 years, imposed a maximum fine of $5,000 and disqualification period of five years (Alexis Lau at [45]).

48 Likewise, I accepted that the harm in Alexis Lau could be said to be comparable to or more serious than that in the present case. However, for the reasons above, I assessed that the appellant was more culpable than the offender in Alexis Lau. The district judge in Alexis Lau did not identify any relevant culpability factors and, in fact, was satisfied that there were extenuating circumstances.

49 While I was satisfied the DJ did not err in his conclusion that the custodial threshold had been crossed, I was of the view that intervention was warranted with respect to the length of the custodial sentence. Having pegged the indicative starting sentence at about seven days’ imprisonment (GD at [85]), the DJ gave full weight to the appellant’s timeous plea of guilt and accorded him a 30% PG discount (GD at [93]–[94]). Additionally, the DJ asserted that he gave due weight to the appellant’s cooperation with the authorities (GD at [96]). After considering the mitigating factors and PG discount, the DJ imposed a sentence of five days’ imprisonment (GD at [95]).

50 I found the DJ’s sentence of five days’ imprisonment to be manifestly excessive.

51 First, the DJ overstated the harm and culpability factors. As explained above, only one harm factor was partially engaged, namely, “impact of injury”, and only one culpability factor was made out on the facts. The DJ also erred in assessing the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries. This was evident, for instance, in how the DJ had apparently assessed the injuries in Erh’s case to be less serious than in the present case (see [45] above). Further, the DJ placed too much weight on the appellant’s carelessness as a discrete culpability factor. I agreed with the Prosecution that this case sat at the borderline of a fine and a custodial sentence. This would justify a lower indicative starting sentence than the seven days’ imprisonment as ascertained by the DJ.

52 Second, the DJ erred in failing to accord sufficient weight to the mitigating factors. The fact that the appellant’s last driving-related antecedent was in October 2013 was not a mitigating factor, as the lack of recent antecedents is at best merely a neutral factor (see Habeeb Zaleena d/o Pallivilakam Kader Habeeb Mohamed v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGHC 99 at [56]). However, I accepted that the appellant had done all he was reasonably expected to do after the accident: he stopped his car promptly, rendered assistance to the victim, and cooperated with the authorities, as acknowledged by the Prosecution in its submissions. ²¹

53 As the Court of Appeal held in Iskandar bin Jinan v Public Prosecutor [2024] 2 SLR 673 at [75], the PG discount is to be accorded in a separate step of the sentencing framework rather than in conjunction with the other offender-specific mitigating factors. In the present case, the DJ had come to the indicative starting sentence of seven days’ imprisonment after an assessment of the harm caused and the appellant’s culpability (GD at [84]). According to the DJ, the reduction from this starting point to the eventual sentence of five days’ imprisonment came after taking into account the mitigating factors and the PG discount of 30% (GD at [94]). However, the PG discount of 30%, in and of itself, accounted for the reduction of two days. In the circumstances, it was not evident that the DJ had accorded sufficient or indeed any weight to the mitigating factors.

54 Taking into consideration all the circumstances above and the relevant mitigating circumstances, I assessed that a custodial sentence of one day’s imprisonment would be appropriate.

55 For the above reasons, I allowed the appeal and substituted the appellant’s sentence of five days’ imprisonment with a sentence of one day’s imprisonment. The DQ Period of five years was to stand.