1 In HC/OA 616/2025 (“OC 616”), Landscape Engineering Pte Ltd (“Landscape”) applied under s 73C of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (“SCJA”) for an extended civil restraint order (“ECRO”) against Dot Safety Solutions Pte Ltd (“Dot”) and Mr Kumarandy Alaguraj (“Mr Alaguraj”). The latter is the sole shareholder and director of Dot. I granted the ECRO against Dot. These are my grounds of decision.

2 Landscape leased a property (the “Premises”) to Dot from 2022 to 2023. Landscape brought DC/OC 1760/2023 (“OC 1760”), claiming that Dot refused to pay rent for March 2023 to June 2023 and failed to deliver up possession of the Premises on expiry of the lease. ¹

3 Landscape obtained summary judgment in its favour (“Summary Judgment”). The terms of the judgment include the following: (a) Dot shall deliver possession of the Premises; (b) Dot shall pay Landscape $17,080 in unpaid rent from 1 March 2023 to 30 June 2023; (c) Dot shall pay Landscape double rent of $8,640 per month from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024 and double rent of $8,640 per month from 1 July 2024 to 17 July 2024. ²

4 After Landscape obtained the Summary Judgment, Dot commenced a series of appeals and applications relating to OC 1760. This led Landscape to its application in OA 616 for a ECRO against both Dot and Mr Alaguraj.

5 Section 73C(1) SCJA provides:

6 Under this provision, two elements must be established before the court may grant an ECRO:

(a) that the respondent “has persistently commenced actions or made applications”; and

(b) such actions or applications were “totally without merit”.

7 I considered first whether the applications relied on by Landscape were “totally without merit”.

8 In Joseph Clement Louis Arokaisamy v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2020] 5 SLR 869 (“Arokaisamy”), applications were considered to be “totally without merit” where the applications were barred by res judicata, wholly misconceived, time-barred, or based on statutory provisions that are plainly inapplicable: at [10]-[32]. In The National University of Singapore v Ten Leu Jiun Jeanne-Marie [2023] SGHC 191 (“Jeanne-Marie”), the court considered that this threshold can also be satisfied where the court hearing the prior action or application so considered the matter to be “totally without merit”. This could be expressed in its dicta or apparent from its reasoning and decision: at [57]. In Loke Wei Sue v Paul Jeyasingham Edwards [2024] SGHC 45, the court held that the approach in Arokaisamy and Jeanne-Marie is consistent with the manner in which our courts have exercised its inherent power to grant civil restraint orders prior to the enactment of s 73C of the SCJA: at [39].

9 Landscape initially submitted that Dot made eight applications which were “totally without merit”.

10 The series of eight applications began with Dot bringing DC/RA 39/2024 (“RA 39”). This was an appeal against the Summary Judgment. In dismissing the appeal in RA 39, the District Judge held that the defendant’s defence was based on bare assertions which were not credible and were contradicted by contemporaneous evidence. ³ However, the District Judge disagreed with one aspect of the Deputy Registrar’s decision, in relation to double rent. The District Judge ordered that double rent of $8,640 commence from 7 October 2023 onwards, instead of 1 July 2023 as ordered in the court below. ⁴ Given that the District Judge varied the Deputy Registrar’s decision in relation to double rent, in my view, it cannot be said that RA 39 was “totally without merit”.

11 Dot then filed DC/SUM 1375/2024 (“SUM 1375”). This was a summons to stay enforcement pending appeal against the Summary Judgment. Leave to withdraw was granted by the Deputy Registrar on 23 August 2024, as this was a duplicate summons with DC/SUM 1387/2024 (“SUM 1387”). At the hearing, Landscape took the position that as this was withdrawn, it would not rely on it for the purposes of s 73C of the SCJA.

12 SUM 1387 was dismissed. The Deputy Registrar noted:

13 I was of the view that SUM 1387 was “totally without merit”. In an application for stay of enforcement, it is for the defendant seeking the stay to show that there are special circumstances justifying the stay. The defendant did not provide any justification relating to special circumstances. Instead, what was relied on, was an undesired outcome that flowed from the judgment.

14 Dot next brought DC/SUM 2018/2024 (“SUM 2018”) to compel mediation. It would be helpful to set out more fully the views of the Deputy Registrar in dismissing SUM 2018:

15 There was nothing to mediate as Summary Judgment had already been granted against Dot. I agreed with the assessment set out above and found that SUM 2018 was “totally without merit”.

16 Dot then brought RA 61/2024 (“RA 61”), which is an appeal against the dismissal of SUM 2018 (to compel mediation). The District Judge held in his grounds:

17 I agreed with the assessment of the District Judge as set out above and found that RA 61 was “totally without merit”. Notably, the District Judge also observed that he agreed with the Deputy Registrar hearing SUM 2018 that Dot appeared “highly litigious and prone to bringing unmeritorious applications”.

18 Dot next brought DC/SUM 587/2025 (“SUM 587”), to restore SUM 1387, which was the earlier summons to stay enforcement pending appeal against the summary judgment. In dismissing SUM 587, the Deputy Registrar held:

19 I agreed with the assessment of the Deputy Registrar. SUM 587 was wholly misconceived on multiple grounds. I was satisfied that it was “totally without merit”.

20 Dot next filed DC/SUM 610/2025 (“SUM 610”), for an extension of time to appeal the dismissal of SUM 1387. In dismissing SUM 610, the District Judge observed that it had been almost ten months since the dismissal of the stay application. The District Judge did not see any good reason for the long delay in filing the application. This is particularly pertinent as not only had RA 39 been heard and dismissed, but enforcement proceedings had also taken place. In addition, the District Judge found that there was absolutely no basis for any stay of enforcement proceedings and that there was “thus plainly no merit in an appeal against the dismissal of stay application and any appeal is doomed to fail”. ⁹

21 I agreed with the assessment of the District Judge and found that SUM 610 was “totally without merit”.

22 Dot next filed RA 25/2025 (“RA 25”) on 9 May 2025, to appeal the dismissal of SUM 587. This has been stayed pending determination of OA 616. As this has not been heard, I did not consider if this was “totally without merit”.

23 I next examined if Dot “persistently commenced actions or made applications” which were totally without merit.

24 The court in Arokaisamy found the four unmeritorious proceedings therein to have satisfied this statutory requirement, while the court in Jeanne-Marie found the five unmeritorious proceedings therein sufficient in meeting this requirement.

25 From the above analysis, Dot made five such unmeritorious applications, namely SUM 1387, SUM 2018, RA 61, SUM 587 and SUM 610, in relation to its dissatisfaction with the Summary Judgment in OC 1760. I found that in so doing, Dot “persistently commenced actions or made applications” which were “totally without merit”, for the purposes of s 73C of the SCJA.

26 I therefore granted Prayer 1 of OA 616. I ordered an ECRO against Dot as per s 73C(2) of the SCJA, in relation to OC 1760. I agreed with Landscape that this should be for a period of two years. Pursuant to the ECRO, Dot is restrained from commencing any action or making any application, in any court or subordinate court, concerning any matter involving, relating to, touching upon or leading to OC 1760, or any enforcement proceedings arising therefrom, without the permission of this court, for a period of two years.

27 Landscape initially also sought an ECRO on the same terms against Mr Alaguraj, who is the sole shareholder and sole director of Dot. This was withdrawn at the hearing. I note in any event, that Mr Alaguraj had merely obtained the leave of court to represent Dot. Mr Alaguraj himself has not made any applications in his personal capacity in relation to the Summary Judgment or the OC 1760 related applications. Nor did Landscape set out how he might have done so. It was not clear what the basis for an ECRO against Mr Alaguraj would have been, even if Landscape had proceeded on Prayer 2.

28 Landscape initially also prayed for all ongoing proceedings brought by Dot or Mr Alaguraj in OC 1760 and all related enforcement proceedings to be stayed and/or discontinued (“Prayer 3”). This was withdrawn at the hearing.

29 Landscape also prayed that Mr Alaguraj be personally liable to pay Landscape the costs awarded against Dot in OC 1760 and its related applications (“Prayer 4”).​

30 Order 2 rule 13(2) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”) states that “The Court which heard a matter must fix the costs of the matter, unless the Court thinks fit to direct an assessment of the costs”. This is also reiterated under O 21 r 2(3) of the ROC 2021. There are two prescribed situations in ROC 2021 where the General Division may decide on costs orders in the District Court: (a) Order 21 rule 2(7) of the ROC 2021, which permits an appellate court to decide on costs in a lower court on appeal, and (b) Order 21 rule 2(8) of the ROC 2021, which permits the General Division to decide on costs of the proceedings before the proceedings were transferred from the District Court to the General Division. The present case does not fall under either of the prescribed situations.

31 When these provisions were brought to the attention of counsel for Landscape, he accepted that the appropriate forum to pursue Prayer 4 was in the State Courts.

32 In view of the above, I made no order on Prayer 4 and left it open for Landscape to pursue this at the appropriate forum.

33 In conclusion, I granted Prayer 1 but made no orders on Prayers 2 – 4 of OA 616.

34 Landscape sought costs for OA 616 against both Dot and Mr Alaguraj. I did not consider it appropriate to make a personal costs order against Mr Alaguraj for the following reasons: (a) Dot was the defendant in OA 616. It was not the party bringing the action against Landscape; (b) Landscape had liberty to pursue its claim for personal costs against Mr Alaguraj for the earlier applications in the State Courts, and would have to establish its claim for personal costs there; (c) Mr Alaguraj was acting in OA 616 as the company representative; and (d) Landscape withdrew its claim in OA 616 against Mr Alaguraj. As noted above at [27], it is doubtful that Landscape would have succeeded even if it proceeded against him. I awarded costs against Dot, in the sum of $8,000 all-in.